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ABSTRACT

The right to use force in self-defence is recognised by law. The idea of self-defence in
criminal law history can be traced back to medieval England’s daily life and ‘the peace’
that the king was trying to establish as his contribution to the good of English society
as a whole. The Crown enacted several statutes during the medieval period to ensure
that those responsible for homicides were convicted, but would occasionally pardon
offenders when the jury qualified their guilty decisions with self-defence explanations.
But because the king did not always grant a pardon, juries developed a reputation for
handing down not guilty verdicts when the jury considered that alleged offenders
should be exonerated on the grounds of self-defence. The king’s statutes about
homicide were passed in an effort to control juries. Those statutes are part of the story
of how juries became independent triers of fact, how the role of public prosecutor was
developed and how juries asserted their independence against executive overreach
and criminal laws they considered draconian. That story assists understanding of how
self-defence laws achieved their current complexity. In particular, that story explains
the long history of jury concern about the line between murder, manslaughter and
acquittal in self-defence cases.
The thesis also explains how self-defence law was developed in Australia during the
20th century and how the parliaments of the Australian states and territories responded
to the continuing uncertainty caused by diversity in High Court and Privy Council
opinion in homicide cases involving self-defence claims. It also analyses the
effectiveness of the self-defence provisions in ss 418 and 421 of the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) which were passed to resolve the problems that arose because of the diversity
in High Court and Privy Council legal opinion. This analysis shows that the New South
Wales statutory provisions have not improved clarity. Rather, they have compounded
the complexity and made it nearly impossible for trial judges to give jury directions that
adequately explain the relevant self-defence law in homicide cases.
The purpose of this thesis is to formulate and recommend a simple self-defence test
that lay jurors in New South Wales can understand and apply in all self-defence cases,
including cases that involve homicide. The intent is to make New South Wales selfdefence law simple enough that jurors can understand it without judicial explanation.

viii

The thesis also recommends appropriate general directions that a trial judge could
give any jury in a self-defence case if the recommended changes were implemented.
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1

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The defence of self-defence is a fact of everyday life. In October 1959 Martin Luther
King, Jr wrote that ‘[t]he principle of self-defense, even involving weapons
and bloodshed, has never been condemned, even by Gandhi.’ 1 As the
Australian High Court Justice Sir William Deane put it in Zecevic:
The defence of self-defence is embedded deeply in ordinary standards of what is fair
and just. It sounds as readily in the voice of the school child who protests that he or
she was only defending himself or herself from the attack of another child as it does in
that of the sovereign state which claims that it was but protecting its citizens or its
territory against the aggression of another state.2

The idea of self-defence is simple. But expressing that idea in law has always been
challenging because the violence involved is unacceptable unless self-defensive
intent is proven, and that proof relies on access to the inviolable precincts of the human
mind. The practical challenge for a lay jury is to determine the accused’s intent without
access to her mind. Was she just defending herself, or did she do more than was

Martin Luther King Jr., ‘The Social Organization of Nonviolence” (October 1959) Libertarian
299, 302 citing what Gandhi said in his essay “The Doctrine of the Sword” of 11 August 1920.
Gandhi said:
1

I do believe that where is only a choice between cowardice and violence I would advise violence
… I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should
in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless victim to her own dishonour.

Published in Clayborne Carson et al (eds), The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr. Volume V:
Threshold of a New Decade, January 1959-December 1960 (University of California Press at
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2005).
2

Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (VIC) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 675 (Deane J)
(‘Zecevic’). This quote illustrates the psychological insight of Justice Deane and His Honour’s
call for the jury to be directed in uncomplicated everyday language. An analysis of the
psychological aspect of self-defence is beyond the scope of this thesis but see a brief
discussion under the heading ‘The Psychology of Self-Defence’ in part one of the Appendix to
this thesis.

2

necessary? And if she did more than was necessary to defend herself, does the need
for some self-defence mitigate her excessive violence in any way?

Because juries have always insisted that self-defence does mitigate violence against
an aggressor, legislatures and judges have been gradually forced to accommodate
that democratic view of self-defence in law with acquittal, and much more recently,
with a manslaughter conviction option in the alternative. But the legislative and judicial
expressions of those options in New South Wales have always been convoluted. It is
the purpose of the thesis to formulate and recommend a simple expression of the law
of self-defence in New South Wales that lay jurors can understand and apply without
much judicial explanation. The focus is on homicide cases, though the final formulation
is intended to express the law of self-defence in other crimes where self-defence is
raised in justification.

1.1 Research Question
Because the law related to self-defence in homicide cases in New South Wales
became very contested during the 20th century for reasons that are explained within
the thesis, the research questions that this thesis will answer are:
1. Is it possible to define self-defence within the existing Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
so simply that no reasonable jury could misunderstand it; and
2. If so, how should self-defence be defined?
Supporting questions that will assist in responding to those primary questions and
which are answered in this thesis are:
3. Did English common law always recognise that self-defensive action by a
person accused of homicide mitigated that action?

4. If not, how and when did self-defence come to be recognised as a defence that
mitigated the severity of a finding of homicide against a person accused of
homicide?
5. What part did the English jury play in the development of a law of self-defence
in English common law?
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6. What part did the High Court of Australia and the Privy Council in England play
in the development of a law of self-defence in Australian common law?
7. How have the parliaments of the Australian states and territories responded to
the uncertainties in Australian self-defence law?
8. Have legislative amendments in New South Wales since Zecevic improved
clarity or have they compounded complexity?
9. Does a simple self-defence test matter?, and
10. If so, what are the requirements of a self-defence test so simple that a jury
cannot misunderstand it?
11. How can such a simple test be formulated?
12. How should self-defence law in New South Wales be reformed?

1.2 Research methodology
To answer the research questions, this thesis takes a qualitative approach and uses
‘doctrinal’3 research and ‘black-letter’ legal methodology.4 However, because this

3

Terry Hutchinson offered an explanation as what doctrinal research in reforming the law
might involve. She stated, ‘[t]he essential features of doctrinal scholarship involve ‘a critical
conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and case law to reveal a statement of the law
relevant to the matter under investigation’.
Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming
the Law’ (2015) 3 Erasmus Law Review 129, 131.
4

Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan has offered one explanation of the term back letter, they
stated:
The term ‘black letter’ refers to research about the law included in legislation and case law. The
term originated from the name of the Gothic type which continued to be used for law texts. It is
defined in Bryan A Gardner (ed), Blacks Law Dictionary (Westlaw International, 9th ed, 2009)
as: ‘One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled.’ In addition, the
definition notes: ‘The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very
bold and black’.

Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal
Research’ (2012) 17 (No1) Deakin Law Review 83, 94 n 42.
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thesis includes law reform recommendations, it may not be categorised as ‘pure’
doctrinal research.5 As Terry Hutchinson has emphasised:
Pure doctrinal research identifies and analyses the current law. Reform-oriented
research recommends change. Most ‘good’ quality doctrinal research goes well
beyond description, analysis, and critique, and invariably suggests ways the law could
be amended.6

Thus, no single research methodology is used to answer the research questions.7
Because this thesis uses a number of different methodologies, which sometimes
overlap, I will now explain the methodological approach.
1.2.1 Methodology of legal history
I have used legal history as a lens to untangle problems rooted in the past and to
examine how English criminal law was reformed in the past.8 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr., is well known for teaching that a sound understanding of the legal history of any

5

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore in detail all the different methodologies that
can be used in legal research. It suffices not to forget what Justice Felix Frankfurter said. He
said:
What is research? … There is nothing technical about the meaning of research, and there is
nothing new except the currency of the term. Maitland and Ames and Holmes did not talk about
research nor did they deem themselves researchers. But eliminate their contributions from the
history of modern jurisprudence, and you take away its greatest glories, the most powerful
influences in the promotion of the scientific temper in law … What is research? It is not a
method, it is not an object, it is a behavior.

Felix Frankfurter, 'The Conditions For, and the Aims and Methods of, Legal Research' (1930)
15 Iowa. L. Rev. 129, 130; Felix Frankfurter, Karl N Llewellyn & Edson R Sunderland,
‘Conditions for and the Aims and Methods of Legal Research’ (1930) 6 (No 11) Am. L. Sch.
Rev. 663, 663-4.
6

Hutchinson (n 3) 132 (emphasis in original).

7

Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the
Conduct of Legal Research (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007) 31.
8

Dirk Heirbaut stated:
There is no ‘methodological king’s road’ for research in the field of legal history … The choices
one makes depend of one’s personal interests and training, the relevant source material and
so on.

Dirk Heirbaut (UGent), ‘Exploring the law in medieval minds: the duty of the legal historian to
write books of non-written law’ in Anthony Mason and Chantal Stebbings (ed), Making Legal
History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge University Press, 2012) ch 3, 118
(citations omitted).
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field of law is an essential foundation before any reform is recommended. On one
occasion he said, ‘[t]he history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge
of what the law is.’9 More famously he observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was so laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was so laid
down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.10

Justice Kirby explained the significance of “the legal history of England” as follows:
In the High Court of Australia, we have had our own debates concerning the extent to
which in understanding contemporary Australian legislation, it is useful to pay close
attention to the legal history of England that preceded our home grown enactments.11

Justice Kirby also observed that ‘[a] knowledge of legal history is basic to a full
understanding of the system and a capacity to influence its development in a socially
desirable way.’12 He then added:
It remains true … that a failure to know one's history inevitably leads to a repetition of
its errors … History is a vital ingredient for the legal context, whether the law in question
is expressed in the Constitution, in statutory texts or in the decisions of the judges.13

Justice Gummow also significantly observed, ‘unless one knows how the law came to
be in its present state, how can one set about with any proper assurance deciding

9

Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (London: MacMillan & Co., 1882) 37.

10

Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of Law (Bedford, Massachusetts, Applewood Books,
1897), 21.
11

Michael Kirby, 'Teaching Legal History in Australia - Decline & Fall' (2009) 13 Legal. Hist. 1,
7, 14.
12

Ibid 7 (citations omitted). See also M H Hoeflich, 'A Renaissance in Legal History' (1984)
1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 507, 507.
Kirby, 'Teaching Legal History in Australia’ (n 11) 17 (citations omitted). Hoeflich stated,
‘when one looks at the problems our legal system faces today, one sees clearly that many of
these are issues that have arisen before or that have their roots in the past’. Hoeflich (n 12)
507.
13
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what it ought to be?'14 The High Court recognised in its decisions, “the impact and
power of legal history” in deciding court cases. Justice Kirby explained:
If the reader doubts the power of legal history in the decisions of the High Court of
Australia, he or she should open the pages of the Commonwealth Law Reports, There,
in every branch of the law, will be found an exploration of the history of the applicable
legislation and common law doctrine which went before the case in hand … It is
impossible to consider the development and extension of common law doctrine in any
case without a full appreciation of what that doctrine is, why it exists, where it came
from and how other jurisdictions have applied and developed it.15

Karl Llewellyn has argued, ‘[t]he argument is simply that no judgment of what Ought
to be done in the future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without
knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now doing.’16 In a similar
vein, Paul Vinogradoff stated:
[W]e may use the effective method of going backward from the present as well as
coming forward from the past. The first requisite to an intelligent study of legal history
is a thorough knowledge of modern law. It is desirable to know the end before we start
searching for the beginning.17

While I have used history as a lens for understanding where the current common law
and statutes that deal with self-defence in homicide came from, I have also used
doctrinal case methodology to advance the thesis project.

W. M. C. Gummow, ‘Comment: Legal Education’ (1988) 11 (No 3) Sydney Law Review 439,
440.
14

Kirby, 'Teaching Legal History in Australia’ (n 11) 26 (emphasis in original), referring to
Commercial Bank of Australia v Armadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Muschinski v Dodds (1985)
160 CLR 583; Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221; Waltons Stores
(Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece
Bros (1988) 165 CLR 107; Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1; Wik Peoples v State
of Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1.
15

16

Karl N Llewellyn, 'Some Realism About Realism--Responding to Dean Pound' (1931) 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1236-7 (emphasis in original).
17

Paul Vinogradoff, 'Meaning of Legal History' (1922) 22 Colum. L. Rev. 693,700-701.
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1.2.2 Methodology of case law
My primary objective in the thesis has been to identify those cases that played a role
in the development and the interpretation of Australia’s unique common law of selfdefence, and statutory self-defence. The study of those cases is essential ‘to uncover
the fundamental rules and principles of law’.18 That study has recognised that the law
of a country ‘sits within a culture. Law both drives and is influenced by the culture of
the [relevant] country.’19 Karl Llewellyn says that the primary methodological questions
for all legal research are, ‘what difference does statute, or rule, or court-decision,
make? … what does law do, to people, or for people? … what ought law to do to
people, or for them?’.20 Justice Richard Posner has made the methodological point
that case law is about real people and real problems and not about hypothetical
scenarios or imagination and invention.21
There is another reason why I focused upon the analysis of court opinion in real time.
That is, ‘[t]he opinion [of the courts that decide cases] may even contain language that
suggests the rule's importance and the necessity for applying it in future cases’.22 In
some cases there is language that suggests why the study of those cases in their
Russell L. Weaver, ‘Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method’ (1991) 36 Vill. L. Rev.
517, 528.
18

19

Edward J Eberle, 'The Methodology of Comparative Law' (2011) 16 Roger Williams U. L.
Rev. 51, 52.
Llewellyn (n 16) 1222-3 (emphasis in original). He later stated, ‘"Law" without effect
approaches zero in its meaning. To be ignorant of its effect is to be ignorant of its meaning’:
at 1249 (emphasis in original).
20

21

Justice Richard Posner has written the following powerful argument:
Although the writers we value have often put law into their writings, it does not follow that those
writings are about law in any interesting way that a lawyer might be able to elucidate. If I want
to know about the system of chancery in nineteenth-century England I do not go to Bleak
House. If I want to learn about fee entails I do not go to Felix Holt. There are better places to
learn about law than novels-except perhaps to learn about how laymen react to law and
lawyers. Obviously this is not true in cultures where the only information about law is found in
what we call literature, though contemporaries thought of it as history … But in a culture that
has nonliterary records, those records generally provide more, and more accurate, information
about the legal system than does literature.

Richard A Posner, 'Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued' (1986) 72 Va. L. Rev.
1351,1356-7 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
22

Weaver (n 18) 553 (citations omitted).
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historical context was ‘of considerable importance’ as Ellinger and Keith have
emphasised:
The historical background of a case is of considerable importance as it can shed light
on the true grounds of, and on the policy related to, the decision. Occasionally, that
background may also suggest good reasons for distinguishing the case or for treating
it as obsolete or as obscure.23

But common law is no longer all there is to Australian law. While the common law still
interacts with statute law and exerts influence on its development, when statutes are
passed, they often trump the pre-existing common law doctrines and so the statutes
merit their own separate methodological consideration. For the most part, the
methodology that lawyers use to study statutes is called statutory interpretation.
1.2.3 Methodology for studying statutes/legislation
A necessary feature of doctrinal research is that it involves an analysis of all relevant
legislation alongside case law ‘to reveal a[ll] … the law relevant to the matter under
investigation’.24 I have therefore compared the common law of self-defence with the
statutes that have followed, and how they have been interpreted by judges to enable
the more detailed analysis that I then undertook of the New South Wales statutory selfdefence provisions. I began with research that looked back to the development of the
law in the 12th century when English criminal law jury trial was forming. To enable
modern readers to understand how the difficult line between murder, manslaughter,
self-defence, limited guilt and no guilt has developed, and how the different degrees
of homicide were developed, I have explained that the Crown enacted several statutes
between the 14th and the 16th centuries. Those statutes were passed not only to
maintain the king’s peace, but also to accommodate jury decisions intended to save
the lives of people who would have been executed for homicide despite claims of selfdefence. I researched the Statutes of the Realm to identify and understand how those
statutes came to be, and I also undertook a brief study of statutory self-defence
provisions which have been passed in the various states and territories of Australia. I

E. P. Ellinger and K. J. Keith, ‘Legal Research: Techniques and Ideas’ (1999) 30 Victoria
University of Wellington Law Review 459, 464.
23

24

Hutchinson (n 3) 130 (citations omitted).
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did that research to identify the modern Australian tests for self-defence so that I could
analyse and assess the utility of the self-defence legislation that has been enacted in
New South Wales.
1.2.4 Methodology of historical background of statutory law
The study of the historical background of statutory law ‘is just as important in the
comprehension of statutory law as it is in the study of case law’.25 Ellinger and Keith
have explained:
There are two reasons for the importance of the historical background of statutory law.
First, very few pieces of legislation are original in the sense of being pure innovations
of a skilled draftsman. In the majority of cases he consults and adapts earlier statutes
or makes use of principles laid down or proposed in decided cases. On the Continent,
the draftsmen may, even, resort to suggestions made in treatises of professors of law.
Secondly, laws are not made in a vacuum. They are passed in order to meet some
needs of society. While they may not always reflect the true wishes of the people, or
even of the ruling group, they reflect, nevertheless, the historical and political spirit of
the day.26

This study recognised some of the ‘very well know techniques’27 that reveal why
statutes evolved as they did. The relevant materials include committee reports,
marginal notes, explanatory notes to a Bill, and second reading speeches. The
importance of this methodology alongside other methodologies such as caselaw
methodology and academic or scholarly writing methodology, is to identify the reason
behind the enactment of a statute, to highlight if mistakes were made in that enactment
process, and to shed some light on aspects of the statutory law which may not have
appropriately responded to all the contested issues.28

25

Ellinger and Keith (n 23) 466.

Ibid 466 (citations omitted). Ellinger and Keith later added, ‘[w]e believe that the study of
statutory law from an historical point of view is a fruitful mode of research not only when applied
in the more traditional Common Law and commercial law fields but also in public law subjects’:
at 467.
26

27

Ibid 468.

28

Ibid 469.
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1.2.5 The use of academic and extrajudicial commentary
I used academic commentary and extrajudicial publications of judges, alongside the
accounts of renowned Australian and English legal historians or scholars, to more
objectively review and understand the significance of statutes, case law or principles
of law. Philip Langbroek and his co-writers have explained the methodological
contribution that such commentary makes to objective legal analysis. They stated:
Academic comments on case law are a point of reference … both explaining what a
judgment does not explicitly say and commenting on the choices made by the courts,
for example through comparing the judgment and its reasoning with earlier decisions
in case law and scholarly debate.29

Justice Gummow also acknowledged the contribution of academic commentary. He
stated:
The High Court of Australia … has for many years (certainly since the appointment of
Sir Owen Dixon in 1929) paid close regard to academic writings and has acknowledged
its indebtedness in this regard … Academic writing tends to look beyond the parochial
and now has an even more important role to play in assisting Australian courts.30

I also note that Heydon J said a lot about the value of academic treatises in his
dissenting judgment in Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (‘Stoddart’).31 The
plurality led by Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) in that case, was not so positive.32
1.2.6 Methodology of Law Reform Commissions’ reports
This thesis used and referred to some law reform commissions’ reports (the
commissions’ reports). Australian governments rely on their law reform bodies for law
reform advice.33 Law reform commissions contribute to law reform because one of
Philip Langbroek et al, ‘Methodology of Legal Research: Challenges and Opportunities’
(2017) 13 (No 3) Utrecht Law Review 1, 1.
29

30

Gummow (n 14) 443 (citations omitted).

See Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554 (‘Stoddart’), 571-620
[43] – [170] (Heydon J dissenting).
31

32

See Stoddart (n 31) (French CJ and Gummow J) 562- 571 [1]-[42], 620-637 [171]-[234]
(Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ).
Justice Kirby explained how and when the ‘"golden age" of law reform in Australia’ began in
Australia. He said:
33
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their functions is to ‘undertake work that lays a foundation for new laws to be
enacted’.34 Justice Kirby has emphasised the significance of the commissions’ reports.
He stated:
It is beyond doubt that courts and academic institutions are increasingly turning to law
reform reports as a significant, intensive and accurate source of legal authority,
principle and policy. In this way, even if unimplemented by the Parliament, a law reform
report can influence the development of the law by the courts, and also by officials and
other agencies. In twenty years as an appellate judge, I have noticed a distinct change
of attitude amongst the Australian judiciary concerning the citation and use of law

In Australia, systematic law reform began in the nineteenth century in a rather modest way …
But it was the establishment of the Law Commissions, and especially the English Commission
under Lord Scarman, that triggered the move for substantial institutional bodies in Australia,
beginning with the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in 1966.

Michael Kirby, ‘Are we there yet?’ in Brian Opeskin and David Weisbrot (ed) The Promise of
Law Reform (The Federation Press, 28 November 2005) ch 30, 3 (citations omitted).
It is to be observed that the idea of governments’ reliance on law reform commissions to reform
the law has existed since the sixth century. Alan Cameron produced the following quotes:
[In 528 at] Justinian’s instigation, John [the Cappadocian] set up a ten-man commission to sort
through the entire corpus of Roman law. The Roman legal system was one of Rome’s greatest
civilisational achievements, but by the sixth century, the code had grown into a gigantic hodgepodge of conflicting and out-of-date laws that hobbled the administration of justice, which in
turn undermined the authority of the state. ‘… the law [we have found] to be so confused that it
is extended to an infinite length and is not within the grasp of human capacity.’
The commission got to work, discarding contradictory and redundant laws, reassembling what
was left into a more coherent form, and introducing new ones as needed to supersede the
confusion.
…
The commission delivered its draft of the Codex of Justinian on 8 April 529, the first
comprehensive and coherent body of Roman law in the empire’s history. It had been completed
in just thirteen months, an astonishingly short period. Justinian crowed as he announced its
publication: ‘Those things which seemed to many former emperors to require correction, but
which none of them ventured to carry into effect, we have decided to accomplish at the present
time, with the assistance of almighty God.’
Alan Cameron, ‘Law Reform in the 21st Century’ (2017) 17 Macquarie Law Journal 1, 3 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).

Marcus Smith, ‘The Contribution of the Senate to Criminal Law Reform’ (2018) 42 Crim. L.
J. 51, 51.
34
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reform reports … partly it is the result of a recognition of the high standard of excellence
in such reports.35

Law reform commissions contribute to law reform because one of their functions is to
‘undertake work that lays a foundation for new laws to be enacted’.36 For example, in
2013 after the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) completed a
comprehensive review of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW), the State of New South Wales
‘implemented many of the NSWLRC’s recommendations’37 when they reformed that
Act. ‘Community participation not only provides “responses and feedback”, it also
promotes “a sense of public “ownership” over the process of law reform.’38 However,
occasionally, New South Wales legislatures have decided not to seek “community
participation” and the “input” of the NSWLRC. One of those occasions was related to
the Abortion Law Reform Act 2019 (NSW). Walsh and Legge explained,39 ‘the
Reproductive Health Care Reform Bill 2017 (NSW) was introduced into the Legislative
Assembly, but without the benefit of community consultation or input from its Law
Reform Commission’.40 Justice Kirby described the drawbacks in not seeking
community consultation in a democratic society. He stated:

35

Kirby (n 33) ch 30, 13 (citations omitted). For High Court cases that referred to, or cited, law
reform reports, see, eg, Peniamina v The Queen (2020) 95 ALJR 85, 91 [14] (Bell, Gageler
and Gordon JJ), 104 [99] (Keane and Edelman JJ dissenting); New South Wales v Robinson
(2019) 266 CLR 619, 643-4 [40]-[41] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ dissenting), 666 [96]
(Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ); IL v The Queen (2017) 262 CLR 268, 293 [60] (Bell
and Nettle JJ), 309 [96] (Gageler J dissenting), 320 [131], 329-330 [165]-[166] (Gordon J
dissenting); IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300, 308 [25], 319 [72] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell
and Keane JJ), 326 [97] (Gageler J), 337-9 [141]-[143], 345 [146] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).
36

Smith (n 34) 51.

Lorana Bartels et al, ‘Bail, Risk and Law Reform: A Review of Bail Legislation across
Australia’ (2018) 42 Crim. L. J. 91, 96-97.
37

38

Hutchinson (n 3) 136 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Anna Walsh and Tiana Legge, ‘Abortion Decriminalisation in New South Wales: An Analysis
of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2019 (NSW)’ (2019) 27 Journal of Law and Medicine 325.
39

Walsh and Legge (n 39) 326. The name change occurred because ‘[[o]ne of the
amendments to the bill was to change the name of the Act to the Abortion Law Reform Act’:
at 626 n 6. On the other hand, and contrary to the approach that the New South Wales
Government has taken, two governments have requested some advice from their respective
reforms’ commissions.
40
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Consultation with the public (through public hearings and other means) has been
useful in law reform agencies not only for occasional feedback but also for raising
expectations of reform outcomes. Access to social sciences and community
consultation is not possible in the case of judicial reform. That fact is sometimes given
as a reason why controversial reforms should not be undertaken in the courts … Law
reform agencies can sometimes help the democratic system work more efficiently and
promptly.41

Justice Kirby’s service on a Law Reform Commission before his appointment as a
High Court judge cannot be ignored. Justice Kirby had been appointed the first
Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) when it was “created” on
1 January 1975.42 Though he left the ALRC in 1984, he ‘watched’ its progress ‘[a]s a
lawyer, appellate judge and citizen … and often used [the ALRC reports] in [his] judicial
work’ since he left it.43 Justise Kirby has explained why he was keen to get involved in
law reform. It is instructive to reproduce what he said:
For me, it was never a purely theoretical or analytical challenge. Law affected
intimately the lives of people. To reform it, and thus to make it better, it was essential

Victoria
In 2007, the Victorian government has requested from
the Victorian Law Reform Commission for “legislative advice on the decriminalisation of
terminations of pregnancy”. The Commission’s final report on the law of abortion was tabled in
Parliament on 29 May 2008; the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) was assented to on 22
October 2008.

Danuta Mendelson, ‘Decriminalization of Abortion Performed by Qualified Health Practitioners
Under the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (VIC)’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 651,
656 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Queensland
In 2017 the Queensland Government, upon a request made to the Queensland Reform
Commission (“QLRC”), the QLRC ‘issued a consultation report in 2017. This was followed by
a call for public submissions, with a final report released in June 2018 recommending
decriminalisation. The Queensland legislation closely follows the framework of Victoria’s
Abortion Law Reform Act 2008’: Walsh and Legge (n 39) 325 (citations omitted).
Michael Kirby, ‘The Decline and Fall of Australia’s Law Reform Institutions – And the
Prospects of Revival’ (2017) 91 A.L.J 841, 850 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
41

42

Kirby, ‘Are we there yet’ (n 33) ch 30, 1-2.

43

Ibid 2.
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to consult the "usual suspects" - judges, legal practitioners, public officials and
institutions. But it was also important to consult ordinary people. They would offer
perspectives that would refine and strengthen our proposals. Moreover, the very
process of consultation would build a momentum that would protect the ALRC against
the risks of bureaucratic and political indifference when the reports were finally written
and tabled in the Parliament … I was curious to hear from other people, living and
working in Australia, about aspects of the law that they perceived as seriously unjust.
If I could have such experiences, surely others could do so in those areas of the law
that affected them.44

1.2.7 Summary
This thesis answers two research questions: (1) Is it possible to define self-defence
within the existing Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) so simply that no reasonable jury could
misunderstand it; and (2) if so, how should self-defence be defined? The thesis also
answers ten supporting questions which assist in responding to those primary
questions. They are: (3) did English common law always recognise that self-defensive
action by a person accused of homicide mitigated that action?; (4) if not, how and
when did self-defence come to be recognised as a defence that mitigated the severity
of a finding of homicide against a person accused of homicide?; (5) what part did the
English jury play in the development of a law of self-defence in English common law?;
(6) what part did the High Court of Australia and the Privy Council in England play in
the development of a law of self-defence in Australian common law?; (7) how have the
parliaments of the Australian states and territories responded to the uncertainties in
Australian self-defence law?; (8) have legislative amendments in New South Wales
since Zecevic improved clarity or have they compounded complexity?; (9) does a
simple self-defence test matter?; (10) if so, what are the requirements of a self-defence
test so simple that a jury cannot misunderstand?; (11) how can such a simple test be
formulated?; and (12) how should self-defence law in New South Wales be reformed?
This methodology summary explains the approach that I have taken in the thesis to
answer those questions. The primary methodological approach is qualitative and uses

44

Ibid 5.

15

‘doctrinal’45 research and ‘black-letter’ methodology.46 The primary materials used in
that doctrinal and black letter research are case law and the legislation/statutes.
However, the thesis begins with a detailed historical section to place the common law
materials in context. After the analysis of the common law, I have reviewed law reform
and academic commentary to identify the reasons for statutory amendments that
flowed from a number of jurisprudential blockages in Australia in the 20th century. The
research questions are thus not answered using a single research methodology; this
thesis uses a number of different methodologies, which sometimes overlap.
I will now outline the structure that I have used in the thesis to answer the research
questions outlined above.

1.3 Structure and contents
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In chapter one, I begin with an outline for
the purpose of this thesis. I explain that the purpose of this thesis is to formulate and
recommend a simple expression of the law of self-defence in New South Wales that
lay jurors can understand and apply without much judicial explanation. The idea of
self-defence is simple. As Oliver Wendell Holmes has observed, ‘even a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked’.47 However, the
legislative and judicial expressions of self-defence law in New South Wales have
always been convoluted, confusing and challenging for a lay jury.
I then set out the research questions which this thesis will answer to achieve that
purpose. They are: (1) is it possible to define self-defence within the existing Crimes
Act 1900 (NSW) so simply that no reasonable jury could misunderstand it; and (2) if
so, how should self-defence be defined? I also set out the supporting questions that
will assist in responding to those primary questions and which are answered in this
thesis. They are: (3) did English common law always recognise that self-defensive
action by a person accused of homicide mitigated that action?; (4) if not, how and
when did self-defence come to be recognised as a defence that mitigated the severity

45

Hutchinson (n 3) above.

46

Hutchinson and Duncan (n 4) above.

47

Holmes, ‘The Common Law’ (n 9) 3.
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of a finding of homicide against a person accused of homicide?; (5) what part did the
English jury play in the development of a law of self-defence in English common law?;
(6) what part did the High Court of Australia and the Privy Council in England play in
the development of a law of self-defence in Australian common law?; (7) how have the
parliaments of the Australian states and territories responded to the uncertainties in
Australian self-defence law?; (8) have legislative amendments in New South Wales
since Zecevic48 improved clarity or have they compounded complexity?; (9) does a
simple’ self-defence test matter?, (10) if so, what are the requirements of a selfdefence test so simple that a jury cannot misunderstand?; (11) how can such a simple
test be formulated?; and (12) how should self-defence law in New South Wales be
reformed?
I finally outline the methodology and the approach that I have undertaken to answer
the above research questions. I explain that the research questions are not answered
using a single research methodology because this thesis uses a number of different
methodologies, which sometimes overlap. I also discuss why each methodology has
been used in answering the research questions.
In chapter two, I answer questions three, four and five: (3) did English common law
always recognise that self-defensive action by a person accused of homicide mitigated
that action?; (4) if not, how and when did self-defence come to be recognised as a
defence that mitigated the severity of a finding of homicide against a person accused
of homicide?; and (5) what part did the English jury play in the development of a law
of self-defence in English common law? I provide a brief history of the development of
the law of self-defence from the 13th century to the 19th century, explaining first where
the criminal law came from. That story is the story of the complicated interaction of
new institutions in a very lawless time. My account is not comprehensive. My focus is
on how the jury dealt with homicide cases when the jury accepted that there was an
element of self-defence in the story. I place the jury in its larger historical context noting
its probable Scandinavian origins through the inquisitorial functions it was assigned by
William the Conqueror (died 1087), and the independent criminal trial decision making
functions it was assigned after Pope Innocent III stopped clergy involvement in ordeal
trials at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. I then explain how the different degrees

48

Zecevic (n 2).
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of homicide were developed. That discussion explains how non-felonious homicide
was established in two categories — justifiable homicide and excusable homicide. I
note the enactment of several statutes by the Crown to press the need for convictions
for homicide to maintain the king’s peace, but with assurances to juries that those they
convicted would be fairly treated if those juries simply noted that the homicide
concerned was a killing in self-defence. Those statutes are part of the story of how
juries became independent triers of fact, how the role of public prosecutor was
developed, and how juries decided self-defence cases from about the late 13th century
to the 18th century. The history of self-defence in English criminal law is the story of
how juries responded to the king’s statutes.
In chapter three, I answer the sixth question: What part did the High Court of Australia
and the Privy Council in England play in the development of a law of self-defence in
Australian common law? I explain the criminal self-defence law that New South Wales
inherited, and how it developed during the 20th century. I have done that in two parts.
In part one, I discuss the four cases that defined Australian common law on selfdefence between 1958 and 1987 which recognised what came to be described as
excessive self-defence as a partial defence to murder. Three were decided by the High
Court of Australia and another by the Privy Council in England. Those cases are: R v
Howe (HC),49 Palmer v The Queen (PC),50 Viro v The Queen (HC),51 and Zecevic v
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (HC).52 Absent statutory clarification, I explain the
difficulty that the High Court had in formulating a self-defence test upon which all the
judges on those superior courts could agree and which a jury could understand. In
part two, I discuss the different strains of academic and extrajudical opinion in
commentary that followed the judicial consideration of self-defence in these four
cases. I note the views that supported or criticised those judicial formulations to more
objectively review and understand the significance of those four cases. I conclude
chapter three by summarising where the common law of self-defence in Australia
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(1958) 100 CLR 448 (‘Howe’).
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[1971] 1 All ER 1077; AC 814 (‘Palmer’).
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(1978) 141 CLR 88 (‘Viro’).
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stood before the legislature intervened to clarify and identify the role that those cases
played in the development of Australia’s unique common law of self-defence.
In chapter four, I answer the seventh question: How have the parliaments of the
Australian states and territories responded to the uncertainties in Australian selfdefence law? I have done that in two parts. In part one, I discuss how the parliaments
of the Australian states and territories have responded to the diverse High Court
opinion, which has already been noted. I identify the seat of that judicial disagreement
in questions about whether modern self-defence law should focus on overall intent or
the proportionality of the self-defensive force that was used. I first explore the statutory
self-defence provisions which have been passed in various Australian states and
territories. I identify the various self-defences tests those legislatures devised and what
judges said about those tests. In part two, I discuss the New South Wales statutory
self-defence provisions in detail. I explain the context in which those provisions were
enacted, and the alternatives considered before they were passed. I then discuss the
self-defence provisions they settled on and what judges have said about them.
In chapter five, I answer the eighth question: Have legislative amendments in New
South Wales since Zecevic improved clarity or have they compounded complexity? In
part one, I analyse the effectiveness of the New South Wales legislative responses to
the uncertainties in Australian self-defence law occasioned by the lack of High Court
unanimity in this self-defence space where homicide is charged. I first recount how the
history explains jury behaviour and question whether juries are still behaving in the
same underlying way. I make some observations about how and why executive
governments in the Westminster tradition still want a conviction for every homicide. I
discuss how that “law and order” obsession results in the formulation of harsh
legislation that does not accord with jury common sense when jurors hear self-defence
stories during real trials. In part two, I analyse the statutory self-defence laws that were
passed into law in New South Wales in 2002. I show how the current ss 418-421 of
the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) came into existence. I briefly recount the road from selfdefence at common law to the current “codified” self-defence provisions. I show that
legislative amendments in New South Wales post Zecevic have not improved clarity,
and how, if anything, those amendments have compounded the complexity. I explain
how complicated these sections are, and why juries do not understand them despite
the best directions our Supreme Court judges can formulate. I discuss some of the
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recurring issues that arise in self-defence cases under ss 418 and 421 and how they
play out in practice. I discuss the complex interaction between s 418 and s 421 and I
state why these sections need to be simplified.
In chapter six, I answer the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth questions: (9) Does a
simple self-defence test matter?; and (10) if so, what are the requirements of a selfdefence test so simple that a jury cannot misunderstand?; (11) how can such a simple
test be formulated?; (12) how should self-defence law in New South Wales be
reformed? I have done that in three parts. I formulate a “simple” self-defence test to
replace ss 418 and 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in all self-defence trials, though
this test is tailored for use in homicide cases. In part one, I explain why a “simple” test
matters and I then discuss the requirements of a self-defence test that is simple
enough that a jury can understand. In part two, I discuss the requirements of a simpler
self-defence test. In part three, I propose a test that meets those requirements.53
In chapter seven, I conclude this thesis.
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Following consultation with my supervisor Dr Keith Thompson, he has advised me that in
order to respect the spirit of the AGLC4 to reduce the size of the footnotes, I should include
the internet citations or links for all electronic material including books, reports of the law
reforms commissions reports, etc., in the bibliography, and refer the readers at the beginning
of the thesis that I have done so. Please refer to the bibliography if becomes necessary to do
so.
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CHAPTER TWO
SELF-DEFENCE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
THE IDEA OF SELF-DEFENCE IN CRIMNIAL LAW HISTORY

Introduction

The purpose of chapter two of this thesis is to provide a brief history of the
development of the law of self-defence from the 13th century to the 19th century.

The history is large and extensive. The story is the story of the complicated interaction
of new institutions in a very lawless time. In discussing a history so large and
extensive, I note that it is not intended to identify precise details for each topic. This
chapter will, however, enable modern readers to understand how the line between
murder, manslaughter, self-defence, limited guilt, or no guilt has always been
challenging.

I will explain this history in three parts. In the first part, I will explain where the criminal
law came from. It may be difficult for modern readers to understand the fact that
criminal law and the law of torts were not separated until about the early 14th century.
Prior to this there was no distinction between wrongs committed between individuals
and wrongs committed against the state, and more specifically “the peace” that the
king was trying to establish as his contribution to the good of English society as a
whole.

The king’s peace was a tool used by the king to control his subjects and to assert his
authority so that he could maintain public order and settle blood-feuds. The idea of
the king’s peace, keeping the king’s peace, and the system of criminal procedure by
which the peace was enforced was the foundation of the entire system of criminal
procedure and led to the growth of criminal procedure.
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In part two, I will explain how we can trace this separation of criminal law and tort law
in the records that were kept. Those records not only enable insight into that
separation, but they show us how the new criminal law developed afterwards. Part of
this discussion will involve an explanation of the evolution of the jury from, what was
probably, its Scandinavian origins, through the inquisitorial functions it was assigned
by William the Conqueror (died 1087), to the independent criminal trial decision
making functions delegated to it after Pope Innocent III stopped clergy involvement in
ordeal trials at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.

In part three I will explain how the different degrees of homicide were developed.
Homicide was a fact of daily life in medieval England, but people understood that there
was a difference between intentional and unintentional homicide. I will discuss how
the distinction between homicide by those carrying out executions for the king and
homicide by misadventure or self-defence, was developed. That discussion will
explain, how the categories of justifiable homicide and excusable homicide were
established as the primary categories of non-felonious homicide.

I will also discuss how the Crown enacted several statutes in order to maintain the
king’s peace while in the meantime saving the lives of people who were convicted of
killing in self-defence. Those statutes are part of the story of how juries became
independent triers of fact, how the role of public prosecutor was developed, how juries
decided self-defence cases from about late 13th century to about the 18th century, and
how juries responded to the king’s statutes.
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Part One: The origin on Anglo-Saxon criminal law
Until the Norman conquest there was no distinction between the law of crime and the
law of tort.1 The Anglo-Saxon legal system was originally a system of tribal justice.2
The state was not considered to be the injured party. That was the family or kinship
group.3 Wrongs between unrelated families were settled by feud between kinship
groups.4 In an effort to control violence and establish obedience to the rule of law,
early English rulers prohibited any form of self-defence. All intentional killings were
capital crimes.5 Life for life punishments were easy enough for medieval people to
understand from their Christian religious teaching which used the “eye for eye” mantra
to explain punishments or restitution that fit the crime. However, from the beginning of
the 9th century principles of self-defence were recognised. Under the laws of King
Alfred, if a man saw his Lord attacked, a man could fight for his lord without being
liable for blood feud, and was considered free.6 Feud was the common response in

1

Holdsworth notably wrote:
We cannot use the term criminal law in a technical sense in the Anglo-Saxon period. A primitive
system of law has no technical terms. It has rules more or less vague, and terms corresponding
thereto, which will, if the law has a continuous history, become the technical rules, and give rise
to the technical terms of later days. In this period we have not yet arrived at the distinction
between the law of crime and the law of tort; far less have we arrived at the leading distinctions
of the later criminal law, felony, treason, and misdemeanor.

William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Methuen & Co, Ltd., 1923) vol 2, 43.
Clarence Ray Jeffery, ‘The Development of Crime in Early English Society’ (1956-1957) 47
J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 647, 654. See also Stanislaw Frankowski, ‘Mens Rea
and Punishment in England: In Search of Interdependence of the Two Basic Components of
Criminal Liability (A Historical Perspective)’ (1986) 63 U. Det. L. Rev. 393, 397. Tribes did not
need law because ‘social relations in the tribe are face-to-face and intimate’. Clarence Ray
Jeffery, ‘An Integrated Theory of Crime and Criminal Behavior’ (1958-1959) 49 J. Crim. L.
Criminology & Police Sci. 533, 534 (citations omitted). Jeffery has also stated:
2

Each tribe was in theory a group of kinsmen. The tribe performed the economic, political,
religious, and familistic functions performed by separate and distinct institutional structures in
a modern society. The tribe was the land-owning unit, and the land was cultivated by a group
of kinsmen who formed plough-teams and who cultivated the land in an open-field system. The
tie which united these smaller pastoral communities was simply that of kindred.

Jeffery, ‘The Development of Crime in Early English Society’ (n 2) 648.
3

Jeffery, ‘The Development of Crime in Early English Society’ (n 2) 654.
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Ibid 655.
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Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 51-4,100.
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Frankowski (n 2) 397, 403.
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homicide cases, but it did not stop the cycle of violence. People resorted to physical
violence in order to defend their honour which resulted in violent blood feuds. 7 The
king marketed his brand of justice as a solution to lawlessness, and his requirement
that the people see him as a source of justice dictated the principles of jurisprudence
developed by his justices in eyre.8 Because the king’s justices visited regularly, judged
fairly and because their judgements were enforced, the king’s law increased in
popularity and came to be accepted as the law of the land.
The Saxon kings adapted the law to take people’s passion into account. But in the
meantime, because they knew it was impossible to completely suppress human
passion and to stop the cycle of violence, they adopted the principle of compensation
for every personal injury, including taking away life.9 There were tariffs for
compensation even if the act was accidental or was necessary for self-defence.10 The
system of wergild or wer, bot and wite did not originate in English custom. When the
King’s justices could not find a solution to stop the cycle of violence in existing English

7

Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 43.

8

Jeffery has stated:
During the tribal period the legal system was in the hands of the tribal group, and justice was
based on the blood-feud. As tribalism gave way to feudalism, the feud was replaced by a system
of compensations. Justice passed into the hands of landlords. There was no separation of lay
and ecclesiastical courts until the time of William. State law and crime came into existence
during the time of Henry II as a result of this separation of State and Church, and as a result of
the emergence of a central authority in England which replaced the authority of the feudal lords.
Henry replaced feudal justice with state justice by means of justices in eyre, the king's peace,
a system of royal courts, and a system of royal writs.

Jeffery, ‘The Development of Crime in Early English Society’ (n 2) 665.
The records of the English National Archives described what an “eyre” means as follows
Counties were grouped into circuits, with a group of justices assigned to each one; and the
circuits, as well as the courts themselves, were known as eyres. In theory the eyre justices
travelled these circuits at seven-year intervals, although the intervals were in practice often
much more varied. The earliest surviving eyre roll dates from 1194, although evidence from the
Pipe Rolls suggests that eyres were first held in the mid-1160s. Although general eyres were
suspended in 1294, there were isolated eyres during the first half of the 14th century, and a
failed attempt at a general revival in 1329-1330. Occasional eyres were summoned until 1374,
but the last to produce any records was in Kent in 1348.

The National Archives.
9

Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 44-5.
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Ibid vol 2, 51.
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custom, they looked elsewhere. In this case they found their answer in the
jurisprudence that the Saxon kings had brought with them from Germany and
Denmark.11 The wergild ‘was the price or value of the man killed and must be paid to
his kinsmen'.12 The bot ‘was the compensation required for injuries less than death’.13
The wite ‘was the penalty or fine due to the king in his public capacity’.14 It is that
system of bot and wer which was calculated to unpick the blood-feud that provided the
groundwork of Anglo-Saxon criminal law.15
During the reign of Henry II (1154-1189), the tribal-feudal system of law was replaced
by a new system of writs and procedures, which marks the beginning of the English
common law of crime.16 As a wrong was also regarded as a breach of the king’s peace,

11

Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law [1956] (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, 2010) ch 1; Holdsworth (n 1) 3-4; William F. W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of
England (Cambridge at the University Press, 1919) Period 1, 1-10; Edward A. Freeman, The
Growth of the English Constitution from the Earliest Times (London: McMillan and Co., 1872)
ch 1; Edward Jenks, in Select Essays In Anglo-American Legal History by Various Authors
(Boston Little, Brown, and Co., 1907) vol 1, 34-87; Heinrich Bettnneb, in Select Essays In
Anglo-American Legal History by Various Authors (Boston Little, Brown, and Co., 1907) vol 2,
7-52; Graham Parker, ‘The Evolution of Criminal Responsibility’ (1971) 9 Alta. L. Rev. 47;
Geoffrey MacCormack, ‘Inheritance and Wergild in Early Germanic Law – I’ (1973) 8 Irish
Jurist N.S. 143.
A Hampton L. Carson, ‘Sketch of The Early Development of English Criminal Law as
Displayed in Anglo-Saxon Law’ (1916) 6 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 648, 656. Holdsworth
states:
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We cannot understand either the amount of the wergild or the method of its payment unless we
remember that it took the place of the feud, and that the feud was always in the background, to
be resorted to if the money was not paid. 'Buy off the spear or bear it,' ran the English proverb.

Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 45. See also Jeffery, ‘The Development of Crime in Early English
Society’ (n 2) 655.
Jeffery ‘The Development of Crime in Early English Society’ (n 2) 655; Holdsworth (n 1) vol
2, 44. Carson has asserted that the bot ‘might be due to the king if the injury affected him in
his private capacity’. Carson (n 12) 656.
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Carson (n 12) 656; Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 45; Jeffery ‘The Development of Crime in Early
English Society’ (n 2) 655. Holdsworth states, ‘[i]n the wite we can see the germ of the idea
that wrong is not simply the affair of the injured individual an idea which is the condition
precedent to the growth of a criminal law’. Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 47.
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Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 46.

Jeffery, ‘The Development of Crime in Early English Society’ (n 2) 660, 662. Maitland had
asserted that the term “common law” was used during or shortly after the reign of Edward I
(1239-1307). Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (n 11) 22. Maitland described
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the wrongdoer not only had to compensate the injured person and his family but also
the king, the lords and the community.17 The king’s peace was a tool used by the king
to control his subjects and also to assert his authority so that he could maintain public
order and settle blood-feuds.18 Because the new system worked and became popular,
the number of offences against the king’s peace was increased, and this contributed
to the growth of the idea of the king’s peace and hence the growth of criminal law. 19
The king's courts assumed jurisdiction over every allegation of breach of the king's
peace.20 By the time of Henry II, the king's peace extended to all persons and all places
in England.21 Keeping the king’s peace was the foundation of the entire system of
criminal procedure and led to the growth of criminal procedure.22 Royal courts
developed this judication and obtained full control over serious offences, and various

The word ‘common' of course is not opposed to 'uncommon': rather it means 'general’ and the
contrast to common law is special law. Common law is in the first place unenacted law; thus it
is distinguished from statutes and ordinances. In the second place, it is common to the whole
land; thus it is distinguished from local customs. In the third place, it is the law of the temporal
courts; thus it is distinguished from ecclesiastical law, the law of the Courts Christian, courts
which throughout the Middle Ages take cognisance of many matters which we should consider
temporal matters: Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (n 11) 22-3.

Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 47. In tracing the history of the king’s peace and its transformation
see Frederic Pollock, ‘The King’s Peace’ (1885) 1 L. Q. Rev. 37. See also Jack K. Weber, ‘The
King's Peace: A Comparative Study’ (1989) 10 J. Legal Hist. 135. But what happened to an
accused with pending criminal offences which occurred ‘during the time of the deceased
monarch?’ Weber has written ‘[w]ith the death of a king in medieval England his peace came
to an end’: Weber (n 17) 151. Weber has also written:
17

And the case law confirms the position of the writers. In Anon v. Howelle in 1316 it was found
that because the offense was committed during the time of the deceased monarch, and nothing
had been done against the peace of the ‘King who now is' the defendant 'was quit of prison’:
Weber (n 17) 152.

Sir Frederic Pollock, Bart, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, in Select Essays In
Anglo-American Legal History by Various Authors [1907] (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010)
vol 1, 78.
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Holdsworth (n 1) vol 2, 48. Those offences were ‘the offences which especially offended the
moral or religious sense of a warlike community’.
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David J. Seipp, ‘The Distinction between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law’ (1996)
76 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 59.
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Sir James Fitzgerald Stephen K.C.S.I., D.C.L., A History of The Criminal Law of England
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1883) vol 1, 184-5.
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torts, by offering the quare writ — that is — original writ.23 Local courts retained a large
jurisdiction over minor offences. Around the middle of the 13th century, trespass contra
pacem was double in nature because certain violent offences could be initiated in
either the king’s court or in the Court of Common Pleas.24 The king, therefore,
established his control by appointing judges and following a rational process to
convince his subjects that they should support his peace project. The writs that he
offered were his process.
The separation between crime and tort became more visible at the beginning of the
14th century. Plucknett explained how the categories of crime and tort gradually
separated as follows:
At the beginning of the fourteenth century the justices of the peace were becoming the
principal jurisdiction for criminal matters, and in their sessions the indictable trespass
is as conspicuous as the civil trespass was in the Common Pleas; consequently, there
was no gap in criminal law forcing litigants to use civil remedies for lack of criminal
ones. The contrast between indictment and original writ thus corresponded nearly
enough with the distinction between crime and tort.25
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Part Two: The evolution of the jury trials
Historians neither agree when jury trials were first introduced into England, nor where
they were first introduced. They have offered various theories. 26
Maitland had suggested ‘that the practice of summoning a body of neighbours to swear
to royal which is the germ of trial by jury appears in England as soon as the Normans
conquered England, and it can be clearly traced to the courts of the Frankish kings’.27
Plucknett discussed more than one theory for the origin of the jury. He observed the
‘[s]upposed Anglo-Saxon origins’ when he explored and challenged the idea that the
jury ‘is descended from the doomsmen who find the judgment and declare the law and
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Hamar Foster has argued that:
there have been really two schools of thought: an older school that saw the jury as an essentially
Anglo-Saxon institution rooted in the popular sovereignty of communal self-government, and a
slightly later school that saw the jury as primarily a Norman innovation that was an important
tool of the despotic and centralizing Angevin monarchy. This issue probably will never be
settled, but recently some scholars have argued rather persuasively that the truth lies
somewhere in between.

Hamar Foster, ‘Trial by Jury: The Thirteenth-Century Crisis in Criminal Procedure’ (1979) 13
U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 280, 281.
It is not my intention here to discuss when jury trial and self-informing jury was precisely
introduced. What matters here is how the jury influenced the development of criminal law and
the doctrine of self-defence. For discussion about when jury trial and the self-informing jury
was exactly introduced see generally: Naomi D. Hurnard, ‘The Jury of Presentment and the
Assize of Clarendon’ (1941) 56 The English Historical Review 374; Robert Von Moschzisker,
‘Historic Origin of Trial by Jury’ (1921-1922) 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1; Robert von Moschzisker,
‘Historic Origin of Trial by Jury’ (1921-1922) 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 73; Robert von Moschzisker,
‘Historic Origin of Trial by Jury’ (1921-1922) 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159; Jeffery ‘The Development
of Crime in Early English Society’ (n 2); J. E. R. Stephens, ‘The Growth of Trial by Jury in
England’ (1896) 3 Harv. Law. Rev. 150; Many Robert H. White, ‘Origin and Development of
Trial by Jury’ (1961-1962) 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 8; Trisha Olson, ‘On Enchantment: The Passing
of the Ordeals and The Rise of Jury Trials’ (2000) 50 Syracuse L. Rev. 109; George Fisher,
‘The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector’ (1997) 107 Yale L.J. 575; Thomas A. Green, ‘Societal
Concepts of Criminal Liability for Homicide in Medieval England’ (1972) 47 (No 4) Speculum
669; James B. Thayer, ‘The Jury and its Development’ (Pt 1) (1891-1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 249;
James B. Thayer, ‘The Jury and its Development’ (Pt 2) (1891-1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 295;
James B. Thayer, ‘The Jury and its Development’ (Pt 3) (1891-1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 357;
Roger D. Groot, ‘The Jury of Presentment Before 1215’ (1982) 26 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1; Roger
D. Groot, ‘The Jury in Private Criminal Prosecutions Before 1215’ (1983) 27 Am. J. Legal Hist.
113; Maximus A. Lesser, The Historical Development of the Jury System (Rochester N. Y.,
The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 1894); Anthony Musson, ‘Twelve Good Men
and True? The Character of Early Fourteenth-Century Juries’ (1997) 15 Law and History
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custom in the ancient communal courts’;28 and the idea that the origin of the jury lay
in the earlier English use of compurgators or oath-helpers, a primitive version of
character witnesses.29 But Plucknett found the idea of a combined English and
Scandinavian origin more plausible. He said that the origin of the jury could be traced
back to a ‘remarkable passage in the Laws of King Ethelred promulgated at Wantage,
which probably dates from about the year 997 … the Wantage enactment’.30 He said
that passage, might have been enacted when Scandinavian institutions prevailed in
that portion of England that had been occupied by the Danes. But Plucknett was
cautious about this conclusion because he said it is impossible ‘to establish continuity
between the Law of Wantage and the jury as it existed after the Norman Conquest’.31
The impossibility arises because there is a two hundred year gap between the
Wantage enactment and next appearance of the presenting jury. Until historians can
fill that gap, it is inaccurate to say that we can find the origin of the jury in Ethelred’s
law.32
J. E. R. Stephens also discussed various theories, but he supported the theory which
he considered had ‘the fewest difficulties’.33 He quoted Serjeant Stephen’s following

28

Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (n 11) 157. Commenting upon that
suggestion, Plucknett stated that:
This explanation, however, is by no means satisfactory, for the doomsmen did not find facts
(for which there was other machinery available) but declared the law which applied to a state
of facts which had already been established.
29

Ibid. Commenting upon that suggestion, Plucknett said:
this is open to the objection that the compurgators were summoned by a party and not by a
public officer, and could not be compelled to act unless they cared to.
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Ibid 157-158. That document states:
And that a gemot be held in every wapontake; and the xii senior thegns go out, and the reeve
with them, and swear on the relic that is given them in hand, that they will accuse no innocent
man, nor conceal any guilty one: at 157. .
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Ibid 157. Here Plucknett states:
The appearance of a principle or institution in one age, followed by the appearance of the same
or a similar institution at a considerably later age, must not lead one to suppose that the later
is derived from the earlier. Before this conclusion would be justified further evidence of
continuity must be adduced: at 157-158.
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statement: ‘We owe the germ of this (as of so many of our institutions) to the Normans,
and it was derived by them from the Scandinavian tribunals, where the judicial number
of twelve was always held in great reverence’.34 J. E. R. Stephens also stated that the
jury in criminal cases was unknown until it was established by William I. He said:
But, whatever may be the remote source of this institution, out of which trial by jury
grew, two points are at any rate clear. (1) The system of inquest by sworn recognitors,
even in its simplest form, makes its first appearance in England soon after the Norman
Conquest. (2) This system was in England, from the first, worked in close combination
with the previously existing procedure of the shire-moot; and, in its developed form of
"trial by jury," is distinctly an English institution.35

Sir Patrick Devlin agreed with Stephens that the jury had a Norman origin. It was their
idea that a man could be compelled by the king to take an oath. The Norman kings
used this spiritual device to enforce their authority. They used it to obtain information
from their English subjects by compulsion.36 Sir Patrick concluded his argument as
follows:
[T]he jury originated as a body of men used in an inquisition or, in the English term, an
inquest. The coroner or crowner, that is, the King's officer, and the jury he summons
and the inquest he conducts come closer to the original of the jury than any of the
forms it later took.37

All these scholars agree that the jury has Norman roots. The “jurors’ spiritual oath”
was adapted to develop criminal law and procedure in England despite its original
administrative use, including in the compilation of the Domesday Book. The original
administrative use and the adaptations that followed, including adaptations to achieve
justice in self-defence cases, will be illustrated below. But although Plucknett,
Stephens and Devlin all emphasise the Norman influence in the development of the
jury, it is not the whole story because we also know that accusation in criminal trials
amongst the Anglo-Saxons were initially made according the law of Ethelred. Twelve

34

Ibid 151.

35

Ibid.

36

Sir Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury, (London Stevens & Sons Limited, 1956) 5-6.

37

Ibid 6.

30

senior thanes of each hundred were required to act as public prosecutors with ‘the
duty of discovering and presenting the perpetrators of all crimes within their district.’38
Apparently because this procedure worked and was popular, just prior to the Norman
invasion that duty was transferred to neighbours when a new trial procedure, the jury
of presentment, came into existence.39 Because neighbours were likely to know what
happened in their community and also because they knew the character of each
member of their community, the presentment duty could be safely passed on to
them.40 The Normans did not interfere with that arrangement after their invasion.41
This practice, however, was open to abuse because rumours and gossip could found
suspicions of criminality in the neighbourhood. It also seems likely that the Norman
introduction of trial by battle soon after their arrival stifled neighbourhood
communication because this additional dispute resolution method was unilaterally
available in what today would be considered criminal cases and would-be accusers
avoided the risk of communications that might have enabled those trial by battle
confrontations.42
Henry II recognised the need to reform the law because trial by battle was deterring
people from pointing out criminals out of fear or unwillingness to be known as accusers
after the introduction of trial by battle ‘which compelled them to support their charge
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by single combat’.43 In 1166 the Constitutions of Clarendon changed the pre-Norman
jury arrangements and required that all violent offences to presented by twelve
neighbours.44 It also required that everyone accused had to submit to the ordeal. 45
Pollock and Maitland asserted that by the Constitutions of Clarendon the accusing jury
became ‘prominent’.46 Maitland observed that those twelve jurors were ‘sworn
accusers; their testimony is not conclusive; their oath does not lead to immediate
condemnation; it leads to trial; it puts the accused on his trial; he must go to the ordeal
… and their sworn accusation is an indictment’.47
Ten years later in 1176 the Assize of Northampton recognised the need to avoid the
criticism that flowed from contrived results under the original one jury solution. They
added a second jury of twelve to the indictment process, which was also part of the
presenting jury.48 This addition ensured ‘not only that both the sets of jurors mentioned
in the first clause of the Assize of Clarendon must concur in their suspicion, but that
43
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every vill in the hundred concerned was expected to give its verdict’.49 Maitland
described the situation as follows:
By the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 reissued with amendments at Northampton in 1176
Henry began a great reform of criminal procedure. Practically, we may say, he
introduced the germs of trial by jury: the old modes of trial, the ordeals and the judicial
combat, begin to yield before the oath of a body of witnesses.50

After 1176, we know there there were two juries of twelve involved in the accusation
process. The first jury identified people thought to have committed crime from 1166
onwards and from 1215, and also decided on guilt or innocence. But it seems that a
second independent jury was introduced in 1176 to review the first jury's accusation
to ensure that any manipulation in the pre-trial process was eliminated. 51
The ordeal was the oldest mode of trial in England. Nothing is older. 52 It was used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Because it was accepted by English
people in the 12th century that the result of the ordeal as administered by a priest
proved the guilt or innocence of the person accused, the result of ordeal trials was
final. It finally provided the guilt or innocence of the accused,53 people believed that
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the answer given by the ordeal was final as it was dictated by the supernatural.54 It
was called iudicium Dei – the judgment of God, and its value was it provided judgment
of God.55 The adjuducation of guilt was a matter of divine judgment. People believed
that ‘jurors might err where God would not’.56 The most routinely used ordeals to
decide the guilt or innocence of the accused were hot iron, hot water, and cold water.57
These tests were always administered by the clergy.58 At the Fourth Lateran Council
in 1215, Pope Innocent III forbade all clergy in the world from participating in religious
ceremonies connected with ordeal trials. 59 He prevented the clergy from performing
Edmund M. Morgan, ‘Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories’ (19221923), 32 Yale L. J. 575, 575.
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Hamer Foster described the various forms of ordeals as follows:
There were four ordeals in Anglo-Saxon times, and Maitland briefly describes them as follows:
The Ordeal of hot iron: the accused is required to carry a hot iron in his hand for nine steps, his
hand is then sealed up and the seal broken on the third day, if the hand is festered then he is
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Foster (n 26) 284-5 (citations omitted).
Charles Wells has suggested that trial by battle is ‘also a form of ordeal or appeal to the
judgment of God, who, it was believed, would not allow the innocent to be defeated in the
judicial combat or duel’: Wells (n 45) 97-8. He further suggested that:
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Pope Innocent III had earlier nullified the Magna Carta charter which was signed by King
John on 15 June 1215. The Pontiff has accepted King John’s complaint that he had affixed
his seal under pressure from the barons. It is important to note, however, that the Magna Carta
was focusing on addressing too many social problems in connection with the public order in
general, one of which the operation of the justice system. It is further important to note that
the Pontiff nullified it only because King John had signed it, and it was obtained, under
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any religious ceremonies in connection with ordeals,60 removing ‘the ordeal from all
religious sanctions, and for all intents and purposes abolished it from a regular means
of trial’.61 That one international ecclesiastical decision unexpectedly abolished the
principal means of determining the guilt or innocence of persons accused of crime in
England.62 But because the English people had no experience with modern processes
under which single non-ecclesiastical judges determine the guilt or innocence of
persons accused of crime, they were not ready to accept the decisions of single lay
judges as a reasonable means of determining the guilt or innocence of their
neighbours. Judicial determination of criminal guilt or innocence likely did not even
occur to them. But the king’s travelling justices were obliged to find a way to determine
criminal guilt or innocence in the absence of the priests who had previously
administered the religious ceremonies which had delivered those answers to their
communities.63
The prohibition of the ordeal in 1215 left the English system of criminal justice in
disarray.64 The abolition of the ordeal forced the king's advisors65 to find an alternative
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When King John died on October 19, 1216, his nine year old son Henry III succeeded him,
with William Marshal as his regent, giving the King’s regent and advisors another chance to
revive the Magna Carta on November 1216 and find a replacement system for the ordeal as
a mood of proof. Two examples may shed some light on the extent of William Marshal’s
involvement in finding a replacement system for the ordeal as mode of proof: (1) his name
‘was the first layperson listed in the 1215 version of the charter’, Allen Shoenberger, ‘William
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way to decide the guilt or innocence of persons indicted by a presentment jury. Henry
III’s government recognised the Fourth Lateran Council’s decree but took time to find
and implement a new guilt adjudication process. There is evidence that despite the
Fourth Lateran Council’s decree in 1215, presenting juries continued to rely on the
ordeal as a method of final proof to determine the guilty of innocence of the accused,66
but it is not clear who administered those ordeals in the absence of the priests, or
whether some priests continued to officiate in ordeal trials, contrary to the Pope’s
direction in 1215.
In 1219, in order to save the English criminal justice system from falling into disrepute
and enable people to have confidence in the justice system, a writ was issued by Henry
III’s government to the justices in Eyre requesting that ‘the justices to be guided by
suspicions, and were to reach their conclusions as to the reasonableness of that
suspicion solely from their own discretion’.67 Plucknett says the 1219 writ was a
temporary solution for the problem that the Fourth Lateran Council had created for
English criminal justice. He also says the problem was solved ‘in a way typical of
papal legate on behalf of Henry III’: at 7. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to elaborate or
explore the extent of William Marshal’s involvement or influence on Henry III and the drafting
of Magna Carta. As Richard Helmholz has argued under the heading of “Difficulties of proving
influence”: ‘There is no direct evidence of the process by which the drafters arrived at the
decisions they made’ (emphasis in original). Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta and the ius commune’
(n 59) 310 (emphasis in original). ‘The drafters left no notes’: Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta and the
ius commune’ (n 59) 359.
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English law – the justices were to make such experiments as they saw fit and gradually
feel their way towards a solution’.68 It must be remembered that this happened at a
time ‘when King’s justices had before them a very considerable number of jurors
making presentments from vills and hundreds, from boroughs and the county itself’.69
It was therefore logical that rather than take the responsibility for ultimate justice upon
themselves, the justices, and hence Henry III’s government, turned their attention to
the recent second jury institution created after Clarendon and which was already
‘travers[ing] the decisions of the former [jury]’,70 and judging those persons accused
by the neighbours.71 Once the second jury was institutionalised, it was a relatively
small step for the justices to decide that the second jury should take the place of
religious administration of the ordeal as the final judge of the accused’s guilt. Passing
that responsibility to a community group also avoided judicial unpopularity. Thus, by
the middle of the 13th century the English jury was practically established as the judge
of criminal guilt, however unlikely that result might have appeared a century earlier.
The two stages of presentment from the middle of the 13th century can now be
summarised. One jury established the facts, and the second jury not only confirmed
those facts, but also determined the accused’s guilt or innocence.72 Larry Bates has
argued:
The simplest procedure was to put a second question to the presenting jury. Since
presumably the first panel was dismissed upon delivery of their indictment, this left the
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37
second panel of twelve to answer the second question-was the accused guilty or
innocent?73

Quoting Theodore Plucknett, Larry Bates further argued that ‘this was a logical
process … the whole principal of jury trial was to get information useful to the Crown
from those people most likely to have it’.74
Robert Groot has argued that the presenting jury was chosen to replace the ordeal
and make the jury’s decision about accused’s guilt or innocence final because by 1215
jurors had developed an adjudicatory power by which they could issue opinions about
the guilt or innocence of the accused. The only additional necessary step left to
implement the new procedural system was to authorise juries to decide guilt or
innocence in trials officially on behalf of the king.75
When the priests administered the ordeal, justice was seen as a sacrament .76 The
presenting jury which thus replaced the ordeal, gave its judgment in place of divine
judgment, and thus made the final decision about accused’s guilt or innocence. Given
that function in place of the previous procedure, they naturally felt empowered to
develop the law as they saw fit — that is, according to their faith, social-culture,
conscience, common sense, and regardless of the directions of judges whose role had
not changed. Members of the jury understood that they were now responsible to
ensure divine mercy and justice was done, and because they knew they were now
called to do what God had directly done in ordeal trials, it was difficult for even the
king’s judges to interfere with jury decisions as a manifestation of the will of God.
When juries replaced the ordeal and began deciding criminal cases, including cases
that included self-defence facts, they exercised considerable discretion. In some selfdefence cases, as will be illustrated below, juries were not bound by law, either
73
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because of the jury's view that the self-defence acts involved were not unlawful, or
because they considered the proposed punishment was too severe. 77 Other reasons
for perverse decisions included juror fear of the defendants’ relatives or friends, or
monetary gain or favour. Judges could not be sure of juries’ motives when they
delivered life-saving verdicts. The judges understood, however, that juries were now
responsible to ensure that divine justice was done. Individual jurors knew they had
been called to declare the Will of God in the matters entrusted to them for decision.
Through its representatives on the jury, society put pressure on the king and judges
to create rules consistent with their decisions rather than have the justice system come
into disrepute because of repeated perverse verdicts. In a sense the king and judges
were between a rock and a hard place. There was no going back to the ordeal because
the priests were not available to administer it, and no one could take their place. Nor
was society ready for adjudication of guilt by a single judge. The jury provided the only
solution that was available. It avoided individual responsibility when its decisions were
unpopular with any part of the community, but because it involved the community
according to what we now know as the subsidiarity principle, it was immediately
popular and the king could not take it away. That popularity and relative independence
enabled juries representing society to exert pressure to change the law when it was
perceived to be unjust. In time, juries could manipulate the evidence in the interests of
the accused. They could decide that even though the accused had committed a capital
offence, the killing involved was both unintended and necessary self-defence — which
met the king’s exonerating criteria for a pardon.78 But if a jury worried that the king
77
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might not grant a pardon for any reason, in the interests of community justice, they
could also completely acquit the accused by finding there was no killing at all. If the
jury considered the accused was guilty, their decision was final and capital punishment
followed.79
Jury influence thus exerted pressure for the law to recognise exceptions to the
common law rule that culpable homicide always merited the death penalty. The notion
of self-defence was one of those exceptions. Examples of cases where medieval juries
supported defendants included cases where juries found that the defendant could
not have avoided the death because the victim held the defendant so tightly that he
could not escape,80 where the victim was faster than the defendant,81 or where the
victim had repeatedly struck the defendant and the defendant struck the victim with
only one blow.82 Other examples of jury findings supportive of defendants include
cases where he was cornered and walls, or hedges and ditches left no avenue for the
defendant’s escape.83 All of these findings or explanations by juries were intended ‘to
save the life of the manslaughterer.’84
Judges were fully aware that juries were manipulating evidence.85 ‘In almost every
case in which self-defense was alleged, judges ‘pressed the jury on two questions:
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Had the defendant acted out of total desperation, and had he acted without malice?’86
Every jury that decided to save a defendant otherwise guilty of a capital crime would
emphasise the complete absence of alternative solutions and the unpremeditated
nature of what had happened despite incredulity from the bench.87 Nor did judges
punish the jury if it was revealed that the jury had manipulated the evidence. The
method of rectification in those cases was “attaint”. Only another jury could find that
the first jury had willfully falsified its verdict. 88
A legitimate question that flows from this analysis is why the judges could not discipline
juries when they went rogue? Edmund Morgan has suggested that judges were not
prepared to intrude upon jurors as the contest between judges and jurors was about
evasion of responsibility and not about expanding the jurisdiction of the king’s
justices.89 Part of the answer, however, also seems to lie in the jury’s popularity and
their position as decider of fact in place of God. While the “god-like” role of the jury in
deciding the guilt or innocence of persons accused of capital offences has received
little attention in commentary, it is clear that it took a long time before the king or his

where the act alleged had actually occurred, but without criminality upon the part of the
accused) to answer their questions as “interrogating” jurors. Morgan (n 54) 591.
86

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 434.
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Ibid 429.
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The history of jury attainder is unclear. Edmund Morgan described it as follows:
It seems that provision was made for punishing those who rendered a false verdict or false
judgment before it was conceived that the verdict or judgment could be set aside. Thus, there
was no attaint of a grand assize and its finding was final, but the jurors were punishable for a
false finding. The usual method of attainting a jury was by verdict of another jury of greater
number whose members were of higher rank than the original jurors. This was not, however,
the only means, for they might be attainted upon their own answers upon a later examination.

Morgan (n 54) 576 n 3 (citations omitted).
Green stated, ‘[t]he closest the bench came to application of the dreaded process of attaint
was the impaneling of a second jury to test the first jury's special verdict of self-defense’.
Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 20. For the history of attainder see generally
Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1898); James B. Thayer, ‘The Jury and its Development’ (Pt 3) (1891-1892) 5 Harv.
L. Rev. 357; John Zane, ‘The Attaint. I’ (1916) 15 Michigan Law Review 1; John Zane, ‘The
Attaint. II’ (1916) 15 Michigan Law Review 127.
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judges developed the confidence and the power to control or reform the juries which
they had unchained.

Part Three: The development of different degrees of homicide
Before 1215 when the jury succeeded to the fact deciding role, homicide was
punishable by death regardless of how it came about. Because crimes in breach of
the king’s peace were also sins in the eyes of the Church, there were always questions
about whether the king’s judges should take jurisdiction or whether these matters
should be referred to the church. While the king’s justices trumped the local laws of
manorial Lords relatively quickly, the authority of the Church and the jurisdiction it
claimed was not so easily eclipsed. The Church had developed more nuanced ways
of dealing with degrees of sin. The king may not always have been willing to cede
jurisdiction, but when Church intervention would yield a more just result, he and his
subjects did not always object. The Church represented God and the king could not
always win the argument that his will was more important, especially if his judgments
did not seem more just on the facts.90 One of the reasons the Pope outlawed priestly
involvement in secular courts after 1215 must have been to emphasise church
jurisdiction in matters of sin. It may be that the Pope fully expected all these difficult
cases to be referred to ecclesiastical courts in the absence of an alternative. That
interpretation of events says that the advent of the jury as the decider of guilt or
innocence in the absence of the ordeal, was a happy coincidence that completely
changed the trim of English criminal procedure for all time. What it ultimately did was
reduce ecclesiastical jurisdiction which is highly ironical in light of the issues at stake
at the time.
In order to compete with the Church’s more developed jurisprudence in sin, the king’s
law had to develop nuances, otherwise the people were apt to think that these cases
should go to the Church because the Church was more competent to deal with them.
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The demise of the ordeal in 1215 following the Fourth Lateran Council is an illustrative
example on the subject matter of the King’s relationship with the Church. It is beyond the
scope of this thesis to explore or elaborate on the politics of the King’s relationship with the
Church. See generally: McAuley (n 53); Olson (n 26); Helmholz ‘‘Magna Carta and the ius
commune’ (n 59); Foster (n 26); Shoenberger (n 59); Bates (n 48); Miller (n 51).
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Homicide was a fact of daily life in medieval England, but people understood that there
was a difference between intentional and unintentional homicide and the accused’s
mental state was recognised as the determinative factor in his or her culpability.91 The
distinction between homicide in execution of the law, as for example, by the king’s
executioner, and homicide by misadventure or self-defence was understood but was
not clearly defined.92 A man was not guilty of homicide if he was the king’s executioner
doing his job as executioner. And in the minds of a jury, accidental and self-defence
killings were never as culpable as what we now call premeditated murder. But the lack
of these distinctions when the king was considering a pardon frustrated juries charged
with making final judgments. They therefore found ways to deliver results they
considered just, despite the king’s inflexible rules. Persons who caused death were
liable to conviction for homicide regardless of whether the cause of death was
intentional or accidental.93 Perverse jury verdicts pressed the kings’ judges to
recommend and recognise categories of homicide.
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Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 416.
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Beale (n 78) 567-8. Beale has stated:
It had become the practice of the Clerks in Chancery to issue a writ (similar to the writ de odio
et atia) to inquire whether a homicide for which a man was under arrest had been committed
"by misfortune, or in his own defence, or in any other manner without felony" ; but by the Statute
of Gloucester this was forbidden, and it was provided that a verdict should be found before the
justices in eyre or gaol-delivery, and then " by the report of the justices to the king the king shall
take him to his grace, if it please him: at 568 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Sir James Stephen has stated that the Statute of Gloucester 6 Edw. I, c. 9. has provided:
The king commands that no writ shall be granted out of the chancery of the death of a man to
inquire whether a man killed another by misadventure or in self-defence, or in other manner
by felony, but if such a person is in prison and before the justices in eyre or justices of gaol
delivery, puts himself on the country for good or evil, and if it is found by the country that he did
it in self-defence or by misadventure then, on the record of the justices, the king shall pardon
him if he will.

Sir James Fitzgerald Stephen K.C.S.I., D.C.L., A History of The Criminal Law of England
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1883) vol 3, 36-7 (citations omitted).
See generally Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The Development of the Law of Homicide’ (1935) 9
Australian Law Journal 64; Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53); Rollin
Perkins, ‘The Law of Homicide’ (1945-1950) 36 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 39; Rollin Perkins,
‘Re-examination of Malice Aforethought’ (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 537; Hessel Yntema, ‘The Lex
Murdrorum: An Episode in the History of English Criminal Law’ (1922) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 146;
William H. Coldiron, ‘Historical Development of Manslaughter’ (1950) 38 Ky. L.J. 527.
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In the 13th century justifiable homicide and excusable homicide were established as
the primary categories of non-felonious homicide.94 The two main categories ‘took their
form during the reign of Henry II and his immediate successor’.95 The distinction
between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide was important because it
enabled the king’s justice to provide a solution that was seen as a fair and just
alternative to the way the Church would handle homicides if it took jurisdiction. The
distinction between murder and manslaughter has attracted the attention of many
historians, authors, and scholars.96
Green identified a distinction between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide.
He wrote: ‘Justifiable homicide included executions pursuant to a royal order and the
ancient practices of slaying thieves caught escaping with the goods and outlaws who
resisted capture. Slayers deemed justified were acquitted by the royal courts’.97 Green
considered excusable homicide to be divided into two categories — accidental
homicide, which was identified when the accused had no intention to kill or seriously
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Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 419. Green stated:
The category of justifiable homicide included executions pursuant to a royal order and the
ancient practices of slaying thieves caught escaping with the goods and outlaws who resisted
capture. Slayers deemed justified were acquitted by the royal courts (citations omitted).
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Ibid. Green stated:
There is some, but slight, evidence that as early as the reign of Henry I, slaying in self-defense
did not lead to payment of the wergild. Nevertheless, the defendant had to make “honorable
amends”: at 419 n 20 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

See generally: Dixon (n 93); Charles E. Tucker Jr., ‘Anglo-Saxon Law: Its Development and
Impact on the English Legal System’ (1991) 2 U.S. A.F. Acad. J. Legal Stud. 127; Yntema (n
93); J M Kaye, ‘Early History of Murder and Manslaughter (pts. 1 & 2)’ (1967) 83 L.Q. Rev.
365; Parker (n 11); Jeffery (n 2); Carson (n 12); Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’
(n 26); Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53); Catheryn Jo Rosen, ‘The
Excuse Of Self-Defense: Correcting A Historical Accident On Behalf Of Battered Women Who
Kill’ (1986-1987) 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11; James D. Barnett, ‘The Grounds of Pardon’ (1927) 61
Am. L. Rev. 694; Beale (n 78); M. Perkins, ‘Self-Defense Re-Examined’(1954) 1 UCLA L. Rev.
133; Darrell A. H. Miller, ‘Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and the State’ (2017) 80 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 85; Nelson E. Johnson, ‘The Early History of the Crime of Murder” (1906) 6
Brief 269; Grupp (n 78); Perkins, ‘The Law of Homicide’(n 93); Perkins, ‘Re-examination of
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injury the victim, and homicide in self-defence when the accused committed homicide
in self-defence to save his own life.98
Sir Owen Dixon has also written about the evolution of the law of homicide. 99 He
stated:
The middle of the thirteenth century provides enough beginning for the development
of the law of homicide … Homicide is the chief felony … The distinction between
murder and manslaughter is unknown. The very word ‘murdrum’ does not, in its legal
use, signify the crime.100

Sir Owen Dixon summarised the law as it existed in the 14th century in the following
terms:
[T]he distinction between murder and manslaughter has not yet emerged. All homicide
is criminal unless it is justifiable as something akin to the execution of justice. Every
killing is a felony involving loss of life or member, unless it is excusable, per infortunium
or se defendendo. These must be especially found, and when especially found they
do not entitle the prisoner to an acquittal but only to a pardon and a pardon does not
give a relief from forfeiture of goods. Homicide can never be excusable on the grounds
of self-defence or misadventure if committed of malice aforethought, and a general
pardon will not avail if malice aforethought is found by inquest.101

Sir Owen Dixon saw the developments occurring later than Green does, but they were
the same developments. However, the evidence which Green has found forty years
after Dixon discussed these developments, does suggest that the distinctions on which
they both agreed occurred earlier than Dixon believed. That is because we can see
evidence of those distinctions in the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1166 during the
reign of Henry II and confirmation in the Statute of Gloucester in 1278 much earlier
than Dixon thought.
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Ibid 64 (emphasis in original).

Ibid 65-6 (emphasis in original). Coldiron has asserted that ‘[t]he practice of forfeiture of
goods in the case of excusable homicide was not abolished until the statute of 9 Geo. IV C.31,
sec. 10, in 1828, although it had fallen into disuse before that time’. Coldiron (n 93) 532.
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In 1267, ten years earlier than Statute of Gloucester, the Statute of Marlbridge,102
abolished the "murdrum"103 fine ‘if the death was occasioned by misadventure’.104
Before the Statute of Marlbridge if a person killed another in misadventure, he paid a
fine but was not guilty of a capital offence.105 But in 1278 there was still no guarantee
52 Hen. III, c. 25. Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 36; F. W. Maitland, ‘The Early History of
Malice Afore Thought’ (1883) 8 Law Mag. & Rev. Quart. Rev. Juris. & Quart. Dig. All Rep.
Cases 5th ser. 406, 407. Thomas Green has cited this statute as the Statute of Marlborough,
Stat. 52 Hen. III, c. 26 (1267). Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 100 n 105;
Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 455-6 n 158. The statute provides:
102

[MURTHER] from henceforth shall not be [judged] before our Justices, where it is found
Misfortune only: But it shall take place in such as are slain by Felony, and not otherwise.

Statutes of the Realm. Volume 1, 25 (emphasis in original).
Hessel E. Yntema has asserted that “murdrum” had Danish or Scandinavian origin and it
was a murder fine designed ‘to bring a few of the more serious offences under royal control’.
Yntema (n 93) 155.
103
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Coldiron (n 93) 539. Coldiron, however, noted that:
A misinterpretation of this statute by Coke and others led to a mistaken belief that prior to this
time one who killed by misadventure or in self-defense, was hung. But this mistake has now
been rectified and it is now settled that this statute merely abolished the "murdrum" fine in cases
of misadventure and self-defense: at 531 n 25 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Maitland ‘The Early History of Malice Afore Thought’ (n 102) 407. Maitland has also argued
that:
105

Mr Justice Stephen shows very clearly that the Statute of Marlbridge does not countenance the
doctrine put forward in the Year Book of 1348, and repeated with exaggerations by Coke,
namely, that before this statute a man was hanged if he slew another in self-defence. The
statute merely abolished the practice of fining the hundred when a foreigner perished
accidentally: at 407 (citations omitted).

Sir James Stephen has written the following account:
It is further to be observed that there was no need to refer in this act to the cases of homicide
under a necessity which might have been avoided. In a case where this happened the person
who caused the death must of course be known, and when the person by whom the death was
caused was known, no "murdrum" was due from the township. The only cases in which the act
could apply would be cases in which some stranger who could not be identified as an
Englishman was found dead under circumstances which led to the inference that his death was
accidental, e.g. if he were found drowned with no marks of violence. The statute therefore
throws little light on the subject, though its words, when rightly understood, seem to imply that
killing "per infortunium" was in those days so far from being felony that the two were contrasted
with each other.

Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 36. Sir James Stephen has also argued that the reason the Statute
of Marlbridge has been invoked in self-defence cases was because of a “mistake” in
constructing it, and ‘this mistake had the practical result of the Statute of attaching forfeiture
of goods to a verdict of se defendendo’: Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 42 (emphasis in original).
See also Parker (n 11) 75 n 174. Parker has asserted:

46

that the king would grant a pardon after a finding of killing by misadventure or in selfdefence, though royal pardons in cases of premeditated murder were granted rarely if
at all.106 Plucknett has noted:
In the thirteenth century misadventure and self-defence were still recognised, not so
much as defences to a charge of homicide as circumstances entitling one to a pardon;
but if these defences were not involved, there was but one other case, and that was
homicide. Whatever might be urged in mitigation of this offence could only be urged
before the king as part of an appeal for pardon; it could not be considered by a court
of law.107

The king wanted that distinction between killing by misadventure or in self defence to
be clarified for the jury and so directed the enactment of the Statute of Gloucester in
1278.108 The Statute of Gloucester made it necessary for the jury to find misadventure
or self-defence if a person accused of a killing was to have any hope of obtaining a
The mistake being that “murder” was not construed as it should have been as murdrum-a fine
on the township, but as the more modern development of murder as the most heinous form of
homicide. Forfeiture was not finally abolished until accomplished by the statute. 9 Geo. IV, c.
31, s. 10.: Parker (n 11) 75 n 174.

Graham McBain, ‘Modernising the Law of Murder and Manslaughter: Part 1’ (2015) 8
Journal of Politics and Law 9, 48.
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Plucknett A Concise History of the Common Law (n 11) 474.
6 Edw. 1, c. 9. James Fitzjames Stephen has written the Statute text is as follows:
The king commands that no writ shall be granted out of the chancery of the death of a man to
inquire whether a man killed another by misadventure or in self-defence, or in other manner
by felony, but if such a person is in prison and before the justices in eyre or justices of gaol
delivery, puts himself on the country for good or evil, and if it is found by the country that he did
it in self-defence or by misadventure then, on the record of the justices, the king shall pardon
him if he will.

Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 36-7. See also Dixon (n 93) 65.
But see Statutes of the Realm volume 1, page 49 where the statute reads:
THE King commandeth, That no Writ shall be granted out of the Chancery for the Death of a
Man to No Writ enquire whether a Man did kill another by Misfortune, or in his own Defence, or
in other Manner [without Felony;') [but he shall be put in Prison until the coming of the justices
in Eyre, or justices assigned to the Gaol-delivery, and shall put himself upon the Country before
them for Good and Evil; In case it be found by the Country, that he did it in his Defence, or by
Misfortune, then by [the Report of the Justices to the King, the King shall take him to his Grace,
if it please him (emphasis in original).

The person’s goods, however, still had to be forfeited and this remained the case for excusable
homicides until 1828 when it was abolished by the statute of 9 Geo. IV C.31, sec. 10. William
532. Coldiron (n 93) 532. See generally Dixon (n 93).
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pardon. Sir James Stephen has explained why the Statue of Gloucester was enacted
in the following words:
This act by its opening words abolished the writ de odio et atia, which was issued, …
in order that a jury might say whether a person accused of homicide was accused duly
or maliciously in order that in the latter case he might be bailed. It would seem from
this statute that the commonest cases of accusations "de odio et atia" were cases of
misadventure or self-defence. The survivors of the deceased in such cases were likely
to accuse of wilful homicide those whose negligence or violence had caused their
relation's death ; and the statute provides that these cases are no longer to be bailable,
and that when the trial comes on, the jury, if they think that the case was one of selfdefence or misadventure, are neither to convict nor acquit, but to find specially to that
effect, upon which the king, if he pleases, may, upon the record or report of the justices,
pardon the party.109

However, as yet there was no statutory recognition of the idea of “malice
aforethought”. Even though any formal written pardon granted by the king would use
that language when affirming that this was not a wilful or premeditated murder, the
language of the Statute of Gloucester did not use the term “malice aforethought” as a
legal term to distinguish homicide resulting from misadventure or self-defence from
other homicides, nor was the term “malice aforethought” defined.110 Juries still did not
trust the king to pardon in all misadventure and self-defence cases so they continued
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Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 37 (emphasis in original). Nelson E. Johnson has written that:
At this time, to secure a pardon in the case of homicide se defendendo, it was necessary,
according to the criminal procedure, that the jury should find that the accused killed in selfdefense, in the following words: "In self-defense and not by felony or malice aforethought." This
is the first time that this term "malice aforethought" is used, as far as the writer has been able
to discover. These words were required by the statute 6 Edw. I., c. 9, known as the Statute of
Gloucester. It happened that this statute abolished the writ de odio et atia, and it seems highly
probable that the "malice aforethought," the absence of which the jury had to find specially, is
the equivalent of the odiam et atia, as set forth in that writ. It is thought that this is the origin of
the "malice aforethought" which is so necessary an element of murder to-day.

Nelson E. Johnson, ‘The Early History of the Crime of Murder’ (1906) 6 Brief 269, 273
(emphasis in original).
The words “malice aforethought” are not included in the translation of the Statute of
Gloucester. See Dixon (n 93) 65; Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 37.
Coldiron (n 93) 531. It is the language of the pardon that used the words “malice
aforethought”: at 531.
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to find such defendants “not guilty” to more completely protect them from the possibility
of capital punishment.
Perkins has offered yet another interpretation of the development of the law of
homicide.111 For Perkins criminal homicide was divided into the categories of murder
and manslaughter ‘several centuries ago’112 but he did not specify when this division
in the law occurred. However, homicide was murder unless it was excused or justified,
in which event it was manslaughter and both classes were common law creations. 113
Perkins has further argued that ‘self-defense cases offer a nice distinction between
the proper use of the words "justifiable" and "excusable" as applied to homicides’.114
With respect, the coincidence of Perkin’s classes with modern homicide categories
seems a little too convenient and the timing of the distinction between murder and
manslaughter is uncertain.
While Green and Dixon disagree about the timing of the distinction, they are ad idem
on what happened, and their distinction does not conveniently coincide with modern
sensibilities. Green’s idea and research is the more convincing because it is more
recent, includes a number of cases which demonstrate his conclusions and it also
benefits from an understanding of the role of the Statute of Gloucester.115 And while
Green does not fully explain why the king’s justices did not upset jury verdicts and

See generally Perkins ‘Re-examination of Malice Aforethought’ (n 93); Perkins, ‘The Law
of Homicide’ (n 93).
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Ibid. Perkins also argued that:
If the distinction between justifiable and excusable homicide is to be retained in modern law,
the difference should certainly be grounded upon other than purely historical reasons. One who
kills another in self-defense, under circumstances in which he was privileged by law to make
use of deadly force to save his own life, should be said to have committed justifiable homicide
(in spite of the fact that it was originally excusable only) because what is authorized by law is
in every proper sense, justified. But one who kills another by accident may, under certain
circumstances, be excused, but cannot properly be said to be justified.

Perkins ‘Re-examination of Malice Aforethought’ (n 93) 541 n 39.
See generally Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77); Green, ‘The Jury and the
English Law of Homicide’ (n 53).
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rarely called for consideration by a second jury, he does show unequivocally that the
king’s justices would not interfere with jury findings of fact.116
In 1293, King Edward I (reigned 1272 – 1307) created further justified homicide
categories when he justified park rangers who killed poachers and exempted them
from capital punishment in the same way that he had already justified the act of the
executioner who was not culpable for the life he took with his axe or at the gallows.117
Sir James Stephen has written that this statute ‘throws some light on the subject ...
This act supplies a case of homicide which was regarded as absolutely justifiable. The
forester or park-keeper was not to be " punished or disturbed " if he acted within the
powers given by the act’.118 After discussing these exemptions for park rangers and
executioners, referring to the Statute of Marlbridge in 1267, the Statute of Gloucester
in 1278 and statute 21 Edw. 1, st. 2 in 1293, Stephen has further written:
The result of these authorities seems to be in the end of the thirteenth and the
beginning of the fourteenth centuries, [that] juries were bound in cases of trials for
homicide, where the defence was misadventure or self-defence, to find specially that
such was the case, upon which the king was bound to grant his pardon.119

See generally Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77); Green, ‘The Jury and the
English Law of Homicide’ (n 53); Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26).
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The Statute of 21 Edw. 1, st. 2. See Statutes of the Realm, Volume 2, 112. This Act provides
that the ‘foresters, parkers, or warreners, if they find trespassers who will not yield themselves
“after hue and cry made to stand unto the peace, but do continue their malice”’. Stephen (n
92) vol 3, ch 26, 37-8.
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Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 37-8 (emphasis in original). Stephen stated:
In 1310 an entry appears upon the Parliament Roll of 3 Edw. 2, in answer to a petition
complaining of the ease with which pardons were granted to homicides and other offenders, …
This seems to show that in such cases pardons were granted as of course: at 38.
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Ibid 38. In support to his analysis, Sir James Stephen has provided the following story:
S. being indicted for the death of N. and pleading not guilty, the jury found that S. and N.
quarrelled on their way to the public-house, and in the course of the quarrel N. struck S. with
an ash stick on the head so that he fell, and S. got up and ran- away as far as he could, and N.
followed S. with the stick in his hand to kill him if he could, and drove him to a wall situated
between two houses which he could in no wise pass; and when S. saw that N. wanted to kill
him with the stick, and that he could not avoid death unless he defended himself, he took a
certain 1 poleaxe and struck N. with it on the head, of which N. immediately died, and the said
S. immediately after fled as far as he could. Wherefore the jurors said that S. killed N. in selfdefence, and not by felony or of malice aforethought, and that he could not otherwise escape
from death. Therefore S. is remitted to prison to wait for the mercy of the king in the custody of
the sheriff: at 38-9 (citations omitted).
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This exception for royal officials appears to have to have led juries to reason — “if the
King can give this exemption, why can he not broaden it to other cases where the
killing was justified?” The cases cited in Thomas Green’s research prove that juries
were pushing back against the king’s limited exceptions in cases that did not involve
his park rangers’ and, in effect, said that additional exceptions were needed in other
cases where killing was justified.120 Green’s research includes examples of cases
during the 13th century where medieval juries supported the defendant’s case by
finding a great variety of justifications. Those include circumstances where the
defendant could not have avoided the death because the defendant escaped after the
victim attacked the defendant; circumstances where though the defendant had
escaped and fallen in a ditch, the victim had followed, caught up and tried to attack
him; 121 and the previously noted circumstances where the victim was faster than the
defendant and there was thus no alternative to the killing;122 and a case where the

See generally Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77); Green, ‘The Jury and the
English Law of Homicide’ (n 53); Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26).
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C 260/6, no. 28 (1292). In this case the jurors stated that:
Gilbert, son of William de Cherneleye, struck Robert de Caterhale upon the head with his bow
so that the bow broke; and Gilbert struck him again with the remaining part of his bow. Robert,
fleeing, sought to cross a ditch in which a hedge grew and in saving himself grasped a branch
from the hedge which broke off so that he fell with the stick into the ditch. Gilbert soon arrived,
assailing Robert with his fractured bow. Robert, considering this, struck back at Gilbert with the
broken branch hitting him in the head so that he died. The jurors were asked whether Gilbert
had a sword or a knife and, if so, whether he had drawn either. When they replied that Gilbert
was so armed, but had drawn neither weapon, the court, obviously doubtful as to the lethal
nature of the broken bow, asked the jurors once again whether Robert could have escaped
without slaying Gilbert. The jury reiterated their opinion that he could not have done so. This
failed to satisfy the court, however, and only after a second jury had been impaneled and had
supported the verdict of the original jury was the defendant awarded a special verdict. The
enrollment indicates in a later hand that Gilbert was pardoned.

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 429 n 59.
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C 260/6, no: 16 (1292). In this case the petty jury stated that:
Alan de la More killed John Tyrel in self-defense after a great chase. The two had argued until
John ran home to fetch a sword. "Alan, seeing John approaching, and desiring to evade John's
malicious intent, kept himself underneath the horse his father, Robert, was riding. Robert did
all in his power to prevent John from striking Alan, but John chased Alan into a certain corner .
.. ," where, as a last resort, Alan retaliated with a mortal blow. The court asked whether Alan
could have fled before John returned from his house armed. The jury replied that the defendant
could not have fled because John was faster than he.

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 429 n 59
Green also has asked to “compare” this case with ‘C 260/23, no. 23 (1332), where the jurors
testified that the defendant fled as fast as he could ("velociori curru quo potuit"), but his
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victim held the defendant tightly so that he could not escape and had no alternative
but to kill.123 Thirteenth century juries thus did not consider that the new statute helped
them much at all. Indeed, this statute seems to have confirmed juries in their
determination to protect persons accused of homicide in self-defence cases with
supportive stories to ensure an acquittal, as anything less would have consigned the
accused to an uncertain fate.
The case of John Pentyn and his wife Clemencia in 1332 is illustrative. The trial jury
made up a story different from the that which was recorded from the inquest’s jury’s
decision. The inquest jury’s story was that John struck the victim in the head when the
victim and others came to his wife’s aide after they had heard her crying for help. They
said that the wife had cried for help when she saw that her husband had locked himself
in the solar124 trying to hang himself. The trial jury’s story was different. They found
that after John and his wife had an argument, she had left the house. When she came
back and found herself locked out, she screamed. When the victim heard her
screaming, he went to her house, entered the solar and tried to kill her husband. When
her husband could not escape, he struck the victim with an iron rod in self-defence.125
Green has summarised another remarkable example of markedly different jury stories
from the same facts somewhere between 1325 and 1326. The inquest jury found that
John le Marche and Agnes de Wycoumbe were arguing outside John’s house past

assailants were even fleeter and caught up with him ("velociores demum ipsum . .. attinxe)’:
at 429 n 59 (emphasis in original).
123

C 260/7, no. 46A (1293). In this case, the jury told the court that:
Gregory le Waleis threw Thomas de Gloucester "to the ground, lay upon him, and drew his
knife desiring to kill him. Thomas, perceiving this, and fearing likewise his own death, drew his
knife and struck Gregory as the latter lay upon Thomas' stomach." The justices then asked the
jury whether in fact Thomas might have escaped without killing Gregory, to which the jury
responded, "No, because Gregory lay upon Thomas' stomach and held him tightly and firmly
to the ground.” … Their reply satisfied the court, and the defendant was remanded to prison to
await his pardon.

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 428-9 n 59.
124

The solar was a private room in a medieval house (or castle) to provide some privacy for
the head of the house.
London Coroners' Rolls, Roll B, 42, pp. 65-6 - C 260/32, no. 15 (1322). Green, ‘Societal
Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 678 n 35; Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77)
40-1 n 41.
125
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local curfew when Agnes took a stick from John’s hand and started to hit John on the
back and sides. When witnesses Geoffrey de Caxtone and Andrew de Wynton saw
what was happening, they came with staves to defend Agnes and struck John on the
head and body and John died a few days later from his injuries. The trial jury’s story,
however, was that John had met Andrew some distance from where he died and struck
him on the head with a staff. Andrew initially fled to save himself until he was up against
a wall and was forced to retaliate. 126
Green notes that in 1339 that juries were still determined to protect and assist people
accused of crimes causing death where they had a credible self-defence story. In that
year, Green refers to an inquest jury’s story of that year in which Simon and Robert
were arguing in the street. Simon struck Robert, wounding him on the upper lip. A
spectator named John then seized a "dorbarre" and struck Simon on the hands, side
and head, killing him.127 The trial jury changed the story perhaps to make it more
believable finding that John had acted in self-defence to save himself from imminent
death. According to the trial jury, Simon and Robert were arguing over some pennies
which Simon owed to Robert. When Simon attempted to strike Robert with a staff,
Robert held it firmly with his hands. Simon drew a knife and stabbed Robert in the
mouth. John witnessed all of this from his shop and then approached both the fighting
men. But when Simon saw John coming, he left Robert and chased John with the
knife. That chase ended with Simon holding John against a wall attempting to kill him.
To prevent his imminent death and because he could not escape, John struck Simon
on the head with the dorbarre he held in his hands and killed Simon. 128
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London Coroners' Rolls, Roll E, no. 35, pp. 162—63 (1325) and C 260/37, no. 7 (1326).
Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 40; Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal
Liability’ (n 26) 677-8. Green noted that ‘[a] trial enrollment is extant only in the case of
Andrew’: Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 40; Green, ‘Societal Concepts of
Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677-8. This is because ‘according to the coroner's roll, Andrew and a
certain Robert le Raykere, who had "aided and abetted" the felony, were immediately
captured; Agnes and Geoffrey fled’: Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 40 n 37;
Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677-8 n 32.
C 260/50, no. 60 (1339). John, son of Robert de Uptone, was tried in 1339 for the death of
Simon Chaucer. Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 435 n 80; Green,
‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 681.
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Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 435 n 80; Green, ‘Societal
Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 681.
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In 1340, King Edward III (reigned 1327-1377) passed a statute to abolish the rule
known as Englishry under which the local hundred had to pay a severe fine if a
foreigner was found dead within their geography and no one had been held
responsible.129 The rule had protected the Danish occupiers under Cnut and had been
adopted by the Normans in favour of the French after their invasion in 1066. 130 This
statute effectively eliminated the distinction between voluntary homicide in general and
murder.131 This adjustment in the law relating to murder was followed by a further
adjustment in 1348 when a further statute was passed to prevent the execution of
people who were convicted of killing in self-defence, though their goods were still
forfeit to the Crown in consequence of the killing.132

129

14 Edw. III, st. 1. c. 4. The statute provides:
ITEM, Because many Mischiefs have happened in divers Counties of England, which had no
Knowledge of Presentment of Engleschrie, whereby the Commons of the Counties were often
amerced before the Justices in Eyre, to the great Mischief of the People ; It is assented, That
from henceforth no Justice Errant shall put in any Article, (') Opposition, Presentment of
Engleschrie against the Commons of the Counties, nor against any of them; but that
Engleschrie and Presentment of the same, be wholly out and void forever, so that no Person
by this Cause may be from henceforth impeached.

Statutes of the Realm. Volume 1, 282.
The effect of a presentment of Englishry was to free the hundred from the fine which was
to be paid if the presumption that the person slain was a Frenchman was not removed. The
fine was called murdrum as well as the offence. Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 31, 40. See also
Coldiron (n 93) 529.
130

131

The difference between homicide and murder was that in cases of murder a presentment
of Englishry was required, in the absence of which the person found killed was presumed to
be a Frenchman (Norman), and the township was fined. See generally Stephen (n 92) vol 3,
ch 26; Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (n 11) ch 1; Coldiron (n 93); Yntema
(n 93). Coldiron stated:
With the passage of this Act the technical difference between voluntary homicide and "murder"
was abolished. But "murdrum" continued in the law, not to indicate a technical fine, but to
distinguish secret slayings by ambush, by waylaying, and by other foul means, from other types
of felonious homicides. Thus, one more step in the break between murder and manslaughter
was complete: Coldiron (n 93) 532 (citations omitted).

21 Edw. III. Sir James Stephen produced the following note from ‘the Year-book, 21 Edw.
3, p. 17B. (A.D. 1348)’
132

Note-That a man was convicted of having killed another in self-defence, and, notwithstanding,
his chattels were forfeited, though his life is safe. The reason is, that at common law a man was
hanged in this case as much as if he had done it feloniously, and, although by the statute
(Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 25) the king has spared his life, his goods remain under the common
law.

54

Despite these statutory reforms in homicide cases, Green records that juries
maintained their determination to protect persons accused of homicide in self-defence
cases with supportive stories, perhaps to avoid the forfeiture of their goods that still
followed any killing in the absence of an acquittal. Thus in 1348, when Thomas and
Richard had an argument and William came to aid his brother Thomas, the inquest
jury found that William had no choice but to draw a knife and stab Richard in the back.
The trial jury added that William had no other option in defending himself in the melee
that followed, though in their version of the story, Richard was fatally stabbed in the
stomach.133
In 1356 even coroner’s juries were lenient. For example, in one case, Walter and
Thomas were began arguing in a cart, Thomas jumped out of the cart and then tried
to stab Walter with an iron fork. Walter’s successful self-defence was that he had
parried Thomas’ thrust with the fork and stabbed Thomas’ left arm with a knife, the
blow being unfortunately fatal.134 The continued jury practice of leniency appears to

Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 41. However, this “[n]ote” was described by Sir James Stephen
as “remarkable passage” because ‘in the course of the eighty-one years, between the Statute
of Marlbridge (1267) and 21 Edw. III (1348), the old law had been completely forgotten’: at 401. Sir James Stephen has also argued that the Statute of Marlbridge has been invoked in selfdefence cases because of a “mistake” in understanding its meaning. He explained the mistake
as follows:
The words " Murdrum de cetero non adjudicetur coram justiciariis ubi infortunium tantummodo
adjudicetur" must have been construed, " Killing by misadventure shall not be held before the
justices to be murder," in ignorance of the fact that " murder" meant the fine on the township.
The recital of the statute of 1340 abolishing Englishry shows how natural the mistake was: at
42 (emphasis in original).

He further explained that ‘this mistake had the practical result of the Statute of attaching
forfeiture of goods to a verdict of “se defendendo”’: at 42 (emphasis in original). The Statutes
of the Realm do not contain the text of this statute.
The coroner’s role: 9 J.I. 3. 134, m.41/4 (1348). Thomas and Richard were having an
argument. William came to the aid of his brother, Thomas. William drew a knife and stabbed
Richard in the back. The Cambridge trial jury told the Court that not only had William stabbed
Richard as he had no other options, but the jury also found that Ricard died of a wound to his
stomach. Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability for Homicide in Medieval England’ (n
26) 682.
133

JUST 2/18, m.45d/5 (1356). Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 431
n 67; Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677; Green, Verdict According to
Conscience (n 77) 39. The trial record ‘has not been located’. ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal
Liability’ (n 26) 677 (n 26); Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 39 n 31.
134
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have been the reason for King Edward III’s additional statute in 1357 to specifically to
deal with
Manslayers and Manslaughters, Robbers and slaughters, Robberies, Trespasses and
Trespassers.135

It specifically stated that pardons should not be granted except in Parliament or
Council and felonies must be specified in Pardons.136 But that new statute did not
make clear how manslayers and manslaughters were to be distinguished from one
another.137 What does seem likely is that the kingsmen (his knights in Parliament) were
trying to impose the king’s will upon the lesser men who had been summoned for jury
service in the country, and who continued to assist defendants with acquittals in
homicide cases when there was any hint of self-defence. Even if juries knew about the
new statute, at least one jury appears to have ignored it and continued to exercise
their lenient practice again one year later in 1358, when they told the court that the
defendant had stabbed the victim with a knife because he thought he wanted to kill
him.138
In 1361 juries continued to be content to support the defendant’s case and leave the
law alone. When James and John were fighting, Alice, James’ wife, tried to save
James and in so doing killed John. The trial jury told the court that Alice had killed
John when she was defending both herself and her husband.139 Another incident
135

31 Edw. III. Stat.4, c. 5. Statutes of the Realm. Volume 1, 358-9.

136

31 Edw. III. Stat.4, c. 6. Statutes of the Realm. Volume 1, 359.

137

It is possible but not certain that that distinction was made upon whether killing was or
without malice aforethought – that is - a person who killed his victim with malice aforethought
was a manslayer, and a person who killed his victim without malice aforethought was a
manslaughterer.
J.I. 2. 18, m.47d/4 (1358). Hugh and John were both chaplains. Hugh took John with his
hands and “threw him feloniously” at his feet wanting to kill him. John thought Hugh wanted to
kill him, so John drew a knife and stabbed Hugh in the chest. Green, ‘Societal Concepts of
Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677; Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 39. The trial
enrollment (C 47, Cambridge, 6/87) is incomplete but the complete parts ‘indicate a classic
form of self-defense’. Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677 n 27; Green,
Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 39 n 32, n 33.
138

C. 9260/792 no. 15. (1361). Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 681. In
the ‘coroner’s indictment copied in gaol delivery roll … there was no mention [that Alice killed
John] in self-defence’: at 681-2.
139
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recorded by Green occurred in 1363. The defendant, Robert, was fearful that the
victim, William, would kill him when he tried to draw a knife, and so struck William on
the head with a hatchet, killing him.140 Robert was pardoned for self-defence in
1367.141
In 1365, jurors had to provide an elaborate story to the coroner to save a defendant
from an uncertain fate. Ruskin started a fight with William de Assheby but got in trouble
and his servant Sydenfen rushed to his aid. The jury told the coroner that William de
Assheby was acting in self-defense when he fatally stabbed Sydenfe.142 A case for
self-defence was also maintained by a jury in 1380 when there was little evidence that
the victim had produced a weapon with which to injure the defendant.143
In Green’s account, jury steadfastness continued to 1389 when the Commons
intervened to suggest by petition that the king’s exceptions were not wide enough.
Their petition suggested that pardons should not be granted in cases of intentional
and premeditated killings, and the king responded with another statute. 144 This time

JUST 2/102, m.9/2 (1363). Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 432
n 67; Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 676 n 23, n 24.
140

141

Green was unable to locate the trial record, but citing the ‘Calendar of the Patent Rolls,
1232-1422 (London, 1906), May 6, 1367, p. 395’, he stated that Robert was pardoned for selfdefense. Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 676 n 24. See also Green, ‘The
Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 431 n 67.
142

J.I. 2. 53, m.3d/4 (1365). Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 39-40; Green,
‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677 n 29. Green also stated ‘[w]hen Assheby
came to trial he already had a pardon’: Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 40 n
35 (citations omitted).
143

J.I. 2. 58, m.4/2 (1380). In this case, after the victim threw the defendant to the ground, the
defendant killed him. But there was no evidence that the victim used or attempted to use any
weapon. Nevertheless, the jury decided that the defendant killed the victim in self-defence.
Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 677 n 27; Green, Verdict According to
Conscience (n 77) 39 n 33.
144

13 Rich. II, s.2 C.1. It provided:
Our lord the king…hearing the grievous complaint of his said Commons…of the outrageous
mischiefs and damages which have happened to his said realm, for that treasons, murders
[murdres], and rapes of women be commonly done and committed, and the more because
charters of pardon have been easily granted in such cases…the king…hath granted, that no
charter of pardon from henceforth shall be allowed before any justice for murder, or for the
death of a man slain by await, assault or malice prepensed [murdre mort de homme occys per
agayt assaut ou malice prepense] …unless the same…be specified in the same charter.
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the "malice aforethought" words from the king’s formal pardon documents were used
in statute for the first time,145 and distinguished between killing with malice
aforethought and other forms of homicide.146 Plucknett has explained the distinction
and context as follows:
[I]n 1390 the Commons secured a statute which recognised certain pardons as issuing
from the Chancery as a matter of course (no doubt cases of self-defence or
misadventure); with these the statute contrasts pardons for ‘murders done in await,
assault, or malice prepense’. In such cases pardons were subject to almost impossible
conditions. The pardoning power in other cases was not touched, and so the Crown
retained its normal powers and procedure for pardoning homicide, except cases of
what we may call wilful murder.147

The language of the new statute confirmed that the king remained determined to
enforce his principle that all killings should result in a conviction and that he alone had
the authority to grant a pardon. He was unhappy with the fact that juries continued to
acquit persons accused of homicide in self-defence cases, so the Commons proposed
he reform the law to re-assure juries that pardons would only be denied in cases of
premeditation. Indeed, it appears that the Commons suggested that the king delegate
the pardon right to his Chancellor, who would then apply standard rules. But the standoff continued.
Thus, from their inception as an institution in what became English criminal law, trial
juries were prepared to act to provide justice even though it was fundamentally at odds
with the letter of the king’s law as understood both by the king and his justices. Juries
understood that they were neither to convict nor acquit but to make special findings
McBain (n 106) 55 (emphasis in original). See also Parker (n 11) 73. See the full text of the
statute at the Statues of the Realm, Volume 2, 68-9.
Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 43, referring to the statute of 13 Rich. II, s.2 C.1. William
Coldiron has argued that this development even if it is correct, it is not important. Coldiron (n
93) 532.
145
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Dixon (n 93) 65. Sir Owen Dixon has suggested that:
This statute upon a petition by the Commons against the practice of pardoning felony in
advance. It enacted that no charter of pardon should be allowed by justices if it was found that
homicide was by ambush, assault or premediated malice unless the pardon specifically
extended to such a case: at 65.

147

Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (n 11) 474-5.
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that the accused had acted in self-defence in appropriate cases. They persisted in
their protection of those who had killed in self-defence throughout the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries with “no alternative but to kill’ findings. They simply did not trust
that the king would pardon these defendants, and they also protected many
defendants from having their property and goods forfeited in the process. The jury
used its unreviewable power, part of which was a consequence of community social
attitudes. One aspect of that attitude was that from about the late Anglo-Saxon times
to about the end of middle ages a difference was perceived between what we call
manslaughter and premeditated murder.148 Medieval communities also perceived a
difference between types of homicide.149 The community also had a deep
understanding of chivalry and honour; a noble and dignified person did not run away
when confronted. We may misunderstand the chivalry/honour system as a species of
pride. But to get inside the minds of 13th and 14th century juries we must understand it
more intimately than that. It may help to remember that George Washington’s Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton died in a duel with Aaron Burr, a later Vice President,
over a trivial matter of honour. If this idea of chivalry or honour was alive enough for
educated men of the 19th century to fight to the death, it is easier to understand why
the nobles and knights and other free men who made up juries in England in the 14th
century should have been more empathetic than the king who simply wanted to
establish law and order through his realm. No one ever challenged the king to a duel.
The foregoing self-defence cases also suggest that self-defence principles such as
intention, imminence, necessity, proportionality and reasonableness, which remain
relevant in self-defence cases, were taken into account by judges and juries after
1200. The juries used their independence from judicial control to make criminal legal
practice conform to common sense. Judges did not have the social power to force the
juries to conform to the rule that issues of self-defence should be indicated and left to
the king. Thus although judges protested from time to time, lest the king thought them
lame, jury popularity and the common sense results they produced, obliged the judges
to go along with them.
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Green, ‘Societal Concepts of Criminal Liability’ (n 26) 669.
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Ibid 682-3.
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We

come

now

to

the

next

step

when,

by

enacting

four

statutes

in

1496,1501512,1511531152 and 1547,153 a “definite break” between murder and
manslaughter took place.154 Those statutes also incrementally excluded the benefit of
clergy155 in cases in which homicides had been committed with "malice aforethought.”
‘It was upon these statutes that the distinction between murder and manslaughter
rested.’156 These statutes however ‘did not provide a new crime’.157 All they did was
make homicide a capital offence when it was committed ‘with a particular kind of mens
rea’158 – that is – when the intention to do the fatal act was made in advance of the
12 Hen. VII, c. 7 (1496). Statutes of the Realm. Volume 2, 639. The expressions used were
‘"wilful prepensed murders," "prepensedly murder"’. Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 44; Pekins
‘Re-examination of Malice Aforethought’ (n 93) 543-4 n 61.
150

4 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1512). Statutes of the Realm. Volume 3, page 49. The expression used
was ‘“murder upon malice prepensed"’. Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 44; ‘Re-examination of
Malice Aforethought’ (n 93) 543-4 n 61.
151

152

23 Hen. VIII, c. 1, sec.1-4 (1531). Statutes of the Realm. Volume 3, page 362-3. The
expression used was ‘"wilful murder of malice prepensed"’. Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 44;
‘Re-examination of Malice Aforethought’ (n 93), 543-4 n 61.
153

1 Edw VI, c. 12, sec. 10 (1547). Statutes of the Realm. Volume 4, page 20-21. The
expression used ‘"murder of malice prepensed”’. Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 44; Perkins, ‘Reexamination of Malice Aforethought’ (n 93) 542-3 n 61.
154

Dixon (n 93) 66. See also Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 44.
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The benefit of clergy was abolished in 1827 by 7 and 8 Geo. IV., c. 28. Stephen (n 22) vol
1, 471. See also Arthur Lyon Cross, ‘The English Criminal Law and Benefit of Clergy during
the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century’ (Apr., 1917) 22 The American Historical Review
544, 564-5. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the benefit of clergy in detail. A
comprehensive analysis of the "benefit of clergy" can be found in J. Bellamy, Criminal Law
and Society in Late Medieval and Tudor England (Palgrave Macmillan, 1st ed, 1984) 115-164.
See also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) (Lonang
Institute, 2010) bk 4, ch 28; Pollock and Maitland (n 40) vol 1, 259-264; Maitland The
Constitutional History of England (n 11) 229-230; William Holdsworth, A History of English
Law (Methuen & Co, Ltd., 1923) vol 3, 293-302. See generally Jeffery (n 2); Arthur Lyon Cross,
‘The English Criminal Law and Benefit of Clergy during the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth
Century’ (Apr., 1917) 22 (No 3) The American Historical Review 544. Green, ‘The Jury and
the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53); J Earll Miller, A History of Benefit of Clergy in England:
With Special Reference to the Period between 1066 and 1377 (Thesis Submitted in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, Graduate
School of the University of Illinois, 1917).
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Dixon (n 93) 66. See also Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 44.
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Dixon (n 93) 66.
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Ibid.
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offence that was committed.159 James Stephen described the law at that stage as
follows:
We have thus arrived at the point at which homicide was finally divided into two main
branches, namely, murder which is unlawful killing with malice aforethought, and
homicide in general, which is unlawful killing without malice aforethought, the one
offence being within, the other without, benefit of clergy.160

Sir James Stephen did not elaborate further in the above quote, but it can be inferred
from the text of the above statutes that what he meant was that a person who could
prove that he was a member of the clergy who was accused of unlawful killing with
malice aforethought could not claim the benefit of clergy and so have his case heard
in an ecclesiastical court. However, a manslaughter charge could still be heard in an
ecclesiastical court if the accused could prove that he was a member of the clergy. In
practice though, it was unlikely that these cases would ever have come before an
ecclesiastical court because it was unlikely that manslaughter was ever the primary
charge even after this distinction was recognised in statute. Even now in homicide
cases, manslaughter is always treated as a secondary fallback charge if the murder
charge is not proven. And if murder was charged as already explained, the matter
would not be referred to an ecclesiastical court.

159

In 1603 stabbing between the Scotch and the English became frequent causing King James
to enact the Stabbing Statute which took away the benefit of clergy from some kinds of
manslaughter - “rage drunkennesse hidden displeasure, or other passion of minde”, but
maintained the benefit for acts committed in self-defence or misadventure. See 1 Jac. I, C.8.
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 4, 1026. Coldiron has suggested that:
It is generally agreed that this statute was an attempt to make a crime of murder, with malice
prepensed, out of circumstances which might only justify a conviction of "chance medley". This
was an important distinction at this time because murder with malice prepensed had been
ousted of the benefit of clergy by the above-mentioned statutes and thus a conviction for that
crime meant death. But "chance medley" or other homicides were clergyable and called only
for a branding on the brawn of the thumb and imprisonment for the maximum of one year.

Coldiron (n 93) 534 (citations omitted).
160

Stephen (n 92) vol 3, ch 26, 45.
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Green says ‘[t]here are no gaol delivery or criminal assize rolls for most of the fifteenth
century or the first half of the sixteenth century’.161 Green also says that Salisbury’s
case in 1553 is the ‘earliest reported [jury] verdict of manslaughter’.162 In this case,
John Vane Salisbury had joined a fight which was already underway.163 Why he joined
the fight is unclear, but he wound up being one of the four defendants indicted for
murdering Ellis. The Court directed:
[I]f the jury found Salisbury "did not have malice aforethought ["malice prepense"], but
suddenly ["sodeynement"] took part with those who had malice aforethought, this
would be manslaughter in him and not murder, because he did not have malice
aforethought.164

The jury convicted the other three of murder but convicted Salisbury of manslaughter
because he had not participated with malice aforethought.165 Upon the jury’s verdict

Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 121 n 62. Green further says ‘[i]n the late
sixteenth century, there were still cases ending in verdicts of self-defense and, apparently, an
order that the defendant obtain a pardon’: at 123 n 72.
161

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 485. Citing Kaye (n 96), Green
also says that Kaye also believed that the first time that a court distinguished murder from
manslaughter is in Salisbury’s case: at 485 n 258 (citations omitted). But Graham McBaine
stated that there was a case in 1348 where it was held ‘that the killing of a third party
peacemaker who intervened in a brawl was manslaughter.’ McBain (n 106) 52.
162

Salisbury’s case is sometimes cited as the oldest case when discussing or arguing the
Doctrine of Transferred Malice. See generally William L. Prosser, ‘Transferred Intent’ (1967)
45 Tex. L. Rev. 650, 652; Anthony M. Dillof, ‘Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Criminal Culpability’ (1998) 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 501, 504; Mitchell Keiter, ‘With Malice
Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes Transferred Intent and Attempted
Murder Law’ (2004) 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 261, 268.
163

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 484 (citations omitted). John
Reeves stated what occurred in the following terms:
164

The jury upon the trial put this question, with relation to one of several that were indicted for
murder, Whether if the defendant was in company with them who of malice prepense killed the
deceased, and when he saw them combating together, took part with them suddenly, without
any malice prepense, and struck the deceased, together with the others, he was guilty of
murder or manslaughter? to which the court answered, if he had no malice prepense, but
suddenly took part with those who had, it was manslaughter, and not murder.

John Reeves, History of English Law, from the Time of the Romans to the End of the Reign of
Elizabeth (London: Reeves & Turner, 1869) vol 5, ch 32, 133 (emphasis in original).
Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 484. Edmund Morgan asserts
that the jury in this case returned special findings because notwithstanding that Salisbury had
committed the act, there was no criminality committed on his part. Morgan (n 54) 581. John
165
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the judges debated among themselves how to sentence Salisbury and whether he
might have killed Ellis in self-defence,166 and so they came face to face with the same
dilemma that juries had been facing for the previous 250 years. Green has asserted
that the decision in Salisbury’s case “reveals” both the judicial application of the
statutory manslaughter distinction and “the fact” that the distinction was unnecessary
because the accused was unable to plead clergy ‘for whatever reason’.167 The judicial
application of the statutes governing murder excluded clergy from the manslaughter
offence and ‘accessories, therefore, lost access to the benefit of clergy as well as
principal offenders’.168 Therefore, if someone was accused of murder with malice
aforethought they could not claim benefit of clergy and it was left to the jury to redeem
persons they considered falsely or unfairly accused. The gradual removal of benefit of

Reeves however had written that ‘[w]hat was finally done in this case does not appear’.
Reeves (n 164) vol 5, ch 32, 134.
166

John Reeves gave this interesting account upon the jury verdict:
Upon this, it was privately debated upon the bench, whether he should be entirely acquitted by
this verdict, inasmuch as he was arraigned of murder, and was acquitted thereof; or whether
he should have judgment to be hanged for the manslaughter; or, thirdly, whether this verdict
should serve for an indictment of manslaughter, or what else should be done: and it was clearly
the opinion of the whole court, that they might give judgment against him to be hanged for the
manslaughter. In support of this, they said, that the jury might give a verdict at large, and find
the whole matter; as if one was arraigned of the death of a man, and he pleaded not guilty, the
jury might find that he killed him in his own defence.

Reeves (n 164) vol 5, ch 32, 134.
Green says that Salisbury in the end ‘was reprieved because of the Court's doubt as to the
effect of a variance between the verdict and the indictment’. Green, ‘The Jury and the English
Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 484. Reeves, however, says ‘[w]hat was finally done in this case does
not appear’. Reeves (n 165) vol 5, ch 32, 134.
Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 484. But Green does not further
elaborate on this point except when he was referring to some inconsistency between the
indictment and the verdict, he stated:
167

I believe we may fairly infer that, had Salisbury been literate, the point would have been moot.
At the worst, the verdict of manslaughter would have forced him to plead his clergy and be
branded before going free.

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 484.
168

Dixon (n 93) 66.
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clergy in cases of serious crime can be seen in legislation during the reign of Queen
Mary who briefly restored Catholicism as the established religion of England.169
Thus we see that all the English monarchs from the fourteenth to the 16th century saw
perverse juries as an impediment to their obligation to punish homicidal killers and to
generally enforce the law in pursuit of peace in society. To the extent that juries
prevented that, they were obstacles to the peaceful development of society. But
because they could not be visibly coerced, monarch after monarch passed clarifying
statutes confirming that all homicides required a conviction and that it was for the
monarch to decide on any appropriate remission of penalty including pardon as an act
of discretionary clemency. 170 But none of those statutes convinced the jury that royal
pardon could be relied on in a single case and juries continued to acquit
manslaughterers on almost any pretext they chose if they felt a whiff of justification.
Absent incontrovertible proof of jury corruption, all jurors safely sheltered behind their
corporate shield.
It is also significant to observe that in the text of all of the statutes those monarchs
passed, the word “homicidis” or “homycides”, only bear one meaning, manslaughter
or manslayer.171 “Murdres” or “murdris” always meant what we would call premeditated

169

See, eg, 4&5 Phil & Mar. c.4, sect.1. Statutes of the Realm: Volume 4, page 322.

170

See, eg, Statutes of the Realm: Volume 1: 1235-1357, 1328: 2 Edw. III. c. 2 (pp 257-258),
1330: 4 Edw. III. c. 13 (p 264), 1336: 10 Edw. III. c. 2 (p 275), 1340: 14 Edw. III. Stat. 1. c. 15
(p 286), 1357: 31 Edw. III. Stat. 4, c. 6 (p 359); Volume 2: 1377-1504, 1389-90: 13 Ric. II. Stat.
2. c. 1 (pp 68-9), 1392-3: 16 Ric. II. c. 6 (pp 86-7), Volume 3: 1509-1545, 1523: 14&15 Hen.
VIII c. 16 (p 242), 1530-31: 22 Hen. VIII c.14, sec. 5 (p 334), 1533-34: 25 Hen. VIII. c. 32 (p
489), 1536: 28 Hen. VIII. c. 41 (p 701).
For a statistical and historical view of the Statutes of the Realm see generally William Tayler,
‘A Statistical and Historical View of the Statute Law of the Realm, and of the Number of
Statutes Passed in Each Reign from the Earliest Recorded Period to the Present Time’ (1854)
17 (2) Journal of the Statistical Society of London 143.
171

See, eg, Statutes of the Realm: Volume 1: 1235-1357, 1328: 2 Edw. III. c. 2 (pp 257-258),
1330: 4 Edw. III. c. 13 (p 264), 1336: 10 Edw. III. c. 2 (p 275), 1340: 14 Edw. III. Stat. 1. c. 15
(p 286), 28 Edw. III. c. 11 (p 347), 1357: 31 Edw. III. Stat.4, c. 5 (p 358), 1357: 31 Edw. III.
Stat.4, c. 6 (p 359); Volume 2: 1377-1504, 1383: 7 Rih. II. c. 6 (p 33), 1399: 1 Hen. IV. c.18
(pp 118-9), 1414: 2 Hen. V. Stat. 1 c. 4-6 (pp 176-8), 2 Hen. V. Stat. 1 c. 9 (p 186), 1421: 9
Hen. V. c. 2 (p 204), 9 Hen. Stat. 1 c. 7 (pp 206-7), 1422: 1 Hen. VI. c. 3 (p 214), 1429: 8 Hen.
VI. c. 7 (p 243), 8 Hen. VI. c. 14 (pp 250-2), 1435: 14 Hen. VI. c. 8 (p 294), 1439: 18 Hen. VI.
c.13 (pp 310-1), 1441-2: 20 Hen. VI. c. 2 (p 317), 20 Hen. VI. c. 11 (p 323), 1444-5: 20 Hen.
VI. c. 7 (pp 332-4).
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murder.172 This drafting distinction was not a historical accident.173 It was the result of
pedantic accuracy by careful draftsmen.174 Both the parliamentarians and the kings’
advisors wanted juries to know that there was a difference between intentional murder
and manslaughter without premeditation so that those juries could, and should, rely
and allow the king to do his divine duty to judge and pardon his people when required.
But jury popularity and acquittal practice stymied the legal drafters for more than three
centuries.
Though the detailed reasons for jury acquittals are not always clear, the unmistakable
common thread is that juries for centuries were concerned that the king would not
pardon persons accused of murder where the jury said the death occurred in selfdefence and was not murder. The statutes passed by successive kings about
distinctions between the various types of homicide should thus be seen both as an
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See, eg, Statutes of the Realm: Volume 1: 1235-1357, 1328: 2 Edw. III. c. 2 (pp 257-258),
1330: 4 Edw. III. c. 13 (p 264), 1336: 10 Edw. III. c. 2 (p 275), 1340: 14 Edw. III. Stat. 1. c. 15
(p 286), 28 Edw. III. c. 11 (p 347), 1357: 31 Edw. III. Stat.4, c. 5 (p 358), 1357: 31 Edw. III.
Stat.4, c. 6 (p 359); Volume 2: 1377-1504, 1383: 7 Rih. II. c. 6 (p 33), 1399: 1 Hen. IV. c.18
(pp 118-9), 1414: 2 Hen. V. Stat. 1 c. 4-6 (pp 176-8), 2 Hen. V. Stat. 1 c. 9 (p 186), 1421: 9
Hen. V. c. 2 (p 204), 9 Hen. Stat. 1 c. 7 (pp 206-7), 1422: 1 Hen. VI. c. 3 (p 214), 1429: 8 Hen.
VI. c. 7 (p 243), 8 Hen. VI. c. 14 (pp 250-2), 1435: 14 Hen. VI. c. 8 (p 294), 1439: 18 Hen. VI.
c.13 (pp 310-1), 1441-2: 20 Hen. VI. c. 2 (p 317), 20 Hen. VI. c. 11 (p 323), 1444-5: 20 Hen.
VI. c. 7 (pp 332-4).
McBain has noted:
The English word ‘homicide’ derives from the latin - from homo and caedes, the killing of a man.
In earlier times, homicide was synonymous with the English [sic] word ‘manslaughter’ and both
were used in contra-distinction to murder (premeditated killing) to cover any other type of killing
of one man by another - such as accidental, negligent or reckless killing, as well as killing in
self-defence or subsequent to provocation.

McBain (n 106) 14-5 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Michael Prestwish noted ‘[t]he question of who was responsible for the statutes is not an
easy one. The drafting of statutes was a technical business, and the range and complexity of
many suggest that it is a mistake to look for a single author’. Michael Prestwich, Edward I
(Yale University Press, 1997) ch 10, 269. At some point in time, judges were involved in
drafting those statutes and no doubt later they left their marks on other subsequent drafters.
Prestwich has given the following account as how judges were involved in drafting statutes:
173

Argument in court in 1311 about the interpretation of the first clause of the statute of
Westminster II of 1285 led Chief justice Bereford to set out what he believed 'he that made the
statute intended’. Earlier, in discussions about a different clause of the same statute, Chief
Justice Hengham had expostulated, '’Do not gloss the statute: we know it better than you, for
we made it”: at 270.
174

Theodore Plucknett, Statutes and their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth
Century (Cambridge at the University Press, 1922) 111.
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affirmation of jury pressure on English monarchs and their parliaments, and as a
succession of attempt to appease those juries with more palatable conviction choices.
By the 15th century it was well established that trial juries did not need to be, and
indeed should not be, self-informing. But by this time even inquest juries were
becoming independent as professional prosecutors began to perform the old functions
of the accusing jury. Langbein has argued that it is not clear why jury independence
continued to develop and led to the emergence of prosecution during the middle of the
16th century.175

However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that professional

prosecution was intended to remove the need for self-informing juries and to insist that
all juries be genuinely independent, without previous personal knowledge of the facts
so that proper convictions might be recorded without contrivance of any kind.
By 1554, management of the trial had thus become the responsibility of the
prosecution176 and the bench.177 Because attempts to control the jury and have them

175

Langbein has written:
The breakdown of the medieval system, the transformation of active medieval juries into
passive courtroom triers, is not well understood either in its timing or its causes. Probably in the
later fifteenth century, but certainly by the sixteenth, it had become expectable that jurors would
be ignorant of the crimes that they tried.

John H. Langbein, ‘The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers’ (1978) 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 299
n 105 (citations omitted).
176

Langbein states:
The public prosecutor in Anglo-American criminal procedure performs two primary functions.
One is investigatorial-evidence gathering-and this has no firm border with the higher levels of
the policing function. The other is the forensic prosecutorial role- presenting the evidence to the
trier (incident to which has developed the power to decide whether to prosecute).

John H. Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (1973) 17 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 313, 313 (emphasis in original).
177

Green states that was because:
The Marian bail and committal statutes of 1554 and 1555 required justices of the peace to
formulate depositions based on pretrial witness testimony, and these depositions were
available to the court. They allowed the bench to play an active role in questioning witnesses
and the defendant. Responsibility for management of the trial was divided between prosecution
and bench; the prosecutor produced witnesses and their prepared depositions, while the judge
put questions to all parties and controlled the structure of, and time allocation for, courtroom
debate.

Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 489-90 (citations omitted).
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to do their duty without embellishment had utterly failed, more serious reform was
essential. The structure of the jury trial was itself therefore changed. The self-informing
jury was broken down by design so that juries could only be independent triers of fact.
The jury itself was still too popular to be abolished in favour of judge alone trials. But
its independence had been turned on its head. Anything that might suggest jury
partiality was scrupulously made illegal and jury independence became jury
impartiality. The jury room itself was still inviolable, but individual misbehaviour could
be punished as a departure from the new independence standard. The aggrieved
person no longer provided information to the jury outside the court and the jury was
no longer self-informed. But aggrieved persons sometimes did not survive to
prosecute or decline to prosecute.178 Because the Crown was not prepared to ignore
these abuses of the English criminal justice system, the Crown seized control of the
trial by making prosecution an official state function.179 It is not insignificant that these
were Marian reforms. This was the short period when Catholics reasserted themselves
but were regularly found murdered without trace of the assassins.
To ensure her supporters were protected by law, Queen Mary passed two new
statutes, the Marian bail statute180 and the Marian committal statute.181 Justices of
peace became public prosecutors for felony and forerunners of modern prosecutors
and that system began to be formalised under Queen Mary.182 Justices of the peace

178

Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (n 176) 318.
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Ibid.

180

1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 13 (1554-55). See statute text in the Statutes of the Realm Volume 4
page 259.
181

2 & 3 Phil. & Mar. c. 10 (1555). See statute text in the Statutes of the Realm Volume 4 page
286.
Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (n 176) 318. Langbein
states:
182

The JPs originated in the fourteenth century as law enforcers, "keepers of the peace," foremost
among whose duties was the arrest of vagabonds and rioters. By mid-century the "keepers"
were "justices": sitting collectively in their quarterly sessions they comprised a law court for
criminal matters. In the fifteenth century the JPs' criminal trial jurisdiction was very extensive.
Felons were routinely indicted, convicted and executed at sessions of the peace. By the midsixteenth century, however, it was rare for the JPs to try felons. The assize system had been
revitalized, and felony cases were generally being held for trial before the royal judges on their
periodic circuit: at 318-9.
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were chosen because ‘well before the Marian statutes the justices of the peace were
the officers to whom aggrieved citizens would make complaint of serious crime’.183 But
though the intent was clearly to isolate jury opinion and prejudice, Green asserts that
it was still several centuries before jurors could be excluded because they knew
something of the facts personally.184 Indeed, it is doubtful that Queen Mary considered
it possible that she could abolish jury prejudice. Her more modest agenda was to
appoint public officials whom she could control and who would insist that even
unpopular prosecutions should proceed.
These Marian Statutes did not completely abolish private citizens’ prosecutions. They
only made justices of the peace back-up prosecutors in case there were no private
accuser or in case the evidence was insufficient to prosecute. The new statutes
enabled Queen Mary’s officials to force her justices of the peace to ‘investigate, bind
witnesses, and appear at assizes to orchestrate prosecution’.185 At the trial justices of
the peace would not only testify about their investigations, but they would also crossexamine the accused before the jury.186 Green made several arguments in relation to
the two Marian Statutes. He argued that the two Marian Statutes assured the public
that:
[T]here would be an official version of the case available to judge and jury and that
witnesses would be bound over to give evidence against the accused. The interest in
evidence meant that the jury was no longer to be self-informing; the presentation of
evidence prompted judicial commentary together with the charge to the jury.187

See generally Anthony Verduyn, ‘The Politics of Law and Order during the Early Years of
Edward III’ (1993) 108 The English Historical Review 842; Bertha Haven Putnam, ‘The
Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into the Justices of the Peace 1327-1380’ (1929)
12 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 19.
183
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Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (n 176) 319.
Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 18.
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Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (n 176) 319.
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Ibid.

Robert C. Palmer, ‘Review: Conscience and the Law: The English Criminal Jury Reviewed
Work(s): Verdict According to Conscience by Thomas Andrew Green’ (1986) 84 Michigan Law
Review 787, 788-9. See also Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 48990.
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While 16th century juries after the Marian Statutes were passed were not yet excluded
from trial if they possessed personal knowledge, Green explains that the development
of the role of public prosecutor reduced jury discretion.188 The function of the jury
became determinative, not informative. The establishment of an official prosecution
created a balance of power between the jury and the judge because the jury was no
longer in control of the production of evidence or procedure.189 And because the jury
lost those controls, it could no longer conceal or alter the evidence.190 All the facts
were discussed in the presence of the judge in open court and he was in a better
position to oversee the verdict and whether it was consistent with the evidence.191 The
Marian Statutes indirectly enabled the future possibility that juries could be punished
for perverse verdicts if their findings were inconsistent with the facts, because they
could not find those facts from their own knowledge behind closed doors.
But jury punishment for perversity still lay in the future. Sixteenth century juries could
still rely on private evidence they knew or heard on their own and because of the
success of their predecessors, likely continued to manipulate that evidence in the
interests of the accused behind closed doors.192 There is no 16th century evidence to
show that they were prevented from doing so.193 The jury considered the evidence
presented in court but continued to rely on what its members knew independently. The
jury also maintained the power to give a final verdict.194
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Palmer (n 187) 789.

189

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 490.

Green does not specifically state in that context that the jury were unable to manipulate
evidence in self-defence cases. Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53)
490-1.
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Green stated that the jury “informed itself or confirmed its earlier impressions” and this
practice did not change throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth-century.
Green, Verdict According to Conscience (n 77) 18.
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Green, ‘The Jury and the English Law of Homicide’ (n 53) 490.
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Langbein suggests that the ‘transformation of the active medieval juries into passive
courtroom triers is among the greatest mysteries of English legal history’.195 The
discussion above confirms that there is no mystery surrounding how jury perversity
was gradually controlled by judges after the Marian Statutes established justices of
the peace as crown prosecutors when there was no private information about serious
crime.
After the independence of the jury settled in the 16th century, there were no further
changes. That is, our jury today is really the same as the independent 16th century
jury. England began its experiment with jury involvement in judicial matters in the 12th
century. The institution developed and endured because it was popular, involved local
people and was perceived to deliver a form of justice that was acceptable to the
community. The institutional jury was a key component of the tension that existed
between the definitions of murder and manslaughter, and what entitled a person
accused of crime to an acquittal. Jury involvement ensured that community opinion
dictated trial outcomes, and it also denied the king complete control over punishment
for homicide. It forced the king and the parliament to accept that genuine self-defence
availed killers from guilt and capital punishment.

Conclusion to chapter two
We have seen that the story of self-defence in English law is the story of the
complicated interaction of new institutions in a very lawless time. Criminal law and the
law of torts were not separated until about the early 14th century. Before that there was
no distinction between wrongs between individuals and wrongs committed against the
state, and more specifically “the peace" that the king was trying to establish as his
contribution to the good of English society as a whole. The king’s wish to establish
peace was the foundation of the entire system of criminal procedure and led to its
growth.
We have seen also that the use of the jury in what became criminal trials, was the
result of the Pope’s proclamation at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, that priests
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Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (n 176) 314.
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could no longer be involved in the king’s ordeal trials. Though the Pope probably
intended to secure ecclesiastical jurisdiction and control over matters of sin by this
proclamation, the dexterous experimental development of the jury as a fact deciding
institution by the king and his judges not only created a popular institution, but an
institution that was popularly perceived as a protector of citizen’s rights and liberty.
To regain control over the fate of persons convicted of homicides, successive English
kings passed a variety of statutes. Each of those statutes was designed to convince
juries to let the king decide who should escape capital punishment for homicide by
royal pardon. But because juries did not trust the king to pardon in self-defence cases,
they manipulated the evidence in various ways to protect popular people accused of
homicide if the jury considered they had acted in self-defence, and not by felony or
malice aforethought. By acquitting people accused of homicide or finding that they had
acted in undeniable self-defence, juries ensured that accused persons would escape
punishment altogether or be granted royal pardons.
The line between murder, manslaughter, self-defence, limited guilt or no guilt has thus
always been challenging. Different degrees of homicide developed in large part
because of jury perversity. A distinction between homicide in execution of the law and
homicide by misadventure or self-defence was developed, and the categories of
justifiable homicide and excusable homicide were established as the primary
categories of non-felonious homicide.
Jury perversity and modern impartial fact finding and independence, only came about
after the development of the role of public prosecutor. Though juries did not have to
have personal knowledge of the facts of a case from the 13th century, they were not
excluded from the trial if they did have personal knowledge until perhaps the 18th
century. Juries were popular because they were believed to protect the common man
against excessive executive action. They continued to find ways to protect people
accused of homicide in self-defence cases, even when statutory lines had been clearly
drawn between murder, homicide, and theoretically dictated when an accused person
was entitled to an acquittal.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELFDEFENCE IN AUSTRALIA AT COMMON LAW
THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA AND SELFDEFENCE: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of chapter three of this thesis is to explain the criminal self-defence law
that New South Wales inherited and how it developed during the 20th century. I will
explain that development in two parts.

In part one I discuss the four cases which defined Australian common law on selfdefence between 1958 and 1987 and which recognised a partial defence to murder
which was generally, but not always accurately, described as excessive self-defence.
Three were decided by the High Court of Australia and one by the Privy Council in
England. Those cases are: R v Howe (HC) (‘Howe’),1 Palmer v The Queen (PC)
(‘Palmer’),2 Viro v The Queen (HC) (‘Viro’),3 and Zecevic v Director of Public
Prosecutions (Vic) (HC) (‘Zecevic’).4 I will explain how these cases show the difficulty
that the High Court had in formulating a self-defence test upon which all those judges
could agree and which a jury could understand.5

1

(1958) 100 CLR 448 (‘Howe’).

2

[1971] 1 All ER 1077; AC 814 (‘Palmer’).

3

(1978) 141 CLR 88 (‘Viro’).

4

(1987) 162 CLR 645 (‘Zecevic’).

5

Lord Scarman stated:
Juries are not chosen for their understanding of a logical and phased process leading by
question and answer to a conclusion, but are expected to exercise practical common sense.
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In part two, I discuss the different strains of academic opinon in the commentary that
grew out of consideration of self-defence in these four cases.

I conclude this chapter by summarising where the common law of self-defence in
Australia stood before legislatures began intervening to clarify the defence.

Part One: The High Court of Australia and Self-Defence Cases
The self-defence law complications that now exist and which are unresolved are not
the result of jury pushback. While the existence of self-defence is a result of jury
pushback during the 14th -16th centuries, juries became subject to judges thereafter
and did not further contribute to the development of the common law of self-defence
in England. That was also true in Australia, but it does not mean the Australian
common law of self-defence was settled. In fact for three decades, between 1958 and
1987, the High Court and Privy Council wrestled with the question whether excessive
self-defence entitled a defendant to a complete acquittal, or whether the conviction
should be reduced from murder to manslaughter. The heart of the judicial conflict was
whether modern self-defence law should focus on overall intent or the proportionality
of the self-defence force that was used. Some judges were focused on whether the
accused’s overall intent was determinative – and if there was no intent to kill but just
to self-defend, they considered that an acquittal was appropriate. Other judges were
of the opinion that if the accused used more force than what was necessary, he or she
could not get an acquittal but instead be found guilty of manslaughter.
The issues here are not the same issues that had subliminally concerned juries in
England between the 14th and 16th centuries. Certainly their above ground concern
was with whether the king would pardon or not. But the reason that juries did not want
self-defenders executed was because they were not as culpable as pre-meditated
murderers. However the amount of force they used appears to have been relevant to
jury assessment of their culpability.

R v Hancock [1986] AC 455; 1 All ER 641, 651 (Lord Scarman).
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There are not many reported cases dealing with self-defence during the 18th century
in England. Between Bushell's Case6 in 1670 (‘Bushell’s Case’) and the late 18th
century the English criminal jury trial and the law of self-defence underwent little
significant change.7 There are no relevant reported cases on self-defence ‘of any court
sitting in banc, at least since R v Mawgridge (1707) Keil. 119; 84 E. R. 1107’8 and so
there is not much to say about that period. By the 19th century, the law recognised
different degrees of homicide because juries had succeeded in changing the law so
that manslaughter was recognised as a separate homicide ategory.

Factors or

circumstances such as imminence, an attack, the apprehension of an attack or serious
violence, the reasonableness of that apprehension, and the necessity of using
excessive force in self-defence, remained matters of concern for both judges and
juries when deciding a self-defence case. Judges were giving directions about those
differences. 9 Juries seemed to understand what the judges told them, but they did not
(1670) Vaughan 135; 124 ER 1006 (‘Bushell's Case’). Weinberg-Brodt has summarised the
case as follows:
6

This case involved a habeas corpus petition on behalf of jurors jailed for acquitting William Penn
and William Mead on charges of seditious libel. The acquittals were in defiance of the trial
judge's instructions and, in the trial judge's opinion, against plentiful and manifest evidence to
the contrary. The trial judge, forced to enter the acquittal, fined and jailed the jury for contempt.
The jury was released by Chief Justice Vaughan, who held that juries could never be punished
for their verdicts but sidestepped the question of whether juries have any concomitant "right" to
nullify. In fact, he implied that no such right exists, but that the de facto power to nullify without
fear of punishment is justified only because nullification is not provable. Chief Justice Vaughan
argued that, since criminal juries have the right to deliver general verdicts, a judge cannot
require a jury to give "official" findings of fact. Thus a judge never can "know" what facts a jury
found and therefore never can prove that a jury has nullified. It is always possible that the jury
just interpreted the facts incorrectly, as is its prerogative in criminal cases.

Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, ‘Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures’ (1990) 65 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 825, 829-30 (citations omitted).
Thomas Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial
Jury, 1200-1800 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985) 276.
7

R v Lawson and Forsythe [1986] VR 515, 560 (Ormiston J) (‘Lawson and Forsythe’). A case
which Ormiston J has suggested was resolved on provocation.
8

See, eg, R v Scully (1824) 1 Car. & P. 319; 171 ER 1213 (‘Scully’); R v Dakin (1828) 1 Lew.
166; 168 ER 999; R v Smith (1837) 8 Car. & P. 160; 173 ER 441; R v Bull (1839) 9 Car. & P.
22; 173 ER 723; R v Odgers (1843) 2 M. & Rob. 479 (‘Odgers’); 174 ER 355; R v Hewlett
(1858) 1 F. & F. 91; 175 ER 640; R v Quin (1863) 3 F. & F. 818; 176 ER 374; R v Alexander
Barnsley Konck [1877] 14 Cox C. C. 1. Some of these cases were also considered in Howe
(n 1) when some of the justices of the High Court were reviewing some of the older authorities
which preceded Howe. But these cases were considered not to be authoritative. See Howe (n
1).
9
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always follow what they were told. Juries did not know the facts before the trial, they
heard the facts for the first time in open court and the judge explained the law to them.
Juries started following judicial directions because of this procedural change, but they
were not subservient. They still ignored strong judicial direction and still found accused
persons not guilty even when the judge thought that the defendant was technically
guilty.10 In a way, this was a new and different version of jury independence. Before
the 18th century, juries appear to have been scared that they would be personally

10

Two cases show that despite the strong implication from the judge that the jury could not
find the accused not guilty because of use of unreasonable force, the jury ignored the judge
and found the accused not guilty anyway.
Scully’s Case
The first case occurred in 1824. John Scully went to the police and made a confession that he
had “unfortunately” shot a man walking into his master’s garden. Scully was indicted for
manslaughter. At the end of the trial, the judge directed the jury that a person watching his
master’s garden was not justified “at all” in shooting “at” or “injuring in any way” persons who
come to their premises “even at night” and “even and if he saw them going into his master's
hen-roost.” He further directed the jury that Scully ought first to have considered if he could
apprehend the victim, and Scully ought to have fired only if he was threatened and his life was
in “actual danger.” If the victim was only a trespasser, Scully would be guilty of manslaughter.
Despite these directions, the jury acquitted Scully even though he confessed that he did not
attempt to apprehend the victim, he was not threatened, and his life was not in danger. Scully
(n 9).
The facts of Scully were almost identical to the very well-known case of R v McKay [1957] VR
560 (‘McKay’) (Lowe, Dean JJ, and Smith J dissenting). The High Court in Howe (n 1) adapted
the reasoning of McKay. The outcome of Scully however was remarkably different from the
outcome in McKay.
Odgers Case
The second case occurred in 1843. Both Odgers and the victim were at a bar when Odgers
challenged the victim to a fight. This was prevented by other people at the bar. Sometime
after, the victim and one of his friends challenged Odgers to fight, but they were again
prevented from fighting. Odgers left the bar, but the victim followed him and again challenged
him to a fight. Odgers asked the victim to stand back and retreated a few steps. The victim
refused and a fight ensued during which Odgers struck the victim across the shoulder-blade
with the scythe causing a severe injury. Odgers was indicted for maliciously cutting and
wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Cresswell J in summing up for the jury,
explained that the law had changed. The word maliciously did not mean with premeditated
malice as in murder anymore. It means manslaughter, not murder, under the new law if there
was an intention to commit the mischief unlawfully and without lawful excuse. For a successful
self-defence plea in a case of homicide committed with a deadly weapon, Odgers must have
retreated as far as possible and only used his weapon to avoid “his own destruction.”
Cresswell J told the jury that he found it impossible that the Odgers was forced to use the
scythe. His offence amounted to manslaughter unless the jury really believed that Odgers had
not intended to do grievous bodily harm. The jury found Odgers not guilty. Odgers (n 9).
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punished if they admitted that they had found someone not guilty to save him from
execution.11 By the 19th century juries knew that they were safe from personal
punishment,12 but they also knew that they could still save someone from the scaffold
by a finding of “not guilty” even when a such a finding was unreasonable.13
There was a hiatus in the development of the law of self-defence between 1700 and
1958 because there are no reported cases for a court sitting en banc during this period.
But that all changed in the twentieth century in Australia. Self-defence could involve
both reasonable and unreasonable force. In Howe14 the High Court found that a
person who had used more force than was necessary to repel an unlawful attack and
killed his attacker was guilty of manslaugter, not murder. If the force used to repel the
attack was reasonable, then he would have been entitled to an acquital.15 The High
11

Jury attainder for making a false verdict was always a possibility. The history of jury
attainder, however, is unclear. Edmund Morgan described it as follows:
It seems that provision was made for punishing those who rendered a false verdict or false
judgment before it was conceived that the verdict or judgment could be set aside. Thus, there
was no attaint of a grand assize and its finding was final, but the jurors were punishable for a
false finding. The usual method of attainting a jury was by verdict of another jury of greater
number whose members were of higher rank than the original jurors. This was not, however,
the only means, for they might be attainted upon their own answers upon a later examination.

Edmund M. Morgan, ‘Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories’ (1922-1923)
32 Yale L.J. 575, 576 n 3 (citations omitted). Thomas Green stated, ‘the closest the bench
came to application of the dreaded process of attaint was the impaneling of a second jury to
test the first jury's special verdict of self-defense, and there is no evidence to suggest that the
first jury would have been punished had its verdict been repudiated’. Green (n 7) 19. For the
history of attainder see generally Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common
Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1898); James B. Thayer, ‘The Jury and its
Development’ (Pt 3) (1891-1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 357; John Zane, ‘The Attaint. I’ (1916) 15
Michigan Law Review 1; John Zane, ‘The Attaint. II’ (1916) 15 Michigan Law Review 127.
12

Weinberg-Brodt (n 6) 829-30. See also Green (n 7) ch 6. The possibility of attainder lapsed
when ‘[t]he absolute power of English juries to find an accused not guilty without fear of
punishment was established in 1670 in Bushell's Case’. Weinberg-Brodt (n 6) 829 (citations
omitted).
13

See Scully (n 10); Odgers (n 10).

14

Howe (n 1).

15

The High Court in Howe (n 1) adopted the reasoning of the Victorian Supreme Court of
Criminal Appeal in McKay (n 10). McKay’s case stood as an authority against the proposition
that it is lawful to kill a fleeing thief solely on the basis of necessity, and for the proposition that
proportionality in using defensive force is a further added condition in deciding such selfdefence cases. See generally Norval Morris, ‘The Slain Chicken Thief [sic]- Some Aspects of
Justifiable and Excusable Homicide’ (1958) 2 Sydney L. Rev. 414; Norval Morris, ‘A New
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Court also held that the old common law rule which denied any reduction of penalty
when an accused had failed to retreat would no longer apply in Australia. Instead,
failure to retreat was a factor which would be considered when the judge directed the
jury how to assess whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable or
unreasonable.16
The Privy Council in Palmer17 rejected the High Court’s doctrine of excessive selfdefence in Howe and left the jury with no option for a verdict of manslaughter in a
murder trial when they considered the defendant had used excessive force. In cases
of excessive force, the Privy Council held that the defence of self-defence either
entirely failed and resulted in a murder conviction, or it succeeded and resulted in an
acquittal.18 The Privy Council said that self-defence was a simple and straightforward
conception, and the idea of excessive self-defence had unduly complicated the
reasoning process required of a jury. Common sense dictated that disproportionality
should not allow any intermediate result. A murder defendant who had used force to
defend himself or herself was either guilty of murder or was entitled to an acquittal.

Qualified Defence to Murder’ (1960) 1 Adel. L. Rev. 23; David Lanham, ‘Killing the Fleeing
Offender’ (1977) 1 Crim. L. J. 16. It also had an influence on Viro’s Case as it led to the
formulation of the test in Viro. Viro (n 3), 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J
agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing
at 180). Some writers argued that the doctrine of excessive self-defence was first raised in
McKay’s case. Stanley Yeo stated that McKay’s case “purports” to be the first Australian case
to recognise the doctrine of excessive self-defence. Stanley Yeo, ‘The Demise of Excessive
Self-defence in Australia’ (1988) 37 Int'l & Comp. L.Q 348, 348 n 1. Referring to McKays’
case, Justice Weinberg said that the doctrine of excessive self-defence ‘seems to have been
ﬁrst raised in Australia in the celebrated case of the chicken farmer who shot the ﬂeeing thief’.
(Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘Moral blameworthiness — The ‘objective test’ dilemma’ (2003) 24
Australian Bar Review 173, 191). But excessive self-defence had been discussed earlier in R
v Griffin (1872) 10 SCR (NSW) 91 (Cheeke J); R v Morrison (1989) 10 NSWR 171 (Windeyer,
Stephen, Foster JJ); and R v Tommy Ryan (1890) 11 NSWR 171 (Windeyer, Innes, Foster
JJ).
16

The Court however split 3 to 2 in deciding what formula should be applied as to what
constituted necessity for the accused to plead self-defence, and what tests were to be applied
in determining that the force used by the accused was excessive and hence whether he was
entitled to a verdict of manslaughter. Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Fullagar JJ formed the majority
on both points. Taylor and Menzies JJ formed the minority. See Howe (n 1).
17

Palmer (n 2).

18

See Palmer (n 2).
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The High Court in Viro19 disagreed with the Privy Council’s analysis in Palmer and
reinstated the doctrine of excessive self-defence that it had set out in Howe. The moral
culpability of a person accused of murder who had used unnecessary force to repel
an unlawful attack was less than the moral culpability ordinarily associated with
murder. To reinforce their reasoning, the High Court formulated six propositions which
they said would enable trial judges to instruct juries how to decide whether the jury
could acquit the accused or convict the accused of the lesser offence of manslaughter
when self-defence was plead in a murder case.20 The High Court’s propositions also
required the jury to assess whether the accused, rather than a reasonable person,
reasonably believed that there was a threat to her life before there could be either an
acquittal or a manslaughter verdict.
But the High Court in Zecevic21 preferred the Privy Council’s reasoning in Palmer and
disapproved its own earlier decisions in Howe and Viro. That is, the High Court in
Zecevic held that only if the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant reasonably believed that it was necessary to do what he did in defending
himself, could the jury acquit the defendant.22 If the defendant had used unreasonable
force, then the only possible verdict was murder.
I now proceed to discuss Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic in more detail.

3.1 The Howe Case
The High Court’s decision in Howe23 was the first of many that considered and
adjusted self-defence law in Australia. It is famous because it is the first case where a
plea of self-defence in a murder case could result in a verdict other than guilty or not
guilty. Howe was charged with the murder of Millard and tried in the Supreme Court of
South Australia. Howe alleged that Millard subjected him to a violent sodomitical

19

Viro (n 3).

20

See ibid.

21

Zecevic (n 4).

22

See ibid.

23

Howe (n 1).
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attack, and that he had killed Millard in self-defence. The Crown alleged that Howe
shot Millard to rob him of money, and this was a case of murder to rob.24 Howe argued
both provocation and self-defence. The judge rejected provocation and only put selfdefence to the jury.25 In directing the jury, Ross J said:
[T]hat where a person charged with the murder of an assailant relies on self-defence,
he cannot succeed, and has no defence at all, if the jury are satisfied that the killing
took place either (1) when the accused has not retreated as far as possible having
regard to the attack; or (2) if he has used more force than is necessary for mere
defence, the result in both cases being that the person who kills is guilty of murder.26

Howe was convicted of murder and appealed to the Full Court of South Australia. 27
The two principal questions on appeal were:
(1) Whether it is an essential condition of the plea as a matter of law that Howe in the
face of a violent and felonious assault, or the threat of such an assault, should have
retreated as far as it was reasonably open for him safely to do before meeting
Millard’s attack with force.
(2) If death ensues because Howe has resorted to an unnecessary measure of force
in resisting an attack or threatened attack, a degree of force out of reasonable
proportion to the danger, does that leave Howe guilty of murder or is his crime
manslaughter? 28

The argument that Howe was not bound to retreat was based on the view that ‘a
person subjected to a violent felonious attack was not bound to retreat’.29 The Full
Court denied that this was a rule of law and said that a failure to retreat is an element
to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. The
Full Court referred to the judgment of Smith J in McKay's case and ruled that only
24

Ibid 458-9 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

25

Ibid 460 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

26

Ibid.

27

R v Howe (1958) SASR 95.

28

Howe (n 1) 456 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

29

Lawson and Forsythe (n 8) 571 (Ormiston J), quoting, Reg. v. Howe (1958) SASR 95, 107.
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‘”necessary self-defence” … ma[d]e…a homicide “justifiable”’.30 The Full Court then
concluded that ‘”when the defence of self-defence against a violent, felonious attack
is raised today, the jury should not be directed to consider only whether the accused
was subjected to a violent and felonious attack.”’31 The jury must also be directed to
consider whether he was subjected to such an attack and whether in all the
circumstances, he was acting reasonably in not retreating and engaging Millard
directly. The question was whether he had done all that he could to avoid killing
Millard.32
The Full Court further analysed Lowe J's judgment in McKay's Case33 and concluded:
We have come to the conclusion that it is the law that a person who is subjected to a
violent and felonious attack and who, in endeavouring by way of self-defence, to
prevent the consummation of that attack by force exercises more force than a
reasonable man would consider necessary in the circumstances, but no more force
than he honestly believed to be necessary in the circumstances, is guilty of
manslaughter and not of murder.34

The Full Court of South Australia had considered two questions. They were:
1. Was more force used than a reasonable man would consider necessary?
2. If so, did the accused nevertheless honestly believe that such excessive force
was necessary?
and both questions would have to be answered in the affirmative to justify a verdict of
manslaughter.35

30

Ibid (Ormiston J) quoting, Reg. v. Howe (1958) SASR 95, 109-110 (emphasis in original).

31

Ibid (Ormiston J) quoting, Reg. v. Howe (1958) SASR 95, 110.

32

Ibid 571 (Ormiston J).

33

Ibid (Ormiston J) citing, Reg. v. Howe (1958) SASR 95,110-122.

34

Ibid (Ormiston J) quoting, Reg. v. Howe (1958) SASR 95,122.

35

Palmer (n 2) 829 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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The Full Court expressed the question in this way:
[Had] a man actually defending himself from the real or apprehended violence of the
deceased … used more force than was justified by the occasion and [had] death …
ensued from this use of excessive force.36

The Full Court allowed Howe’s appeal, overturned Howe’s conviction of murder and
ordered a new trial. The Crown obtained special leave to appeal to the High Court.37
The High Court ‘treated the appeal as raising an abstract point of law’.38 The essential
question was ‘as to the consequence of the use of excessive force in self-defence?’39
And the assumption made for the purpose of answering this question was that:
[A] man actually defending himself from the real or apprehended violence of the
deceased has used more force than was justified by the occasion and that death has
ensued from this use of excessive force.40

Dixon CJ said that there was no satisfactory judicial decision to answer this question;
the High Court was required to break new ground. Dixon CJ said:
There is no clear and definite judicial decision providing an answer to this question but
it seems reasonable in principle to regard such a homicide as reduced to
manslaughter, and that view has the support of not a few judicial statements to be
found in the reports.41

36

Howe (n 1) 460 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

37

Ibid 455 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

38

Palmer (n 2) 828 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).

Viro (n 3) 96 (Barwick CJ dissenting). See also Howe (n 1) 460-1 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J
agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464), 465 (Taylor J), 469 (Menzies J).
39

40

41

Howe (n 1) 460 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

Howe (n 1) 461 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464). It is
important to note what Barwick CJ said in Viro when he was commenting about the above
quote of Dixon CJ. He said ‘[t]he Court reviewed a number of judicial pronouncements, which,
it is proper to say, were not the outcome of any specific argument in which basic principle was
examined’. Viro (n 3) 97 (Barwick CJ dissenting).
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After reviewing a number of cases,42 Dixon CJ agreed with the Full Court of South
Australia43 stating:
From the foregoing authorities it appears that in substance the Supreme Court took a
correct view of the consequences of the failure of a plea of self-defence to a charge of
murder when it fails only because the deceased's death was occasioned by an
excessive use of force, that is to say by force going beyond what was necessary in the
circumstances or might reasonably be regarded in the circumstances as necessary.44

All the judges agreed that if it was necessary for the accused to defend himself but he
had used excessive force resulting in the death of the attacker, he was guilty of
manslaughter, not murder. But the unanimity ended there. The Court was split 3:2 on
how to decide whether the force actually used was excessive.45
Writing for the majority Dixon CJ said that if the accused ‘feared for his life or the safety
of his person from injury, violation or indecent or insulting usage’,46 then ‘he was
entitled to use force in order to “repel force or apprehended force’.47 If the force he

42

During his judgment Dixon CJ reviewed several authorities. These are: R. v. Biggin (1920)
1 K.B. 213; 36 T.L.R. 17; R. v. Whalley (1835) 7 Car & P 245 [173 E. R. 198]; Reg. v. Patience
(1837) 7 Car & P 775 [173 E. R. 338]; R. v. Scully (1824) 1 Car & P 319 [171 E. R. 1213];
Reg. v. Bull (1839) 9 Car& P 22 [173 E. R.723]; Reg. v. Weston (1879) 14 Cox CC 346; R. v.
Barilla (1944) 4 D.L.R. 344; Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions (1942) A.C. 1; Reg. v.
McKay (1957) V. R. 560; Sir James Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 9th ed. (1950) 252,
253; Beard v. United States (1895) 158 U.S. 550 [39 Law Ed. 1086]; Brown v. United States
of America (1920) 256 US [65 Law Ed. 961]; Beale, ‘Retreat from Murderous Assault’ (1903)
16 Harvard Law Review 567 (Dixon CJ citations).
Howe (n 1) 461-3 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).
43

Ibid 464 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

44

Ibid 462 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464). Dixon CJ also
agreed in substance with Lowe’s J sixth proposition in McKay’s Case, which was as follows:
If the occasion warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention of felony or the
apprehension of the felon, but the person taking action acts beyond the necessity of the
occasion and kills the offender, the crime is manslaughter: at 462 (citations omitted).

Dorothy Kovacs, ‘Excessive Self-Defence in Homicide Cases: Some fundamental Problems
in Australian Law’ (1977) 4 Monash U. L. Rev. 50, 51.
45

46

Howe (n 1) 460-1 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

47

Ibid.
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used was reasonable and proportionate, he was entitled to an acquittal. But if the force
used was excessive or disproportionate, he was entitled to a verdict of manslaughter,
not murder.48 The minority could not agree and formulated two further tests.
Taylor J said that Lowe’s J sixth proposition in McKay’s case49 was wrong because ‘it
was not … limited to cases where it appears that the accused entertained an honest
belief that the force used, though excessive on any reasonable view, was necessary’.50
Taylor J further said that unless the jury was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
what the accused had done was not primarily for the purpose of defending himself
against an attacker,51 the jury should return a verdict of manslaughter.52 He said:

48

Ibid 462 (Dixon J, McTiernan J agreeing at 464, Fullagar J agreeing at 464).

49

Which was formulated as follows:
if the occasion warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention of felony or the
apprehension of the felon, but the person taking action acts beyond the necessity of the
occasion and kills the offender, the crime is manslaughter - not murder.

McKay (n 10) 563. Howe’s counsel relied on the sixth proposition before the Full Court and
the High Court as an authority for the proposition:
not only that a verdict of manslaughter is permissible in the circumstances hypothetically stated
but that a verdict of murder is not open in any case where, on such an occasion, the killing
results from the use of force beyond that reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

Howe (n 1) 467 (Taylor J dissenting).
50

Howe (n 1) 466-7 (Taylor J dissenting).

51

Ibid 466 (Taylor J). Taylor J had also some doubts about the South Australia Full Court
Supreme Court ruling. He said:
It may be thought with some justification that a direction founded upon this view of the law would
tender a somewhat artificial or unreal issue of fact for the consideration of a jury. Indeed it may
be thought only remotely possible that a jury, having satisfied itself beyond reasonable doubt
that an accused person had used more force in self-defence than he could reasonably have
thought necessary, would, thereafter, be prepared to entertain the view that the degree of force
used was no greater than the accused, in fact, honestly believed to be necessary. In this
situation it is not surprising that the principle which the Full Court thought to be "implicit in the
early cases", has not, as their Honours observed, attracted the attention of textbook writers and
commentators or been the subject of consideration by any appellate court in England. Nor,
indeed, was counsel for the prisoner able to cite any English cases or any textbook in which
the enunciated proposition had been stated to form part of the English common law relating to
homicide: at 466 (emphasis in original).
51

Ibid.

During his judgment Taylor J reviewed several authorities. These are: McKay’s case (n 10);
Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions (1935) A.C. 462; Mancini v Director of Public
52
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I prefer to state the test as being whether the respondent used more force than on
reasonable grounds he could have believed to be necessary and not whether he used
more force than on reasonable grounds he actually believed to be necessary.53

Menzies J expressed the question to be answered in this way:
Whether upon a trial for murder where self-defence is an issue the jury should be
directed that it is manslaughter and not murder if an accused person in defending
himself from a violent and felonious attack killed his attacker by the use of force which
notwithstanding his honest belief that it was necessary for his self-protection was force
in excess of that which on reasonable grounds he could have believed was necessary
for that purpose.54

Menzies J said that he expressed the question in this way because in the
circumstances of Howe’s case ‘it would be a very unusual case in which a jury would
come to such findings …’55 Menzies J confined his views to self-defence cases ‘against
serious violence, but not necessarily felonious violence’,56 and formulated his test as
follows:
I have reached the conclusion that the law is that it is manslaughter and not murder if
the accused would have been entitled to acquittal on the ground of self-defence except
for the fact that in honestly defending himself he used greater force than was
reasonably necessary for his self-protection and in doing so killed his assailant. It is to
Prosecutions (1942) A.C. 1; Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions (1946) A.C. 588; Chan
Kau v The Queen (1955) A.C. 206 (Taylor J citations). Howe (n 1) 465-9 (Taylor dissenting).
53

Howe (n 1) 469 (Taylor J dissenting). See also Palmer (n 2) 829 (Lord Morris for Lord
Donovan and Lord Avonside).
54

Howe (n 1) 469 (Menzies J).

55

Ibid 469 (Menzies J).

56

Menzies J went on to say:
A man who is attacked may use such force as on reasonable grounds he believes is necessary
to prevent or resist the attack and if in using such force he kills his assailant he is not guilty of
any crime even if the killing was intentional. In deciding in a particular case, whether it was
reasonably necessary to have used as much force as was in fact used, regard must be had to
all the circumstances including the possibility of retreating without danger or yielding anything
that a man is entitled to protect. If the force used was disproportionate to the seriousness of the
attack and the danger of the person attacked, then force beyond what was reasonably
necessary will have been used and some crime will have been committed. This statement
leaves open the exact consequences of using what is conveniently enough described as
excessive force to meet such an attack and to that difficult question I now turn.

Howe (n 1) 471 (Menzies J).
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be observed that this statement of the law would always leave open the question
whether the person who killed was defending himself when he did so.57

In Howe the High Court thus briefly established a common law doctrine of excessive
self-defence manslaughter in Australia.58 But it only survived until 1971 when the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England59 revisited the new doctrine in
Palmer.60

3.2 The Palmer Case
Sigismund Palmer “Palmer” was indicted in Jamaica for murdering Cecil Henry on 14
May 1968. The Crown’s case was that Palmer had stolen a quantity of illegal drugs
and when escaping with the drugs, had fatally shot one of his pursuers. Palmer denied
that he had fired a shot.61 The jurors accepted the Crown’s version of events and
Palmer was sentenced to death.62 Palmer’s application for leave to appeal to the
Jamaican Court of Appeal was refused but he was granted special leave to appeal to
the Privy Council. Lord Morris delivered the judgment of the Court. He said:

57

Ibid 477. See also Palmer (n 2) 829 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan, and Lord Avonside).
During his judgment Menzies J reviewed the following several authorities: Reg. v Mckay
(1957) V.R. 560; Reg. v. Bufalo (1958) V.R. 363; Russell on Crime, 10th ed. (1950), vol. 1;
Stephen's General View of the Criminal Law of England, 1st ed. (1863), R. v. Cook (1640) Cro
Car 537 [73 E.R. 1063]; R. v. Whalley (1835) 7 Car & P 245 [173 E.R. 108]; Reg. v. Patience
(1837) 7 Car & P 775 [173 E. R. 338]; Reg. v. Allen (1867) 17 L.T. (NS) 222; Reg. v. Griffin
(1871) 10 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 91; Reg. v. Weston (1879) 14 Cox. C.C. 346; R. v. Barilla (1944) 4
D.L.R. 344 ; The Commonwealth v. Beverly (1935) 237 Ky. 35; Mancini v. Director of Public
Prosecutions (1942) A.C. 1 (Menzies J citations). Howe (n 1) 472-5 (Menzies J).
Paul Ames Fairall, ‘The Demise of Excessive Self-Defence Manslaughter in Australia: A
Final Obituary?’ (1988) 12 Crim. L. J. 28, 28.
58
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For the influence of the Privy Council on the Australian common law, the history of appeals
from Australian courts to the Privy Council including Australian attitudes to the desirability of
a London-based court of ﬁnal appeal, and the effect of the severance of Australia’s formal
links, see Chief Justice Murray Gleeson AC, ‘The inﬂuence of the Privy Council on Australia’
(2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 123.
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Palmer (n 2).
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Ibid 820-2 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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Ibid 823-4 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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[T]he only question that [was] raised for determination [was] whether in cases where
on a charge of murder an issue of self-defence is left to the jury it will in all cases be
obligatory to direct the jury that if they found that the accused while intending to defend
himself had used more force than was necessary in the circumstances they should
return a verdict of manslaughter.63

Their Lordships examined both the majority and minority views in Howe64 and refused
to follow any of the reasoning, though they supported Taylor J’s criticisms of the
majority.65 Their Lordships emphasised the need for a commonsense approach with
the jury as arbiter. They said:
In their Lordships' view the defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be
readily understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no
abstruse legal thought. It requires no set words by way of explanation. No formula
need be employed in reference to it. Only common sense is needed for its
understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may
defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do,
what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances. Of these a jury can decide … If the jury consider that an accused acted
in self-defence or if the jury are in doubt as to this then they will acquit. The defence of
self-defence either succeeds so as to result in an acquittal or it is disproved in which
case as a defence it is rejected.66

63

Ibid 820 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).

Howe (n 1). Lord Morris also discussed McKay’s case (n 10), and in particular Lowe J’s sixth
proposition which was “quoted with approval” in Howe’s case. He said:
64

[t]he sixth [proposition] was in these terms …
If the occasion warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention of felony or the apprehension
of the felon, but the person taking action acts beyond the necessity of the occasion and kills the
offender, the crime is manslaughter--not murder.

Palmer (n 2) 830-1 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
Their Lordships quoted Taylor J’s “summary” of the minority’s views in Howe’s case at 467
as to why the majority test in McKay’s case was erroneous. Palmer (n 2) 831 (Lord Morris for
Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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Palmer (n 2) 831-2 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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For a brief period after 1971,67 Australian State courts were conflicted as to whether
they should follow Palmer or “a conflicting decision” of the High Court of Australia
because Australian appeals to the Privy Council were not finally abolished until 1986.68
The decision of the Privy Council in Palmer has unsurprisingly attracted the attention
of many academics, authors and scholars.69 It remained the common law in Australia

67

Mason CJ described the situation as follows:
In Viro the Court was called on to make a choice between the Howe and Palmer versions of
self-defence. What Howe had decided settled the common law of self-defence in Australia until
the Privy Council in Palmer rejected Howe. Thereafter until Viro, trial judges directed juries in
accordance with Palmer. In so doing trial judges complied with the rule that State courts, at
least in non-federal matters, were bound to follow a decision of the Privy Council in preference
to a conflicting decision of this Court. That rule, which was a by-product of the existence of the
appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council, ceased to have any application once the appeal
from this Court was abolished by the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975
(Cth). The point is that, despite Howe, Palmer was accepted as authoritative before Viro.

Zecevic (n 4) 650 (Mason CJ) (emphasis in original).
Murray Gleeson CJ, ‘The Influence of the Privy Council on Australia’ (2007) 29 Australian
Bar Review 123, 126. By ‘the Australia Acts 1986’: at 128. See generally A. Mason, ‘The
Limitation of Appeals to the Privy Council from the High Court of Australia , from the Federal
Courts other than the High Court, from the Supreme Courts of the Territories and from courts
Exercising Federal Jurisdiction’ (1968) 3 Federal Law Review 1; Sir Ivor Richardson, ‘The
Privy Council as the Final Court for the British Empire’ (2012) 43 VUWLR 103; Sharon Hamby
O'Connor and Mary Sarah Bilder, ‘Appeals to the Privy Council Before American
Independence: An Annotated Digital Catalogue’ (2012) 1 Law Library Journal 83.
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See generally Ian Elliott, ‘Excessive Self-Defence in Commonwealth Law: A Comment’ 22
(1973) 22 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 727; Sornarajah, M., ‘Excessive Self-Defence in Commonwealth
Law’ (1972) 21 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 758; M. Sornarajah, ‘Excessive Self Defence under the
Australian Criminal Codes’ (1982) 7 U. Tas. L. Rev. 156; Justice A. Lee, ‘Self Defence,
Provocation and Duress’ (1977) 51 A. L. J 427; Kovacs (n 45); Lanham (15); R. S. O'Regan,
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Council Decisions in Australia: The Law of Excessive Force in Self-Defense Viro v. the Queen’
(1977) 8 Sydney L. Rev. 731; Ian Elliott, ‘The Use of Deadly Force in Arrest: Proposals for
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governing self-defence cases until the High Court’s decision in Viro,70 which was the
third time the High Court had altered the doctrine of excessive self-defence and where
they formulated the six point text referred to in the introduction to this chapter.

3.3 The Viro Case
On 22 January 1975 Frederick Viro (‘Viro’), Sebastian Greco (‘Greco’) and a few
others agreed to rob John Rellis (‘Rellis’). According to the Crown, Rellis was lured
into the middle of the back seat of Viro's car where Viro would supply him with heroin.
But Viro did not have any drugs and had no intentional of supplying Rellis with any
drugs. During the car journey Viro attacked Rellis from the front passenger seat with
a jack handle. During the attack, Rellis produced a flick knife. The driver stopped the
car and during the ensuing three-way fight between Viro and Greco on one hand, and
Rellis on the other, Viro produced a steak knife which he had in the glove box and
stabbed Rellis repeatedly.71 Rellis was thrown out of the car and later died of his
wounds. The intended robbery never took place as the sum of $1250.00 which Viro
and Greco intended to steal was later found on Rellis’ body.72
Viro and Greco both pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. The Crown argued
that Viro intended to kill Rellis or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon him. Alternatively,
Viro’s acts which caused Rellis’ death were done in an attempt to commit a crime
punishable with penal servitude for life.73 Viro argued that he never intended to harm
Rellis. Viro said he stabbed Rellis because he was personally affected by heroin and
Demise of Equality Before the Law: The Pernicious Effects of Political Correctness in the
Criminal Law of Victoria’ (2016) 7 The Western Australian Jurist 1.
70

See Viro (n 3).
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The steak knife, which was exhibited, had a serrated blade, about 10 1/2 cm in length. The
flick knife that Viro said had been used by Rellis had a blade 9 1/2 cm in length but it was a
heavier blade than that of the steak knife. Viro (n 3) 104 (Gibbs J).
72

73

Viro (n 3) 103-4 (Gibbs J).

Ibid 106 (Gibbs J). There was no robbery and no money was taken from Rellis. The Crown
case was that the relevant crime was assault with intent to rob with offensive weapons and
wounding. The intention which the Crown had to prove on this aspect of the case was an intent
to rob Rellis. The evidence that Viro intended to rob Rellis was strong. Viro never suggested
that the use of the drugs meant that he had not formed an intent to rob Rellis: at 107-8 (Gibbs
J).
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was trying to get Rellis’ money to buy heroin for himself. Viro also said that he had
stabbed Rellis because he was afraid for his life because Rellis was a big man.74
The trial judge directed the jury that they must find that Viro and Greco intended to kill
Rellis, or to do him grievous bodily harm, before they could convict.75 However the trial
judge did not tell the jury that the fact that Viro had used heroin might be relevant to
the question whether Viro had formed the necessary intention to kill or do grievous
bodily harm.76 Viro’s counsel specifically asked the trial judge to give that direction,
but the trial judge declined to do so.77 The trial judge was also asked by Viro’s counsel
to direct the jury that if Viro had used excessive self-defence, the jury could come to a
verdict of manslaughter. The trial judge thought that he had given such a direction,78
74

Ibid 105 (Gibbs J).

75

Ibid 108 (Gibbs J).

76

The trial judge said to the jury:
Gentlemen, in relation to each of the accused who said they were heroin addicts or on drugs,
the fact that a person is a drug addict is an irrelevant situation so far as the commission of this
crime is concerned. It is no excuse or no defence and it only comes into the matter, as I
understand, because it is suggested on their behalf that if you are on drugs you are not able to
think clearly, not able to remember things and things of that nature. That is the only way it
comes into this case as I understand it.
Their records of interview are put before you as documents of truth which you can rely on and
the learned Crown Prosecutor suggests that an examination of those will show in each case
they were clear in their evidence, able to think and they gave detailed explanations and there
was no impairment or infringement of their faculty to remember or express themselves and to
understand.

Ibid (108) (Gibbs J).
77

Ibid (109) (Gibbs J).
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Jacobs J reproduced the transcript of this exchange:
"MR. LLOYD-JONES: Would your Honour direct the jury that if the accused Viro used
excessive self-defence then manslaughter is available.
HIS HONOUR: No, I will not put that. Excessive self- defence?
MR. LLOYD-JONES: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: I have put it higher. I have put it that unless they are satisfied they
should find him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter."

Viro (n 3) 150 (Jacobs J).
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but on self-defence, the trial judge had directed the jury according to Palmer and a
manslaughter verdict in accordance with Howe was not set out as an option.79
Viro and Greco were both convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Both appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, and their appeals
against their conviction were dismissed.80 Viro obtained special leave to appeal to the
High Court. Viro has argued that the trial judge failed to direct the jury that in deciding
whether Viro had formed the intention necessary to constitute murder they should take
into account the fact that he had used drugs, and that they were entitled to return a
verdict of manslaughter if they believed Viro had acted in self-defence but had used
excessive force in defending himself.81
In considering whether manslaughter was an appropriate verdict in an excessive selfdefence case, the High Court had to choose between the reasoning in its own decision
in Howe and the Privy Council’s contrary view in Palmer.82 While there was a
preliminary constitutional question as to whether the Court was free to disregard the
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The trial judge said to the jury:
It is the law that any person who is attacked with violence may defend himself. If in the course
of defending himself against an attack, the man who is his aggressor is killed, then it will be a
question for you to determine whether or not what he did was done primarily for that purpose
of defending himself against the aggressor and you would have to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that this was not so before you could return a verdict of murder.

Ibid 148-9 (Jacobs J).
80

The Full Court of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal approved of the trial judge's
direction which was as follows:
No question of self-defence can arise in this case unless you take the view that on the facts the
man who was killed was attacking these two men, that he was the aggressor, because the thing
explains itself. It is only if you are attacked that you are entitled to defend yourself. If you are
the attacker you cannot complain if your victim has the temerity to defend himself and if he
beats you in a fight it is just too bad. So you see it never arises unless there is material upon
which you can say at the point of. time this man was stabbed, Rellis was the aggressor. He
was attacking him. They had ceased all attack on him and that is the way it is put.

Kovacs (n 45) 64.
81

Viro (n 3) 106 (Gibbs J). Argument on the first ground was heard by Gibbs, Stephen, Mason,
Jacobs, and Murphy JJ, and on the second ground by the full court: Barwick CJ, Gibbs,
Stephen, Mason, Jacobs, Murphy, and Aickin JJ. Viro (n 3) 92 (Barwick CJ dissenting).
82

Zecevic (n 4) 650 (Mason CJ).
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Privy Council’s decision in Palmer and follow its own decision in Howe, it also had the
opportunity to decide which reasoning was the more persuasive. That is, if excessive
self-defence was proven, should it result in manslaughter according to Howe or an
acquital according to Palmer?
Barwick CJ and Gibbs J preferred the Privy Council’s reasoning in Palmer. In homicide
cases, self-defence must be objectively judged and there was no middle ground. The
defence of self-defence either entirely fails and results in a murder conviction or it
succeeds and results in an acquittal.
Stephen, Mason and Aickin JJ preferred the High Court’s earlier reasoning in Howe.
While they agreed that an objective reasonableness element was engaged when selfdefence was argued in homicide cases, when self-defence had been proven but the
force used was excessive, the jury could be directed to convict the accused of the
lesser offence of manslaughter rather than to exonerate with an acquittal.
Jacobs and Murphy JJ agreed with Barwick CJ and Gibbs J that there must either be
a murder conviction or an acquittal when self-defence was argued in such cases. But
contrary to the opinion of Barwick CJ and Gibbs J, they said that the accused’s selfdefence arguments should be considered in a subjective way. Jacobs J said the
accused should be acquitted if he or she believed that it was necessary to use the
force in the way he or she did, and that belief was not irrational. Murphy J said that all
that mattered was that the accused believed that he was defending himself. If that was
true, he was entitled to an acquittal. The rationality of his belief was irrelevant. 83
Stephen, Aickin, and Mason JJ, said that manslaughter was the right verdict. They
relied on Howe.84 The law had been stated correctly in Howe, and they expressly
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Ibid 651 (Mason CJ). See also Fairall (n 58) 34.
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The rationale is that:
[T]he moral culpability of a person who kills another in defending himself but who fails in a plea
of self-defence only because the force which he believed to be necessary exceeded that which
was reasonably necessary falls short of the moral culpability ordinarily associated with murder.

Viro (n 3) 139 (Stephen J). See also Zecevic (n 4) 660 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
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rejected Palmer. In an effort to clarify, they set out the task of the jury in death or
grievous bodily harm cases as follows:
1.

(a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased
the accused reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with
death or serious bodily harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man
would have believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all
the circumstances in which he found himself.

2. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief
by the accused of such an attack no question of self-defence arises.
3. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such
reasonable belief by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in fact used
by the accused was reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he
faced.
4. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used than
was reasonably proportionate it should acquit.
5. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used, then its
verdict should be either manslaughter or murder, that depending upon the answer to
the final question for the jury - did the accused believe that the force which he used
was reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced?
6. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have such
a belief the verdict will be murder. If it is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused did not have that belief the verdict will be manslaughter.85

Viro (n 3) 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs
J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
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Though they did not concur with Mason J’s judgment, because trial courts need
“practical guidance”,86 Gibbs J,87 Jacobs J,88 and Murphy J,89 accepted Justice
Mason’s six propositions. Thus in Viro, six of the judges ruled that Australian juries
should be instructed to follow the law as it had been set out in Howe.90
Ordinarily it would not be necessary to further consider the individual opinions of the
High Court justices in Viro since six of them had agreed on the outcome and the
directions that should be given to Australian juries in such cases in the future. But the
apparent consensus lasted only nine years. Further analysis of the reasoning of the
different judges in Viro reveals why the apparent consensus did not hold.
Jacobs and Murphy JJ favoured a subjective approach to the accused’s response in
defending himself. Jacob J’s view was that he would have accepted that Howe was
correct, but for his view that there was no objective element in self-defence.91 He said:
I think it best to state what I understand to be the applicable principle. In my opinion
the question for the jury is whether the accused although he had the intention to kill or
to do grievous bodily harm acted as he did with the purpose of defending himself and
in the belief that the infliction of death or the grievous bodily harm inflicted by him was
necessary in order to defend himself. If the facts of the case leave open the view that
there were no rational grounds for the belief which the accused had, then, and only
then, should the jury be told that the belief of the accused must be a rational one. Then
… it would be desirable to make it clear that the belief must be one which a rational
man might or could have held, not necessarily the belief which the jury as reasonable
persons think that they would have held.92

It is for this reason, the majority in Zecevic said that it was “open to question” whether Viro
is an authority for the use of excessive force in self-defence. Zecevic (n 3) 660 (Wilson,
Dawson and Toohey JJ).
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Viro (n 3) 128 (Gibbs J).
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Ibid 158 (Jacobs J).
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Ibid 171 (Murphy J).
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See Viro (n 3).

91

Ibid 153-4 (Jacobs J).
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Ibid 157-8 (Jacobs J).
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Murphy J said that there had been rapid social change in Australia and in that context,
‘the creative role of appellate courts naturally expands to adapt decisional law to the
new social environment’.93 That context dictated that if the accused believed, and there
were reasonable grounds for that belief, that he was defending himself it would be
sufficient to lead to a complete acquittal.94 He said:
The problem arises from the maintenance of the objective test (that there were
reasonable grounds for believing what was done was necessary for self-defence) in
addition to the subjective test (that he believed he was defending himself). In order to
avoid confusion, I use the expressions "subjective test" and "objective test" as
ordinarily used in the literature, although from the trial court's point of view, these
descriptions would be more accurate if they were transposed. In my opinion, the
objective test should be abandoned … The argument that the objective test should be
retained in order to preserve the social fabric is not convincing to me. It is a curious
jurisprudence which requires acquittal of murder because, as a result of intoxication
by drugs or alcohol, the requisite intent (to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm) is absent,
but does not require acquittal when the accused, with that intent, killed because he
honestly believed that he was defending himself (although he did more than was
reasonably necessary).95

Murphy J also said that excessive force, proportionality and failure to retreat are all
factual matters for the jury to consider.96 He added that this area of the criminal law
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Ibid 166 (Murphy J).
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Ibid 168.
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Ibid (emphasis in original).
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Murphy J said that:
The test of proportionality has been applied as if a proportionate response between the
apprehended harm and the action of the accused were essential to the defence. This is not an
ingredient. Proportionality between the apprehended harm and force used to repel it merely
bears on whether he was defending himself. That an accused took no less action than he was
certain would avoid his own death or grievous bodily harm would not, in my view, point against
his believing he was defending himself. But that is a factual general observation. Whether an
accused retreated, or declared off his own attack are also for the jury on the issue. They are
not conditions of the defence. Self- defence is not strictly a defence. Perhaps what is done in
self- defence should be regarded simply as an act (or omission) which is not malicious within
the meaning of s. 18 (2) (b).

Ibid 170 (Murphy J).

94

was further complicated by a ‘general tendency to elevate factual arguments into legal
tests which are often not only erroneous but also complicate the criminal law and
confuse trials’.97 Murphy J observed that self-defenders act instinctively and it was
unrealistic to impose objective rationality upon anyone faced with some pressure. 98
He suggested jury directions in the following terms:
I favour the instructions on this aspect of self-defence being confined to a direction that
the onus is on the prosecution to prove (beyond reasonable doubt) that the accused
did not act in his own defence, and that considerations such as excessive force,
proportionality and failure to retreat, are not conclusive but may be taken into account
when deciding that issue. This applies also to questions of whether an accused
believed he was defending himself or that what he was doing was necessary to avoid
the apprehended harm, or whether he had any belief at all.99

Relying on Palmer,100 Barwick CJ and Gibbs J said that a person was not guilty of any
crime, if, in defending himself or herself, the accused used force that was not greater
than what the accused believed was reasonably necessary and was not out of all
proportion to the injury that he or she was intending to prevent.101 In those
97

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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When their Lordships stated:
In their Lordships' view the defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily
understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no abstruse legal thought.
It requires no set words by way of explanation. No formula need be employed in reference to
it. Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that
a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do,
but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular
facts and circumstances. Of these a jury can decide. It may in some cases be only sensible
and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and
dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common
sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities
of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then immediate
defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent
danger he may have to avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack is all over and
no sort of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment
or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any
link with a necessity of defence. Of all these matters the good sense of a jury will be the arbiter.

Palmer (n 2) 831-2 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
101

Viro (n 3) 101-2 (Barwick CJ dissenting), 127-8 (Gibbs J).
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circumstances, a person accused of murder or inflicting grievous bodily harm was
entitled to an acquittal. For Barwick CJ the accused’s intent was fundamental in
formulating the correct test for homicide in self-defence cases. Barwick CJ was of the
view that there is no middle ground – ‘either the requisite intent to kill or to do grievous
bodily harm is present, or it is absent’.102
The law stated in Viro survived until it was reconsidered by the High Court in
Zecevic.103

3.4 The Zecevic Case
Fadil Zecevic and his family immigrated from Albania to Australia and they were living
in a block of units which they had built. Two units were available for rent and one of
them was rented by the victim, Harold Peter Triebel (“Harry”) and his girlfriend. Harry’s
repeated failures to close the security gates to the courtyard around which the units
were erected and his failure to place his car in the garage provided to him, worsened
the relationship between him and the Zecevic family. On 16 July 1983, Zecevic fatally
shot Harry after an argument when Harry had again left the gates open and left his car

102

Barwick CJ explained himself as follows:
Upon the failure of self-defence as an excuse of a homicide committed with intent to kill or to
do grievous bodily harm, the presence of that intent leaves no room, in my opinion, for a finding
of manslaughter. In this connexion, I must say that I can see no justification for concluding that
an intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm does not amount to malice aforethought in a case
where self-defence is for any reason not accepted by the jury as excusing the homicide: that is
to say, I can see no validity in the proposition that, if self-defence is not accepted because of
the disproportionate nature of the force used in a case where the intent to kill or to do grievous
bodily harm is present, malice aforethought is not itself present. Either the requisite intent to kill
or to do grievous bodily harm is present, or it is absent. There is, in my opinion, no middle
ground constructed upon the failure for any reason of self-defence as an excuse of the
homicide. As I have indicated, the absence of the requisite intent will open the door to a
conviction for manslaughter, if in the result the killing was not excusable. But the failure of the
excuse based on self-defence for the killing with the requisite intent cannot, in my opinion,
reduce the consequence of such a killing from murder to manslaughter. Non-acceptance of the
excuse of self-defence necessarily, in my opinion, involves the conclusion that the accused
when killing with intent was not defending himself but, on the contrary, was an aggressor with
the deceased his victim. I can see no basis for regarding the resultant homicide done with intent
as being merely unlawful and not murderous.

Viro (n 3) 96 (Barwick CJ dissenting).
103

Zecevic (n 4).
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outside the garage.104 Zecevic was charged with murder. Zecevic raised the issue of
self-defence, but Gray J would not put self-defence to the jury.105 Relying on the first
of the six propositions in Viro,106 Gray J concluded:

104

Zecevic (n 4) 654-5 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ). Zecevic said that he was going home
after he had bought some bread and milk at a shop and returned home when the following
exchange with Harry took place:
I asked him why he didn't close the doors and why he didn't put his car in the garage. He got
very angry with me and say, 'What's it to you, I do what I like, I pay rent.' I say, 'Why do you
think spend so much money on the doors?' and he said, 'It's none of your business, I do what I
like, I pay $115 rent.' He won't close the doors and he went to his unit. I went to my unit and
opened the door and I put the bread and milk on the steps. Then I went and knocked on his
door. I was upset with him because he won't shut the gates. When I knocked on his door, the
glass broke. He come to the door and looked very angry. His colour had changed and he was
white. I asked him why he did not close the doors and why he did not put his car in the garage,
and he say, 'Wait a second,' and went back inside. I stood back from his door and he come with
his hands behind in his back and stabbed me. He stabbed me in the chest on the left side, on
the left side, but I did not see the knife. I thought - I didn't know how bad I was stabbed. I was
angry and very much scared. I ran inside to my unit. He say, 'I blow your head off.' I believed
he had a knife, and I thought he might have a shotgun in the car. I ran up to my bedroom. I was
very angry and very frightened. I was not sure what I was doing at that stage. I got the gun and
shells and went downstairs and loaded the gun. I could see Harry and I was very scared and
upset. He was near his car, and I thought Harry was going to do something more to me, and
he was going to, he was going to kill me. I had been stabbed already, and I thought he might
have had a gun or something in the car. After that I don't remember exactly what happened. I
was lost. I remember I see him there and I shot. He was facing me when I start to shoot. I don't
remember how many times, I don't remember how many time I shoot. At that time I was very
frightened and angry and I wasn't myself at all. I knew I didn't want to kill him. I wanted to protect
myself because I thought he was going to kill me: at 655 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ)
(emphasis in original).
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Ibid 656 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
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Ibid. Viro’s six propositions are as follows:
1. (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the
accused reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or
serious bodily harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would
have believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the
circumstances in which he found himself.
2. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief by the
accused of such an attack no question of self-defence arises.
3. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such reasonable belief
by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in fact used by the accused was
reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced.
4. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used than was
reasonably proportionate it should acquit.
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[T]hat the only inference open upon the evidence was that the appellant did not
reasonably believe that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious
bodily harm was being or was about to be made upon him.107

Zecevic was convicted of murder and his appeal was dismissed by the Full Court of
the Supreme Court of Victoria.108 Zecevic was granted special leave to appeal to the
High Court so that the common law of self-defence could be reconsidered.109 Mason
CJ acknowledged that the six tests he had set out in Viro were unduly complex and
included three separate elements of reasonableness.110 He agreed that the joint

5. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used, then its verdict
should be either manslaughter or murder, that depending upon the answer to the final question
for the jury - did the accused believe that the force which he used was reasonably proportionate
to the danger which he believed he faced?
6. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have such a belief
the verdict will be murder. If it is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not
have that belief the verdict will be manslaughter.

Viro (n 3) 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs
J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
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Ibid 653 (Mason CJ). Deane J described the three stages of reasonableness as follows:
The first stage is in the requirement that the perception of the accused that there existed an
occasion of self-defence must have been reasonable in the sense "not (of) what a reasonable
man would have believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the
circumstances in which he found himself". If the accused's perception of an occasion of selfdefence was unreasonable in the context of his actual circumstances, the effect of the
formulation is that the defence fails completely. "(N)o question of self-defence arises". The
second stage at which the element of reasonableness arises under the Viro formulation is that
the force used must have been "reasonably proportionate to the danger which (the accused)
believed he faced". The "danger" for the purposes of this test of reasonableness is not the
actual danger but the danger which the accused believed existed. If there was no such
reasonable proportionality but the elements of the defence are otherwise not disproved, the
defence necessarily fails as a defence to manslaughter. Whether, in such a case, it also fails
as a defence to murder depends upon the third test of reasonableness, namely, whether the
accused believed that "the force which he used was reasonably proportionate to the danger".
The element of reasonableness at this third stage is different from that involved in the other two
tests. It alone is completely subjective in the sense that it requires no more than a subjective
belief that reasonable proportionality existed where in fact it did not.

Ibid 672 (Deane J dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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judgement of Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ was simpler and should be followed. 111
Mason CJ, and Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ overruled the High Court’s earlier
decisions in Howe and Viro and approved the High Court’s earlier reasoning in Palmer.
In doing so, they abolished the doctrine of excessive self-defence which had allowed
a manslaughter conviction rather than an acquittal in some self-defence cases,112
blending the three separate elements of reasonableness in Viro and incorporating
them into a single question –
[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in selfdefence to do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds
for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an
acquittal.113

Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ emphasised that it was for the jury alone to decide
what to make of the evidence and to answer this question. They said that in many
cases the trial judge should assist the jury by telling them:
[I]n determining whether the accused believed that his actions were necessary in order
to defend himself and whether he held that belief on reasonable grounds, it should
consider whether the force used by the accused was proportionate to the threat
offered. However, the whole of the circumstances should be considered, of which the
degree of force used may be only part.114

Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, rejected Zecevic’s submission that there ‘should be
no objective element in the defence of self-defence’,115 and concluded that an honest
and reasonable belief test is the correct test.116 In support of that conclusion, they said
111
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Zecevic (n 4) 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
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that “’neither the history of the law relating to that defence, nor its exculpatory
character, supported that submission’,117 and they noted that ‘the modern law of selfdefence had its origin in rules that distinguished between justiﬁable and excusable
homicide’.118
Brennan J accepted Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ’s test but would have expressed
it differently as follows:
1. Whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in
self-defence to do what he did; and

a subjective test is applied. On the other hand, a mental state belonging to a defence
warrants an objective test.
(2) In respect of offences of violence (such as assault and murder), an accused's belief
(mistakenly perhaps) as to the existence of a threat occasion justifying his use of violence
by way of self-defence is a defence element. It follows from (1) above that such a belief
needs to be based on reasonable grounds”: at 139 (citations omitted).
117

Zecevic (n 4) 648 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 652).
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It is instructive to reproduce in detail what Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ said:
[T]he modern law of self-defence has its origin in rules which distinguished between justifiable
and excusable homicide. The importance of the distinction lay largely in the different
consequences of successful pleas of justification and excuse and now is a matter of history.
Justifiable homicide carried with it commendation rather than blame and accordingly entitled
the accused to total acquittal, entailing no forfeiture and requiring no pardon. It extended to
killing done in the execution of justice, which came to include both the apprehension of felons
and the prevention of felonies and thus those cases of self-defence which were in response to
a felonious attack by the deceased. Excusable homicide, on the other hand, was not entirely
without blame and merely excused rather than acquitted, requiring, at first, a pardon and
involving, for a somewhat longer period, forfeiture. It was concerned, not with the execution of
justice, but with a necessary and reasonable response to a threat to life and limb. Any practical
distinction between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide disappeared with the abolition
of forfeiture by statute in 1828 and today it is no part of the law in Australia to differentiate
between the two … But the history of the matter serves to explain why the requirement of
reasonableness, which was a requirement of excusable homicide, has remained part of the law
of self-defence. Moreover, it establishes why that requirement ought not be regarded as a
definitional element of the offence in question but as going rather to exculpation. True it is that
in result a successful plea of self-defence resembles justification rather than excuse because it
entitles the accused to a full acquittal, but in scope and in practice nowadays the plea has a
greater connection with excusable homicide, being in most cases related to the preservation of
life and limb rather than the execution of justice.

Ibid 657-8 (‘Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ) (citations omitted). See also Weinberg ‘Moral
blameworthiness — The ‘objective test’ dilemma’ (n 15) 193-4; Yeo ‘The Element of Belief in
Self-Defence’ (n 116) 140.
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2. Was the force or threatened force against which the accused reasonably believed
it was necessary to defend himself such that a person in the victim's position was
not lawfully entitled to apply it?119

Deane and Gaudron JJ both wanted to retain the Howe and Viro test and preserve the
verdict of manslaughter in excessive self-defence cases, but their reasoning differed.
Deane J thought it was essential to ensure that jurors could understand the issues of
fact to determine, and he said trial and appellate judges should avoid treating factual
arguments as legal principles.120 Deane J accepted Viro’s complex principles but was
of the view that it had to be ‘framed not in terms of legal technicality but in terms of
factual justification’.121 Deane J was also of the view that there was a “basic and
conceptual anomaly” in Viro’s six propositions. He said:
Regardless of whether one see the basis of the decision in Viro that excessive selfdefence reduces homicide from murder to manslaughter as lying in ordinary standards
of moral culpability or in modern notions of the content of malice aforethought in the
crime of murder, it is anomalous that the offence should not also be reduced to
manslaughter in a case where the element of objective reasonableness in the
accused's belief that he was acting in self-defence is absent because the accused's
genuine perception of an occasion of self-defence was unreasonable.122

Deane J noted that the majority of the Court in Viro did not address this issue. Deane
J did, and concluded that:
[T]he proper verdict in a case of homicide where self-defence fails as a complete
defence by reason only of the fact that the accused's genuine belief that he was acting
in reasonable self-defence was not reasonably held is manslaughter regardless of
whether the absence of the element of reasonableness is caused by the
unreasonableness of the perception of an occasion of self-defence or the
unreasonableness of the belief that the force used was not excessive. If that view be
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Zecevic (n 4) 681-2 (Deane J dissenting).
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accepted, as I think it should be, much of the difficulty of the Viro formulation
disappears in that there is no longer any need to distinguish between the first and
second stage requirements of reasonableness.123

Gaudron J said that when self-defence is an issue, it is neither necessary nor desirable
to instruct the juries with a precise formula on the distinction between murder and
manslaughter.124 She said that despite “Van Den Hoek v. The Queen” absence of
malice aforethought still has a role to play in homicide self-defence cases as a point
of distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter.125 Gaudron J was also of
the view that the law of self-defence was that the accused should be found guilty of
manslaughter rather than acquittal126 ‘if he or she believed on reasonable grounds that
it was necessary to resort to force in self-defence, and otherwise believed, although
unreasonably, that his or her acts were necessary in self-defence’, she continued:
So stated, the issue remains throughout as one of self-defence; the issue of
disproportionate force is but an aspect of the surrounding circumstances by reference
to which the jury will determine whether the accused, in fact, had any relevant belief,
and if so, whether the belief was reasonable.127
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On the condition that:
[M]atters of onus and standard of proof are properly explained it is sufficient that a jury be
instructed in the context of the relevant facts, that a person, although not entitled to the full
benefit of self-defence, is guilty of manslaughter and not murder, if he or she believed on
reasonable grounds, that it was necessary to resort to force in self-defence, and otherwise
believed, although unreasonably, that his or her actions were necessary in self-defence.

Ibid 687-8 (Gaudron J dissenting).
125
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Indeed, in Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, it was the necessity of the
Crown to prove malice in a charge of murder which served as the rationale for the requirement
that where the charge is murder the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the act causing death was unprovoked (citations omitted)
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The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside Zecevic’s conviction and sentence and
ordered a new trial. Zecevic has not been superseded.

Part Two: Academic commentary on the Zecevic settlement
Howe,128 Palmer,129 Viro130 and Zecevic131 have attracted considerable academic
commentary. Most of this commentary has been directed to whether there should be
a half-way house or a middle-ground verdict in proven self-defence homicide cases.
Some commentators liked the half-way house or middle ground approach; others liked
the all-or-nothing approach and rejected the half-way house or middle-ground
approach for various reasons. In the following section, I discuss the various reasoning
of those commentators, sparked initially by the decision in the Howe case and “settled”
in Zecevic.

3.5 Commentary following Howe
The recognition of the excessive self-defence doctrine in Howe132 was welcomed as
a new and major development in the area of homicide. Howe’s explicit ruling that a
verdict of manslaughter could be appropriate in a proven self-defence case where the
charge had been murder133 brought reason to the law after a long period of “obscurity”
and could be stated ‘with [a] reasonable degree of certainty’.134 Courts had previously
been required to sentence convicted murderers to death or to life imprisonment. The
Howe recognition of excessive self-defence gave courts an opportunity to avoid a
murder verdict,135 and save someone who had committed homicide with mitigating
128
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130
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Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘Norval Morris and the ‘New Manslaughter’ in the Adelaide Law Review’
(2019) 40 Adelaide Law Review 75, 80.
135
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circumstances from the death penalty or life imprisonment.136 The idea of excessive
self-defence also enabled juries that did not wish to acquit those who had committed
a homicide but who had raised dubious self-defence arguments, to convict of
manslaughter.137 The possibility of a manslaughter verdict was a commonsense
response to a modern iteration of the ancient jury’s concern about excessive penalties
when the law did not recognise mitigating circumstances.
The ruling in Howe that failure to retreat was no longer an essential element of a selfdefence plea in a homicide case where the charge was murder,138 was also a welcome
development.139 However, a failure to retreat could still be taken into account when
deciding whether there should be an acquittal or a conviction for either murder or
manslaughter.140 Even though a failure to retreat still entangled the old chance medley
rule in murder cases,141 it was no longer the single deciding factor in whether a claim
136
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Morris has argued that:
one who had voluntarily engaged in a sudden affray could withdraw and, having indicated his
intention to quit the affray by retreating "to the wall", would be excused the murder if he then
killed an assailant.

Morris, ‘A New Qualified Defence to Murder’ (n 15) 32 (emphasis in original). George Crabb
described chance medley as a term used ‘when the killing of a man was se defendendo, in
self-defence, in a medley, that is, scuffle, affray, or sudden quarrel’. George Crabb, A history
of English law, or, An attempt to trace the rise, progress, and successive changes of the
common law: from the earliest period to the present time (London: Baldwin and Cradock,
1829) ch 20, 293 (emphasis in original). Bernard Brown has argued that ‘Chance medley …
may be regarded as the direct progenitor of provocation’. Bernard J. Brown, ‘The Demise of
Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a Defence to Murder in English Law’
(1963) 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 310, 310. Bernard Brown has reproduced the following quote of
what Lord Goddard CJ said in R v Semini [1949] 1 All E.R. 233; 1 KB 405, 407-408
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of self-defence should succeed.142 The mitigation idea of excessive self-defence in
Howe was seen to be ‘based on principles of justice and reasonableness’.143 It was
also logical as a matter of deterrence because it did not equate those who killed with
deadly force with those who killed believing that it was necessary to do what they
did.144
The Howe reasoning even allowed a manslaughter verdict where the accused ‘had
made an unreasonable mistake as to the degree of retaliatory force required by the
occasion’.145 The mitigation idea in Howe also allowed the court to simultaneously
control the limits of permissible violence, satisfy the jury’s common sense of justice by
enabling it to return an intermediate verdict of manslaughter,146 and provide justice to
the person accused of homicide. There were also arguments that the reasoning in
Howe gave both the jury and sentencing judge the flexibility to ‘ensure that the charge
and punishment accurately reflect[ed] the accused's moral culpability’.147
Other commentators thought that the logic behind the doctrine of excessive selfdefence that was legitimised in Howe was ‘seriously defective’.148 A “fundamental
shortcoming” was that the purpose of the qualified defence was unclear.149 It was
suggested that ‘the true object of excessive defence was not to mitigate the severity
of the law, but “to restrict … an admitted right of self-defence”’.150 Excessive selfBernard Brown has argued that killing in such circumstances was “picturesquely” termed
“chance medley” which was initially called "chaud melee" but ‘became corrupted into "chance
medley" or "chaunce medley”’.
142
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defence required the jury to ‘go through a complicated and difficult process’.151
Excessive self-defence was ‘incoherent in principle and difficult, if not impossible, to
explain to juries’.152 The jury’s task of defining the proper scope of the excessive selfdefence allowed in Howe was a difficult one.153 It was difficult because the new halfway house defence required the jury to delimit the circumstances154 in which the
qualified self-defence rule applied.155 It was predicted that this test would be subject
to further modification,156 and that was a problem because the limits of this qualified
defence would be determined by the facts of each case rather than by the law. 157
Some commentator did not accept that a mere insult158 could justify the intentional
killing of another.159 Nor was the co-option of the reasonable man test into the law of
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murder welcomed, because it would make excessive self-defence difficult to define.160
If the accused had acted unreasonably as when a response to threatened harm was
disproportionate, the accused could not succeed in a plea of self-defence.161 Other
commentators did not accept that an accused could not rely on excessive self-defence
unless the situation warranted some degree of violence,162 and the accused had
inflicted on the victim, at least, a grievous bodily harm.163
The idea of excessive self-defence made it difficult for the jury to identify whether the
accused had lost self-control or had some hidden malicious motive such as revenge
when more violence was used than a reasonable man would have considered
necessary.164 The idea of excessive self-defence in Howe

was also said to be

‘fashioned by men’,165 for men who kill men, and it failed to take into account the
circumstances of women who kill men in self-defence as a response to domestic
violence within a family.166 The distinctions in the idea of excessive self-defence in
Howe were not nuanced enough to answer the question whether a person subject to
domestic violence including threats of injury, violation and indecency, could justify a
resort to deadly force.167
Other commentators argued that the new idea of excessive self-defence in Howe had
“little merit”. Mitigating circumstances could already be raised to reduce penalty during
a sentencing hearing, they argued that sentencing practice made murder and
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manslaughter verdicts “equally variable”.168 Others disagreed and said there was no
comparison between sentences for murder and manslaughter in any Australian
common law jurisdiction.169

3.6 Commentary following Palmer
The return to the Privy Council requirement of an ‘all-or-nothing’ result in the Palmer
case170 re-energised commentators. The commentary was complicated by the
continuing argument whether Australian common law should be decided in England.
But the core ideological battleground remained whether there was room for the middle
ground verdict of manslaughter when the charge was murder and the defence
responded with self-defence arguments. Should self-defence either entirely fail and
result in a murder conviction, or should the defence succeed and result in a complete
acquittal even though the force used in the self-defence was out of all proportion to
the threats or violence that had been used against the accused? 171 Some
commentators liked the reasoning in Palmer because the test it required172 was
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It requires no set words by way of explanation. No formula need be employed in reference to
it. Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that
a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do,
but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular
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straight forward and easy for a jury173 to understand174 and comprehend.175 The
Palmer test was also said to be based ‘upon common sense notions of fairness and
justice’.176 Common sense would not permit any action in self-defence which was
disproportionate to the ‘necessities of the situation’.177 The defence of self-defence left
no room for an intermediate plea of excessive self-defence, nor was there a need for
it.178 The commentators who did not like the reasoning in Palmer said that its ‘all-ornothing’ approach179 was not ‘based on principles of justice and reasonableness’180
and could not deliver justice to the accused at the same time as it controlled the limits
of permissible violence. The only way those two social goals could be achieved
simultaneously was if juries were allowed to return manslaughter verdicts in murder
cases where self-defence was pleaded as per Howe.181 The decision in Palmer was
also said to be ambiguous182 because it did not allow the jury to identify when the force
used by the accused in killing his victim was excessive.183 The Palmer reasoning
173
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understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend
himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably
necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. Of these a
jury can decide.
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elided two different views of acceptable self-defence in Australian society and that
created unacceptable uncertainty.184 It was further argued that the reasoning in Palmer
risked causing injustice because it allowed juries to acquit the accused even if the
force used in self-defence was excessive.185

3.7 Commentary following Viro
The Viro decision was not popular with judges or other commentators because of the
complexity of the six-part test that it set out.186 Nor did it resolve the underlying tension

Kovacs called one interpretation the traditionalist approach and required that necessity and
proportionality are not “discrete” ingredients for a self-defence plea. She argued that this
approach retained the idea that if the accused failed to establish that the force used was
proportionate, that would mean that accused failed to establish a “a sine qua non of the
defence” and his or her defence would entirely fail resulting in a murder conviction. Kovacs
called the other interpretation or approach, the “second interpretation”. She argued that this
interpretation rejected the idea that necessity and proportionality are discrete ingredients
which must be established for a plea of self-defence to succeed. She then concluded that that
distinction was “hardly an academic one”: Kovacs (n 45) 56-7.
184
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(1)(a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the
accused reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious
bodily harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself.
(2) If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief by the
accused of such an attack no question of self-defence arises.
(3) If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such reasonable belief
by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in fact used by the accused was
reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced.
(4) If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used than was
reasonably proportionate it should acquit.
(5) If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used, then its verdict
should be either manslaughter or murder, that depending upon the answer to the final question
for the jury - did the accused believe that the force which he used was reasonably proportionate
to the danger which he believed he faced?.
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between those who argued that binary verdicts were sufficient in homicide cases with
a self-defence element, and those who argued that the failure to recognize that selfdefence could be reasonable or unreasonable, was leading to unjust verdicts and
punishments.
Extra-judicially, judges did not hide their dissatisfaction with the excessive self-defence
doctrine as it was expressed in Viro. Weinberg J said that Viro ‘turned out to be a
disaster for the administration of criminal justice’.187 Gleeson CJ said it was ‘an
example of an attempt at individualised justice that went too far’ because the ‘elaborate
interplay between the subjective and objective factors … was difficult to explain to
juries’.188 Sir Darryl Dawson added that Viro’s six separate propositions189 were ‘quite
beyond a jury's comprehension’.190 He continued that they would remain ‘hopelessly
abstruse’ no matter how a trial judge might “adapted” them when instructing the jury. 191
Justice Weinberg said that they were ‘complex, unnecessary’192 and ‘almost
incomprehensible’ for a jury to understand.193 This was because they contained ‘a
number of negatives and double negatives’,194 and were designed to take account ‘not
only of the various factual possibilities that might exist, but also of the problems that

(6) If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have such a belief
the verdict will be murder. If it is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not
have that belief the verdict will be manslaughter.

Viro (n 3) 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs
J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law - A Mildly Vituperative Critique’ (2011) 35 Melb. U. L.
Rev. 1177, 1181.
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Murray Gleeson CJ (Chief Justice of the NSW Supreme Court then), ‘Individualized Justice:
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Viro (n 3) 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs
J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
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Justice M Weinberg, ‘Jury Directions on Trial – A Pathway Through the Labyrinth?’
(Supreme and Federal Court Judges’ Conference, Darwin, 5–9 July 2014), 3 n 10.
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arise having regard to the need to bear in mind considerations of onus of proof’.195 Nor
could they be reformulated in a way that might assist the jury.196 Reducing them in
writing to be handed to the jury did not help either.197 Trial judges ‘continued to
encounter difficulties’ in explaining them to the jury.198 That ‘task has vexed courts …
jury directions were often “replete with length, turgidity, complexity, and double, even
multiple negatives”’.199
Academic commentators agreed that the six Viro rules200 lacked coherence and
consistency,201 and that Mason J's six points to be included in jury instructions which
was intended to assist juries in applying the excessive self-defence doctrine, was
probably more of a hindrance than a help.202 Viro’s excessive self-defence doctrine
did not acknowledge any moral difference between different self-defence cases, but it
led inexorably to confusion. That was because it required the jury to assess the
accused’s honesty rather than his reasonableness. And yet it provided the accused
with a complete defence if threat perceptions were reasonable, but not otherwise. 203
This was also described as a ‘basic and complicating conceptual anomaly’.204

Anthony Murray Gleeson ‘Clarity or Fairness: Which Is More Important’ (1990) 12 Sydney
L. Rev. 305, 309.
195
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Viro (n 3) 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs
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3.8 Commentary following Zecevic
Stanley Yeo welcomed the High Court’s decision in Zecevic because it recognised
the significant role that subjective fear played in self-defence cases.205 But Yeo was
not completely satisfied because a test rephrased in terms of the accused's
reasonable belief,206 would have assured more subjectivity than a reasonable person
test, and would have allowed the jury to take into account additional factors of a
‘personal nature’ that were not encompassed by pure proportionality.207 Yeo did not
think it necessary to resurrect the excessive self-defence doctrine.208
Paul Fairall agreed that it was not necessary to resurrect the excessive self-defence
doctrine even though the six Viro rules209 were flawed, complex, incoherent and
inconsistent.210 The excessive self-defence doctrine was not the only option for reform
but it could be further refined.211 As Deane J had pointed out in his dissenting
judgment,212 it was not necessary to reverse the Howe and Viro decisions.213 The selfdefence rules could be improved by separately considering the accused’s response to
the threat experienced and in the response chosen. There was no clear majority as to
whether self-defence could only succeed if the accused used lawful force. Only
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Yeo, ‘Self-Defence: From Viro to Zecevic’ (n 174) 262.
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The test for the jury to apply was as follows:
[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 4) 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).
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Brennan and Deane JJ wanted to retain the old idea that ignorance of the law excuses
no one (ignorantia juris neminem excusat) and automatically defeated a plea of selfdefence.214 They said it did not matter that the accused was mistaken about the
lawfulness of the aggressor's behaviour.215 The majority’s approach however,216
eliminated the need to distinguish between lawful and unlawful self-defence
conduct.217 The accused could be convicted of murder even if he honestly believed
that he was acting reasonably in self-defence.218 The jury only needed to be instructed
that they must work out whether the accused’s belief that he was acting in self-defence
was honest and reasonable. 219
There was no longer any rule which required the jury to consider the manslaughter
option in cases of excessive self-defence because the majority ruled that ‘there is no
rule which dictates the use which the jury must make of the evidence and the ultimate
question is for it alone’.220 However, none of the commentators explained how the jury
might find a different verdict if they did not like the two options available and there
were no instructions from the judge suggesting what they should do in that case. Fairall
had suggested that there is nothing to bar the accused, or his or her defence counsel,
that it is within their constitutional right to find a middle-ground verdict of manslaughter
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Mason CJ said:
In the result I now consider that we should accept that the joint judgment of Wilson, Dawson
and Toohey JJ. correctly states the law of self-defence. The law on this topic in Australia will
then conform to the law in the United Kingdom as expounded in Palmer and The Queen v.
McInnes and in other jurisdictions. The risk that an accused person may be convicted of murder
when he lacks reasonable grounds for his belief that the degree of force used was necessary
for his self-defence will be alleviated by several factors. It is for the Crown to establish that there
was an absence of reasonable grounds for the accused's belief. A jury will be slow to make
such a finding if the Crown has failed to satisfy them that the accused did not honestly believe
that the force used was necessary. And the jury will not return a verdict of murder unless it is
satisfied that there was an intention to kill or to do grievous bodily harm.

Zecevic (n 4) 654 (Mason CJ) (citations omitted).
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‘even though the formal elements of murder (as redefined in Zecevic) are
established’.221
Arenson said that none of the four justifications which were offered222 in support of
abolishing the excessive self-defence doctrine, allowing a half-way house and
manslaughter verdict were convincing.223 He added that the excessive force
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apply; would restore consistency to the law of self-defence; there would be no risk for injustice
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expressed in ‘Palmer (adopted in England in McInnes) and which are generally consonant
with the law in the code States’. Zecevic (n 4) 664-5 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
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Arenson, ‘Expanding the Defences to Murder’ (n 69) 132. Arenson has argued that:

Firstly, the view that both judges and juries would be able to understand and apply the Zecevic
test is “unsupported by empirical evidence”: at 132.
Secondly, while the majority view that ‘doctrinal consistency would be best served by
abolishing the dichotomy that existed between murder and all other offences regarding the
law of self-defence’ is “appealing on its face”, this justification ‘ignores the very policy
considerations’ which created the excessive self-defence’s doctrine. These are:
[C]riminal sanctions do little, if anything, to deter those who act with a genuine belief that their
conduct is legally and morally correct … and those who kill under circumstances amounting to
‘excessive self-defence’ are not in pari delicto with those who kill maliciously and with full
awareness that the use of deadly force is unwarranted: at 133 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).

Moreover:
Though it is certainly true that the dichotomy between murder and other defences regarding
the law of self-defence is at odds with doctrinal consistency the courts have never decreed, nor
do considerations of logic or fairness suggest, that the need for doctrinal consistency in the law
is so paramount that it should never be subordinated to countervailing interests such as those
underlying the doctrine of ‘excessive self-defence’: at 133 (emphasis in original).

Thirdly, the majority conclusion that “the risk of such an injustice” for an accused in the
abolition of the excessive self-defence’s doctrine “is remote”, was not acceptable, because ‘if
one accepts that it is better to allow a thousand guilty persons to walk free than to convict one
innocent person, then is it not equally true that an injustice to one represents an injustice to
all?’: at 133-4 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

Fourthly, the majority view that abolishing the doctrine of excessive self-defence ‘would bring
the Australian common law doctrine into harmony with that of England and the various code
jurisdictions throughout Australia’: at 135 (citations omitted); it is inconsistent with ‘the fact that
the High Court has not hesitated to break with precedents in England and other jurisdictions
when there has been a perceived necessity for doing so’: at 135.
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manslaughter rule had been known and applied for centuries, and had been
‘consistently affirmed and reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia and appellate
courts in other jurisdictions’.224 Ignoring this conventional wisdom failed to recognise
the malice aforethought that had always been required to convict anyone of murder.225
Arenson believed that juries had enough ‘common sense and intellect to understand
and correctly apply [judicial] directions’ differentiating between murder and
manslaughter to any set of facts that raised these matters for decision.226
Eric Colvin argued that it was odd to assess a self-defence situation using a
reasonableness standard when a person had to make a quick decision under stress.
That implied that a person accused of a serious crime would be criminally responsible
for not giving enough thought to the existence or nature of an attack, or the options for
dealing with it.227 In particular, Colvin observed that courts, including the High Court in
Zecevic, had repeatedly stressed that in self-defence cases, juries should be reminded
that they should approach the ‘task in a practical manner and without undue nicety,
giving proper weight to the predicament of the accused which may have afforded little,
if any, opportunity for calm deliberation or detached reflection’.228 Eric Colvin also

See also Yeo ‘The Demise of Excessive Self-Defense in Australia’ (n 15) 355-6.
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Ibid 9. Arenson has argued that according to Zecevic:
an accused’s genuine belief that it was necessary to resort to the use of deadly force in selfdefence was deemed to negate the malice aforethought element of murder under the excessive
force manslaughter doctrine: at 4 n 8.

Malice aforethought was defined in the following terms:
[T]he presence or absence of malice aforethought does not depend on whether the accused
acted with actual malice or prior design … suffice it to say for present purposes that malice
aforethought is nothing more than a term of art that is used to depict the overall conduct of one
who kills under any of the circumstances amounting to murder at common law. Conversely, if
the accused’s conduct does not amount to any form of murder at common law, s/he has not
acted with malice aforethought (citations omitted).
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Eric Colvin, ‘Ordinary and reasonable people: The design of objective tests of criminal
responsibility’ (2001) 27 Monash University Law Review 197, 209.
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Ibid 209. See also Zecevic (n 4) 662-3 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Palmer (n 2) 832
(Lord Morris for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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argued that the Zecevic test229 might be made more helpful if it were asked ‘whether
the assessment of the situation was one that an ordinary person could have made,
rather than by asking whether there were reasonable grounds for it’.230

3.9 Summary
Even though the majority of the High Court in Zecevic had said that it was conforming
the law of self-defence in Australia to that of England, some commentators have
argued that there is still a difference in approach. English trial judges following Palmer
instructed juries in subjective terms – did this accused honestly believe he was acting
in self-defence? Following Zecevic trial judges in Australia were required to instruct
juries to decide guilt in self-defence cases by asking whether the accused’s belief was
honest and reasonable which was almost completely objective.
Stanley Yeo questioned the majority’s belief in Zecevic that their ruling would conform
the Australian common law of self-defence to the English law as laid down in Palmer231
and Mclnnes232 on three grounds.233 In contrast to Zecevic’s ruling that the accused’s
belief has to be reasonable, in England courts permitted the defence to succeed if an
accused honestly although unreasonably believed that he was being or was about to
be attacked; English law frames the element of use of force in self-defence in terms of
what a reasonable person would regard as proportionate force. Yeo argued that
English law framed self-defence in terms of what a reasonable person would regard
as proportionate force, and English courts had not clarified whether the exercise of
reasonably proportionate force was to be construed as a rule of law or merely as an
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The Zecevic test for the jury to apply was as follows:
[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.
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evidentiary matter.234 Yeo also criticized the majority in Zecevic235 because they had
ignored the Australian view that the half-way house and manslaughter verdict option
allowed in both Howe236 and Viro237 accorded with public sentiment in this country.238
He suggested that the majority in Zecevic had been over-zealous in their rejection of
the excessive self-defence doctrine because the six propositions in Viro had created
problems for trial judges when trying to provide juries with clear instructions. Abolishing
the excessive self-defence doctrine completely was an over-reaction because trial
juries did not appear to have had problems in making occasional manslaughter
decisions after Howe before the complicating Viro propositions had been
introduced.239
Justice Mark Weinberg had also criticised the discussion of the origin of modern law
self-defence in the joint judgment of Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ.240 He wrote:
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Weinberg, ‘Moral blameworthiness — The ‘objective test’ dilemma’ (n 15) 195. It is
instructive to reproduce in detail what the majority said in Zecevic. They said
240

[T]he modern law of self-defence has its origin in rules which distinguished between justifiable
and excusable homicide. The importance of the distinction lay largely in the different
consequences of successful pleas of justification and excuse and now is a matter of history.
Justifiable homicide carried with it commendation rather than blame and accordingly entitled
the accused to total acquittal, entailing no forfeiture and requiring no pardon. It extended to
killing done in the execution of justice, which came to include both the apprehension of felons
and the prevention of felonies and thus those cases of self-defence which were in response to
a felonious attack by the deceased. Excusable homicide, on the other hand, was not entirely
without blame and merely excused rather than acquitted, requiring, at first, a pardon and
involving, for a somewhat longer period, forfeiture. It was concerned, not with the execution of
justice, but with a necessary and reasonable response to a threat to life and limb. Any practical
distinction between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide disappeared with the abolition
of forfeiture by statute in 1828 and today it is no part of the law in Australia to differentiate
between the two … But the history of the matter serves to explain why the requirement of
reasonableness, which was a requirement of excusable homicide, has remained part of the law
of self-defence. Moreover, it establishes why that requirement ought not be regarded as a
definitional element of the offence in question but as going rather to exculpation. True it is that
in result a successful plea of self-defence resembles justification rather than excuse because it
entitles the accused to a full acquittal, but in scope and in practice nowadays the plea has a
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With great respect, their Honours’ conclusion that self-defence as we now know it was
essentially exculpatory in its origin may be an overstatement. There are passages in
Hale that support that conclusion, but Stephen takes a somewhat different approach.
The view taken by the court gives insufficient weight to the breadth of the term
‘felonious attack’ at common law, which rendered self-defence justiﬁable, and not
merely excusable.241

Gleeson J (as his Honour then was) said that the High Court decisions Howe, Viro and
Zecevic, were an “experiment” with criminal law and justice.242 The High Court rejected
Palmer and in Howe and Viro, attempted to conform the law of self-defence in Australia
to popular sentiment. Gleeson J also observed that juries did not appear to have had
problems in choosing occasional manslaughter verdicts after Howe allowed them to
do so.243 He observed that the idea of excessive self-defence had enabled juries to
convict persons accused of homicide of manslaughter when they considered their self
defence arguments were dubious.244
The High Court appears to have been discouraged in their efforts to modernise the
law of self-defence in Australia before 1986 because they were still subject to the
English common law precedent. But the complexity and impracticality of their six
propositions in the Viro case did not assist their modernisation efforts. Because those
modernisation efforts were inconsistent and did not garner universal support, state
legislatures have stepped in and that has made the law more complex as I will explain
in chapter four.

greater connection with excusable homicide, being in most cases related to the preservation of
life and limb rather than the execution of justice.
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Conclusion to chapter three
Even though the decisions in Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic did not succeed in
creating a simple and predictable modern law of self-defence in Australia, they have
identified the competing arguments as to what a good modern law of self-defence
should look like. The residual questions revolve around the question whether selfdefence should be objectively or subjectively assessed. Does the speed and violence
involved in homicides mean that objective tests are inappropriate in this criminal law
space? Is it fair to apply civil law negligence standards in the criminal law arena where
there is no or inadequate time for an accused person to work out a reasoned response
to instant threats? But if arguments that objective standards ask too much of any
reasonable man or woman under threat of death or grievous violence, is it appropriate
to abandon objective standards completely and have a jury reduce a resulting penalty
because that jury does not consider it fair to expect any better conduct from this
accused in light of all the surrounding circumstances?
The underlying questions were about whether modern self-defence law should focus
on overall intent or the proportionality of the force that was used. A secondary conflict
concerned whether proven intent should result in an acquittal or a manslaughter
conviction in a self-defence case. Some judges focused on whether the accused’s
intent was determinative. If there was no intent to kill but just to self-defend, then an
acquittal was appropriate. Other judges believed that if the accused used more force
than what was necessary, then an acquittal was inappropriate and a manslaughter
verdict was then appropriate.
These questions and the subsequent academic and extra judicial criticism provide a
frame for chapter four. Since the High Court had been unable to answer these
questions in a convincing or authoritative way, was it time for Australian state and
territorial legislatures to step in and make the law both consistent and coherent again?
In that discussion, I will suggest that these legislatures could respond in two (or three)
different ways:
1. They could deny the possibility of acquittal altogether since there had been a
homicide. In a sense this concern is the same concern that motivated pre-16th
century juries to prevent homicide cases going to the king for pardon when they
were worried that he might not exercise the clemency that they thought was
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appropriate in some self-defence cases. Arguably governments and their law
enforcement agencies, like all the kings of England between the 12th and the 16th
centuries, are reluctant to condone any homicide at all.

2. Alternatively, they could recognise enduring community sentiment that says there
are three possible results when a homicide case has involved a self-defence
element:
a. The accused could be exonerated and acquitted;
b. The accused’s penalty could be reduced to manslaughter because
of the judge or jury’s assessment of the self-defence context; or
c. The judge or jury could decide that the alleged self-defence context
did not mitigate the homicide at all, and that the accused should be
convicted of a cold-blooded and premeditated murder.
In chapter four I discuss how the Australian state and territorial legislatures have
responded to the uncertainties in Australian self-defence law occasioned by the lack
of any unanimous High Court decision in this self-defence homicide space. I analyse
the effectiveness of these legislative responses in chapter four before I discuss options
for further reform in New South Wales in chapter six. Because I do not have space in
the confines of this thesis to recommend changes to the relevant law of all the states
and territories, my reform suggestions in chapter six suggest wise reforms in New
South Wales recognising that if those reforms are effective, they will be influential in
all other Australian jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER FOUR

STATUTORY SELF-DEFENCE IN THE AUSTRALIAN
JURISDICTIONS:
AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of chapter four of this thesis is to discuss how the parliaments of the
Australian states and territories have responded to the uncertainties in Australian selfdefence law. Once again, that uncertainty has been caused by continuing diversity in
High Court opinion in this self-defence homicide space, and by disagreement as to
whether modern self-defence law should focus on overall intent or the proportionality
of the self-defence force that was used.1

In Part One I briefly discuss the statutory self-defence provisions that have been
passed in the various states and territories, including the various tests as to what
constitutes self-defence that those legislatures have devised and what judges have
said about those tests.

In Part Two I discuss the New South Wales statutory self-defence provisions in detail.
I explain the context in which these provisions were passed and the alternatives that
were considered before they were passed. I then discuss the self-defence provisions
which were settled on, and what judges have said about them.

1

The focus of this thesis is only directed to the self-defence of person as distinct from defence
of property, and defence of other.
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My conclusion will be a summary. I will defer making suggestions as to why and how
the New South Wales self-defence provisions should be reformulated until chapters
five and six.

Part One: Brief overview of statutory self-defence law in the
Australian jurisdictions
When it became clear that the disagreement between the High Court and the Privy
Council had become intractable, the individual Australian parliaments began taking a
variety of legislative steps to clarify the law of self-defence. Because all those steps
were different, there could be no standard formula for jury instructions in deciding a
self-defence case. And while the Victorian legislature even acknowledged that selfdefence legislation was confusing in the text of their statute,2 trial judges ‘continued to
encounter difficulties’3 in explaining those provisions to the jury.
The statutory self-defence formulas varied. Some were subjective, some were
objective or were a combination of both.4 If the statutory formula required that the
accused’s criminal responsibility should be determined subjectively, then the jury had
to decide whether the accused, with this state of mind and personal characteristics or
circumstances was justified in the self-defence steps that were taken. If the statutory
formula required that the accused’s criminal responsibility be determined objectively,
then the jury had to decide whether a reasonable person placed in the same
circumstances at the time would have been justified in this self-defensive conduct. If

In Victoria the Parliament ‘[has] recognize[d] that…in recent decades, the law of jury
directions in criminal trial has become increasingly complex; and…has made it increasingly
difficult for jurors to understand and apply jury directions’. Subsections 5 (1)(b) and (c) of the
Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic).
2

Judge Sydney Tilmouth, ‘The wrong direction: A case study and anatomy of successful
Australian criminal appeals’ (2015) 40 Australian Bar Review 18, 34.
3

Stanley Yeo described the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” as follows: ‘The
expression “subjective” refers to the accused's actual mental state, personal characteristics or
circumstances, while “objective” denotes a reasonable person's thinking or response towards
a matter’. Stanley Yeo, ‘Revisiting Excessive Self-Defence’ (2009) 12 Current Issues Crim.
Just. 39, 39. See also Victoria Nourse, ‘Self-Defense and Subjectivity,’ (2001) 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1235, 1240 n 23; Eric Colvin, ‘Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective
Tests of Criminal Responsibility’ (2001) 27 Monash University Law Review 197, 197.
4
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the statutory formula included both subjective and objective proof elements, the jury
had to decide whether the accused believed his self-defensive conduct was
necessary, and whether his or her conduct or response, in the circumstances as he or
she perceived them, was reasonable.
Most of these new self-defence provisions post-date the Zecevic decision in the High
Court. The test in that case required that the accused subjectively believed the actions
taken were both necessary and objectively reasonable.5

Though most of the

legislation included the idea of necessity, the wording of the test of reasonableness
varied. New South Wales,6 the Australian Capital Territory,7 and the Northern
Territory8 adopted9 the self-defence provision of the Commonwealth Criminal Code.10
5

The Zecevic test was as follows:
[Did] the accused believe … upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 661 (Wilson, Dawson
and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J agreeing at 666) (‘Zecevic’).
6

Sections 418-422 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). Miriam Gani was of the view that the
judiciary of New South Wales has accepted those self-defence provisions ‘as a codification of
the law of self-defence’ (citations omitted). Miriam Gani, ‘Codifying the criminal law:
Implications for interpretation’ (2005) 29 Crim. L. J. 264, 277.
7

Section 42 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). It is not my intention to analyse s 42 of the
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) and s 10.4 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) because both sections
are similar to s 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
8

Section 43BD of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT).

9

In Egitmen v Western Australia Mitchell JA said:
The Commonwealth, New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory provisions were based
on those recommended by a 1992 report of the Criminal Law Officers Committee of the
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General for the Model Criminal Code.

Egitmen v Western Australia (2016) 263 A Crim R 203, 244 [249] (Mitchell JA, Mazza JA
agreeing at 221 [121]) (‘Egitmen’). See also Eric Colvin, ‘Abusive Relationships and Violent
Responses: The Reorientation of Self-Defense in Australia’ (2009-2010) 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev.
339, 347.
10

See s 10.4 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. In Egitmen Mitchell JA said that the proper construction of s 10.4 should be as
follows:
[S]ection 10.4 (2)(a)] is entirely subjective. The question is whether the accused subjectively
believes the conduct is necessary to defend a person irrespective of the reasonableness of that
belief. [Section 10.4(2)(b)] has a subjective and an objective component. The objective
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Under section one of that provision, the accused’s criminal responsibility was nullified
if the accused was shown to have carried out the conduct constituting the offence, in
self-defence.
But s 2 complicated that consideration. It divided that consideration into two limbs.
Under the first, the accused must subjectively believe that the defensive conduct was
necessary. But the second alternative limb mixed objective and subjective elements.
It requires that the accused’s response to the circumstances be objectively
reasonable, but it does not require that the accused’s perception of the surrounding
circumstances be objectively reasonable.11 If the accused misread the circumstances,
that had to be taken into account.
Because the prosecution retains the overriding obligation to prove the accused guilty
of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution must persuade the
jury that the accused’s self-defence arguments were not convincing under either limb
of this provision. That is, the prosecution must satisfy the jury that this accused did not
believe his self-defence conduct was necessary (limb one); or that the accused’s selfdefensive conduct was not reasonable in light of what he believed about the
circumstances (limb 2).12

component is that the accused's conduct is “a reasonable response in the circumstances”.
However, the reasonableness of the response is to be assessed by reference to the
circumstances as the accused subjectively perceives them, irrespective of the reasonableness
of that perception.

Egitmen (n 9) 244 [251] ((Mitchell JA, Mazza JA agreeing at 221 [121]).
See Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department in association with the Australian
Institute of Judicial Administration, The Commonwealth Criminal Code A Guide for
Practitioners (Prepared by Ian Leader-Elliott, 2002) 229-231 (‘The Guide’). The Guide
relevantly suggests that chapter three, of which s 10.4 is part, imposes ‘no limit of this kind on
the range of offences for which self defence might provide an excuse or justification’: The
Guide (n 10) 229. The Guide further suggests that under s 10.4 the accused is judged on his
or her own perceptions of the threat and ‘an unreasonable mistake can provide the basis for
a complete defence’: The Guide (n 10) 229. Moreover, self defence is available to the accused
‘even in circumstances where the accused responded to an unreasonable apprehension of
harm’: The Guide (n 10) 230-1.
11

Moore v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 185, [27] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94])
(‘Moore’).
12

R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613, [23] (Howie J) (‘Katarzynski’).
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The legislatures in South Australia,13 Tasmania,14 Victoria15 and Western Australia16
have all made different changes since Zecevic. But there have been no changes in
the Queensland self-defence provisions, since Sir Samuel Griffith drafted the Criminal
Code in 1889.17

I will now briefly discuss the statutory self-defence provisions that have been passed
in the various states and territories.

4.1 South Australia
The self-defence provisions in South Australia have been described as ‘notorious for
the difficulty they cause in directing juries’.18 The test has two limbs.19 Under the first
limb, s 15(1)(a) requires an assessment of the accused’s subjective belief as to what
was necessary and reasonable.20 The jury is required to assess the accused’s genuine
belief about the threat or perceived threat, but there is no requirement of
reasonableness.21 At this stage the jury is not required to examine whether a

13

Sections 15-15B of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).

14

Section 46 of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas).

15

Sections 322G-322N of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).

16

Sections 247-248 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA).

17

Sections 271-272 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). Sir Samuel Griffith described ss 271 and
271 as both correctly stating the common law in Queensland. In Sir Samuel Griffith’s letter to
Queensland’s Attorney General accompanying the Draft Code in 1897, he ‘stated that in this
part of his draft Code the sections corresponded to the common law unless otherwise
indicated. There is no contrary indication concerning ss. 278, 279 in the draft which correspond
to ss. 271, 272 of the Code as enacted in 1901’. S. O’Regan, ‘Self-Defence in the Grifﬁth
Code’ (1979) 3 Criminal Law Journal 336, 337 n 3.
18

R v Dunn [2012] SASCFC 40, [43] (Gray J, Anderson J agreeing at [53], Stanley J agreeing
at [54]) (‘Dunn’).
19

See s 15 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) in the legislation schedule in part
three of the appendix.
20

R v McCarthy (2015) 124 SASR 190, 208 [59] (Gray J dissenting) (‘McCarthy’).

21

R v Edwards [2009] SASC 233, [152] (Gray J) (‘Edwards’).
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reasonable person would hold that belief. 22 The jury is however, required ‘to determine
whether it is a reasonable possibility that the accused held that belief’.23
After the jury has already considered the accused’s belief under first limb, 24 its next
task is to consider whether the accused has responded reasonably to the perceived
threat (subs 15(1)(b)). This requires the jury to make an objective assessment of the
response of the accused with regard to the threat which the accused subjectively and
genuinely believed to have existed,25 and requires in accordance with ‘the law at least
since Viro v The Queen, that the force used must not be disproportionate to the
necessities of the occasion’.26 This subsection, however, “departs” from the decision
in Zecevic because it requires an objective assessment of the reasonableness of the
accused's response.27 In Zecevic ‘it was the accused’s belief based upon the
circumstances as the accused perceived them to be, which ha[d] to be reasonable

22

Dunn (n 18) [44] (Gray J, Anderson J agreeing at [53], Stanley J agreeing at [54]).

23

Ibid. See also McCarthy (n 20) 208 [59]-[60] (Gray J dissenting) (citations omitted). In
McCarthy Gray and Peek JJ quoted what Vanstone J said in R v Fragomeli [2008] SASC 96
at [28]
the fact is that [s 15(1)(a)] does import, in a limited way, the concept of proportionality. Plainly
the accused’s genuine belief must extend to the necessity to employ force and to the degree of
force he uses: (McCarthy (n 20) 209 [64]) (Gray J dissenting), 292 [350] n 219 (Peek J)).

Peek J was of the opinion that:
s 15(1)(a) does not specifically require a positive belief that the conduct was proportionate to
the threat … However, in considering whether the defendant actually did hold a belief that the
conduct was necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose pursuant to s 15(1)(a), one
does consider all of the facts; if the defendant’s conduct is completely disproportionate to any
threat he could have apprehended, that apparent disproportionality may (not must) tend to
indicate that the defendant did not in fact actually consider that his conduct was necessary and
reasonable for a defensive purpose: (McCarthy (n 20) 292 [350] (Peek J, Kourakis CJ agreeing
at 197 [1])).
24

Dunn (n 18) [44] (Gray J, Anderson J agreeing at [53], Stanley J agreeing at [54]).

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.
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and not the belief of the reasonable man.’28 Subsection 15(1)(b) is said to require the
jurors to place themselves in the position of the accused at the time the self-defence
was required, and then to objectively assess the reasonable proportionality of the
accused’s conduct.29 However it is questionable that the word “genuine” in the
subsection assists the jury’s assessment of the accused’s belief since what is required
is an assessment of the accused’s state of mind and ‘[a] belief cannot be held without
being genuine.’30 A direction for the jury under the second limb is also said to require
a direction with respect to the phrase “reasonably proportionate”.31 This South
Australian code is also the example of a statutory self-defence law in Australia that
requires the accused’s self-defence to be proportional “to the threat”.32

4.2 Tasmania
In Tasmania the self-defence provisions do not contain reference to a necessity
requirement. That is, there is no requirement that the accused believed that his or her

28

Katarzynski (n 12) [6] (Howie J) (citations omitted). The Zecevic test was expressed in the
following terms:
[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 5) 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).
29

Dunn (n 18) [29], [43] (Gray J, Anderson J agreeing at [53], Stanley J agreeing at [54]).

30

Edwards (n 21) [152] (Gray J).

31

Dunn (n 18) [29] (Gray J, Anderson J agreeing at [53], Stanley J agreeing at [54]). Section
15B of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) provides:
15B Reasonable proportionality
A requirement under this Division that the defendant's conduct be (objectively) reasonably
proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist does not imply that
the force used by the defendant cannot exceed the force used against him or her.
32

Section 15(1)(b) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) provides
(b) the conduct was, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be,
reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely believed to exist.
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response to the circumstances was necessary.33 However, in R v Walsh (‘Walsh’),34
Slicer J said that the first limb required the jury to consider whether the accused
‘genuinely and honestly believed that force was necessary’.35 The Tasmanian test also
has two limbs. The first limb is purely subjective and requires the jury to assess
whether the accused believed he needed to use defensive force at the time of the
incident.36 The jury is required to place itself in the position of the accused at the time
and ‘ascertain his belief as to the element of danger’.37 The accused ‘may be mistaken
but the test is genuineness of [his] belief not [his]reasonableness’.38 This requirement
may be satisfied even if the accused was mistaken about the need for self-defence.39
The second limb involves the use of a mixed objective/subjective test. It requires the
jury to assess whether the force used by the accused was reasonable in the
circumstances as the accused believed them to be.40 The accused’s belief of the
33

Section 46 of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (TAS) provides:
A person is justified in using, in the defence of himself or another person, such force as, in the
circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to use.

34

(1991) 60 A Crim R 419 (Slicer J) (‘Walsh’).

35

Walsh (n 34) 423 (Slicer J).

Ibid. See also Robinson v Chatters [2010] TASSC 66, [59] (Wood J) (‘Chatters’); Tasmania
Law Reform Institute, Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (Report No 20, 2015) 6-7
(‘Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence’).
36

37

Walsh (n 34) 423 (Slicer J).

38

Ibid.

Ibid. Slicer J also said that this approach ‘is consistent with the approach’ taken by English
Court of Appeal in R v Gladstone Williams when their Lordships said:
39

The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant's belief is material to the question
of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all. If the belief was in fact held, the
unreasonableness, so far as guilt or innocence is concerned, is neither here nor there. It is
irrelevant … if the defendant may have been labouring under a mistake as to the facts, he must
be judged according to his mistaken view of the facts: at 423 (Slicer J) citing, R v Gladstone
Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, 282.

Slicer J then said the above principle ‘was affirmed by by the Privy Council in Beckford’ when
in that case their lordships “add[ed]” ‘no jury is going to accept a man's assertion that he
believed that he was about to be attacked without testing it against all the surrounding
circumstances’: at 423 (Slicer J) citing, Beckford [1988] AC 130, 145; (1987) 85 Cr App R 378,
386. See also Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (n 36) 6-7.
40

Walsh (n 34) 423-4 (Slicer J). See also Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (n 36)
6-7.
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circumstances is to be is determined on a subjective basis. But whether the force used
by the accused was reasonable in those circumstances is determined on an objective
basis.41 In other words, assuming the jury has already found that the belief of the
accused was genuinely held, the jury would be required to assess whether a
reasonable person would consider the force actually used by the accused was
reasonable to the circumstances as he or she believed them to be.42
In R v Walsh (‘Walsh’),43 Slicer J said this process ‘would be difficult’ for the jury.44 He
further said that if the jury found that the belief of the accused was genuinely held, they
would then have to consider other matters: the surrounding circumstances at the time,
place, time of the day, relative sizes of the accused and the victim; and the personal
characteristics and attributes of the accused, such as whether the accused:
[W]as a war veteran who had been badly injured, or who had been severely injured
following an attack by a group of youths … a person with the experiences of the
accused would be more susceptible to fear of consequences and be more likely to
perceive a necessity for immediate and drastic action.45

He also said that evidence of ‘the effect of prior traumatic experiences on susceptibility
or sensitivity to a perceived threat’46 was relevant evidence to be considered by the
jury.
The Tasmanian self-defence provision does not just apply in cases of homicide. It also
applies in other cases of violent crime including assault, wounding and causing
grievous bodily harm.47 When a self-defence plea succeeds in Tasmania, it is a

41

Walsh (n 34) 423-4 (Slicer J). See also Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (n 36)
6-7.
42

Ibid.

43

Walsh (n 34) (Slicer J).

44

Ibid 424 (Slicer J).

45

Ibid 424 (Slicer J). See also Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (n 36) 8.

46

Walsh (n 34) 424 (Slicer J). See also Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (n 36) 8.

47

Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (n 36) 6.
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complete defence,48 and the accused in entitled to an acquittal. That is, there is no
half-way house possibility of a manslaughter conviction where the accused is charged
with a homicide.49 Either the accused was justified in using the force, or she was not.50

4.3 Victoria
In Victoria, the self-defence provisions distinguish between cases of general
violence,51 and cases of family violence.52 There are separate definitions for “family
violence”, “family member’ and what “evidence of family violence” is to be taken into
account when a case involves family violence.53

48

Ibid 6, 11, 30, 50.

49

Duggan v The Queen [2001] TASSC 5, [32] (Crawford J, Slicer J agreeing at [80], Evans J
agreeing at [81]), (‘Duggan’).
50

Ibid [32]. In Wright v Tasmania (‘Wright’) Blow J said:
In determining whether the amount of force used in self-defence was reasonable or excessive,
a jury must take into account the fact that a person defending himself or herself may be in a
stressful situation with little or no time to think.

Wright v Tasmania [2005] TASSC 113, [16] (Blow J, Tennent J agreeing at [33]) (citations
omitted).
He further said:
A person who believes he or she is about to be attacked does not necessarily have to wait for
the assailant to strike the first blow or fire the first shot. Circumstances may justify the use of
pre-emptive force in self-defence: Wright at [17] (Blow J) (citations omitted).
51

See s 322K of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or analyse domestic or family violence
and the associated self-defence questions about “domestic-captives” or “dominated
defendants”. But see the brief discussion of this phenomenon in part two of the Appendix
under the heading ‘Self-Defence in Domestic Violence Cases’.
52

See s 322M of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix.
53

See s 322J of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). It is also relevant to note that if a request is made
by the accused, or his counsel, to the trial judge under s 58 (Request for direction on family
violence) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), or if the accused is unrepresented and the
judge considers it in the interests of justice to do so, the judge must direct the jury in
accordance to s 59 of the Jury Directions Act 2015. See s 59 in the legislation schedule in part
three of the appendix. The judge may also direct the jury according to s 60 of the Jury
Directions Act 2015 (Vic). See s 60 in the legislation schedule in part three of the appendix.
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The test in cases of general violence is governed by s 318K(2).54 The test has two
limbs. Under the first, the accused must subjectively believe that the defensive conduct
was necessary (subs 318K(a)).55 The second limb mixes objective and subjective
elements. It requires that the accused’s response to the circumstances be objectively
reasonable, but it does not require that the accused’s perception of the surrounding
circumstances be objectively reasonable (subs 318K(b)). If the accused misreads the
circumstances, that has to be taken into account.56
The test in cases of family violence is governed by s 322M. The two limbs of the test
in s 318K are maintained, except that s 322M modifies the factors to be considered by
making them less stringent in assessing the belief of the accused in circumstances
where family violence is in issue. Section 322M justifies the subjective belief of the
person in the necessity of self-defence and the objective reasonableness of the
defensive conduct even if “the person is responding to a harm that is not immediate”
(subs 322M(b)) and the ‘the response involves the use of force in excess of the force
involved in the harm or threatened harm’ (subs 322M(b)). Circumstances of family
violence can thus affect both limbs of the test for self-defence. The two questions for
the jury to answer in cases involving family violence then are: is there a reasonable
possibility that the accused believed that his or her conduct was necessary to defend
himself or herself?; and is there a reasonable possibility that what the accused did was
a reasonable response to the circumstances as he or she perceived them?57 The jury
should find the accused not guilty unless the jury’s answer is “No” to one of those
questions.58
It is not for the accused to establish that he or she held the relevant belief and that his
or her conduct was a reasonable response in the perceived circumstances. The onus

54

The Victorian test in s 318K(2) adopts the same test of s 418(2) of the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW).
Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book, Part 8.1, [32]-[33] (‘Victorian
Criminal Charge Book’).
55

56

Ibid [51]-[52].

57

Victorian Criminal Charge Book (n 55) [26]-[27] citing, Katarzynski (n 12) [22] (Howie J).

58

Victorian Criminal Charge Book (n 55) [28].
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is on the prosecution to disprove, beyond reasonable doubt, the accused’s defence.
But the accused has the evidential onus of establishing the self-defence argument on
the balance of probabilities.59 This is consistent with general common law principles
as set out in the decisions in Viro60 and Zecevic.61

4.4 Western Australia
Like Victoria, the Western Australian self-defence provision does not just relate to
homicide as it provides that the accused’s “harmful act” would be “lawful” if it was done
in self-defence.62 It does that by requiring the court to separately consider the “harmful
acts” of both the accused and the victim every time the issue of self-defence arises in
a criminal trial. Moreover, the self-defence provision ‘contemplate[s] a person acting
in respect of a harmful act which is not imminent’.63
Section 284 (4) has been described as complex and ambiguous and has been said to
“create an irreconcilable contradiction. Its objective assessments overlap and are
impossible to apply without either ignoring some of [its] terms or contorting the
meaning of others’.64 The provision has also been criticised because it does not take
into account the gender inequality that has been addressed in the Victorian provision.65

59

See s 322I of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix.
60

Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 (‘Viro’).

61

Zecevic (n 5).

62

See s 248 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix.
63

Goodwyn v Western Australia (2013) 45 WAR 328, 350 [164] (Mazza JA) (‘Goodwyn’).

Stella Tarrant, ‘Self-defence in the Western Australian Criminal Code: Two Proposals for
Reform’ (Research Paper, University of Western Australia-Faculty of Law, 2015-2016), 11-2.
64

65

Ibid 11. See ss 322J, 322M, and 322N of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
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In Egitmen v Western Australia (‘Egitmen’)66 Buss P explained why it is so hard to
explain the requirements of s 248(4) to a jury.67 He said:
[S]ection 248(4) enumerates four elements. First, the accused [must] (subjectively)
believe… the harmful act is necessary to defend the accused or another person from
a harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent (s 248(4)(a)). Secondly, the
accused's harmful act [must be] a reasonable (objective) response by the accused in
the circumstances as the accused (subjectively) believes them to be (s 248(4)(b)).
Thirdly, there [must be] reasonable (objective) grounds for the accused's (subjective)
belief that the harmful act is necessary to defend the accused or another person from
a harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent (s 248(4)(a) read with s
248(4)(c)). Fourthly, there [must be] reasonable (objective) grounds for the accused's
(subjective) belief as to the circumstances (s 248(4)(b) read with s 248(4)(c)).68

This summary reiterates what Martin CJ said in Goodwyn v Western Australia
(‘Goodwyn’)69 when he explained that it was not practically possible to ask the jury to
divide the accused’s intention in the manner the legislature seemed to intend as per
the requirements of s 248(4). He said:
However, in the way in which s 248(4) has been structured, it is impossible to
segregate the existence of objectively reasonable grounds for a subjective belief that
the act of the accused was a necessary response to the apprehended threat from the
existence of objectively reasonable grounds for the apprehended threat. Put another
way, the way that the section has been structured, it is logically impossible to conceive
of a circumstance in which a subjective belief that the act of the accused was a
necessary response to an apprehended threat could be based on objectively
reasonable grounds unless there were objectively reasonable grounds for the
apprehension of a threat which justiﬁed the response of the accused.70

66

Egitmen (n 9).

67

Ibid 214-5 [64]-[75] (Buss P, Mazza JA agreeing at 221 [121]). See also Goodwyn (n 63)
341-2 [84]-[95] (Buss JA), 350-1 [166]-[174] (Mazza JA); Raux v Western Australia (2012) 210
A Crim R 562, 585 [136]-[141] (Buss JA, McLure P agreeing at 568 [26], Pullin JA agreeing at
568 [27]) (‘Raux’).
68

Egitmen (n 9) 215 [76] (Buss P, Mazza JA agreeing at 221 [121]).

69

Goodwyn (n 63).

70

Goodwyn (n 63) 331-2 [3] (Martin CJ).
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The accused’s belief in subs 248(4)(a) is a singular belief – that is – both the accused’s
‘belief as to the apprehended threat, and a belief as to whether a particular act is
necessary to defend against that threat’,71 are neither discrete nor divisible.72 While
the jury may think that there are many factors that informed both the accused’s
decision and their own analysis, they have to roll all those considerations into the one
decision they are called to make – “Was this self-defence or was it not?” It was just
such intertwined complexity that saw English juries before the 16th century either
qualify their verdicts or even choose supposedly aberrant decisions.
Section 248(3) complicates matters further by introducing the notions of partial selfdefence and excessive self-defence which will be remembered from the Howe Case.
The result is that in proven homicide self-defence cases the jury is expected to return
a verdict of manslaughter if the accused’s response was unreasonable in the
circumstances as he or she believed them to be. Thus, even if the use of force by one
person is lawful, if the force used was more than justified by law under the
circumstances, the jury is required to find that such excessive force was unlawful.73
But there is even more complexity. If the accused made a mistake of fact about the
lawfulness of an attack that was honest and reasonable, s 24 provides that he or she
can rely upon self-defence, and the s 2474 option is not excluded as a defence under
s 248(5).75
In all these scenarios, the burden of disproving the accused’s self-defence argument
remains with the prosecution. In all cases, the prosecution must exclude the possibility

71

Ibid 332 [2] (Martin CJ), 341 [87] (Buss JA).

72

Ibid.

73

Section 260 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) provides:
260 Excessive force is unlawful
In any case in which the use of force by one person to another is lawful, the use of more force
than is justified by law under the circumstances is unlawful.

74

See s 24 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix.
75

William- Jones v Miller 269 A Crim R 320, 332-3 (Smith AJ).
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of self-defence beyond reasonable doubt.76 In practice that means that the prosecution
must show that the accused was not acting in self-defence if ‘it established one or
more of the following matters beyond reasonable doubt:
•

that the accused did not subjectively believe that the harmful act was necessary
to defend herself;

•

there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the accused to believe that
the harmful act was necessary to defend herself;

•

the accused’s harmful act was not an objectively reasonable response in the
circumstances that she subjectively believed to exist; or

•

there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the accused’s subjective
belief as to the circumstances.’77

Proof beyond reasonable doubt of any one of those matters would mean that the
prosecution had negated the defence of self-defence.78 On the contrary, however, in
self-defence cases, the accused must succeed if he or she raises a reasonable doubt
about the prosecution’s allegations.79

4.5 Queensland
In Queensland, the self-defence provisions in ss 271 and 272 of the Criminal Code
1899 distinguish between provoked80 and unprovoked assault,81 and in order ‘to be
76

Egitmen (n 9) 215 [76] (Buss P, Mazza JA agreeing at 221 [121]), 239 [228] (Mitchell JA).

77

Gallagher v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 54, [20] (Buss and Mazza JJA, Mitchell J)
(‘Gallagher’). See also Goodwyn (n 69) 342 [95]-[96] (Buss JA); Egitmen (n 9) 239-240 [227][228] (Mitchell JA, Mazza JA agreeing at 221 [121]).
78

Gallagher v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 54, [20] (Buss and Mazza JJA, Mitchell J)
(‘Gallagher’). See also Goodwyn (n 69) 342 [95]-[96] (Buss JA); Egitmen (n 9) 239-240 [227][228] (Mitchell JA, Mazza JA agreeing at 221 [121]).
79

Goodwyn (n 69) 342 [96] (Buss JA); Egitmen (n 9) 239-240 [227]-[228] (Mitchell JA, Mazza
JA agreeing at 221 [121).
80

See s 271 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. See also Graham v The Queen (2016) 90 ALJR 820, 823-4 [9]-[11] (French CJ,
Kiefel and Bell JJ, Gordon J agreeing at 832 [57) (‘Graham High Court Appeal’).
81

See s 272 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. See also Graham High Court Appeal (n 80) 823-4 [9]-[11] (French CJ, Kiefel and
Bell JJ, Gordon J agreeing at 832 [57).
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understood [these] must be considered together’.82 There are four elements of
unprovoked assault that the jury must consider under s 271(1). They were set out by
the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Sharpley (‘Sharpley’).83 In that case
Chesterman JA, with whom White JA and Daubney J agreed, said that the defence
must prove:
(a) The accused must have been unlawfully assaulted; (b) [h]e did not provoke the
assault on him; (c) [t]he force used to resist the assault is reasonably necessary to
make an effective defence to the assault; and (d) [t]he force used was not intended to
cause death or grievous bodily harm and was not in its nature likely to cause death or
grievous bodily harm.84

Unless the prosecution disproves, beyond reasonable doubt, “at least” one of the above
four elements, the accused’s self-defence plea would succeed.85
In Zecevic,86 Brennan J defined the word “unlawful” as it forms part of the first element
of s 271. He said:

R v Muratovic [1967] Qd R 15, 25 (Hart J) (‘Muratovic’). In R v Wilmot, Jerrard JA was of
the view that the construction of self-defence provisions in the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) is the
same as per Zecevic’s common law test. He said that in Zecevic “the common law position
approved by the majority” was as follows:
82

The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon
reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief
and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the
matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal …
If the response of an accused goes beyond what he believed to be necessary to defend himself
or if there were no reasonable grounds for a belief on his part that the response was necessary
in defence of himself, then the occasion will not have been one which would support a plea of
self-defence.

R v Wilmot (2006) 165 A Crim R 14, 25 [35]-[36] (Jerrard JA, Muir J agreeing at 31 [59])
(‘Wilmot’) (citations omitted).
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[2011] QCA 124 (‘Sharpley’).
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Ibid [34] (Chesterman JA, White JA agreeing at [58], Daubney J agreeing at [59])
(‘Sharpley’).
85

86

Ibid [35].
Zecevic (n 5)
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[Unlawful] is used in the self-defence provisions to describe the character of the force
against which a person may defend himself, not to describe force applied by a victim
who is criminally responsible for applying it: see the Criminal Code (Q.) ss.246,271;
(W.A.) ss.223,248 …

and is to be understood “to describe force which is not

authorized, justified or excused by law whatever be the state of mind of the person
who applies it.87

In R v Graham (‘Graham Appeal’)88 Morison JA, Atkinson and Applegarth JJ in the
Queensland Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s directions to the jury 89 when
he described the meaning of the word “provoke” forming part of the second element of
s 271(1):
“Provocation” means any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be likely, when
done to an ordinary person, to deprive him of the power of self-control, and to induce
him to assault the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered.90

They also agreed with the trial judge’s directions to the jury91 when he told the jury that
the word ‘assault’ in the third element:
[D]oes not have to involve actual physical assault: a movement or a gesture may
constitute an assault, but more than that: ... a threat to apply force of any kind ... under
such circumstances that the person has, actually or apparently, a present ability to
affect the person’s purpose ...’ can constitute an assault.92

In R v Allwood (‘Allwood’)93 McPherson JA said that the words “unlawful” and
“unprovoked” in s 271(1) are to be understood to mean that an accused would have

87

Ibid 668 (Brennan J).

88

[2015] QCA 137 (‘Graham Appeal’).

89

Graham Appeal (n 88) [41] (Atkinson J, Morrison JA agreeing at [1], Applegarth J agreeing
at [79]).
90

Ibid [30].

91

Ibid.

92

Ibid (emphasis in original).

93

[1997] QCA 257 (‘Allwood’).
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an “excuse” to defend himself or herself against ‘unlawful and unprovoked assault …
[to] an attack or a threatened attack’.94
There are also four elements that the jury must consider under s 271(2). They were
set out by the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Graham (‘Graham Appeal’).95 There
Morison JA, Atkinson and Applegarth JJ agreed with the trial judge96 when he told the
jury ‘there is no burden on the [accused] to satisfy you that he was acting in selfdefence’,97 self-defence is excluded ‘if the prosecution satisfies you beyond
reasonable doubt that:
[1] That the accused was unlawfully assaulted; or [2, that] the accused had not
provoked the assault on him; or [3, that] that the nature of the assault was such as to
cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm; or [4, that] the
accused believed on reasonable grounds that he could not otherwise preserve himself
or herself from death or grievous bodily harm.’98

94

Ibid 7 (McPherson JA).

95

Graham Appeal (n 88).

96

Ibid [41] (Atkinson J, Morrison JA agreeing at [1], Applegarth J agreeing at [79]).

97

Ibid [30].

98

Ibid. See also Muratovic (n 82). In Muratovic Hart J said:
To enable a person charged with a wilful murder or murder to raise a defence on a literal
meaning of s 271 there must be evidence of the following constituents: That he was unlawfully
assaulted; that he had not provoked the assault on him; that the nature of the assault was such
as to cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm; that he believed on
reasonable grounds that he could not preserve himself or herself from death or grievous bodily
harm otherwise by using force; that the force used by him was necessary for his or her defence:
Muratovic (n 82) 26 (Hart J).

In R v Wilmot Jerrard JA said:
In Marwey v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 630 the High Court unanimously approved the
construction Gibbs J had placed on s 271(2). Barwick CJ wrote that what that second paragraph
called for was the actual belief by the defendant on reasonable grounds of the necessity of the
fatal act for his own preservation (at 637). His Honour held the section made the belief of the
defendant the deﬁnitive circumstance, which belief must be based on reasonable grounds. He
held that in contrast, in s 271(1) the determination of the extent of the permissible force was
directly committed to the jury as an objective fact. Stephen J considered s 271(2) raised two
questions: whether there was a belief on the part of the defendant that the force he used was
necessary, a subjective belief; and whether there existed reasonable grounds for that belief (an
objective question, exclusively concerned with the jury’s view whether there were reasonable
grounds for the defendant’s belief.

Wilmot (n 82) 25 [34] (Jerrard JA, Muir J agreeing at 31 [59]). See also Marwey v The Queen
(1977) 18 ALR 77, 86 (Stephen J) (‘Marwey’); Sharpley (n 83) [34] (Chesterman JA, White JA
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In R v Muratovic (‘Muratovic’) 99 Gibbs J said that the word “otherwise” in s 271 (2) is
to be understood to mean ‘otherwise than by using the force which he in fact used’.100
In R v Allwood (‘Allwood’)101 McPherson JA described the complexity of s 271. She
said:
Section 271 is one of a group of sections of the Criminal Code on which it is difficult to
instruct a jury in terms that are at once simple, accurate and readily comprehensible.
Merely to read the provisions out is seldom of much help to them. It takes close study
for even a trained lawyer to understand how those provisions operate in particular
circumstances.102

The elements that the jury must consider under s 272 were set out by the Queensland
Court of Appeal in R v Graham (‘Graham’).103 There Morison JA, Atkinson and
Applegarth JJ agreed with the trial judge104 when he told the jury that ‘there is no
burden on the [accused] to satisfy you that he was acting in self-defence’,105 selfdefence is excluded ‘if the prosecution satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that:
1. The assault by [the victim] was not of such violence as to cause reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm; or
2. The assault did not induce [ the accused] to believe, on reasonable grounds, that
it was necessary for his own preservation from death or grievous bodily harm to
use the force he used in self-defence; or
3. The force used by [ the accuse] was more than was reasonably necessary to save
her from death or grievous bodily harm; or

agreeing at [58], Daubney J agreeing at [59]); Graham Appeal (n 88) [30] (Atkinson J, Morrison
JA agreeing at [1], Applegarth J agreeing at [79]).
99

Muratovic (n 82).

100

Ibid 18-9 (Gibbs J). See also Marwey (n 98) 636-7 (Barwick CJ), 639-640 (Stephen J);
Wilmot (n 82) 24-5 [32]-]34] (Jerrard JA, Muir J agreeing at 31 [59]).
101

Allwood (n 93).

102

Ibid 7 (McPherson JA).
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Graham Appeal (n 88).
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Ibid [41] (Atkinson J, Morrison JA agreeing at [1], Applegarth J agreeing at [79]).

105

Ibid [30].
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4. The [accused] first began the initial assault with intent to kill or to do grievous bodily
harm to [the victim]; or
5. The [accused] endeavoured to kill or do grievous bodily harm to [the victim] before
the necessity of so preserving herself arose; or that
6. In either case, unless, before such a necessity for self-defence arose, the
[accused] declined further conflict, and quitted it, or retreated from it as far as
practicable’.106

If the prosecution excludes any one of those matters, beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused’s plea of self-defence would fail.107

4.6 Northern Territory
In the Northern Territory, there are two self-defence provisions with two different
tests.108 Section 29 mimics the common law test in Zecevic,109 and s 43BD does not.
In Burkhart v Bradley (‘Burkhart’)110 all the Northern Territory Supreme Court Justices
noted the difference.111 Section 43BD, like s 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW),
106

Ibid [30]. See also Muratovic (n 82) 26-7 (Hart J).

107

Graham Appeal (n 88) [30] (Atkinson J, Morrison JA agreeing at [1], Applegarth J agreeing
at [79]).
108

See s 43BD of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) in the legislation schedule in part three of
the appendix. Section 29 of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) is also relevant. See s 29 in the
legislation schedule in part three of the appendix.
109

Burkhart v Bradley 33 NTLR 79, 84 [23] (Southwood, Kelly, and Barr JJ) (‘Burkhart’). The
Zecevic test was expressed in the following terms:
[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 5) 661(Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666). See also Angelica Guz and Marilyn McMahon, ‘Is Imminence Still
Necessary? Current Approaches to Imminence in the Laws of Governing Self-Defence in
Australia” (2011) 13 Flinders L.J. 79, 89.
110

Burkhart (n 109).

111

Ibid. Southwood, Kelly, and Barr JJ said:
The main difference in the two provisions is the requirement in s 29(2)(b) that, “the conduct is
a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person reasonably perceives them” rather
than “as the person perceives them” (in s 43BD): at 84 [22] (emphasis in original).
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“mirrors” s 10.4 of Commonwealth Criminal Code.112 Both the NSW provision and s
43BD(2) have two limbs. In Woods v The Queen (‘Woods’)113 Riley CJ, Kelly and Barr
JJ described the requirements of the two limbs in s 43BD(2) as follows:
The Criminal Code requires not only that an accused believe that conduct in selfdefence is necessary to defend himself or herself or another person, but that such
conduct in self-defence must be “a reasonable response in the circumstances as he
or she perceives them.114

Section 29(b), however, requires that the accused’s perception, and his or her
response, must be reasonable.115 In Burkhart v Bradley (‘Burkhart’),116 referring to s
29(b) the Court said: ‘The Crown can disprove self-defence by negating either the first

They further said:
[W]e note that it seems anomalous to have two different tests for defensive conduct in the
Criminal Code, one in s 43BD applying to Schedule 1 offences, and one in s 29 applying to all
other offences. Moreover, Schedule 1 offences include serious offences against the person
including murder. The effect of that is that a person may be found not guilty of murder because
the killing amounted to defensive conduct (on the application of s 43BD) if (given the requisite
belief) the killing was a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused person
perceived them (with no requirement for that perception to be reasonable); whereas a person
charged with assault (as Mr Burkhart was) will only be found not guilty on the basis that the
conduct was defensive (again given the requisite belief) if the assault was a reasonable
response in the circumstances as the accused person reasonably perceived them – ie that
perception must be reasonable (on the application of s 29). We respectfully suggest that it
would be appropriate for the legislature to address this anomaly: at 85 [27] (emphasis in
original).

This “anomaly” has not been addressed by the Northern Territory’s legislature since 2013.
112

Ibid 84 [21]. This section was inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) on 20
December 2006: at 84 [21] n 8.
See The Guide (n 10). The Guide relevantly suggests that chapter three, of which s 10.4 is
part, imposes ‘no limit of this kind on the range of offences for which self defence might provide
an excuse or justification’: The Guide (n 10) 229. The Guide further suggests that under s 10.4
the accused is judged on his or her own perceptions of the threat and ‘an unreasonable
mistake can provide the basis for a complete defence: The Guide (n 10) 229. Moreover, self
defence is available to the accused ‘even in circumstances where the accused responded to
an unreasonable apprehension of harm’: The Guide (n 10) 230-1.
113

[2012] NTCCA 8 (Riley CJ, Kelly and Barr JJ) (‘Woods’).

114

Ibid [6].
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Burkhart (n 109) 84 [22] (Southwood, Kelly, and Barr JJ).

116

Burkhart (n 109).
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or the second requirement of the defence of self-defence. It is not necessary for the
Crown to negative both requirements’.117 With respect, the same principles should be
applied to s 43BD(2). It should also be presumed that the Crown is required to exclude
any one of those matters, beyond reasonable doubt.

I now discuss in part two, the nature of statutory self-defence in New South Wales. It
will now be clear that the self-defence statutes that the state and territory legislatures
have passed in response to the Palmer and Zecevic decisions by the High Court are
inconsistent and confused. Because the Australian Constitution does not require the
standardisation of any aspect of state and territory criminal law, it is well beyond the
scope of this thesis to suggest that all of these provisions might be clarified in any
single legislative reform effort. But since the combined reform efforts of the
Commonwealth and New South Wales have succeeded in promoting a Uniform
Evidence Act since 1995,118 I return to the more modest goal of recommending
appropriate reforms in New South Wales as reform in that State will be influential
elsewhere in Australia.

Part Two: Self-Defence in New South Wales
4.7 The backdrop for enacting self-defence provisions in the Crimes
Act 1900 (NSW)
In 1987, the search for consistent expression of the principles of criminal justice led to
the establishment of a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Harry Gibbs119 to
overhaul the Commonwealth criminal law (hereafter the “Gibbs Committee”).120 The
117
118

Ibid 84 [24] (Southwood, Kelly, and Barr JJ).
Uniform Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

119

The Committee consisted of three members. Former Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir
Harry Gibbs, Justice Ray Watson, and Mr Andrew Menzies. Mathew Goode, ‘Constructing
Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (2002) 26 Crim L. J. 152, 153.
Mathew Goode ‘Codification of the Australian Criminal Law’ (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal
5, 6-7. See generally Eric Colvin, ‘Unity and Diversity in Australian Criminal Law: A Comment
on the Draft Commonwealth Code’(1991) 15 Crim. L. J. 82; Mathew Goode, ‘The Model
Criminal Code Project’ (1997) 5 (4) Australian Law Librarian 265; Goode, ‘Constructing
Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (n 119); Mathew Goode, ‘Codification of
the Criminal Law’ (2004) 28 Crim L. J. 226; Arlie Loughnan, ‘The Very Foundations of Any
System of Criminal Justice: Criminal Responsibility in the Australian Model Criminal Code’
120
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Gibbs Committee issued several reports,121 but its proposals were viewed as
controversial and were subject to ‘well-reasoned criticism’.122 The Gibbs Committee
recommended codification of the general principles of criminal responsibility in its first
interim report.123 However, it is not clear whether the Gibbs Committee intended that
the entire criminal law of the Commonwealth should be codified.124 Perhaps the Gibbs
Committee had in mind that it would have been unconstitutional to codify the entire
criminal law of the Commonwealth since the Australian Constitution does not confer
the power to make comprehensive criminal laws on the Commonwealth. ‘According to
the constitutional arrangement in Australia … the general criminal law is a matter for
the States and Territories rather than a matter for the Commonwealth’.125 The Gibbs

(2017) 6(3) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 8; Miriam Gani,
‘Codifying the criminal law: Implications for interpretation’ (2005) 29 Crim. L. J. 264; Adrian
Roden, ‘Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other Matters’ (1991) 32 Platypus 8.
Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (n 119) 153 n 8.
Those reports were:
121

Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report, Computer Crime (November 1988);
Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report, Detention Before Charge (March
1989); Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report, Principles of Criminal
Responsibility and Other Matters (July 1990); Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Fourth
Interim Report (November 1990) (administration of justice offences, offences against
government, bribery and corruption, search warrants); Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law,
Fifth Interim Report (June 1991) (arrest, sentencing, forgery, offences relating to the security
and defence of the Commonwealth.
122

Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (n 119) 154.

123

See Commonwealth Government of Australia, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law,
Interim Report: Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other Matters (Australian
Government Publishing Service, July 1990) ch 3.
Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (n 119) 154.
Goode summarised the situation at the time as follows:
124

The three themes that seem to have emerged at this point were:
1. consistency, if not uniformity, across Australian criminal jurisdictions;
2. the overall benefits of codification; and
3. the consensus on these objectives by both Code and common law jurisdictions.
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Ibid 152. But the constitutional problem was not the only problem. There was another
“substantive” problem. Sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) allow the court
which exercising Commonwealth jurisdiction, by default, to “pick up” and apply the law of the
relevant state or territory of the place in which the court is sitting if there is no criminal law
provision enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament to deal with the prosecution of a
Commonwealth offence. The source of this “substantive” problem was that “the states and
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Committee also proposed that Australia follow recent developments in England and
abandon the traditional requirement that a mistake be reasonable if it was to afford an
exculpatory defence such as self-defence.126
In 1990 the codification of Commonwealth criminal law and the recommendations of
the Gibbs Committee were considered by the Third International Law Congress which
was held in Hobart. ‘The general impression left by the Congress not only support for
the codification of Commonwealth criminal law but, far more importantly, a strong
questioning of the extent of the diversity between the criminal laws of the States and
Territories’.127 The Congress further observed that there were very few
Commonwealth criminal cases and all homicides were charged under state or territory
laws.
The Gibbs Committee drafted a Bill for a federal criminal code but it was not introduced
to Parliament.128 However, the Gibbs Committee Reports did lead the Standing
Committee of Attorneys-General of Australian states and territories (the “Standing
territories” had not ‘maintained [a] modicum of consistency, if not uniformity, in the criminal
law or the law of criminal procedure and evidence’: at 152-3.
126

Colvin, ‘Unity and Diversity in Australian Criminal Law’ (n 120) 85.

Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (n 119) 154
(citations omitted). Goode also quoted other criticisms such as what the then Attorney-General
of Queensland said in his paper to the Third International Law Congress in September 1990:
127

Why should a person’s criminal responsibility, the punishment which a certain offence carries
or even, indeed, whether certain conduct amounts to an offence vary simply by the crossing of
State boundaries? In a country as homogenous as Australia, this amounts to at worst lunacy
or at best illogicality: at 154 (citations omitted).

Furthermore, citing the Editorial in the Criminal Law Journal, Mathew Goode reproduced the
following quote:
the often disparate State and Territory criminal laws on the same subject-matter created
injustice and inequality before the law; that the time was ripe for the criminal laws of the various
States and Territories to be uniformly expressed and applied; and that the Review Committee’s
report was a viable starting point towards achieving this uniformity: at 154 n 12 (citations
omitted).

See generally Editorial, ‘Towards a Trans-jurisdictional Criminal Law’ (1991) 15 Crim. L. J. 1;
Editorial, ‘The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Model for States and Territories?’ (1991) 15
Crim. L. J. 79.
Arlie Loughnan, ‘The Very Foundations of Any System of Criminal Justice: Criminal
Responsibility in the Australian Model Criminal Code’ (2017) 6(3) International Journal for
Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 8, 10.
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Committee”) to consider developing a uniform criminal code for Australia. 129 The
Standing Committee established the further Model Criminal Code Officers Committee
(the “Model Code Committee”) and, in 1992, the Model Code Committee made final
recommendations to the Standing Committee. Those recommendations formed the
basis of the Criminal Code Bill 1994 (Cth), which was passed by the Commonwealth
Parliament in March 1995.130
The Australian constitutional settlement in 1901 was focused on the separation of
power between the Commonwealth and the states. Federation was primarily focused
on the reduction of trade barriers and the cost of collective defence of the former
colonies. Because the Australian constitutional framers did not contemplate a nation
with an integrated and consistent criminal law, they did not design constitutional
machinery to enable the creation of such law or indeed, a similarly integrated
Australian Corporations or Family Law. While a comprehensive Corporations Law was
successfully engineered after a false start,131 and Family Law has been standardised
in all Australian states except Western Australia,132 efforts to integrate Australian
criminal and evidence law have been less successful for a variety of political and
logistical reasons. Evidence law is closer to national integration than criminal law but
fissures in the national fabric of evidence law continue.133 The creation of consistent
129

Goode, ‘Codification of the Australian Criminal Law’ (n 120) 6-8.

130

Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (n 119) 155.
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Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). For the historical development of Australian corporations law
from medieval forms and early commercial associations in Europe until the enactment of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), see T F Bathurst, 'The historical development of corporations
law' (2013) 37 Australian Bar Review 217.
132

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). See generally Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Law
for the Future – An Inquiry into the Family Law System (Final Report – 2019) ch 2.
133

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss if or how the states and territories have
adopted the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). See generally Australian Law Reform Commission; New
South Wales Law Reform Commission; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence
Law (Report 102, 2005) ch 1, 2. Note for example the current efforts of the Council of the
Australia Governments (COAG) to agree on a consistent national reform to s 127 of the
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (religious confession privilege in child abuse cases). See generally
Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Final
Report, 2017); Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child
Sexual Abuse, Criminal Justice (Report, 2017); Anthony Gray, ‘Is the Seal of the Confessional
Protected by Constitutional or Common Law’ (2018) 44 (1) Monash University Law Review
112; Joe Harman, ‘The Power of Confession: Mandatory Reporting, Confession and the
Evidence Act’ (2013) 38 Alternative Law Journal 239.
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national criminal laws has proven to be more elusive. While there are now only three
states that have declined to adopt the Uniform Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),134 the Gibbs
Committee’s draft national criminal code did not get off the ground. In that context, the
modest goal of this thesis is to propose adjustments to New South Wales criminal law
in self-defence space which might persuade other states that their laws can also be
simplified and in a manner which will improve the trial judge explanations of selfdefence laws to juries. But since even the Gibbs’ Committee draft model provisions
which were adopted in New South Wales have not proven logically simple and easy
to explain to juries, I discuss how those provisions might be further improved.
The

New

South

Wales

self-defence

provisions

were

drafted

based

on

recommendations made by the Model Code Committee for the Model Criminal
Code,135 and took effect on 22 February 2002.136 The explanatory notes for the Selfdefence Amendment Bill in 2001 were brief. They stated that the object of that bill was
to codify self-defence law in New South Wales137 in order to ‘accord with the Model
Criminal Code’.138 The explanatory notes also stated that:
The codification effected by the Bill seeks to simplify the law by enabling defendants
to rely on self-defence if they believed their conduct was necessary (even if they were
wrong), so long as the response was objectively proportionate to the situation (as they
perceived it).139

134

Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia.
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Egitmen (n 9) 244 [249] [(Mitchell JA, Mazza JA ageing at 221 [121]). See also Colvin,
‘Abusive Relationships and Violent Responses’ (n 9) 347. See s 10.4 of the Criminal Code
1995 (Cth) in the legislation schedule in part three of the appendix.
136

The statutory provisions dealing with self-defence were inserted into the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) by the Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Act 2001 (NSW) and took effect on 22
February 2002. Moore (n 11) [26] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [122]).
137

The long title of the Crimes Amendment (Self-Defence) Act 2001 (NSW) provides:
An Act to amend the Crimes Act 1900 to codify the law with respect to self-defence; and to
repeal the Home Invasion (Occupants Protection) Act 1998 and the Workplace (Occupants
Protection) Act 2001.
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In particular s 10.4 of Commonwealth in the Criminal Code Act 1995. See Explanatory
Notes for Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Bill 2001 (‘Explanatory Notes’).
139

Explanatory Notes (n 138) (emphasis in original).
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The explanatory notes were explicit that the Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Bill
2001 has not been drafted to accord with the Model Criminal Code. Despite idealistic
striving for the implementation of a standardised Model Criminal Code, and perhaps
because the New South Wales legislature knew that its new law would stand alone, it
decided to reintroduce the manslaughter half-way house option in homicide cases
which had caused common law friction between the Privy Council and the High Court
of Australia before appeals to the Privy Council were completely abolished in 1986. It
stated:
(a) The Bill (and the Code) excludes self-defence in those circumstances if the accused
uses force that inflicts really serious injury, and
(b) The Bill (but not the Code) reduces murder to manslaughter in the case of
excessive self-defence, that is, where the defendant believed it was necessary for
personal defence, but where the accused uses force that inflicts death and that is not
a reasonable response in the circumstances.140

The explanatory notes further stated:
The Bill confirms (in accordance with the existing law and other provisions of the Code
that if the issue of self-defence is raised, the prosecution must prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act in self-defence.141

The New South Wales legislature recognised that for centuries, juries wanted a
manslaughter option in homicide cases despite executive pressure to force them to
convict of murder when acquittal was the only other option in homicide cases.

4.8 Self-defence provisions: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Against that backdrop, and since 2002 in New South Wales,142 statutory self-defence
provisions have replaced the common law test of self-defence as stated in Zecevic.143
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Ibid (emphasis in original).

141

Ibid.
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The statutory provisions dealing with self-defence were inserted into the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) by the Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Act 2001 (NSW) and took effect on 22
February 2002. Moore (n 11) [26] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]).
143

The Zecevic test was as follows:

148

The relevant provisions introduced into the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) are ss 418,144
419145 and 421.146
Section 418 (1) nullifies the accused’s criminal responsibility for an offence if the
person carried out the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence. Section 418(2)
sets out the circumstances where self-defence is available. It provides that the conduct
of an accused is conduct done in self-defence if: (a) the accused believes that the
conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself; and (b) the conduct was a
reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceived them. The
questions for the jury to answer under s 418 are not the same as they were at common
law under Zecevic.147

[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 5) 661(Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).
144

See s 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. See also Moore (n 11) [26] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]). It is not my
intention to fully analyse s 418 in chapter four. See chapter five.
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See s 419 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. See also Moore (n 11) [26] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]). It is beyond
the scope of this thesis to analyse s 419.
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See s 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in the legislation schedule in part three of the
appendix. See also Moore (n 11) [26] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]). It is not my
intention to fully analyse s 421 in chapter four. See chapter five.
Katarzynski (n 12) [22] (Howie J) (“Katarzynski’). See also: R v Burgess; R v Saunders
(2005) 152 A Crim R 100 105 [10]-[12] (Adams J, Halsop J agreeing at 117 [51], Newman JA
agreeing at 117 [52]).
147

This is because, Howie J said, according to Zecevic ‘it was the accused’s belief based upon
the circumstances as the accused perceived them to be, which has to be reasonable and not
the belief of the reasonable man’. Katarzynski (n 12) [6] (Howie J).
The Zecevic test was in the following terms:
[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 5) 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).
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The operation of this section was explained by Howie J in R v Katarzynski
(‘Katarzynski’).148 He said:
[I]s there [sic] a reasonable possibility that the accused believed that his or her conduct
was necessary in order to defend himself or herself; and, if there is, is there also a
reasonable possibility that what the accused did was a reasonable response to the
circumstances as he or she perceived them?149

It is doubtful that Howie J’s explanation of the operation of s 418 accurately reflects
the new provision. The phrase “is there is a reasonable possibility” is not included in s
418(2). The addition of this phrase made the test more complicated than it already is.
It added an objective component to the first limb of subs 418(2), which is otherwise
purely subjective, and added an objective component to the second limb of subs
418(2), which already mixes objective and subjective elements. Nevertheless, Howie
J’s formula became the recognised test for the statutory self-defence test.150
In Oblach v The Queen151 Spigelman CJ said:
The distinction [Howie J] drew between the two aspects of the test under s 418 turns
on the absence of the word “reasonable” before “believes” in the introductory words of
s 418(2) and the presence of that word before the word “response” in the last part of
that subsection.152

Neither the “codified” self-defence test in s 418, nor the “codified” onus of proof section
in s 419, contains the phrase “reasonable possibility”.153 Nevertheless, Howie J used

148

Katarzynski (n 12) [22] (Howie J).

149

Ibid.

The phrase “reasonable possibility” had been challenged on the basis that it undermined
the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard of proof. But citing Crawford v the Queen [2008]
NSWCCA 166 at [22]; R v Jacobs [2009] NSWSC 235 at [9]; B v R [2015] NSWCCA 103 at
[77], R A Hulme J said that he was ‘unaware of any case in which anything that was said in
R v Katarzynski had [sic] been called into question’, including when R V Katarzynski itself went
on appeal. Moore (n 11) [122]-[124] (R A Hulme J).
150

151

(2005) 65 NSWLR 75 (‘Oblach’).

152

Ibid 84 [52] (Spigelman CJ, Sully J agreeing at 89 [83], Hulme J agreeing at 91 [95]).

153

But see s 322(I)(1) in the Criminal Code 1958 (Vic), the onus of proof section, where the
phrase “reasonable possibility” is incorporated in this section.
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that phrase in formulating the test under s 418(2). Barwick CJ explained how the onus
of proof should be approached in homicide self-defence cases in Viro.154 He said:
Although it is common enough to speak of the "defence" of self- defence, since
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, where the proven facts give rise to the
reasonable possibility that the fatal act was done in self-defence and the accused
raises the question (see Director of Public Prosecutions v. Walker), the onus rests
upon the Crown to negative that possibility, i.e. to remove any reasonable doubt that
the fatal act was not done in self-defence.155

In Moore v The Queen (‘Moore’)156 Basten JA noted the “significance” of this
statement. He said:
What is significant is that the statement of principle as to the burden of proof equated
negativing “the reasonable possibility that the fatal act was done in self-defence” with
removal of “any reasonable doubt that the fatal act was not done in self-defence”.157

By incorporating the common law onus of proof from Viro and Zecevic into the New
South Wales self-defence law in homicide cases (ss 418 & 419), the two questions for
the jury become:
1. is there a reasonable possibility that the accused believed that his or her
conduct was necessary to defend himself or herself? and,
2. if there is, is there a reasonable possibility that what the accused did was a
reasonable response to the circumstances as he or he perceived them?158
Section 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides:
418 Self-defence —when available
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the
conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.
154

Viro (n 58).

155

Ibid 95 (Barwick CJ dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Zecevic (n 5) 657 (Wilson,
Dawson and Toohey JJ).
156

Moore (n 11).

157

Ibid [43] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]) (emphasis in original).

158

Katarzynski (n 12) [22] (Howie J).
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(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes the
conduct is necessary:
(a) to defend himself or herself or another person, or
(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the
liberty of another person, or
(c) to protect property from unlawful taking, destruction, damage or
interference, or
(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person
committing any such criminal trespass,
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives
them.

Section 418(2) separates the subjective belief of the accused from the question of the
reasonableness of his or her conduct.159 The test in s 418(2) has two limbs. The first
limb is “completely” subjective. That is, once the jury understands all the personal
characteristics of the accused at the time he or she carried out the conduct,160 the jury
must consider only what the accused believed. The accused need not have had
reasonable grounds for his or her belief for the self-defence actions concerned to come
within the protection of the overall provision.161 Moreover, the statutory provisions do
not require the jury to consider what a reasonable or ordinary person would have
believed in the circumstances and it does not matter if the accused’s belief was
mistaken, as long as it was genuinely held.162
The second limb is another mixed objective/subjective test, but it separates the
subjective element from the objective element. The question whether a response was
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Katarzynski (n 12) [23] (Howie J). See also Moore (n 11) [47] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J
agreeing at [122]).
160

Katarzynski (n 12) [23] (Howie J).

161

Ibid [22] (Howie J); Oblach (n 151) 84 [51] (Spigelman CJ, Sully J agreeing at 89 [83],
Hulme J agreeing at 91 [95); Moore (n 11) [27] (Basten JA, RA Hulme agreeing at [94]);
Sivaraja v The Queen; Sivathas v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 236, [122] (Meagher JA; R A
Hulme and Beech-Jones JJ) (‘Sivaraja and Sivathas’).
162

Katarzynski (n 12) [24] (Howie J).
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reasonable requires an “entirely” objective assessment of the proportionality of the
accused’s response to the circumstances which the accused subjectively believed that
he or she was facing.163 In other words, it requires that the accused’s response be
reasonable in the circumstances as he or she perceived them to be, but does not
require that the accused’s perception of the circumstances be reasonable. 164
In R v Katarzynski (‘Katarzynski’)165 Howie J explained the test as follows:
The issue as to the reasonableness of the accused’s response is objective in so far as
the jury is not concerned with what the accused believed was necessary to respond to
the circumstances as he or she perceived them to be. The current provision is not
concerned with whether the accused’s belief as to what was the necessary response
was a reasonable one or whether he or she had reasonable grounds for that belief.
This is where the current provisions are in contrast to the position at common law: the
accused need not have reasonable grounds for his or her belief that it was necessary
to act in the way he or she did in order to defend himself or herself. It is sufficient if the
accused genuinely holds that belief.166

The jury is required to assess whether the accused’s response was reasonable, not
what the response of the ordinary or reasonable person would be.167 That is why
Howie J identified relevant factors to be considered by the jury when assessing the
reasonableness of the accused’s response. Those factors include, depending upon
the circumstances of each case, “some of” the personal attributes of the accused such
as gender, age, state of health; and “some of” the surrounding physical
circumstances.168

163

Oblach (n 151) 84 [51] (Spigelman CJ, Sully J agreeing at 89 [83], Hulme J agreeing at 91
[95]).
164

Moore (n 11) [27] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]).
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Katarzynski (n 12) (Howie J).
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Ibid [24] (Howie J).
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Ibid [25] (Howie J).

168

Ibid.
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The idea of excessive self-defence is contained in s 421. It will be remembered that
excessive self-defence had been confirmed by Howe,169 disapproved by Palmer,170
reinstated by Viro,171 and disapproved again by Zecevic.172 It has been labelled
manslaughter by excessive self-defence and it is now recognised as a form of
voluntary manslaughter.173 Once again, that idea is that in a case of proven selfdefence, a verdict of manslaughter should be available if the jury concluded that the
self-defensive force used was excessive.174 It will also be remembered that in such
cases, the accused does not deny any element of the offence but relies on selfdefence to deny at least part of the responsibility or liability for committing that
offence.175
The “emphasis” in s 421 on the response of an accused person “in the circumstances
as he or she perceives them” (subs 421(1)(b)) requires the jury to undertake ‘an
evaluation of the degree to which the response exceeds that which would be a

169

R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 (‘Howe’).

170

Palmer v The Queen [1971] 1 All ER 1077; AC 814 (‘Palmer’).

171

Viro (n 58).

172

Zecevic (n 5).

173

Lane v The Queen (2013) 241 A Crim R 321, 335 [50] (Bathurst CJ, Simpson and Adamson
JJ); Grant v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 67, [62]-[64] (Lemming JA, Adams and Hall JJ);
Abdallah v R [2016] NSWCCA 275, [45] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting).
174

Section 421 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). See Moore (n 11) [29] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J
agreeing at [94]). Basten J went on to say:
The administration of justice would be much improved if the following proposition from Palmer
v The Queen accurately described the legal principles at stake:
In their Lordships' view the defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily
understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no abstruse legal thought.
It requires no set words by way of explanation. No formula need be employed in reference to it.
Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a
man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do,
but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular
facts and circumstances: Moore (n 11) at [30] (citations omitted).
175

The Guide (n 10) 337.
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reasonable response if those circumstances existed’.176 That analysis is ‘inherently
both complex and evaluative’ especially in a family violence case.177
Section 421 does not approach the idea of excessive self-defence in the same way as
the High Court did in Viro178 and Zecevic.179 But perhaps that is not surprising since
the High Court was not involved in a statutory drafting exercise when it decided those
cases. The New South Wales drafters have chosen to include excessive self defence
in their statutory treatment – whereas others have either not done so (despite jury
pressure for centuries) or have treated it differently. In chapter five and in chapter six
I discuss how community expectations of self-defence in homicide has been treated
by the law and I suggest how they should be treated by the law.
The “onus of proof” in all cases of self-defence in New South Wales is set out in s 419.
In criminal cases, the “ultimate onus of proof” never leaves the prosecution. The
defence succeeds if it raises a reasonable doubt. That remains true in cases where
statutes recognise defences like provocation, intoxication and self-defence which
complicate jury cases at common law. Section 419 recognises this enduring proof
principle in modern self-defence cases in New South Wales.

Under s 419, the

prosecution may prove its case beyond reasonable doubt by showing either that:
(a) the accused did not believe at the time of the act that it was necessary to do what
he or she did in order to defend himself or herself; or
(b) the accused’s act was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or
she perceived them (emphasis in original).180
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Smith v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 193, [58] (Leeming and Simpson JJA, Hamill J).
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Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284, [93] (McCallum J).
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Viro (n 58).
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Zecevic (n 5).

180

Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Criminal Trials Courts Bench Book (Judicial
Commission of New South Wales, 2019) 1297 (emphasis in original).
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The statutory self-defence formulas which have been developed in New South Wales
in ss 418 and 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 remain difficult to understand and apply and
need to be simplified. They have not resolved the difficulties which were highlighted
between 1958 and 1987 in the decisions of Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic discussed
in chapter three.
The danger of creating complex formulas is that trial judges find them difficult to explain
and juries also find them difficult to understand, accept and apply. As shown in chapter
two, English history in criminal jury cases suggests that juries did not trust the king to
grant pardons in self-defence cases. To avoid the risk that the king would not grant a
pardon, juries manipulated the evidence to protect persons accused of homicide from
the death penalty, if the jury considered the accused had acted in self-defence.
Australian criminal law history has not been immune from difficulty in homicide cases
where self-defence is claimed. As is shown in chapter 5, history and research in the
United States and in Australia suggests that complex self-defence formulas may result
in perverse verdicts and unjust decisions.

Conclusion to chapter four
For the last 60 years, judges in Australia have struggled to explain self-defence in
murder cases in a way that helps juries to make their decisions. The development of
the idea of self-defence in the common law between 1950 and 1990 presents as
judicial innovation responding to jury questions about the fairness of convicting
someone when there was an element of self-defence involved in the facts, or when
the self-defence pled was more than was necessary to deal with the violence that drew
out the self-defensive conduct. In that sense, jury questions in the 20th and 21st
centuries present as a modern reiteration of jury concerns that the king would not
pardon people who were legitimately defending themselves from violence before
evidence became public and subject to judicial control after the 17th century.
For better or worse, juries have added a democratic community element to the law of
self-defence since the beginning.181 In early times, juries used their unreviewable

181

See generally Ian Barker QC, Sorely tried:
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power to prevent the king executing people they thought were innocent or less
responsible than those who had committed premeditated murder. When the king's law
did not differentiate, juries did. The idea of excessive self-defence presents as a
modern jury response to a law that is not nuanced enough. Because appellate courts
in Australia and England have been reluctant to interfere with jury verdicts, and
because it is no part of the judicial function under a Westminster system of government
to create precise legislative tests, neither the High Court of Australia nor the Privy
Council in England have been able to adjust homicide self-defence law in a manner
that has respected and accommodated enduring jury concern. At a most basic level,
appellate courts simply apply existing law. When the Palmer and Zecevic cases
focused this jury discontent with binary acquit or convict, black and white results in
self-defence law, it was appropriate that legislatures step in since they have the power
to make precise amendments to the criminal law in ways that appellate courts cannot.
But the Commonwealth legislature does not have the constitutional power to make
criminal laws that are binding in every state and territory. In chapter five, I therefore
assess the utility, wisdom and practicality of the state legislative responses which I set
out in chapter four. That analysis will provide a foundation for further reform
recommendations that I will make in chapter six.

Democracy and trial by jury in New South Wales (Series: Francis Forbes Lectures ‐ 2002) on
the history of trial by jury in NSW and on the question of whether we should keep the jury or
not. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer this question.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW SOUTH WALES SELF-DEFENCE
PROVISIONS

Introduction

This chapter analyses the effectiveness of the New South Wales legislative responses
to the uncertainties in Australian self-defence law occasioned by the lack of any
unanimous High Court decision in this self-defence homicide space.

While the “facts” of self-defence cases may differ, there are recurring areas of concern
which are incompatible with the New South Wales legislative responses and justify the
reformulation of a simple test to assist juries in deciding self-defence cases. As Lord
Scarman said, ‘[j]uries are not chosen for their understanding of a logical and phased
process leading by question and answer to a conclusion, but are expected to exercise
practical common sense.’1 For Justice Oliver Wendell Homes it is the lawyers’ training,
not juries, which ‘is a training in logic’.2 In Zecevic, Deane J said:
The defence of self-defence is embedded deeply in ordinary standards of what is fair
and just. It sounds as readily in the voice of the school child who protests that he or
she was only defending himself or herself from the attack of another child as it does in
that of the sovereign state which claims that it was but protecting its citizens or its
territory against the aggression of another state.3

1

R v Hancock [1986] AC 455; 1 All E.R. 641, 651 (Lord Scarman) (‘Hancock’).

2

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 465.

Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 675 (Deane J)
(‘Zecevic’).
3
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This chapter has two parts. In Part One I recount how the history explains jury
behaviour and whether juries are still behaving in the same underlying way. I make
some observations about how the “law and order” mandate to politicians has directed
the formulation of harsh legislation that does not accord with jury instinct, and why
judge’s directions should be kept to a minimum.
In Part Two I analyse the statutory self-defence provisions in New South Wales.4 I
show why we have the current law, ss 418-421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). I briefly
recount the road from self-defence at common law to the current “codified” selfdefence provisions. I show that legislative amendments in New South Wales post
Zecevic have not improved clarity. If anything, those amendments have compounded
the complexity. I explain how complicated these sections are and why the sections do
not respond to or accommodate the jury common sense instinct. I discuss some of the
recurring issues which arise in self-defence cases in connection with ss 418 and 421
and how they operate in practice. I state why these sections need to be simplified. I
discuss the complex interaction between s 418 and s 421.

My conclusion summarises and leads into my recommendation in chapter six.

Part One: The jury and the politicians: A brief overview
The jury has been entrusted with the adjudication of criminal guilt in the most serious
cases since the late 12th century. For many generations the king tried to make juries
make decisions that went against their conscience, but they pushed back. They
continued to push back when the English Parliament allied with the king to pass many
laws that told them how to decide these serious cases. Their push back may be
analogous to the more well-known struggle for judicial independence. Both judge and
jury need to be able to make their decisions without the intervention or meddling of
other forces. Jury push back in historical times was hailed as courageous and saw the
jury celebrated as the greatest bulwark of liberty. But even when the judges
unexpectedly gained the ability to control juries as the result of legislation during the

4

The scope of this thesis is directed to the defence of the person as distinct from defence of
others and property.
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reign of Bloody Mary, the public still retained their confidence in the jury as a
democratic institution. While jury push back is not as obvious today as it was before
the 17th century, common sense jury decisions and the occasional aberrant verdict still
exert pressure on the courts and modern parliaments to bring the law into line with jury
common sense. The jury verdicts in the cases of Katharine Abdallah5 and Manisha
Patel6 are cases in point. I now briefly discuss those two cases.

5.1 The case(s) of Katherine Abdallah
Katherine Abdallah “Katherine” and her cousin Suzie Sarkis (“Suzie”) had been living
together at a townhouse owned by Katherine. They had a physical fight after Suzie
smashed a vase on the floor. During the fight, Katherine struck Suzie on the forehead
with a four pack of V-drink and she ‘took two large knives from a knife block’ in the
kitchen and stabbed her. 7 There was also evidence of earlier hostility after Katherine
discovered that while unlicensed, Suzie had taken her Mercedes for a drive.8 On that
occasion, after the police told Katherine what happened, Katherine had responded to
the police: ‘She’s going to be in serious trouble when I get her. You guys will probably
be called back’.9
Katherine was charged with murdering Suzie under s (18)(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW).10 Katherine pleaded self-defence. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of
R v Abdallah [2015] NSWSC 531 (‘Abdallah First Sentencing Hearing’); Abdallah v The
Queen [2016] NSWCCA 275 (‘Abdallah Appeal’); R v Katherine Abdallah (No 6) [2018]
NSWSC 729 (‘Abdallah Second Sentencing Hearing’).
5

Patel v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 121 (‘Patel First Appeal’); R v Patel (No 3) [2018]
NSWSC 952 (‘Patel Sentencing Hearing’); Patel v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 170 (‘Patel
Second Appeal’).
6

7

Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [1]-[14] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting).

8

Ibid [13].

9

Ibid.

10

Abdallah Second Sentencing Hearing (n 5) [17] (Lonergan J). Section 18 of the Crimes Act
1900 (NSW) provides:
18 Murder and manslaughter defined
(1)
(a) Murder shall be taken to have been committed where the act of the accused, or thing by
him or her omitted to be done, causing the death charged, was done or omitted with reckless
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murder but guilty of manslaughter.11 Katherine was sentenced to imprisonment for 11
years.12 In his jury directions, the judge “was not satisfied” that Katherine intended to
kill Suzie when she murdered her, but he “was satisfied” that she “intended to cause
her really serious injuries (grievous bodily harm) when she stabbed her”. He accepted
that Katherine believed that her self-defence conduct was necessary, but he found
that the stabbing which had caused Suzie’s death was an “unreasonable response” to
the circumstances as Katherine perceived them.13
Katherine appealed to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal against her
conviction and sentence on the basis that the judge had given the jury incorrect selfdefence directions.14 Button J with whom Campbell J agreed, allowed the appeal
against conviction, quashed the conviction for manslaughter, and ordered a new trial
on a count of manslaughter.15 Katherine’s second trial was for manslaughter pursuant
to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).16 The second trial judge described the
indifference to human life, or with intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon some person,
or done in an attempt to commit, or during or immediately after the commission, by the accused,
or some accomplice with him or her, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for life or for 25
years.
(b) Every other punishable homicide shall be taken to be manslaughter.
(2)
(a) No act or omission which was not malicious, or for which the accused had lawful cause or
excuse, shall be within this section.
(b) No punishment or forfeiture shall be incurred by any person who kills another by
misfortune only.
11

Abdallah First Sentencing Hearing (n 5) [44] (Adamson J); Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [2] (Hoeben
CJ at CL dissenting dissenting).
12

Abdallah First Sentencing Hearing (no 5) [66] (Adamson J).

13

Ibid [38], [40], [55] (Adamson J). But see Abdallah Appeal where Hoeben CJ said:
The applicant was sentenced on the basis that she possessed the requisite intent for murder,
believed that her conduct was necessary but that the act causing death was an unreasonable
response to the perceived circumstances (i.e. excessive self-defence).

Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [4] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting).
14

Abdallah Appeal (n 5).

15

Ibid [119] (Button J, Campbell J agreeing at [86]).

16

Abdallah Second Sentencing Hearing (n 5) [17] (Lonergan J). See s 18 of the Crimes Act
1900 (NSW) (n 10) above.
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offence charged under this subsection as a punishable homicide that did not amount
to murder.17 Katherine pleaded self-defence. The jury rejected that defence18 and
convicted her of manslaughter.19 Katherine was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment
with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months.20

5.2 The case(s) of Manisha Patel
Manisha Patel (“Patel”) met Niraj Dave (“Niraj”) through a website used by Indian
nationals seeking prospective marriage partners. They formed an intimate relationship
but they both agreed not to get married. Two years later Niraj’s parents arranged for
him to meet Purvi Joshi (“Purvi”) in India as a prospective wife. Niraj travelled to India
to meet her. Patel travelled with Niraj to India on the same flights but they had no
contact with each other once in India.21 On their return journey, Niraj and Patel slept
together at a stopover hotel, Patel got pregnant and terminated the pregnancy. Some
months later Purvi arrived from India to live with Niraj, Patel went to Niraj’s flat,
attacked Purvi and she died.22
Patel was charged with murdering Purvi and Patel pleaded self-defence. After trial by
jury Patel was convicted of murder. She appealed her conviction on the basis that the
judge had given the jury an incorrect self-defence direction.23 Patel’s appeal was

17

Abdallah Second Sentencing Hearing (n 5) [17] (Lonergan J).

18

Ibid [18]-[19] (Lonergan J).

19

Ibid [1] (Lonergan J). Katherine was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 9 years
with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months: at [77] (Lonergan J).
20

Ibid [77] (Lonergan J).

21

Patel First Appeal (n 6) [1]-[6] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and McCallum J). It is to be
noted that the facts as were stated by the Criminal Court of Appeal in Patel First Appeal were
brief. However, the facts as described by sentencing judge of the Supreme Court were detailed
and occupied about 36 paragraphs. See Patel Sentencing Hearing (n 6) [13]-[49] (Lonergan).
The facts summarised here were taken from both of these cases.
22

Patel First Appeal (n 6) [1]-[6] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and McCallum J).

23

Ibid [1]; Patel Sentencing Hearing (n 6) [2] (Lonergan).
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allowed, and a new murder trial ordered.24 The new (second) jury returned a verdict of
not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter based on excessive self-defence.25
On some views Abdallah and Patel present as cases of premeditated murder.
Nevertheless, the two juries in Abdallah and the second jury in Patel,26 would not
accept that they had to find these women guilty of murder. Three of the four juries that
considered these cases would not convict either defendant of premeditated murder.
Both cases present as examples of modern juries using existing tools (self-defence
findings in this case) to qualify the likely punishment following premeditated homicide
convictions. In both cases we can infer that the juries thought a murder conviction
would result in too harsh a punishment. Both juries improvised and used the excessive
self-defence provisions in the statute as a way to reduce the penalty that would apply
if the accused had been convicted of premeditated murder..
As explained in chapter two, perverse jury verdicts were a factor in the introduction of
manslaughter as an option in homicide cases. It was also arguably perverse jury
verdicts that saw the High Court develop the idea of excessive self-defence at
common law. Those judges recognised ongoing jury concern about all-or-nothing
results in murder cases where there were mitigating circumstances, but it would not
be right to acquit. The Privy Council did not agree, but the High Court persisted. The
Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of AttorneysGeneral27 attempted to settle the disagreement between the Privy Council and the
24

Patel was tried again for the murder of Purvi but she did not give evidence at her second
trial. The transcript of her evidence from the earlier trial was tendered and read aloud to the
jury. Patel Second Appeal (n 6) [10] (Harrison J, Simpson AJA agreeing at [1], N Adamson J
agreeing at [63]); Patel Sentencing Hearing (n 6) [5] (Lonergan).
25

Patel Sentencing Hearing (n 6) [3] (Lonergan); Patel Second Appeal (n 6) [2] (Harrison J,
Simpson AJA agreeing at [1], N Adamson J agreeing at [63]). Patel was sentenced to
imprisonment for 9 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 7 years. Patel Sentencing
Hearing (n 6) [118] (Lonergan); Patel Second Appeal (n 6) [2] (Harrison J). Patel sought leave
to appeal the severity of her sentence. Leave to appeal was granted but her appeal was
dismissed. See Patel Second Appeal (n 6).
26

Patel was convicted of murder after her first jury trial. The Court of Appeal ordered a new
trial after she appealed her conviction on the basis that the judge had given the jury an
incorrect self-defence direction. Patel First Appeal (n 6) [1] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL
and McCallum J); Patel Sentencing Hearing (n 6) [2] (Lonergan).
27

8.

See Mathew Goode ‘Codification of the Australian Criminal Law’ (1992) 16 Crim. L. J. 5, 6-
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High Court with s 10.4 of the Criminal Code.28 Their proposals were rejected by the
New South Wales legislature. The New South Wales legislature saw the wisdom of
what the High Court had been trying to achieve with decisions in the occasional murder
cases involving self-defence claims that reached them. The New South Wales
legislature therefore crafted a new self-defence statute that allowed manslaughter
convictions when the jury decided the self-defence action taken was excessive but
where the intention to commit premeditated murder could not be proven to the
satisfaction of the jury. But the formulas they wrote into their statute were too
complicated for judges to explain to juries. In part 2, I will explain why those formulas
have proven difficult and even unworkable.
Like kings before them, modern ministers of justice seem to want murder convictions
for every dead body in an age when courts are required by media representations of
public opinion to sentence murderers to the most serious penalties available in law.
Our democratic history has given the jury the task of weighing the evidence and
judging the facts, and to make these decisions according to their own best judgment.
Nevertheless, the political desire for murder convictions has directed the formulation
of complex legislation that does not always accord with the jury’s common-sense
approach to choosing a verdict, and indirectly, a sentence that fits the crime. There is
a peculiar disconnect between media representations of public opinion that call for
murder convictions for every homicide and the decisions made by juries as the actual
representatives of the public who decide these cases. The executive’s concern seems
to be that a jury verdict less than murder will not go down well in the media and may
harm re-election chances. History also suggests that judicial disquiet with the
disconnect between jury decisions and the law, also leads to legislative reform. An
example is that the appellate judges in the Abdallah case appear to have found it hard
to accept that the jury chose not to convict Katherine Abdallah of murder when the trial
judge seemed to think that should have been the result according to the law and facts.

Explanatory Notes for Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Bill 2001 (‘Explanatory Notes’).
The explanatory notes were referring to s 10.4 of Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). See s 10.4 of
the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) in the legislation schedule in part three of the appendix. See
also Egitmen v Western Australia (2016) 263 A Crim R 203, 244 [251] (Mitchell JA) (‘Egitmen’);
Eric Colvin, ‘Abusive Relationships and Violent Responses: The Reorientation of Self-Defense
in Australia’ (2009-2010) 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 339, 347.
28
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As we saw in chapter two, in historical times, the reason juries found mitigating
defences was to avoid the risk that a judge might sentence the accused to execution
or life imprisonment when those sentences did not accord with jury common-sense.
While the risk of capital punishment has gone, the Abdallah and Patel cases suggest
that modern juries in New South Wales are using contemporary self-defence
provisions to mitigate what they perceive to be the harshness of the modern
sentencing regimes which have been provided by politicians. This chapter argues that
the current amendments to New South Wales self-defence law are too complex and
are resulting in retrials that could be avoided if the law was simplified. If we are to
persist with criminal jury trials we need to trust juries with the task of determining
whether the accused has committed murder or manslaughter or is entitled to an
acquittal. It is submitted that part of the reason why the existing legislation is so
complicated is because it is too prescriptive. As in historical times, it suggests that the
legislature is trying to tell the jury what its verdict should be, which does not accord
with the principle that all those vested with criminal decision-making power in our
system of criminal justice should exercise that power independently.29
The law should be simple enough so that the jury cannot misunderstand it, 30 and can
make an independent decision. In Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)
(‘Kable’)31 the High Court resisted the idea that the legislature should be able to direct
judges what their verdicts should be in criminal cases.32 For McHugh J ‘[c]ourts
29

The question of whether we should abolish criminal jury trials is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
30

The question of how we should do that will be the subject of the recommendations made in
chapter six.
(1996) 189 CLR 51 (‘Kable High Court Appeal’). Kable High Court Appeal was ‘widely and
rightly seen as a pivotal event in the emergence of the public interest strategy of pursuing
constitutional validity to statutes which are alleged to effect over-criminalisation in one way or
another’. Luke McNamara and Julia Quilter, 'High Court Constitutional Challenges to Criminal
Law and Procedure Legislation in Australia' (2018) 41 UNSW L. J. 1047, 1050. McNamara
and Quilter has argued that the result of Kable High Court Appeal has led to a number of
further challenges to the validity of statutes because they interfered with judicial
independence. See McNamara and Quilter: 1047-1082.
31

32

It suffices to summarise some aspects of this case.

In 1989 Gregory Wayne Kable (“Kable”) murdered his wife by stabbing her to death in the
house where she lived with the two young children of the marriage. Mr Kable was charged
with murder but the Crown chose to accept a plea to manslaughter based on diminished
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exercising federal jurisdiction must be perceived to be free from legislative or executive
interference.’33 He was also of the view that the Legislation at issue in that case made
the New South Wales Supreme Court:

responsibility. Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1995) 36 NSWLR 374, 380 (Mahoney
JA, Clarke JA agreeing at 395 E, Sheller JA agreeing at 395 G, 396 A) (‘Kable Appeal).
On 2 December 1994, the New South Wales Parliament passed the Community Protection
Act 1994 (NSW) ("the Act") which conferred jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of New South
Wales to make an order for the preventive detention of the appellant after his sentence for
manslaughter ended. The legislature enacted this “extraordinary” legislation only for the
detention of Kable, ‘[requiring the [New South Wales] Supreme Court to participate in the
making of a preventive detention order where no breach of the criminal law [wa]s alleged and
where there ha[d] been no determination of guilt’. Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 98 (Toohey
J).
Section (3)(a) of the Act permitted 'the preventive detention ... of Gregory Wayne Kable' upon
application by the Director of Public Prosecutions under s (5)(1)(a) of the Act, provided the
Supreme Court of New South Wales was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities (s 15), that
Kable was likely to commit a 'serious act of violence' (s (5)(1)(a)) and that he posed a
continuing threat to the community (s (5)(1)(b)). For a brief summary of the “central provisions”
of the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) see Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 119-121
(McHugh J).
On 23 February 1995, Levine J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales ordered that Mr
Kable “be detained” in custody for the maximum period of six months (s 5(2)). No criminal trial
took place before Levine J. Levine J made the order under s 9 of the Act. (Kable Appeal above
377 (Mahoney JA, Clarke JA agreeing at 395 E, Sheller JA agreeing at 395 G, 396 A)). Kable
appealed unsuccessfully to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. See Kable Appeal.
Kable was then granted special leave to appeal to the High Court. The question before the
High Court ‘was whether the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) was a valid law of the
Parliament of New South Wales’. Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 108 (McHugh J).
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, upheld Kable's appeal, and held that
the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) was invalid. Brennan CJ and Dawson J dissented.
See Kable High Court Appeal (n 31).
Notwithstanding the High Court judgment in 1996 finding the Community Protection Act
1994 (NSW) (‘the Act’) invalid, the Act was repealed on 8 July 2015 by Sch 6 to the Statute
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 (NSW) No 15.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the constitutional validity of a legislature
enacting a statute that only applies to one person. It suffices to note McHugh J’s observation
that the purpose of enacting this legislation ‘[was] to detain the appellant not for what he has
done but for what the executive government of the State and its Parliament fear that he might
do’. Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 120 (McHugh J).
33

Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 116 (McHugh J).

166
[T]he instrument of a legislative plan, initiated by the executive government, to imprison
the appellant by a process that is far removed from the judicial process that is ordinarily
invoked when a court is asked to imprison a person.34

Justice Gaudron said:
The integrity of the courts depends on their acting in accordance with the judicial
process and, in no small measure, on the maintenance of public confidence in that
process. Particularly is that so in relation to criminal proceedings which involve the
most important of all judicial functions, namely, the determination of the guilt or
innocence of persons accused of criminal offences.35

These principles were reiterated by Justice Gummow when he cited with approval a
dissenting judgement in a US case.36 The relevant part of that judgment reads:
Most critically, public confidence in the judiciary is indispensable to the operation of
the rule of law; yet this quality is placed in risk whenever judges step outside the
courtroom into the vortex of political activity. ... The need to preserve judicial integrity
is more than just a matter of judges satisfying themselves that the environment in which
they work is sufficiently free of interference to enable them to administer the law
honorably [sic] and efficiently. Litigants and our citizenry in general must also be
satisfied.37

Kable is authority for the proposition that:
[S]ince the Constitution established an integrated Australian court system, and
contemplates the exercise of federal jurisdiction by State Supreme Courts, State
legislation which purports to confer upon such a court a function which substantially

Ibid 122 (McHugh J). See also Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575, 596
(McHugh J) (‘Fardon’).
34

35

Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 107 (Gaudron J).

The US case was ‘Hobson v Hansen (1967) 265 F Supp 902 at 923, 931, per J S Wright J,
dissenting.’ Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 132 n 260 (Gummow J). That decision ‘was later
referred to favourably by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re Application of
the President's Commission on Organized Crime and by Kozinski J in giving the judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gubiensio-Ortiz v Kanahele’: at 132 (Gummow J)
(citations omitted).
36

37

Kable High Court Appeal (n 31) 132-3 (Gummow J).
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impairs its institutional integrity, and which is therefore incompatible with its role as a
repository of federal jurisdiction, is invalid.38

In Wainohu v New South Wales, French CJ and Kiefel J explained what the term
"institutional integrity" means. They said:
The term "institutional integrity", applied to a court, refers to its possession of
the

defining

or

essential

characteristics

of

a

court.

Those

characteristics include the reality and appearance of the court's independence
and its impartiality.39

As the High Court said, independence is removed when the power to make
independent decisions is removed or diluted.

Looking back to the year 1700, we find that preserving the judicial integrity and
maintaining the independence of the courts is not a new principle. The purpose of the
Act of Settlement in 1700 was to “preserve judicial integrity” by preventing the
executive from leaning on judges.40 It is submitted that the jury are as entitled to their
unfettered “adjudicative independence” as judges. If they are to decide criminal cases,
they need to judge by themselves and without being told what to do in so much detail
that their discretion is taken away from them. Lawyers and judges should understand
this. It is what all the argument about judicial independence under our Constitution41
is all about. Though the law of evidence has been called the law of jury control, the

Fardon (n 34) 591 [15] (Gleeson CJ). See also Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513,
519 [5] (Gleeson CJ).
38

39

Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181, 208 [44] (French CJ and Kiefel J)
(citations omitted).
40

See the English Statute of 12 & 13 Will 3 c. 2. § 2. known as the Act of Settlement 1700.
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 7, 636,7. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace the history
of the Act of Settlement 1700 and the various efforts to protect judges from executive direction.
But concerning the developing perception of the need to protect the judiciary from executive
direction, see generally Robert Stevens, 'The Act of Settlement and the Questionable History
of Judicial Independence' (2001) 1 Oxford U Commw. L. J. 253; Douglas E Edlin, 'The
Constitutional Logic of the Common Law' (2020) 53 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 79.
41

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.
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proponents of that view did not suggest that legislative control of juries should extend
to directing their verdicts.42
The foregoing discussion takes us to the question of what exactly jury independence
means.

5.3 The essence of jury independence
The argument here is that independence in criminal decision making belongs to juries
as much as to judges.43 That is, because the idea of jury independence is a
fundamental aspect of a jury trial. What should the jury be independent from? If we
are to persist with criminal jury trial as an institution in our criminal justice system,
juries are as entitled to complete autonomy in deciding the guilt or innocence of the
accused as a judge in a judge-alone trial.44 The job of the jury is to judge. Let us

John H. Langbein, ‘The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law’ (1973) 17(4) The
American Journal of Legal History 313, 317; Thayer, James B., ‘The Jury and its Development
III’ (1891-1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 357, 387-8.
42

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or analyse the subject matter of judicial
independence but see generally David Clark, 'The Struggle for Judicial Independence: The
Amotion and Suspension of Supreme Court Judges in 19th Century Australia' (2013) 12
Macquarie L. J. 21; Anthony Mason, 'Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers Some Problems Old and New' (1990) 13 UNSW L.J. 173; Michael D Kirby, 'Judicial
Independence in Australia Reaches a Moment of Truth' (1990) 13 U. NSW L. J. 187; Garfield
Barwick, 'Parliamentary Democracy in Australia' (1995) 25 UW Austl. L. Rev. 21; Michael
Kirby, 'Judicial Accountability in Australia' (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 41; Amy B Atchinson and
Lawrence Tobe Liebert and Denise K Russell, 'Judicial Independence and Judicial
Accountability: A Selected Bibliography' (1999) 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 723; Robert Stevens, ‘A
Loss of Innocence?: Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers’ (1999) 19 (3)
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 365; William H Rehnquist, 'Judicial Independence' (2004) 38
U. Rich. L. Rev. 579; Anthony J Scirica, 'Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence'
(2015) 90 NYU L. Rev. 779.
43

44

Section 133 of Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides:
133 Verdict of single Judge
(1) A Judge who tries criminal proceedings without a jury may make any finding that could have
been made by a jury on the question of the guilt of the accused person. Any such finding has,
for all purposes, the same effect as a verdict of a jury.
(2) A judgment by a Judge in any such case must include the principles of law applied by the
Judge and the findings of fact on which the Judge relied.
(3) If any Act or law requires a warning to be given to a jury in any such case, the Judge is to
take the warning into account in dealing with the matter.

169

simplify the law and let juries judge instead of fettering their decision-making with
complicated legal formulas that they find difficult to understand.
Ian Barker has stated that democracy in New South Wales emerged as
‘a battle for [the] right to be tried by a “petty” jury’.45 Sir Barwick says ‘“[d]emocracy”, a
frequently misused, describes a system of government under which a community
manages and controls the whole of its affairs without exception.’46 The jury system is
arguably an essential feature of a real democracy.47 The people of Australia as
represented by juries in our system of criminal justice, are ‘the true source of
sovereignty’.48 The common sense of lay jurors is the embodiment of community
standards and ‘ensures that certain standards applied in the courts reflect community
standards’.49 Juries thus ‘ensure … the right of an accused person to a fair trial’.50
Contrary to Sir James Stephens, Evatt J argued that the jury is ‘just as capable of
performing judicial and political functions as those who from their infancy have had the
advantages of leisure, education, and wealth’.51
If democracy is enhanced by independent decision making in criminal trials, then jury
independence should be as important as “judicial independence” in a criminal trial
decided by a judge alone. But what does “judicial independence” mean?

5.4 A brief history and justification for judicial independence in
Australia
The Doctrine of Judicial Independence can be traced back to the Act of Settlement
1700 (UK). In Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs
(‘Hindmarsh Island Bridge case’) the majority said ‘[t]he inherited tradition of judicial
45

Ian Barker QC, Sorley tried: Democracy and trial by jury in New South Wales (Series:
Francis Forbes Lectures, 2002) 22.
46

Barwick (n 43) 21 (emphasis in original).

47

H. V. Evatt, ‘The Jury System in Australia’ (1936) 10 Aust. L. J. 49, 67.

48

Michael Kirby, 'Judicial Accountability in Australia' (2003) 6 Legal Ethics 41, 43.

49

Barker (n 45) 12.

Mark Findlay, ‘Policies of Secrecy and Denial: Barriers to Jury Reform’ (1996) 7 (3) Current
Issues in Criminal Justice 368, 370.
50

51

Evatt (n 47) 67.
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independence is rooted in and manifested by the Act of Settlement 1700’.52 In R v
Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (‘Trade Practices
Tribunal’),53 Windeyer J said that:
it is well-recognized dogma for us that the judicial power is to be exercised separately
from the exercise of the other two powers, and by different people. This is a necessity
of our written constitutional law as well as a compelling part of our inheritance of the
British tradition of the independence of the judges.54

The source of judicial independence in Australia is Chapter III of the Australian
Constitution.55 However, in Australia ‘there is no single ideal model of judicial
independence’.56 It suffices to say, however, that the idea behind judicial
independence in Australia is that the members of the judiciary should have ‘completely
separate authority and function from all other participants in the justice system’.57 As
Dixon CJ said, the “core” purpose of judicial independence is that:

52

Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs (‘Hindmarsh Island Bridge
Case’) (1996) 189 CLR 1, 12 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ)
citing, the English Statute of ‘12 & 13 Will 3 c 2’.
53

(1970) 123 CLR 361.

54

Trade Practices Tribunal (n 53) 12 (Windeyer J) (emphasis in original). Cited with the
Majority approval in (Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case’) (n 52) 12.
Nevertheless, in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘Forge’)
Gleeson CJ said:
55

If Ch III of the Constitution were said to establish the Australian standard for judicial
independence then two embarrassing considerations would arise: first, the standard altered in
1977; secondly, the State Supreme Courts and other State courts upon which federal
jurisdiction has been conferred did not comply with the standard at the time of Federation, and
have never done so since.

Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 66 [36]
(Gleeson CJ) (‘Forge’).
56

Ibid 65 [36] (Gleeson CJ). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or analyse the
Doctrine of Judicial Independence under the Australian Constitution and the different
arrangements that bear upon judicial independence. See generally Forge (n 55).
57

Sir Anthony Mason, 'Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers - Some Problems
Old and New' (1990) 13 UNSW L. J. 173, 174 n 2 citing, Justice Dickson in The Queen v
Beauregard 2 [1986] 2 SCR 56, at 73, and referring to Valente v The Queen [1985] 2 SCR
673.
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[N]o outsider – be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge should interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts
his or her case and makes his or her decision.58

In the same vein, the majority in the Hindmarsh Bridge case cited with approval the
following passage from Mistretta v United States:59
The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends upon its reputation for
impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political
branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action.60

Looking back at the year 1700 we find that the “judicial independence” “rooted and
manifested” in the Act of Settlement 1700 was intended to ensure ‘the further
Limitation of the Crown and [to] better secur[e] the Rights and Liberties of the
Subject’.61 The High Court cases discussed above also show that the aim of judicial
independence is to ensure that judges make their own decisions without any
interference from outsiders, governmental or otherwise. It can be inferred that the
foundational aim of judicial “independence” continues to be the ‘guarantee’ and
‘protection of the individual liberty of the citizen’.62 The question that follows is: do we
not expect this same virtue from the juries we appoint to decide our criminal cases?
The judicial independence to which we aspire is set out in the Criminal Procedure Act
1986 (NSW). Section 133 states that the judge has “complete” autonomy in deciding
the guilt or innocence of the accused.63 The judge is said to be the only ‘independent
58

The Queen v Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, 69-70 (Dixon CJ) reproduced by Ian Greene
in the 'The Doctrine of Judicial Independence Developed by the Supreme Court of Canada'
(1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L. J. 177, 188.
(1989) 488 US 361. Which was also ‘adopted by McHugh at 372 and Gummow at 392’ in
Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348. Hindmarsh Island Bridge case (n 52) 9 (Brennan CJ,
Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
59

Hindmarsh Island Bridge case (n 52) 9 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and
Gummow JJ).
60

61

See the English Statute of 12 & 13 Will 3 c. 2. § 2. known as the Act of Settlement 1700.
Statutes of the Realm: Volume 7, 636-7.
62

Hindmarsh Island Bridge case (n 52) 11 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and
Gummow JJ).
63

Section 133 of Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides:
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arbiter’64 in a judge-alone criminal trial. While jury independence is not similarly stated
expressly, there is an implied common law expectation (symbolically restated in the
Australian Constitution) that our juries must be similarly independent arbiter and are
expected to exercise complete autonomy when they decide the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If that is so, then our criminal law needs to be expressed plainly and
without overbearing legislative guidance so that juries can democratically and
independently adjudicate guilt or innocence in criminal trials. Excessive legislative
direction arguably compromises jury independence in the same way in which it has
been held to compromise judicial independence when directed at judges.65
If judges, politicians, and lawyers disagree what a law means and how it should be
applied, it is unreasonable to expect lay jurors to understand and apply it. For the
reasons identified above, it is also arguable that unnecessarily complex criminal law
compromises jury independence. Nor is it appropriate that judicial explanations of what
criminal law means should be so intrusive that they reach into the jury room and tell
the jury what to decide. In the context of this thesis, the concept of self-defence is
simple enough that lay people can understand it. It is submitted that the legislative
task is to express that concept simply enough that any judge can explain it with ease
but leave the factual decision making to the jury.

133 Verdict of single Judge
(1) A Judge who tries criminal proceedings without a jury may make any finding that could have
been made by a jury on the question of the guilt of the accused person. Any such finding has,
for all purposes, the same effect as a verdict of a jury.
(2) A judgment by a Judge in any such case must include the principles of law applied by the
Judge and the findings of fact on which the Judge relied.
(3) If any Act or law requires a warning to be given to a jury in any such case, the Judge is to
take the warning into account in dealing with the matter.

Dyson Heydon, ‘Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law’ (2004) 10(4) Otago Law
Review 493, 494.
64

65

See Kable High Court Appeal (n 31). The exposition of this principle and its application in
jury cases is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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5.5 The importance of simple judicial instructions
The need for lay jurors to understand judicial explanations of the law is well explained
by two American empirical studies jointly undertaken by Steel and Thornburg.66 Their
studies “tested” the extent to which jurors understand judges’ instructions in criminal
and civil cases. They also surveyed people who actually served as jurors and reached
a verdict.67 These two studies showed the impact of jury confusion on jury verdicts and
how overly complex instructions confuse and interfere with jury independence. 68 The
Steele and Thornburg studies also noted that jury ‘verdict[s] based on misunderstood
instructions will stand’.69 They observed that jury comprehension of judges’
instructions is inadequate and that improvements to jury instructions would improve
jury comprehension of those instructions. They recommended that if juror
comprehension of the instructions was “an important factor” on appeal, judges should
“make the effort” to write “comprehensible” instructions.70 They also recommended
that judges be permitted ‘to comment on the evidence and to inform the jury on the
effect of its answers’,71 and that ‘juror comprehension would be improved if each juror
were given a written copy of the judge’s instructions to take into the jury room’.72
Those findings confirm that judges need to provide juries with instructions that simply
and accurately explain the law. Legislatures need to make sure that criminal laws are
simple enough that judges can explain them in terms that any jury can understand. In
2018 in a “Banco Court Lecture”, High Court Justice Virginia Bell said that complex
law makes it difficult for trial judges to explain that law to juries.73 She said that ‘the
Walter W. Steele Jr. and Elizabeth G. Thornburg, ‘Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate’ (1988) 67 N.C.L. Rev. 77.
66

67

Ibid 78.

68

Ibid.

69

Ibid 83.

70

Ibid 108.

71

Ibid 109.

]
72
73

Ibid.

Virginia Bell AC (Justice of the High Court of Australia), Jury Directions: the Struggle for
Simplicity and Clarity (Banco Court Lecture Supreme Court of Queensland, 20 September
2018) 1.
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directions of law that judges were required to give the jury had become excessively
long and complex’.74 She also observed that the complexity of the criminal law
‘reflect[ed] a tendency on the part of appellate judges to over-intellectualise the
criminal law … the intended audience had become the appellate court and not the
jury’.75
The difficulties that jurors face in self-defence trials in England is also applicable in
Australia.76 The English research demonstrated that out of 797 jurors, only one third
were able to fully understand the law of self-defence.77 When jurors misunderstand
judicial explanations of homicide law and self-defence, there is a risk of serious
consequences and the miscarriage of justice. Those consequences were
demonstrated in Sellars v. United States(‘Sellars’).78 Instead of acquitting the
defendant in that case, the jury found him guilty of manslaughter because they
mistakenly understood that even if the defendant had acted in self-defence, he still
had to be convicted of manslaughter.79 The problem was compounded by the fact that
74

Ibid.

75

Ibid. In support of that proposition, Justice Bell referred to the references which were given
separately, between about 2009 and 2012, to “the Law Reform Commissions of Victoria
("VLRC"), Queensland ("QLRC"), and New South Wales ("NSWLRC")”, requiring each
commission “to report on the directions given to juries in criminal trials.” The three
commissions produced three reports. These are:
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Jury Directions, Final Report 17 (May 2009) (the "VLRC
Report"); Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Jury Directions, Report No 66
(December 2009) (the "QLRC Report"); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Jury
Directions, Report 136 (November 2012) (the "NSWLRC Report"): at 1.

See generally Lord Justice Alan Moses, ‘Summing Down the Summing-up’ (Speech
delivered at the Annual Law Reform Lecture, The Hall, Inner Temple, London, 23 November
2010).
76

77

To illustrate the difficulties that jurors face in self-defence trials in England, citing Professor
Cheryl Thomas’ research in 2010, Lord Justice Moses, quoted the results for a film used by
Professor Thomas in her research to see how potential jurors would respond in a trial for a
charge of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The accused pleaded self-defence. The
judge “posed” to the jury the following two questions (which were similar to the test in s 418 of
the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)): “did the defendant believe it was necessary to defend himself”?
and, “did he use reasonable force?” Out of 797 jurors “only 31% accurately identified both
questions, 48% one and 20% neither” (ibid).
78

401 A.2d 974, 980-82 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979) (Reilly CJ, Harris Associate judge, and Mack AJ
dissenting) (‘Sellars’).
79

J Alexander Tanford, 'The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions' (1990) 69 Ne. L. Rev.
71, 101.
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the trial court and the Court of Appeal refused to change the verdict even when ‘[j]urors
later told the court that they had misunderstood the self defense instruction’.80 The
majority of the Court of Appeal found no error after examining why the trial judge
refused to change the verdict.81
‘[A] systematic study’ of ‘successful criminal appeals across Australia’82 between 5
June 2005 and 31 December 2012 undertaken by Judge Sydney Tilmouth QC of the
South Australian District Court is also relevant to this consideration. Judge Tilmouth’s
aim was to identify where judges had made errors when directing juries in criminal
cases. He found ‘that judge induced error…[was] more common than expected’.83
Though judicial directions about self-defence in homicide cases ‘ha[d] long been
recognised as confusing and complex for juries’,84 he concluded that ‘matters have
not become any clearer by a succession of legislative interventions, which if anything
[those legislative changes] have only served to compound the complexities involved’.85

80

Ibid 101-2. See also Sellars (n 78).

81

The Court of Appeal explained what happened. The Court of Appeal said:
The trial judge received a note from the jury foreman. It alleged that the jurors had agreed that
appellant acted in self-defense, but that the verdict did not convey that agreement. The trial
judge held a hearing in chambers, questioning each juror individually in the presence of the
prosecutor, appellant, and defense counsel about the verdict. Three jurors reaffirmed the
verdict as rendered. The foreman virtually admitted that he had changed his mind about
appellant's guilt after the jury was discharged. The remaining jurors said they had believed
appellant acted in self-defense and had intended the manslaughter verdict to reflect that
conclusion. They apparently had misunderstood one portion of the court's charge, which read
as follows:
If you find that the Government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this
defendant did not act in self-defense, in connection with the actions he took against
both Epluribus Thomas and Clyde Thomas, you must find the defendant not guilty.

‘The court denied relief and imposed sentence. This appeal followed.’
See Sellars (n 78).
Judge Sydney Tilmouth, ‘The wrong direction: A case study and anatomy of successful
Australian criminal appeals’ (2015) 40 Australian Bar Review 18.
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Ibid 18.
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Ibid 34.
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That confusion should not surprise experienced criminal lawyers and judges because
it has been embedded in English criminal law for a long time. But that difficulty is no
reason why the New South Wales legislature cannot simplify how self-defence law is
expressed in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Historically, as has been shown in chapter two, as members of the community juries
were required to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused in criminal matters
according to their conscience. When kings were disappointed by jury verdicts, they
enacted statutes in an effort to regulate and even direct the verdicts juries should
return.86 Juries resisted. Modern experience suggests that juries remain inclined to
resist the law when it is said to require decisions which contradict conscience. The
Abdallah and Patel cases are examples. Such pressure is exerted incrementally. The
fact that jury decisions do not always accord with the alleged expression of community
expectations in modern media should not surprise us. Juries hear the nuances of
cases and are charged with making decisions according to their conscience in
individual cases rather than in view of more generalised social justice. Conscience
and social justice do not always sell media copy, especially when some of the nuanced
facts that influenced the jury are not reported. I will now discuss how previous efforts
to amend self-defence law in New South Wales has complicated the law and made it
difficult for lay juries to apply.
As explained in chapters three and four, that complication is the product of diverse
judicial opinion about how self-defence law should operate. In chapter three, it was
observed that the dissenting judges in Viro and the majority in Zecevic warned against
complex laws that juries could not understand. In chapter four, in Moore v The Queen

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 418–423; Criminal Law Consolidation (Self Defence) Amendment
Act 1991 (SA) s 15; Crimes (Homicide) Act No 77 of 2005 (Vic); Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss
267, 271, 272, 278; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 244, 248–255; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss
27, 28, 29; Criminal Code Act (NT) 1991 ss 46 and 47 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) (s 46,
s 47, s 49, as amended by the Criminal Code Amendment (Self-Defence)Act 1987 (Tas)); the
Criminal Code (ACT) 2002 s 42 and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 10.4 (Tilmouth J
citations): at 34 n 336.
86

For example: Constitutions of Clarendon (1164-1176); Statute of Marlbridge (1267), 52 Hen.
III, c. 25; Statute of Gloucester (1278), 6 Edw. 1, c. 9; Liberty of Subject Act (1354), 28 Edw.
III, ch 3; Observance of Due Process of Law Act (1386), 42 Edw. III, ch 3; The four statutes: 12
Hen. VII, C. 7 (1496), 4 Hen. VIII, C. 2 (1512), 23 Hen. VIII, C. 1, sec.1-4 (1531), and 1 Edw
VI, C.12, sec. 10 (1547); Marian bail statute (1554-5), 1&2 Phil. & Mar. c. 13; Marian committal
statute (1555), 2&3 Phil. & Mar. c 10; Statute of Stabbing (1663-4), 1 Jac. I c. 8.
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Justice Basten expressed his view that the ‘administration of justice would be much
improved’ if Palmer87 were understood to have ‘accurately described the legal
principles at stake’.88 And, as is discussed below, in Hamzy v The Queen in the Court
of Appeal, Justice Simpson confirmed the writer’s view that s 421 ‘presents difficulties,
of construction’.89 It will also be shown in this chapter, that even though the legislative
intention in enacting s 421 was to restore ‘the common law position as previously
stated by the High Court in Viro’ 90 despite the provisions of the Model Criminal Code,
neither s 421 nor s 418 approach excessive self-defence in the same way as the High
Court did in Viro.91 Nor can lay jurors understand or practically apply the tests set out
in ss 418 and 421 when self-defence is raised in answer to a homicide charge under
s 18 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Many High Court judges have recognised the importance of clarity and certainty in
criminal law. In Mraz v The Queen (‘Mraz’),92 Fullagar J said that ‘every accused
person is entitled to a trial in which the relevant law is correctly explained to the jury’.93
In Taikato v The Queen,94 the majority said that ‘[t]he operation of the criminal law
should be as certain as possible.’95 Gleeson CJ observed that ‘in the area of criminal
justice … certainty is of particular importance’.96 The US empirical studies by Steel
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Palmer v The Queen [1971] 1 All ER 1077; AC 814 (‘Palmer’).

88

Moore v The Queen ([2016] NSWCCA 185, [30] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94])
(‘Moore’).
89

Hamzy v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 53, [183] (Simpson JA dissenting) (‘Hamzy’).

Chrissa Loukas, citing, the second reading speech of the New South Wales Attorney
General [Hansard 28.11.2001 at page 19093]. Chrissa Loukas, ‘Crimes Amendment (Self
Defence) Act 2001’ (Published paper, 28 February 2002). But the way to understand a subject
‘is not to read something else, but to get to the bottom of the subject itself’. Holmes (n 2) 476.
90
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Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 (‘Viro’).

92

(1955) 93 CLR 493 (‘Mraz’).

93

Ibid 514 (Fullagar J).

94

(1996) 186 CLR 454 (‘Taikato’).

95

Ibid 466 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).

Anthony Murray Gleeson (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales as he
then was) ‘Clarity or Fairness: Which Is More Important’ (1990) 12 Sydney L. Rev. 305, 309.
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and Thornburg97 and Judge Sydney Tilmouth’s Australian research98 discussed above
provide insight that is relevant in Australia. The point is to simplify the law so that
judges can simply explain it to juries so that all the jurors understand it. The decisions
in the Abdallah and Patel cases discussed above also suggest that the four juries in
these cases did not clearly understand the self-defence provisions in the existing NSW
statute.
This brings us to an analysis of the statutory self-defence provisions in New South
Wales and an explanation why those formulas have proven difficult and even
unworkable.

Part Two: Analysis of self-defence provisions in New South Wales
5.6 The road from common law self-defence to the current “codified”
self-defence provisions
The complicated self-defence law that is now expressed in the NSW statutory formulas
has not resolved the difficulties which were highlighted between 1958 and 1987 in R
v Howe (‘Howe’),99 Palmer v The Queen(‘Palmer’),100 Viro v The Queen(‘Viro’)101 and
Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic)(‘Zecevic’).102 While the existence of
self-defence in the English criminal law inherited by Australia is at least partly the result
of jury pushback during the 14th-16th centuries, juries have not been able to influence
the shape of the criminal law since they became subject to judicial oversight during
and after the reign of Queen Mary in Tudor England. Nor have they been able to make
direct contributions to the development of the common law of self-defence in either

97

See Steele and Thornburg (n 66).

98

See Tilmouth (n 82).

99

R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 (‘Howe’).

100

Palmer (n 87).

101

Viro (n 91).

102

Zecevic (n 3).

179

England or Australia since. But that does not mean the Australian common law of selfdefence was settled. Between 1958 and 1987 jury verdicts in homicide self-defence
cases were out of step with legislative expectations and forced the High Court and
Privy Council to wrestle with the question whether excessive self-defence entitled a
defendant to a complete acquittal or whether the conviction should be reduced from
murder to manslaughter.
The heart of the judicial conflict was whether modern self-defence law should focus
on overall intent or the proportionality of the self-defensive force that was used. Some
judges were focused on whether the accused’s overall intent was determinative, and
if there was no intent to kill but just to self-defend, they considered that an acquittal
was appropriate. Other judges were of the opinion that if the accused used more force
than was necessary, he or she should not be acquitted but should be found guilty of
manslaughter. As before the 16th century, it seems that the unexpected nature of some
jury verdicts raised these questions for judicial and then legislative review.
In Howe103 the High Court found that a person who had used more force than
necessary to repel an unlawful attack and killed his attacker was guilty of manslaugter
not murder. If the force used to repel the attack was reasonable, then he would have
been entitled to an acquittal.104 In Howe the High Court thus briefly established at

103

104

Howe (n 99).

The High Court in Howe (n 99) adopted the reasoning of the Victorian Supreme Court of
Criminal Appeal in R v McKay [1957] VR 560 (‘McKay’). McKay’s case stood as an authority
against the proposition that it is lawful to kill a fleeing thief solely on the basis of necessity, and
for the proposition that proportionality in using defensive force is a further added condition in
deciding such self-defence cases. See generally Norval Morris, ‘The Slain Chicken Thief [sic]Some Aspects of Justifiable and Excusable Homicide’ (1958) 2 Sydney L. Rev. 414; Norval
Morris, ‘A New Qualified Defence to Murder’ (1960) 1 Adel. L. Rev. 23; David Lanham, ‘Killing
the Fleeing Offender’ (1977) 1 Crim. L. J. 16. It also had an influence on Viro’s Case as it led
to the formulation of the test in Viro. Viro (n 3), 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128,
Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin
J agreeing at 180). Some writers argued that the doctrine of excessive self-defence was first
raised in McKay’s case. Stanley Yeo stated that McKay’s case “purports” to be the first
Australian case to recognise the doctrine of excessive self-defence. (Stanley Yeo, ‘The
Demise of Excessive Self-defence in Australia’ (1988) 37 Int'l & Comp. L.Q 348, 348 n 1).
Referring to McKays’ case, Justice Weinberg said that the doctrine of excessive self-defence
‘seems to have been ﬁrst raised in Australia in the celebrated case of the chicken farmer who
shot the ﬂeeing thief’ (Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘Moral blameworthiness — The ‘objective test’
dilemma’ (2003) 24 Australian Bar Review 173, 191). But excessive self-defence had been
discussed earlier in R v Griffin (1872) 10 SCR (NSW) 91 (Cheeke J); R v Morrison (1989) 10
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common law that a manslaughter conviction was appropriate rather than an acquittal
when the accused has used more force than was necessary to defend himself — since
called excessive self-defence. But the common law doctrine of excessive self-defence
was revisited and struck down by the Privy Council in Palmer v The Queen (‘Palmer’)
in 1971 after only 13 years.105
Palmer had killed Henry, and the jury convicted him of murder. Palmer appealed to
the Privy Council arguing that the judge should have directed the jury about an
alternative verdict of manslaughter in light of the self-defence issues involved in the
case and the decision taken by the High Court of Australia in Howe. The Privy Council
rejected Palmer’s appeal and said that there was no option for a verdict of
manslaughter when a defendant had used excessive force in self-defence. The
defence either succeeded in its entirety or it failed.106 That Privy Council decision left
the jury with no manslaughter conviction option in a murder trial when the jury
considered that the defendant had used excessive force. The Privy Council said that
self-defence was a simple and straightforward conception, and the idea of excessive
self-defence had unduly complicated the jury’s reasoning.107 The Privy Council
decision, however, was out of step with the idea that had surfaced in Australia, which
held that a manslaughter halfway house was appropriate in self-defence cases when
excessive force had resulted in a homicide. The decision in Palmer remained the
common law in Australia governing self-defence cases until the High Court’s decision
in Viro v The Queen (‘Viro’).108
The Viro case was the third time that the High Court considered itself obliged to
grapple with the doctrine of excessive self-defence. The High Court in Viro disagreed
with the Privy Council’s analysis in Palmer and reinstated the doctrine of excessive
self-defence that it had set out in Howe. The moral culpability of a person accused of

NSWR 171 (Windeyer, Stephen, Foster JJ); and R v Tommy Ryan (1890) 11 NSWR 171
(Windeyer, Innes, Foster JJ).
105

Palmer (n 87) (Lord Morris of Birth-y-Gest for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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See ibid.
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Palmer (n 87) 831-2 (Lord Morris of Birth-y-Gest for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).

108

Viro (n 91)
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murder who had used more force than necessary to repel an unlawful attack was less
than the moral culpability ordinarily associated with murder. To reinforce its reasoning,
the High Court formulated six propositions which it were said would enable trial judges
to instruct juries how to decide whether the jury should acquit the accused or convict
of the lesser offence of manslaughter when self-defence was plead in a murder
case.109 The judgments of Mason, Stephen and Aikin JJ also required judges to
instruct juries to assess whether the accused rather than a reasonable person,
believed that there was a threat to her life before there could be either an acquittal or
a manslaughter verdict.110

109

Ibid 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J
agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180). The six propositions
were in the following terms:
1 (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the accused
reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily
harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself.
2. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief by the
accused of such an attack no question of self-defence arises.
3. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such reasonable belief
by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in fact used by the accused was
reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced.
4. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used than was
reasonably proportionate it should acquit.
5. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used, then its verdict
should be either manslaughter or murder, that depending upon the answer to the final question
for the jury - did the accused believe that the force which he used was reasonably proportionate
to the danger which he believed he faced?
6. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have such a belief
the verdict will be murder. If it is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not
have that belief the verdict will be manslaughter.
110

The first proposition was as follows:
1 (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the accused
reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily
harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself.
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The self-defence doctrine stated in Viro came under pressure because Viro’s six
propositions were too complicated for trial judges to explain simply to juries.111 So the
High Court revisited the issue in Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic)
(‘Zecevic’).112 That new panel of the High Court thought, as the Privy Council had said
in Palmer, that their predecessors had gone too far in creating the half-way house and
so they retreated to murder or acquittal as binary alternatives in homicide cases
involving claims of self-defence. The High Court panel in Zecevic preferred the Privy
Council’s reasoning in Palmer and disapproved its own earlier decisions in Howe and
Viro. In Zecevic, the High Court held that the jury could only acquit if it was satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant reasonably believed that it was
necessary to do what he did in defending himself. If the defendant had used
unreasonable force, then the only possible verdict was murder.113 But the doctrinal
agreement between the Privy Council in Palmer and High Court in Zecevic still did not
resolve the underlying doctrinal issues because the legislature was alert to the
underlying perception of injustice that arose in homicide cases where self-defence was
argued and the manslaughter half-way house was not available.
Gleeson CJ said that the High Court decisions in Howe, Viro and Zecevic, were an
“experiment” with criminal law and justice.114 For Gleeson CJ, ‘[f]ine distinctions and
nice elaborations are the stuff of which revenue law is made, but they are generally
alien to criminal law.’115 The inference from his expression of concern is that the
legislature should simplify the law since the High Court would not be able to do so.
High Court efforts to clarify law would always be limited by the facts of the cases which
they were asked to decide. Underlying the majority view in Zecevic was a concern

Viro (n 91) 146 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J
agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
Zecevic (n 3) 653 (Mason CJ) citing, ‘Reg. v. McManus (1985) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 448, at pp.461462; and Reg. v. Lawson and Forsythe [1986) V.R. 515, at p. 547-549 (Mason CJ citations)’.
See also Zecevic (n 3) 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Tilmouth (n 82) 34.
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Zecevic (n 3).
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See Ibid.
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Gleeson (n 96) 309.
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about simplicity.116 However, ‘[d]espite the elegance and simplicity of Zecevic's
statement of the law’,117 it removed the possibility of a manslaughter conviction in
cases of excessive self-defence.
In light of the history, the removal of the manslaughter option in excessive self-defence
cases did not sit well with the New South Wales legislature and they decided not only
to “codify” self-defence, but to restore excessive self-defence as a partial defence in
murder cases. They tried to reintroduce the High Court’s manslaughter halfway house,
but it is submitted that the formula they provided in the amended statute is too
complicated. The difficulty that formula presents is demonstrated in the Abdallah and
Patel decisions already discussed. The question is how the statutory formula might be
further simplified. Revising statutory formulas is not the job of the courts and especially
not in Australia. Courts do their best with the formulas the legislature provides, but the
code provided by the legislature in this case did not simplify the issues involved.
The New South Wales self-defence provisions were drafted to:
[G]enerally accord … with the codification of that defence contained in the Model
Criminal Code recommended by the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General.118

Those provisions took effect on 22 February 2002119 but they are not simple. The
explanatory notes for the Self-defence Amendment Bill in 2001 were brief. They stated
116

The majority in Zecevic stated the test as follows:
The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon
reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief
and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the
matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 3) 662 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).
117

Bell (n 73) 15.

118

Explanatory Notes (n 28). The explanatory notes were referring to s 10.4 of Criminal Code
Act 1995 (Cth). See also Egitmen (n 28) 244 [251] (Mitchell JA, Mazza JA agreeing at 221
[121]); Eric Colvin, ‘Abusive Relationships and Violent Responses: The Reorientation of SelfDefense in Australia’ (2009-2010) 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 339, 347. See s 10.4 of the Criminal
Code 1995 (Cth) in the legislation schedule in part three of the appendix.
119

The statutory provisions dealing with self-defence were inserted into the Crimes Act 1900
(NSW) by the Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Act 2001 (NSW) and took effect on 22
February 2002. Moore (n 88) [26] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [122]).
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that the object of the bill was to codify self-defence law in New South Wales.120 The
explanatory notes also stated that:
The codification effected by the Bill seeks to simplify the law by enabling defendants
to rely on self-defence if they believed their conduct was necessary (even if they were
wrong), so long as the response was objectively proportionate to the situation (as they
perceived it).121

The New South Wales legislature introduced the manslaughter half-way house option
in self-defence homicide cases knowing that it had caused friction between the Privy
Council and the High Court of Australia before appeals to the Privy Council had been
abolished in 1986.122 Even though, the legislature was committed to the
implementation of a standardised Model Criminal Code, it still decided to reintroduce
the manslaughter half-way house option in self-defence homicide cases.123 Bell J
described that decision as follows:

120

The long title of the Crimes Amendment (Self-Defence) Act 2001 (NSW) provides:
An Act to amend the Crimes Act 1900 to codify the law with respect to self-defence; and to
repeal the Home Invasion (Occupants Protection) Act 1998 and the Workplace (Occupants
Protection) Act 2001.

121

Explanatory Notes (n 28) (emphasis in original).

Gleeson CJ, ‘The Influence of the Privy Council on Australia’ (2007) 29 Australian Bar
Review 123, 126, 128. By ‘the Australia Acts 1986’: at 128. See generally A. Mason, ‘The
Limitation of Appeals to the Privy Council from the High Court of Australia , from the Federal
Courts other than the High Court, from the Supreme Courts of the Territories and from courts
Exercising Federal Jurisdiction’ (1968) 3 Federal Law Review 1; Sir Ivor Richardson, ‘The
Privy Council as the Final Court for the British Empire’ (2012) 43 VUWLR 103; Sharon Hamby
O'Connor and Mary Sarah Bilder, ‘Appeals to the Privy Council Before American
Independence: An Annotated Digital Catalogue’ (2012) 1 Law Library Journal 83.
122
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The explanatory notes stated:
(a) The Bill (and the Code) excludes self-defence in those circumstances if the accused uses
force that inflicts really serious injury, and
(b) The Bill (but not the Code) reduces murder to manslaughter in the case of excessive selfdefence, that is, where the defendant believed it was necessary for personal defence, but where
the accused uses force that inflicts death and that is not a reasonable response in the
circumstances.

Explanatory Notes (n 28) (emphasis in original).
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Simplicity in the statement of the law has given way to the legislature's judgment that
the law should provide for the lesser culpability of the accused whose acts done in selfdefence are disproportionate. It is a judgment that accords with Howe.124

The statutory self-defence provisions approved by the New South Wales legislature
and effective since 2002 are set out in ss 418-423 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).125
Sections 418, 419 and 421 provide:
418 Self-defence —when available
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the
conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.

(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes the
conduct is necessary:

(a) to defend himself or herself or another person, or

(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the
liberty of another person, or

(c) to protect property from unlawful taking, destruction, damage or
interference, or
(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person
committing any such criminal trespass,
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives
them.

124

Bell (n 73) 16.

125

The scope of this thesis is directed to ss 418 and 421.
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419 Self-defence—onus of proof
In any criminal proceedings in which the application of this Division is raised, the
prosecution has the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the person did not
carry out the conduct in self-defence.126
421 Self-defence —excessive force that inflicts death
(1) This section applies if:
(a) the person uses force that involves the infliction of death, and
(b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary:
(c) to defend himself or herself or another person, or

126

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse s 419 (and s 420) and what the standard of
“beyond reasonable doubt” means, and whether or not judges should explain it to jurors, or
whether or not s 419 should be reformulated. For some of the ensuing debates in relation to
these issues see for example R v Dookheea (2017) 347 ALR 529; Darkan v The Queen (2006)
227 CLR 373; Chief Justice Brian Martin, ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ (2010) 1 NTLJ 225; Lily
Trimboli, ‘Juror Understanding of Judicial Instructions in Criminal Trials’ (2008) 119 Crime and
Justice Bulletin 1; Theodore Waldman, ‘Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt’
(1959) 20 Journal of the History of Ideas 299; Anthony A Morano, ‘Retreat from Unanimity and
Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases’ (1969) 1 U. Toledo L. Rev. 337; Anthony A Morano, ‘A
Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule’ (1975) 55 Boston
University Law Review 507; Barbara J. Shapiro, ‘To A Moral Certainty: Theories of Knowledge
and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850’ (1986) 38 Hastings L.J. 153; Scott E Sundby, 'The
Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence' (1989) 40 Hastings L. J. 457; Barbara
J. Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause: Historical Perspectives on the
Anglo-American Law of Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Steve
Sheppard, ‘The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof
have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence’ (2003) 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165; James
Q Whitman, ‘The Origins of "Reasonable Doubt’ (Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship
Series, 2005); Barbara Shapiro, ‘The Beyond Reasonable Doubt Doctrine: ‘Moral Comfort’ or
Standard of Proof?’ (2008) 2(2) Law and Humanities 149; James Q Whitman, 'Response to
Shapiro' (2008) 2 Law & Human 175; Barbara Shapiro, 'Changing Language, Unchanging
Standard: From Satisfied Conscience to Moral Certainty and beyond Reasonable Doubt'
(2009) 17 Cardozo J Int'l & Comp L 261; Barbara J Shapiro, ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’: The
Neglected Eighteenth-Century Context’ (2014) 8(1) Law and Humanities 19; Jeffrey S.
Helmreich,’ Reasonable Doubts Or Doubtable Reasons: The Case For an Objective Standard’
(2015) 4 Brit. J. Am. Legal Stud. 355.
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(d) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty
of another person.

(2) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder, the
person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise criminally
responsible for manslaughter.

In this thesis, I have focused on homicide cases. Section 421 is not the only section
that deals specifically with homicide. Section 418 is also about self-defence and is
engaged in homicide cases as it provides a complete defence to various offences
including murder.127 In homicide cases under s 18 of the Crimes Act (NSW), the jury
is required to consider the terms of both ss 418 and 421 when self-defence is raised.
For reasons that are not entirely clear, when the legislature drafted their new serious
crime self-defence regime, they chose to differentiate between homicides and other
serious crimes. What the jurors are asked to do under ss 418 and 421 is not simple.
‘Section 418 provides a complete defence and is applicable to various offences other
than (but including) murder.’128 Section 421 is also applicable to “the use of force that
involves the infliction of death” (s 421(1)(a)). However, under ss 418 and 421, the jury
is required to ascertain the “response” of the accused twice, and each time they are
expected to ascertain that response by applying a different test. I explain.
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Smith v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 193, [18] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1],
Hamill J agreeing at [75]) (‘Smith’). By way of example, these offences include wounding or
causing grievous bodily harm with intent (s 33); assault causing death (s 25A); assault
occasioning actual bodily harm (s 59); common assault (s 61); and murder (including killing
with intent to do grievous bodily harm) and manslaughter (s 18). It is beyond the scope of this
thesis to analyse the offences provisions or make any recommendations for reforms. It suffices
to say that most, if not all, of these provisions could be replaced by one single provision, which
could be stated as follows:
Section XX: Injury to a person or death
A person may not cause bodily injury or death to another person.

See for example Paul H. Robinson, Peter D. Greene and Natasha R. Goldstein, ‘Making
Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of Conduct and a Code of Adjudication’ (1995-1996) 86
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 304, 306-7.
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Smith (n 127) [18] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1], Hamill J agreeing at [75]).
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Section 418 provides:
418

Self-defence —when available

(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the
conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.

(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes the
conduct is necessary:

(a) to defend himself or herself or another person, or

(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the
liberty of another person, or

(c) to protect property from unlawful taking, destruction, damage or
interference, or
(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person
committing any such criminal trespass,
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives
them.

Under s 418 (2)(a) the jury is required to consider whether the conduct of the accused
was a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them. In
assessing whether the accused’s response was reasonable, the jury is assessing the
response of the accused, not the response of an ordinary or reasonable person.129
Section 418 thus mixes objective and subjective tests with the result that it is difficult
even for lawyers to work out whether they are assessing what the accused believed
and did in response, or what a reasonable person would have believed and done in
response.
When the jury turns to consider s 421, they are required to apply a different test.
Section 421 provides:
R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613, [25] (Howie J) (‘Katarzynski’). In Moore (n 88) RA
Hulme J said that he was ‘unaware of any case in which anything that was said in R v
Katarzynski had (sic) been called into question’: (Moore) [124]).
129
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421 Self-defence —excessive force that inflicts death
419

This section applies if:

(d) the person uses force that involves the infliction of death, and
(e) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary:

(c) to defend himself or herself or another person, or

(d) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty
of another person.

(3) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder, the
person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise criminally
responsible for manslaughter.

As can be seen, the jurors under are no longer assessing the “reasonableness” of the
response; they are assessing its “unreasonableness”. Moreover, when assessing
whether the accused’s response was unreasonable, the jury is assessing the response
of a reasonable person, not the response of the accused.130
The legislature has not explained these complications in their explanatory notes. 131
The differences between ss 418 and 421 also raise the question why the self-defence
test is different when the charge is homicide and not some lesser crime. Moreover,
when the difference between these subjective and objective assessments is
explained, the jury is apt to think it is being assigned to do something other than what
comes naturally in applying their conscience to the facts presented. If we believe that
juries can judge whether an accused person is guilty of murder or manslaughter, or is
entitled to an acquittal based upon all the factors raised in evidence at the trial

Grant v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 67, [65] (Lemming JA, Adams and Hall JJ), (‘Grant’);
Sutcliffe v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 208, [11] (Leeming JA, Adams and Fullerton JJ),
(‘Sutcliffe’).
130

131

Explanatory Notes (n 28).
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(including making deductions about the accused's intent), then arguably, we need say
no more than that.
Because the tests in ss 418 and 421 are different, they are difficult for jurors to
understand regardless how they were explained.132 And though the tests in ss 418
and 421 appear to be simpler than the High Court’s six propositions in Viro, they are
no easier to explain to jurors as the decisions in Abdallah and Patel show. Simplicity
is important to ‘help a jury reach a conclusion of guilt or innocence’.133 The statutory
formula needs to be revisited and simplified.
In Australia, drafting statutes is the province of the legislature. The separate judicial
task of the courts, including the High Court is to interpret the formulas provided by the
legislature in statute. Courts do their best with the formulas that the legislature
provides. As the High Court judges in Howe and Viro showed, the constraints of judicial
decision making on a case by case basis do not naturally allow judges to develop
generally applicable formulas. That difference between the judicial and legislative
functions is clearer in Australia where judicial activism is frowned upon since close
observance of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty save in cases of constitutional
interpretation, dictates that the legislature should take the leading role in law reform.
That role should be utilised to formulate a simple self-defence test using every day
language that any lay jury can understand.
I now explain why those formulas have proven difficult and even unworkable.
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See, eg, above nn 82-85 and accompanying text. The provisions in its current form are also
incompatible with the principles of due process, procedural fairness, and natural justice; and
might be unconstitutional as well. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the subject
matter of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of unclear or vague criminal law provisions
and the accused’s right to due process of law. For the discussion of the question of whether
the Australian Constitution provides a due process protection to criminal litigants see Chief
Justice Robert S. French, Procedural Fairness – Indispensable to Justice? Sir Anthony Mason
Lecture, The University of Melbourne Law School Law Students' Society, 7 October 2010);
Anthony Gray, Criminal Due Process and Chapter III of the Australian Constitution (Federation
Press, 2016); Amsterdam G. A, ‘Note: The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court: A Means to an End’ (1960) 109 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 67; Andrew E
Goldsmith, 'The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited' (2003) 30 Am.
J. Crim. L. 279.
Justice M Weinberg, ‘Jury Directions on Trial – A Pathway Through the Labyrinth?’
(Supreme and Federal Court Judges’ Conference, Darwin, 5–9 July 2014) 1.
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5.7 Analysis of s 418
Section 418 defines self-defence in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and it ‘provides a
complete defence to various offences other than (but including) murder’.134 It lets the
jury weigh anything presented as evidence and anything else they think appropriate
to factor into their decision as to whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged or
not. Under subsection one of that provision (s 418(1)), the accused’s criminal
responsibility is nullified if she is shown to have carried out the conduct constituting
the offence, in self-defence.135 But s 418 (2)(a) complicates that consideration. It
divides that consideration into two limbs:
(2)(a)(i) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes
the conduct is necessary (limb one); and
(2)(a)(ii) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them (limb two).

The two limbs in s 418(2) separate the subjective belief of the accused from the issue
of the reasonableness of her conduct.136 Under the first limb, the accused must
subjectively believe that the defensive conduct was necessary. But the second limb
mixes objective and subjective elements. It requires that the accused’s response to
the circumstances be objectively reasonable, but it does not require that the accused’s
perception of the surrounding circumstances be objectively reasonable.137 If the
accused misreads the circumstances, that has to be taken into account.
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Smith (n 127) [18] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1], Hamill J agreeing at [75]).
See also above (n 127).
135

Section 418(1) provides:
A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the conduct
constituting the offence in self-defence.

Section 418(1) is premised on whether “a person” is “not criminally responsible”
notwithstanding the form of the verdict the jury is asked to return is: “guilty” or “not guilty”, not
“criminally responsible” or “not criminally responsible”.
Katarzynski (n 129) [23] (Howie J). See also Moore (n 88) [47] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J
agreeing at [94]).
136

137

Moore (n 88) [27] (Basten JA, RA Hulme J agreeing at [94]).
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Because the prosecution retains the overriding obligation to prove the accused guilty
of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt (s 419), the prosecution must
convince the jury that the accused’s self-defence arguments are not convincing under
either limb of s 418 (2). That is, the prosecution must satisfy the jury that this accused
did not believe his self-defence conduct was necessary (the first limb); or that the
accused’s self-defensive conduct was not reasonable in light of what he believed
about the circumstances (the second limb).138 When the different tests embedded in
the two subsections of s 418(2) are broken down like this in a legal explanation by a
judge, they are likely to confuse a jury and make the jurors think that they cannot
decide the case in accordance with their ordinary lay English view of the self-defence.
I now analyse in more detail the two limbs of the test, s 418(2)(a)(i) and s 418(2)(a)(ii).
5.7.1 First Limb: s 418(2)(a)(i): The element of belief, intention and the guilty
mind or mens rea under s 418(2)(a)(i)
The first limb is “completely” subjective. That is, it requires the jury to place itself in the
shoes of the accused,139 and then consider only what the accused believed. This
subsection does not require the accused to have reasonable grounds for his belief. 140
Nor does this limb require the jury to consider what a reasonable or ordinary person
would have believed in the circumstances, and it does not matter if the accused’s belief
was mistaken, as long as it was genuinely held.141 The belief of the accused is not
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Katarzynski (n 129) [23] (Howie J).
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Ibid.
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Ibid [22] (Howie J); Oblach (n 151) 84 [51] (Spigelman CJ, Sully J agreeing at 89 [83],
Hulme J agreeing at 91 [95); Moore (n 11) [27] (Basten JA, RA Hulme agreeing at [94]);
Sivaraja v The Queen; Sivathas v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 236, [122] (Meagher JA; R A
Hulme and Beech-Jones JJ) (‘Sivaraja and Sivathas’).
Katarzynski (n 129) [24] (Howie J). However, it is questionable that the word “genuine” in
Howie J’s test assists the jury’s assessment of the accused’s belief since what is required is
an assessment of the accused’s state of mind and ‘[a] belief cannot be held without being
genuine’. R v Dunn [2012] SASCFC 40, [29], [43] (Gray J) (‘Dunn’).
141

Kai Ambos argued that this form of “subjectification” “eliminates a difference that ontologically
cannot be eliminated, namely the difference between reality and imagination” because ‘the
conﬂict between aggressor and defender does not take place in the real word but only in the
mind of the defender, who mistakenly believes that he is attacked, his reaction is necessary’.
K. Ambos, Other Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility: in Cassese A Gaeta P &
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only the triggering condition for his or her intention but also the prerequisite for
determining the necessity of his or her self-defensive conduct. The subjective belief of
the accused would also provide the jury with an answer to the question whether the
accused intended to defend herself or was using the occasion to attack the victim. 142
More specifically, if the intention of the accused was to defend herself, then she will
also not have believed that she was committing murder because her self-defensive
actions would eliminate the intention required to commit that crime. Or, as Barwick CJ
put it in Viro, ‘if the act is to be accounted as done in self-defence, defence must be
[the accused’s] intention’.143
Because these issues lie at the heart of proof in all criminal law cases, they have
received a great deal of judicial and scholarly comment all of which is relevant to this
analysis of the proof of intent in New South Wales when self-defence is claimed by
criminal defendants under ss 418, 419 or 421. I now discuss the interrelation of
criminal intent and self-defensive intent in homicide cases in New South Wales.
5.7.1.1 Proof of intent as an essential element in any crime
Since the common law and the statutory formulas in ss 418, 419 and 422 will normally
leave judging intent to the jury, they should not be complicated. In particular, the jury
should understand as just explained that an intent to defend oneself is inconsistent
with an intention to commit murder. Or as Lord Chief Justice Russell said in 1899, ‘[n]o
crime can be committed unless there is a mens rea’144 – actus reus not facit reum nisi
mens sit rea. Criminal intent has been defined many times.145 Given that common
Jones JWD ed The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford
University Press Oxford, 2002) vol 1, ch 24, 1013.
142

Viro (n 91) 99 (Barwick CJ).
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Viro (n 91) 102 (Barwick CJ).

Williamson v Norris (1899) 1 Q.B 7 (Lord Russell CJ, Wills J agreeing at 14), 14 (Lord
Russell CJ).
144

For example, in He Kaw Teh v The Queen the High Court said “Mens rea” means ‘evil
intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act (citations omitted). He Kaw Teh v The
Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523, 530 (Gibbs CJ), 549 (Wilson J), 566 (Brennan J).
145

In R v Shipley Lord Erskine said ‘[i]ntention to commit the crime is certainly of the essence of
the crime’. R v Shipley (1784) 99 ER 774, 790 (Lord Erskine) (‘Shipley’). He also said ‘the
criminal intention is a fact, and must be found by the jury; and that finding can only be
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knowledge, we may infer that jurors are individually and collectively competent to use
their common sense to infer the existence and difference between criminal and selfdefensive intent when a defendant raises a self-defence argument. That is, we accept
that juries can properly judge degrees of blameworthiness including the difference
between the intent to murder and the intent to defend oneself.
In Zecevic Weinberg QC146 argued that self-defence ‘is a negative condition of the
offence and is therefore an integral part of it’.147 In effect, Weinberg QC argued that
the mental element necessary to demonstrate self-defence is an essential
consideration in judging whether the accused had the intent to commit the offence
concerned. It follows that when there is no intent to commit murder, it is unlikely that
there is intent to create a lesser offence either, since the self-defensive intent will be
found to be pervasive. That is, persons who act in self-defence do not plan their
reactions, but act in a responsive manner out of necessity, fear of harm or fear for their
lives.148
It is axiomatic that to be a crime, an act which injures another must include both mens
rea and actus reus.149 Crimes are serious offences. The history I have outlined in
chapter three and in chapter four suggests that juries have long been unwilling to
expressed upon the record by the general verdict of guilty which comprehends it’: Shipley (n
145) 808 (Lord Erskine).
146

Counsel for the Appellant, Zecevic, in Zecevic (n 3) (as he was then. Now he is a justice of
the Victorian Supreme Court).
147

Zecevic (n 3) 657 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ). Weinberg QC continued his argument
and submitted to the High Court:
For that reason … the mental element necessary to raise the plea bears, in a negative sense,
upon the mens rea of the offence itself making it inappropriate in cases of homicide to require,
in addition to the subjective requirement that the accused should believe that he is threatened
with death or serious bodily harm, an objective requirement that the belief should be reasonable
(citations omitted).

Weinberg QC’s argument was made in support of his submission that the defence of selfdefence should no longer contain the objective element of “reasonable belief’ and judgment
of the accused should concern the necessity of what he did in self-defence ‘according to the
facts as he believed them to be’: at 651 (Mason CJ).
148

Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest But Unreasonable Mistake of
Fact in Self Defense’ (1987) 28 B.C. L. Rev. 459, 516.
Jeremy M Miller, ‘Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal
Law?’ (2001) 29 W. St. U. L. Rev. 21, 44.
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accept that public policy can justify any criminal conviction without proof of intent. If
perverse verdicts are to be avoided, criminal law codes need to accord with common
sense and in particular, with the democratic common sense of any jury summoned to
decide a criminal case.
I now discuss the complexity that is introduced into the self-defence formula in s
418(2)(a)(i) by its reference to the idea of necessity.
5.7.1.2 The element of necessity under s 418(2)(a)(i)
The first limb of s 418(2)(a)(i) provides:
(2)(a)(i) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes
the conduct is necessary (limb one).

The absence of the word "reasonable" before the word “believes”150 and the presence
of the word "necessary"151 result in the conclusion that s 418(2)(a)(i) is not an objective
In Viro Mason J explained how to approach the issue of the accused’s “reasonable belief”
in relation to the nature of a threat in self-defence cases. He said:
150

[b]y the expression ‘reasonably believed’ is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself.

Viro (n 91) 146 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J
agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
“Reasonable Belief” has the same substance as “reasonable grounds for belief”. In Marwey
Stephen J said:
To ask If reasonable grounds existed then the belief was itself reasonable. To ask "Had he a
reasonable belief?" is not different in substance from asking "Had he reasonable grounds for
belief?

Marwey v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 630, 641 (Stephen J) (‘Marwey’) cited, with approval in
Taiapa v The Queen (2009) 240 CLR 95, 105 [29] (French CJ, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and
Bell JJ) (‘Taiapa’).
151

See generally the analysis of Barwick CJ in Marwey (n 150). The analysis of Barwick CJ
was concerned with s 271 of the Criminal Code 1889 (Qld)) which imported an objective
requirement (the existence of reasonable grounds) in relation to the accused’s belief. In
particular, the analysis concerned the effect of the “insertion” or elimination of the word
“reasonably” before the word “necessary”; how it “goes much deeper than the question
whether the word "necessary" can properly be qualified in its context by the word
"reasonably"”; and what effect the presence of the word “reasonably” (subs 271(1)) or absence
of it (in subs 271(2)), of the Criminal Code 1898 (Qld), could have on the interpretation of that
self-defence provision: at 635- 9. See s 271 of the Criminal Code 1898 (Qld) in the legislation
schedule in part three of the appendix.
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test of reasonableness. Rather, the accused determines for herself whether what she
did was necessary for her defence.152 This makes the “belief” of the accused in the
“necessity” of her defensive act, definitive in the circumstances.153 Consequently, there
is no room for any objective consideration by the jury. The accused is the judge of the
reasonableness of what she did in the circumstances and all the jury has to decide is
whether that belief was honest or not. But this does not mean that the jury must accept
that what the accused said is true. The reality is that the jury’s consideration will involve
an assessment of the reasonableness of the accused’s belief when assessing whether
she honestly held that belief. As Lord Griffiths said in Beckford v The
Queen(‘Beckford’):154
[N]o jury is going to accept a man’s assertion that he believed that he was about to be
attacked without testing it against all the surrounding circumstances … where there
are no reasonable grounds to hold a belief it will surely only be in exceptional
circumstances that a jury will conclude that such a belief was or might have been
held.155

Perhaps because there are no obvious limits as to how a jury determines whether the
degree of force used was appropriate, the legislature has tried to spell out limits. But
that has resulted in overcomplication. Arguably, if the jury is to remain as a judicial
institution which adjudicates guilt in our criminal justice system, the legislature needs
to trust the jury to make its own decision without second guessing its common sense
analysis. There are a number of ways in which the legislature has tried to direct the
jury’s decision making under ss 418 and 421 and one of those arises in the way that
the concept of necessity is expressed.
5.7.1.3 The plain English meaning of necessity
In the absence of any definition of the meaning of necessary in s 418 or anywhere
else in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the jury would normally be guided by the plain
152

Marwey (n 150) 635 (Barwick CJ).
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Ibid 637 (Barwick CJ).
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[1988] 3 All ER 425; AC 130 (‘Beckford’).
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Ibid 145 (Lord Griffiths) cited, with approval in R v Walsh (1991) 60 A Crim R 419, 423
(Slicer J).
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English meaning of the word.156 Self-defence is an excuse of natural necessity.157 In
plain English terms, for the defence to succeed, the accused must convince the jury
that what she did was necessary158 – although as already explained, under s
418(2)(a)(i), for the self-defence claim to succeed, the accused must convince the jury
on the balance of probabilities that she believed that what she did was necessary.
William Blackstone said that when a man kills another in self-defence, it is an
excusable necessity or ‘necessitas culpabilis [culpable necessity]’.159 ‘”[I]t is necessary
self defence which makes a homicide justifiable”… what is necessary in the eyes of
the community will vary from age to age and according to the circumstances’.160 Sir
James Stephen has written ‘the infliction [sic.] of death, or minor personal injuries’161
if self-defence is found justified, is based upon reasonable necessity. The Privy
Council in Palmer said that ‘[i]t is both good law and good sense that he may do, but
may only do, what is reasonably necessary.’162 The word “reasonably” does not need
to be added. It is included in the word necessary because it is an objective word. So
even though s 418(2)(a)(i) presents as a subjective test, because it uses the word
156

In Palmer v The Queen, Lord Morris said:
In their Lordships' view the defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily
understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no abstruse legal thought.
It requires no set words by way of explanation. No formula need be employed in reference to
it. Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that
a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do,
but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular
facts and circumstances. Of these a jury can decide.

Palmer (n 87) 831 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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Douglas Stroud, Mens Rea or Imputability Under the Law of England (London: Sweet &
Maxwell Ltd., 1914) 284.
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See Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)
(London: Macmillan and Co., 4th edition, 1887) 143. See also Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,
A History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan and Co., 1883) vol 3, ch 26, 12.
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(Mayo, Reed JJ, and Piper AJ).
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“reasonably”, it has objectivity subliminally laced into it which unnecessarily
complicated things for the jury.
The threshold of self-defence remains as necessity, and the necessity is a matter for
determination by the jury as the embodiment of community standards. When the jury
considers whether what the accused did was necessary or “reasonably” necessary,
factors like the imminence of the danger, the opportunity to retreat from that danger,
and the personal characteristics or attributes of the accused (e.g. age, sex, ethnicity,
religious beliefs, tribal beliefs and traditions, physical disabilities, and cognitive and
volitional capacities), become relevant. While imminence, necessity, retreat and the
personal characteristics or attributes of the accused were often specifically referred to
in past self-defence statutes and got a lot of attention in jurisprudence and
commentary, the writer submits that the omission of reference to these factors is a
good thing. That is because their omission reduces the matters about which judges
must give detailed instruction to the jury. Arguably they are factors that should be
referred for jury consideration, but they do not require detailed judicial explanation.
Juries know how to make judgments about the severity of danger and detailed judicial
explanation of these matter arguably disrespects jury independence and competence.
Indeed, the judicial break down of necessity into a number of forensic parts, including
the difference between subjective and objective assessments, is apt to see the jury
think that it is being assigned to do something other than what comes naturally. If we
believe that juries can judge whether an accused person is guilty of murder,
manslaughter or is entitled to an acquittal based upon all the factors raised in evidence
at the trial, a trial judge need say no more than it is for the jury to judge whether what
the accused did was necessary or not. If we still consider that juries are competent to
make those judgment calls, then we ought to leave them to decide the matter by
themselves, with a minimum of judicial explanation.
As we have seen above, William Blackstone and Sir James Stephen have merged
subjective and objective elements together and assumed that merger is appropriate in
the phrase “reasonably necessary”. With due respect, while that may be fine for the
lawyers and judges that ponder over their analysis, that does not mean it is wise to
merge all these issues together in modern statutes so that judges feel obliged to
explain all they know about them to the jury. Certainly this complexity and merger of
what lawyers recognise as objective and subjective tests is deeply embedded in the
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law. But now that we can see that these phrases complicate the directions that trial
judges may feel obliged to give juries, we need to consider simplification. That is, in
the s 418(2)(a)(i) context, the word “reasonably” arguably does not add anything to the
word “necessary”. The idea of reasonableness is already included in the word
“necessary” because it is an objective word. With or without the word “reasonably” in
s 418(2)(a)(i), the jury is not obliged to accept what the accused said is true. But judges
who know that every statutory word must be given its due, wrestle to explain the
unnecessary addition of the word “reasonably” and are apt to confuse jurors in the
process., As Lord Griffiths said in Beckford v The Queen (‘Beckford’),163 the reality is
that the jury will assess the reasonableness of the accused’s belief when assessing
the honesty of that belief as a matter of common sense.164 It is better to leave these
issues to the jury without analysing them in detail in judicial directions as lawyers are
want to do. As Oliver Wendell Holmes J has observed, ‘even a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked’.165
The question that follows is — Should self-defence provisions be reformulated
subjectively based upon the “necessity” of the self-defence conduct or should some
objectivity requirement be included? That is, should a simplified definition add
“reasonable grounds” to the definition of acceptable self-defensive conduct or should
acceptable conduct be required to be “reasonably necessary”? That is a question that
I will answer in chapter six.
This brings us to the second limb of the test in s 418(2) (a)(ii).
5.7.2 Second limb: s 418(2)(a)(ii)
The reader will recall that the self-defence test in 418(2)(a) has two limbs:
(2)(a)(i) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes
the conduct is necessary (limb one); and
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Beckford (n 154).
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Ibid 145 (Lord Griffiths).
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Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law (London: MaCmillan & Co., 1882) 3.
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(2)(a)(ii) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them (limb two).

The jury under s 418(2)(a)(ii) is required to undertake a different exercise from that
which they have taken under the first limb (s 418(2)(a)(i)).166 Unlike s 418(2)(a)(i) which
is expressed in subjective terms,167 s 418(2)(a)(ii) is a test expressed in mixed
objective/subjective terms even though it does not intend assessment according to
independent third party standards.168 That is, the s 418(2)(a)(ii) test requires that the
accused’s response be reasonable in the circumstances as he or she perceived them,
but does not require that the accused’s perception of the circumstances be reasonable
according to community standards.169 Under this subsection, the jury is required to
assess whether the accused honestly thought that her response was reasonable, not
whether an ordinary or reasonable person would think that the accused’s response
was reasonable.170 The jury is not supposed to consider what another person or an
objective person would have done in the circumstances. The section requires the jury
to assess the honesty of the accused’s subjective belief, but not its objective
reasonableness. Despite Barwick CJ’s concern that a jury should never be forbidden
to consider objective factors,171 that is what the section requires. And yet the idea of
reasonableness still appears in the subsection to confuse the jury and to complicate
how the judge explains the subjective assessment required to the jury.
It is also difficult for the jury to judge the subjective belief of the accused and her
subjective perception in the circumstances, if she elects not to give direct evidence
and invokes the right to remain silent.172 Four judges in two recent cases recognised
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Moore (n 88) [48] (Basten JA, RA Hulme agreeing at [94]).
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Katarzynski (n 129) [23] (Howie J). See also discussion above.
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Ibid [23] (Howie J).
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Moore (n 88) [27] (Basten JA, RA Hulme agreeing at [94]).
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Katarzynski (n 129) [25] (Howie J).
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See above (n 151).

The right to silence is a common law right. For the “applicable legal principles of the
common law right for the right to silence” see Sanchez v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 171,
[42]-[55] (Campbell JA, Latham J agreeing at [87], Harrison J agreeing at [88]) (‘Sanchez’).
For the “time on direction for the right to silence” see Sanchez at [56]-[58]. Section 89 of the
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this difficulty and added an “objective” element of “reasonableness” into their
explanation of the operation second limb of subs 418(2)(a)(ii) in a manner that made
the section wholly objective. While it is difficult to argue with their explanations why
they chose to interpret subs 418(2)(a)(ii) in this way because of the absence of
evidence in this case, the fact remains that their interpretation disregarded the
statutory direction intended in subs 418(2)(a)(ii). Though neither case involved a jury
trial, the Magistrates in both cases were required to make their decisions in
accordance with subs 418(2)(a)(ii). The problem was that there was no defence
evidence from which to infer the subjective intent or honesty of the accused. I explain.
In Colosimo & Ors v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (‘Colosimo’)173 the
defendants claimed self-defence but provided no evidence. The claim of self-defence
was deduced or inferred by the defence lawyers from prosecution evidence and
defence cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. Because the defendants did not
participate in interviews, gave no statements to investigating police, and did not give
evidence during their trial,174 there was no evidence from the defendants ‘as to their
beliefs or perceptions’.175 Hodgson JA (with whom Handley and Ipp JJA agreed) said:

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) deals with the statutory right of silence in general terms. Section
89 “is narrower in its scope than the common law concerning the right of silence: at [71].
Section 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) came into operation on 1 September 2013 with
the commencement of the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 (NSW). This
provision altered the right to silence of an accused in criminal proceedings for serious
indictable offences in New South Wales:
In summary, s 89A permits unfavorable inferences to be drawn against a defendant who relies
at trial upon a fact that was not mentioned at the time of questioning for the offence charged
and where the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention the fact in the
circumstances existing at the time. Such inferences can only be drawn where the special
caution is given to the defendant who has been provided with legal assistance in respect of the
caution. The provision only applies to offences carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment
or a term of imprisonment of five years or more. It does not apply to a defendant under the age
of 18 years.

Special Bulletin 31 — August 2013: Right to silence — the effect of s 89A of the Evidence Act
1995. Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Criminal Trials Courts Bench Book (Judicial
Commission of New South Wales, 2019).
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[2006] NSWCA 293 (‘Colosimo’).
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Ibid [9] (Hodgson JA, Handley JA agreeing at [1], Ipp JA agreeing at [27]).
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Ibid.
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It is not essential that there be evidence from the accused as to the accused’s beliefs
and perceptions: evidence of circumstances from which inferences may be drawn as
to the accused’s relevant beliefs and perceptions may be sufficient. However, if the
accused does not give evidence of his or her beliefs and perceptions, then generally,
in the absence of other evidence suggesting the contrary, inferences have to be drawn
on the basis of what beliefs and perceptions a person in the position of the accused
could reasonably hold in the circumstances.176

Colosimo was not appealed and was cited with approval about 11 years later in
Director of Public Prosecutions v Evans (‘Evans’).177 Colosimo is thus a precedent
which judges use to instruct the juries when the defendant claims self-defence but
provides no evidence. In Evans178 the evidence as to whether the issue of self-defence
arose was assessed on the basis of the evidence that had been given by the defendant
and the prosecution. The prosecution called two police officers to give evidence. The
defendant gave evidence and called his half-brother to give evidence,179 but the
defendant gave no evidence as to his beliefs and perceptions nor any evidence as to
whether he believed his conduct was necessary.180 Citing Colosimo, Davies J said ‘in
the absence of such direct evidence, ordinarily inferences will be drawn on the basis
of what beliefs and perceptions a person in the position of the Defendant could
reasonably hold’.181
Evans was not appealed. It now also stands as a precedent which judges use to
instruct juries when the defendant claims self-defence, gives evidence but fails to give
evidence as to her beliefs and perceptions or any evidence as to whether she believed
her conduct was necessary or from which such beliefs or perceptions could be
inferred.
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Colosimo (n 173) [19] (Hodgson JA, Handley JA agreeing at [1], Ipp JA agreeing at [27]).
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[2017] NSWSC 33 (‘Evans’).
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Ibid.
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Ibid [10]-[11] (Davies J).
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Evans (n 177) [51] (Davies J).
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Evans (n 177) [51] (Davies J); Colosimo (n 173) [19] (Hodgson JA, Handley JA agreeing
at [1], Ipp JA agreeing at [27]).
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As in Abdallah and Patel, Colosimo and Evans suggest again that the legislative
formulas are complicated and sometimes impractical. Notwithstanding the subjective
nature of the second limb under subs 418(2)(a)(ii), the judges in Colosimo and Evans
considered that they were obliged to revisit the statutory formulas and replace the
statutory requirement that the perceptions of the accused guide judgment as to
whether the self-defence was justified with an objective version of the test. The judges
did their best with the formulas provided by the legislature, but one senses their
concern about the utility of the formulas expressed in the statute since the law of
evidence generally accords the accused a right to silence. The danger of creating
complex formulas is that juries will not be able to understand, accept or apply them.
History suggests complex formulas may result in perverse verdicts. The statutory
formulas in ss 418 and 421 need to be revisited and simplified.
While those who drafted ss 418 and 421 have simplified the old common law by
removing the requirements for judges to explain “imminence” and “retreat” to juries in
great detail, there is room for further improvement. The new sections have not
resolved the underlying disagreement between the High Court and the Privy Council
between 1958 and 1978. That disagreement includes the perennial legal question of
whether self-defence claims should be assessed objectively or subjectively. With
respect, in the context of New South Wales’ continuing commitment to jury trial, the
legislature’s failure to conclusively resolve that legal argument in the statute is unwise
and unnecessarily complicates criminal trials where self-defence claims are made by
the accused. The jury is competent to decide whether self-defence claims are honest
and justified and to decide whether the appropriate verdict in a homicide trial is a
murder, manslaughter or acquittal. They do not need legislators or judges instructing
them about the differences between objective and subjective tests in law. They need
to be trusted with the assessment of the evidence as they choose the appropriate
verdict. The provisions in the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 that deal with selfdefence need to be simplified. I suggest ways in which those provisions may be
simplified in chapter six. I now discuss the additional matters on which the second limb
of the self-defence test set out in s 418(2)(a)(ii) requires that trial judges instruct juries.
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5.7.2.1 The scope of the accused’s “conduct” under s 418(2)(a)(ii):
Reasonableness of the “conduct” and proportionality: The problems with
proportionality
In Howe,182 Palmer,183 Viro,184 and Zecevic,185 the resort to force, the intent in using
that force, and the degree of that force — that is — the proportionality of that force,
were the central issues in assessing the claim of self-defence. The issue that arises
for lawyers when they consider whether a self-defence response was proportional is
whether that is the same question in law as asking whether the accused’s response
was reasonable? Even if there is no difference, explaining that these ideas mean the
same thing, complicates the instructions that judges feel they must give juries under
the ss 418 and 421 formulation of self-defence law in New South Wales and it is once
again doubtful that the complexity or the explanations are necessary in the delivery of
justice.
The requirement that self-defence ‘conduct is a reasonable response’ (s 418(2)(a)(ii))
is contingent upon the accused’s “belief” that it was necessary to defend herself (s
418(2)(a)(i)), in the circumstances as she perceived them (s 418(2)(a)(ii)). Selfdefence (ss 418 and/or 421) is commonly raised to answer violent offences like
common assault (s 61); assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s 59); wounding or
causing grievous bodily harm with intent (s 33); assault causing death (s 25A); and
murder and manslaughter (s 18). In all these offences, the degree of self-defensive
force used by the accused is the factor which determines whether the accused is guilty
or not guilty. In the case of charges of murder or manslaughter, the degree of selfdefensive force used by the accused determines whether the accused is guilty of
murder, manslaugter or whether she is entitled to an acquittal.
At core, it is the accused’s perception of the need to use force and the degree of force
used that determines whether that force was proportional. But proportionality can be
assessed subjectively or objectively. That is, did the accused honestly think that this
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See Howe (n 99).

183

See Palmer (n 87).

184

See Viro (n 91).

185

See Zecevic (n 3).
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much force was required to prevent the perceived threat, or would a reasonable man
have thought so? This brings our consideration back to what the Privy Council said in
Palmer.186 That is, in deciding whether the degree of force was reasonable, it is
necessary to take into account the fact that:
[A] person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary
defensive action … If a jury is of the opinion that in a moment of unexpected anguish
the person attacked did only what he honestly and reasonably thought was necessary,
that should be regarded as most potent evidence that only reasonably defensive action
was taken.187

In Palmer188 the Privy Council took the “unexpected anguish” of the accused into
account when assessing whether the self-defensive force used was reasonable. This
brings us to the issue of fear which is commonly raised in self-defence cases in
connection with the “perception” of the accused ‘in the circumstances’ (s 418(2)(a)(ii)).
It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the element of fear. It suffices so say that it is a
relevant issue when a jury is judging the reasonableness of the self-defender’s
conduct or response, and in particular when family violence is in issue.189 All jurors
have experienced fear. They can assess how it should be factored into their
assessment of subjective guilt and the overall reasonableness of a response. This is
because fear does not discriminate with regard to a person’s race, age, height, weight,
colour, ethnicity, national origin, culture, religious beliefs, tribal beliefs, sex, gender,
sexual preference, physical or mental ability, or marital status.190
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Palmer (n 87).
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Ibid 832 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
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Ibid.
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or analyse domestic or family violence and
the associated self-defence questions about “domestic-captives” or “dominated defendants”.
But see the brief discussion of this phenomenon in part two of the Appendix under the heading
‘Self-Defence in Domestic Violence Cases’.
190

Kahan et al. argued that
Numerous studies show that risk perceptions are skewed across gender and race: women
worry more than men, and minorities more than whites, about myriad dangers-from
environmental pollution to handguns, from blood transfusions to red meat.Dan M. Kahan;
Donald Braman; John Gastil, ‘Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the WhiteMale Effect in Risk Perception’ (2007) 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 465, 465-6. See generally Dan
M Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’ (1996) 96
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The foregoing analysis shows that the legal tests currently built into s 418(2)
unnecessarily complicate the jury’s task in reaching a verdict. As explained above, our
democratic history has given the jury the task of making decisions in criminal cases
according to their own best judgment. ‘Juries are not chosen for their understanding
of a logical and phased process leading by question and answer to a conclusion, but
are expected to exercise practical common sense.’191
The foregoing analysis also shows that the adjudication of a claim of self-defence in a
criminal trial is founded upon the assessment of necessity by whoever is assigned to
make the judgment, whether judge or jury. The idea of necessity absorbs all the
elements, circumstances and factors which were discussed above. Juries do not make
their assessment in the same way as legally trained judges, but that does not mean
they cannot judge necessity nor that they have to do it in the same way as judges.
Understanding that juries make judgments in light of their own lay experience rather
than in light of detailed legal training and judicial experience, suggests that it is
legitimate to reformulate the way we express the law that we ask juries to apply when
they make their decisions in self-defence cases. That is, we should simplify the
assessments we ask them to make in self-defence cases in a way that recognises
their lay approach to judgment which rests on their democratic common experience.
The Privy Council in Palmer192 and the High Court in Zecevic193 also favoured a simple
approach that a jury using common sense can understand.

Colum. L. Rev. 269; Posner, Eric A., ‘Law and the Emotions’ (Working Paper No. 103, 2000).
An analysis of the psychological aspect of self-defence is beyond the scope of this thesis but
see a brief discussion under the heading ‘The Psychology of Self-Defence’ in part one of the
Appendix to this thesis.
191

Hancock (n 1) 651 (Lord Scarman).

192

Palmer (n 87) 831-2 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest for Lord Donovan, and Lord Avonside).

193

The majority in Zecevic stated the test as follows:
The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon
reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief
and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the
matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 3) 662 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).

207

Because juries are required to consider not only s 418 but also s 421 when selfdefence is raised in answer to a charge of murder or manslaughter, I now discuss s
421.

5.8 Analysis of s 421: The use of “force” in self-defence cases which
“involves the infliction of death”
It will be remembered that at common law the idea that excessive self-defence could
mitigate a murder charge had been confirmed in Howe,194 disapproved in Palmer,195
reinstated in Viro,196 and disapproved again in Zecevic.197 The statutory idea that
excessive self-defence should result in a manslaughter conviction rather than an
acquittal has been described as voluntary manslaughter by excessive self-defence.198
The use of “excessive” force in self-defence which ‘involves the infliction of death’ is
governed by s 421. Section 421 provides:
421 Self-defence —excessive force that inflicts death
(1) This section applies if:
(a) the person uses force that involves the infliction of death, and
(b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary:
(c) to defend himself or herself or another person, or ...
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Howe (n 99).
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Palmer (n 87).

196

Viro (n 91).

197

Zecevic (n 3).

198

Lane v The Queen (2013) 241 A Crim R 321, 335 [50] (Bathurst CJ, Simpson and Adamson
JJ); Grant (n 130) [62]-[64] (Lemming JA, Adams and Hall JJ); Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [45]
(Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting dissenting).
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(2) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder,
the person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise
criminally responsible for manslaughter.199

The legislature’s intention when enacting s 421 was to partially depart from the Model
Criminal Code200 to restore:
[T}he common law position as previously stated by the High Court in Viro (1978) 141
CLR 88. It was held in that case that self-defence, which was necessary but which
involved the use of excessive force causing death, would lead to a finding of
manslaughter instead of murder.201

Neither s 421 nor s 418 approach the test of excessive self-defence in the same way
as the High Court did in Viro. In Viro, the High Court did not require the accused to
have believed that the excessive force “was necessary”, and Viro’s six propositions

199

It is to be noted, however, that from 22 February 2002 and until 12 January 2003, s 421
excluded the “intention to inflict grievous bodily harm” because s 421(1)(a) required “force that
involves the intentional or reckless infliction of death”. Section 421(1)(a) was, therefore,
amended by Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (NSW), commencing on 13 January
2003, to omit the words “intentional or reckless”. Judicial Commission of NSW, Partial
Defences to Murder in NSW 1994-2004 (Monograph 28, 2006) 50 n 159. See also s 421 of
the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Point-in-Time). See CRIMES ACT 1900 (austlii.edu.au). This
database provides 'point in time' version of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). (The reader has: (1)
to go to this website; (2) click on s 421; and (3) select the date in the three designates boxes
(year, month, day), e.g., 13 January 2003.)
200

The explanatory notes were explicit that the Crimes Amendment (Self-defence) Bill 2001
has not been drafted to accord with the Model Criminal Code. It sated:
(a) The Bill (and the Code) excludes self-defence in those circumstances if the accused uses
force that inflicts really serious injury, and
(b) The Bill (but not the Code) reduces murder to manslaughter in the case of excessive selfdefence, that is, where the defendant believed it was necessary for personal defence, but where
the accused uses force that inflicts death and that is not a reasonable response in the
circumstances.

Explanatory Notes (n 28).
201

Chrissa Loukas, citing, the second reading speech of the New South Wales Attorney
General [Hansard 28.11.2001 at page 19093]. Chrissa Loukas, ‘Crimes Amendment (Self
Defence) Act 2001’ (Published paper, 28 February 2002). But the way to understand a subject
‘is not to read something else, but to get to the bottom of the subject itself’. Holmes (n 2) 476.
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were all premised in “reasonableness”.202 According to the reasoning in Viro, and
contrary to s 421 (and s 418), the juries were required to apply the six steps in a
sequential manner. Moreover, in Viro, the jury was required to assess the
“reasonableness” of the accused’s belief203 (not what a reasonable man would have
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Viro (n 91). Viro’s six propositions were in the following terms:
1 (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the accused
reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily
harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself.
2. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief by the
accused of such an attack no question of self-defence arises.
3. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such reasonable belief
by the accused, it must then consider whether the force in fact used by the accused was
reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he faced.
4. If the jury is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used than was
reasonably proportionate it should acquit.
5. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force was used, then its verdict
should be either manslaughter or murder, that depending upon the answer to the final question
for the jury - did the accused believe that the force which he used was reasonably proportionate
to the danger which he believed he faced?
6. If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not have such a belief
the verdict will be murder. If it is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not
have that belief the verdict will be manslaughter: at 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128,
Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J
agreeing at 180).

The Zecevic test also required the jury to assess whether the belief of the accused was “on
reasonable grounds”. The Zecevic test was in the following terms:
203

[Did] the accused believe…upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to
do what he did? If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is
left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 3) 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666). It is to be noted that “reasonable belief” has the same substance as
“reasonable grounds for belief”. In Marwey Stephen J said:
To ask If reasonable grounds existed then the belief was itself reasonable. To ask "Had he a
reasonable belief?" is not different in substance from asking "Had he reasonable grounds for
belief?

Marwey (n 150) 641 (Stephen J) cited, with approval at Taiapa (n 150) 105 [29] (French CJ,
Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
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believed) in the “imminency” of the ‘unlawful attack which threatened him with death
or serious bodily harm’.204 In Viro the jury was also required to assess the
“proportionality” of the “force” used by the accused, not the accused’s “conduct” at
large. That is, whether the accused “reasonably believed” that ‘the force in fact used
by the accused was reasonably proportionate to the danger which he believed he
faced’.205
There are three “essential” elements that the jury must consider under s 421(1). They
were set out by Simpson JA in Smith v The Queen(‘Smith’).206 She said:
o

the accused uses force that involves the infliction of death;

o

the accused believes that the conduct (that is, the use of the force in fact
used) is necessary to defend himself or herself or another person; and

o

that conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the
accused perceives them.207

Justice Simpson’s first element above comes from s 421(1)(a) and applies if the
accused used force ‘that involve[d] the infliction of death’.208 However, Justice
Simpson’s summary of the elements the jury must consider under s 421 does not take
into account the fact that s 418(2) also applies in homicides that involve excessive
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The first proposition of Viro was in the following terms:
1 (a) It is for the jury first to consider whether when the accused killed the deceased the accused
reasonably believed that an unlawful attack which threatened him with death or serious bodily
harm was being or was about to be made upon him.
(b) By the expression "reasonably believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would have
believed, but what the accused himself might reasonably believe in all the circumstances in
which he found himself.

Viro (n 91) 146 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J
agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
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Ibid 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J
agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
206

Smith (n 127).
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Ibid [20] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1], Hamill J agreeing at [75]). See also
Hamzy (n 89) [184] (Simpson JA dissenting). In Hamzy Simpson JA went on and observed
that ‘[by] s 418, the second and third elements also arise in relation to the offence of wounding
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’: Hamzy [185].
208

Smith (n 127) [18] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1], Hamill J agreeing at [75]).
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self-defence. The question whether there is a need to refer to s 418(2) must arise if
the jury decide that the self-defensive force used was not excessive.
The second and third elements in Justice Simpson’s analysis come from s 421(1)(b).
In Hamzy v The Queen (‘Hamzy’)209 she explained in dissent how the jury apply s
421(1)(b). She said:
Section 421(1)(b) is in two parts. One concerns the belief of the accused person as to
the circumstances. That is to be determined subjectively. The other is the
reasonableness of the conduct of the accused person in response to those
circumstances (whether or not the circumstances were objectively verifiable). The
question of reasonableness is to be determined objectively.210

McCallum J agreed with Simpson JA adding ‘[i]n that way, s 421 deliberately subjects
an accused person’s subjective assessment of his circumstances to the test of
objective community standards’.211
In Grant v The Queen (‘Grant’)212 and Sutcliffe v The Queen(‘Sutcliffe’)213 the New
South Wales Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal said that in assessing the
“unreasonableness” of the accused’s response the jury is assessing whether a
reasonable person in the position of the accused would have considered that her
response was unreasonable in the circumstances.214

209

Hamzy (n 89).
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Ibid [195] (Simpson JA dissenting, McCallum J agreeing with her at [207]).
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Ibid [207] (McCallum J). Hoeben CJ at CL has not discussed this point.
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Grant (n 130).
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Sutcliffe (n 130).
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See Grant (n 130) [65] (Lemming JA, Adams and Hall JJ); Sutcliffe (n 130) [11] (Leeming
JA, Adams and Fullerton JJ). But note what Howie J said in Katarzynski (n 129) when he was
discussing how the jury should ascertain the response of the accused under s 418(2(a)(ii). He
said:
It will be a matter for the jury to decide what matters it should take into account when
determining whether the response of the accused was reasonable in the circumstances in
which he or she found himself or herself. The jury is not assessing the response of the ordinary
or reasonable person but the response of the accused: Katarzynski [25] (Howie J).

It is also to be noted that there is a difference between a reasonable person and an ordinary
person. In Stingel v The Queen the High Court said that the reasonable person is not to be
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The “emphasis” in s 421 on the response of the accused person “in the circumstances
as he or she perceives them” (subs 421(1)(b)) requires the jury to undertake ‘an
evaluation of the degree to which the response exceeds that which would be a
reasonable response if those circumstances existed’.215 That analysis is ‘inherently
both complex and evaluative’216 especially when family violence in issue. In Hamzy v
The Queen (‘Hamzy’),217 Justice Simpson confirmed that s 421 ‘present difficulties of
construction’.218 In relation to s 421(1)(b), she said:
The jury is required to consider whether the conduct … was a reasonable response
in the circumstances as the applicant perceived them. The provision requires that the
question of reasonableness be answered in the light of the circumstances as the
applicant perceived them. The circumstances as the applicant perceived them
included … that it was necessary for him to do what he did … in order to defend
himself.
So to construe s 421(1) would deprive the third element of meaning. It would mean
that whether the third element was established would be dictated by the second, and
have no real independent operation. “[T]he circumstances as he or she perceives
them” in s 421(1)(b) must exclude the circumstance that the accused person believed
that the conduct was necessary in order to defend himself. However, it does not
exclude the basis upon which the applicant came to that belief.219

The difficulties which Justice Simpson has identified are not something that a judge
can simplify or take away from the jury as s 421 stands. The difficulty in explaining s
421 to a jury is compounded when a judge is required to explain s 418 as well just in
case the jury decides that the force used was not excessive so that s 421 does not
confused with the ordinary person because “[a] reasonable person acts on reason. An ordinary
person may not.” Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312, 314 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane,
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (‘Stingel’). The idea behind the ‘ordinary person’
test is that “all persons are held to the same standard notwithstanding their distinctive
personality traits and varying capacities to achieve the standard: Stingel at 324. See also
Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58, 72 (McHugh J).
215

Smith (n 127) [58] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1], Hamill J agreeing at [75]).
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Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284, [93] (McCallum J).
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Hamzy (n 89).
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Ibid [183] (Simpson JA dissenting).
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Ibid [189]-[190] (Simpson JA dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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apply. New South Wales law in self-defence cases needs to be improved. I provide
recommendations for reform in chapter six.

5.9 The combined effect of s 418 and s 421
Again, in a homicide self-defence case what the jurors are being asked to do under ss
418 and 421 is not simple. The jury is required to judge the “response” of the accused
twice and apply different rules each time.220
Under s 418 (2)(a)(ii) the jury is required to consider whether the conduct of the
accused was a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives
them. In making that assessment, the jury is asked to subjectively decide whether the
accused rather than a reasonable person responded appropriately to the circumstance
as she perceived them.221 On the other hand, under s 421, the jury is asked to assess
whether the accused’s response was “unreasonable” according to objective
standards.222 The legislature has not explained this difference in their explanatory
notes223 and it is difficult for trial judges to explain this difference to juries coherently
when self-defence is raised by the accused in homicide cases. This complexity caused
by ss 418 and 421 in New South Wales also raises the question why the self-defence
rule should be different in homicide cases than in cases of lesser crime. In chapter six
I outline a self-defence law that can enable simple judicial directions in lesser crimes
of violence where the jury only has to decide between convict and acquit verdicts and
220

It is even more complex if the jury in a self-defence case would also be required to consider
an additional test under s 93FB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (Possession of dangerous
articles other than firearms). See s 93FB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in the legislation
schedule in part three of the appendix. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse s 93FB
and its combined effect with s 418 and/or s 421. It suffices to note that s 93FB(4) of the Crimes
Act 1900 (NSW) specifically provides that in assessing whether the accused possessed a
dangerous article for the purpose of self-defence (s 93FB(3)), “the court must have regard to
its reasonableness in all the circumstances of the case, including-- (a) the immediacy of the
perceived threat to the person charged.” For the difficulties that juries could face in dealing
with the defence of self-defence in connection with s 93FB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
(formerly s 545E) see the High Court decision in Taikato v The Queen (1996) 186 CLR 454.
Katarzynski (n 129) [25] (Howie J). In Moore (n 88) RA Hulme J said that he was ‘unaware
of any case in which anything that was said in R v Katarzynski had (sic) been called into
question’: Moore at [124].
221

Grant (n 130) [65] (Lemming JA, Adams and Hall JJ); Sutcliffe (n 130) [11] (Leeming JA,
Adams and Fullerton JJ).
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See Explanatory Notes (n 28).
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the homicide cases where an intermediate manslaughter verdict is also a possible
outcome.
The use of the idea of reasonableness in both subjective and objective ways in ss 418
and 421 is confusing and as will be suggested in chapter six, unnecessary. The
subjective use of reasonableness in ss 418 and 421 is unwise and should be changed.
That is, let us find a way to redraft these sections simply using words without baggage
that do not interfere with the simple reasoning required of a jury. As I am
recommending that ss 418 and 421 be repealed and we start with a clean sheet of
paper it is unnecessary to analyse whether the jury should consider ss 418 and 421
simultaneously, sequentially, or whether they could be flexible in how they analyse the
case. Nevertheless, I comment briefly on this issue.
A number of judges have recognised the confusion that I have identified in ss 418 and
421 and have tried to find a way to simplify jury consideration by suggesting that
approaching the two different judgments required to be approached in a sequential
way.224 In Abdallah v The Queen (‘Abdallah Appeal’)225 the threshold question was
whether the jury should have been directed to consider the reasonableness of
Katherine’s response under ss 418 and 421 simultaneously, sequentially or whether
they could be flexible in how they analysed the case.226 The Court of Criminal Appeal
did not know on what basis the jury acquitted Katherine of murder.227 The jury could
have considered the reasonableness of Katherine’s response under ss 418 and 421
simultaneously, sequentially or could have been flexible as how they approached the
case.228

Perhaps taking a lead from the view of Mason J in Viro that his six points’ test simplified
the issues involved if the test was approached sequentially. See Viro (n 91) 146-7 (Mason J,
Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J agreeing at 158, Murphy
J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
224

225

Abdallah Appeal (n 5).

226

Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [36], [46]-[51], [54] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting, Campbell agreeing
at [84]), [84] (Campbell J), [106]-[108] (Button J).
227

Ibid [44] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting).

228

See Abdallah Appeal (n 5).
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Hoeben CJ said ‘consider[ing] s 418 before considering s 421 … is certainly one way
of approaching such consideration but it is not the only way and it is not mandatory.
The flexibility of a jury in how they approach such matters was made clear’.229 In overall
dissent, he said, ‘t]he better approach in a case such as this where self-defence was
the primary consideration is for the jury to consider the reasonableness of the
response at the same time for the purposes of both s 418 and for s 421’.230 Campbell
J agreed with Hoeben CJ that ‘the better approach to instructing the jury on selfdefence in murder cases is to deal with ss 418 and 421 at the same time’.231
Button J approached the “sequential approach” from another perspective. He said that
even though the jury should be given flexibility and were ‘entitled to decide issues
when deliberating in the manner and order that they see fit’,232 a sequential approach
‘in the particular context of the inter-relationship between homicide and self-defence
generally is of significance’.233 This is because, Button J said:
[E}xcessive self-defence does not arise at all if the jury is satisfied merely of the
elements of manslaughter and not murder … in a practical sense it will very often be
essential for the jury to consider first the question of which, if any, form of homicide is
proven, before turning to an assessment of the “defence”.234

Button J also said that the effect of s 418(2) was that ‘if the Crown failed on both legs
of self-defence, the applicant was entitled to a complete acquittal’. 235
Notably, in Smith v The Queen(‘Smith’)236 the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal identified how the jury approached ss 418 and 421. The Court said ‘[p]lainly,
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Ibid [46] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting) (citations omitted).

230

Ibid [48] (Hoeben CJ at CL dissenting, Campbell agreeing at [84]).

231

Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [84] (Campbell J).

232

Abdallah Appeal (n 5) [106] (Button J).

233

Ibid [108] (Button J).

234

Ibid [107] (Button J).

235

Ibid [100] (Button J) (emphasis in original).

236

Smith (n 127).
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having rejected the s 418 defence, the jury then turned to s 421’.237 But this does not
mean that the jury always take a sequential approach. The fact that five judges came
to different conclusions in Hamzy and Abdallah as to whether the jury should be
instructed by the trial judge to approach the tests in ss 418 and 421 sequentially or
not, confirms that the drafting of these two sections results in a self-defence law that
is less than transparent. I submit that lack of clarity is another good argument for
reforming these provisions.
While it is doubtful that instructing a jury to take a sequential approach simplifies the
task the jury faces in such cases, the problem could be avoided if the statutory
provisions were simplified and expressed in plainer English. Reform is not a judicial
task. Judges have to make the best of the cards they are dealt with by the legislature.
While some judges think that instructing juries to take a sequential approach when
they assess self-defence arguments under ss 418 and 421 can provide them with a
logical framework which assists their deliberation, it is submitted that the legislation is
still flawed and would be better if it were simplified. Simplification is the focus of chapter
six.

Conclusion to chapter five
The self-defence formulas that the legislature have provided in the statute since 2002
are too complicated for judges to easily explain to juries. In practice they ask juries to
undertake complex legal analysis which is incompatible with the principle of
‘democratic common sense’ which juries are expected to apply in reaching their
verdicts. And, as has been consistently observed for hundreds of years, that is why
we have continued to engage juries in criminal trials. While New South Wales judges
of appeal and High Court judges have tried very hard to explain the formulas the
legislature have provided, jury instructions in self-defence cases in New South Wales
remain challenging to get right. Further, it is not the job of the courts in Australia to
reform the law. The New South Wales legislature need to revisit and simplify the selfdefence provisions in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).

237

Ibid [20] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1], Hamill J agreeing at [75]).
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In chapter six I discuss and suggest simple reforms in New South Wales that would
make jury instruction much easier for judges in self-defence cases. I also submit that
if those reforms are effective, they will be influential in other Australian jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER SIX

A SIMPLE SELF–DEFENCE TEST: RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This purpose of this chapter is to propose a “simple” self-defence test to eliminate the
difficulties and complexities of ss 418 and 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) that
judges and juries face in self-defence trials.

This chapter has three parts. In part one I briefly discuss why a ‘simple’ test matters.
In part two I discuss the requirements of a self-defence test simple enough so that a
jury cannot misunderstand it. In part three I propose a simple test that meets those
requirements.

Part One: Why a “simple” self-defence test matters
The reader will remember that while jury push back is not as obvious today as it was
before the 17th century, common sense jury decisions and the occasional aberrant
verdict still exert pressure on the courts and modern parliaments to bring the law into
line with jury common sense. The jury verdicts in the cases of Abdallah1 and Patel2
discussed in chapter five are cases in point. Abdallah and Patel suggest that juries in
New South Wales do not easily understand the existing New South Wales statute. The
decisions in Colosimo3 and Evans4 confirm that the legislative formulas are

R v Abdallah [2015] NSWSC 531 (‘Abdallah First Sentencing Hearing’); Abdallah v The
Queen [2016] NSWCCA 275 (‘Abdallah Appeal’); R v Katherine Abdallah (No 6) [2018]
NSWSC 729 (‘Abdallah Second Sentencing Hearing’).
1

Patel v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 121 (‘Patel First Appeal’); R v Patel (No 3) [2018]
NSWSC 952 (‘Patel Sentencing Hearing’) and Patel v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 170 (‘Patel
Second Appeal’).
2

3

Colosimo & Ors v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2006] NSWCA 293 (‘Colosimo’).

4

Director of Public Prosecutions v Evans [2017] NSWSC 33 (‘Evans’).
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complicated and sometimes impractical. As discussed in chapter five, despite the
subjective nature of the second limb under subs 418(2)(a)(ii), the appellate judges in
Colosimo and Evans considered that they were obliged to revisit the formulas and
replace the statutory requirement that the perceptions of the accused guide judgment
as to whether the self-defence was justified, with an objective version of the test. The
judges did their best with the formulas that the legislature provided, but the accused’s
exercise of his right to silence in both of those cases made it difficult for any fact finder
to infer anything about the accused’s subjective state of mind as the statute required.
The danger of creating complex formulas is that trial judges will find them difficult to
explain and juries will also find them difficult to understand, accept and apply. History
and research in the United States and in Australia suggests that complex self-defence
formulas may result in perverse verdicts and unjust decisions. English history in
criminal jury cases suggests that juries did not trust the king to grant a pardon in selfdefence cases. Rather, juries manipulated the evidence in various ways to protect
persons accused of homicide from the death penalty, if the jury considered the
accused had acted in self-defence. Australian criminal law history has not been
immune from difficulty in homicide cases where self-defence was claimed. The
decisions in the Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic cases confirm that complex statutory
formulas in such cases are difficult to understand and apply in practice. The statutory
formulas that have been developed in New South Wales in the wake of those cases
in ss 418 and 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 remain difficult to understand and apply and
need to be simplified.
The overseas studies discussed in chapter five are relevant in Australia.5 The
American studies demonstrate the impact of juror confusion on jury verdicts.6 When
jurors “seriously” misunderstand trial judge instructions, they make mistakes.7 The
American studies also suggested that ‘juror comprehension of [judicial] instructions is
pitifully low’.8 The law relating to self-defence in homicide cases needs to be simplified
Walter W. Steele Jr. and Elizabeth G. Thornburg, ‘Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, (1988) 67 N.C.L. Rev. 77.
5

6

Ibid 78.

7

Ibid 79-83.

8

Ibid 109.
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to enable trial judges to give juries clear and simple instructions that all jurors can
understand.9 The English research discussed in chapter five is also relevant in
Australia. The difficulties that jurors face in self-defence trials in England is also
applicable in Australia.10 This research demonstrated that out of 797 jurors, only one
third were able to fully understand the law of self-defence.11
Judge Sydney Tilmouth’s 2012 Australian study of criminal appeals, which was
discussed in chapter five, also suggested that complex and confusing judicial
directions in self-defence homicide cases are causing problems in Australia.12 His
study was focused on identifying where judges had fallen into error when directing
juries in criminal proceedings. ‘[J]udge induced error…[was] more common than
expected’.13 Though he said that judicial directions about self-defence in homicide
cases ‘ha[d] long been recognised as confusing and complex for juries’, he concluded
‘matters have not become any clearer by a succession of legislative interventions,
which if anything [those legislative changes] have only served to compound the
complexities involved’.14 But Judge Tilmouth made no reform recommendations
following his study.

9

Ibid 108-109.

See Lord Justice Alan Moses, ‘Summing Down the Summing-up’ (Speech delivered at the
Annual Law Reform Lecture, The Hall, Inner Temple, London, 23 November 2010).
10

11

To illustrate the difficulties that jurors face in self-defence trials in England, citing Professor
Cheryl Thomas’ research in 2010, Lord Justice Moses, quoted the results for a film used by
Professor Thomas in her research to see how potential jurors would respond in a criminal trial
for a charge of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The accused pleaded self-defence.
The judge “posed” to the jury the following two questions (which were similar to the test in s
418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)): “did the defendant believe it was necessary to defend
himself”? and, “did he use reasonable force?” Out of 797 jurors “only 31% accurately identified
both questions, 48% one and 20% neither” (ibid).
Judge Sydney Tilmouth, ‘The wrong direction: A case study and anatomy of successful
Australian criminal appeals’ (2015) 40 Australian Bar Review 18.
12

13

Ibid 18.

14

Ibid, citing
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 418–423; Criminal Law Consolidation (Self Defence) Amendment
Act 1991 (SA) s 15; Crimes (Homicide) Act No 77 of 2005 (Vic); Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss
267, 271, 272, 278; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 244, 248–255; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss
27, 28, 29; Criminal Code Act (NT) 1991 ss 46 and 47 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) (s 46,
s 47, s 49, as amended by the Criminal Code Amendment (Self-Defence)Act 1987 (Tas)); the
Criminal Code (ACT) 2002 s 42 and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 10.4 (Tilmouth J
citations): at 34 n 336.
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All of these studies suggest or infer that self-defence directions in homicide cases
need to be simple to be effective and legally safe. If the jury can understand the
relevant statutory provision with minimum judicial direction, that would be ideal.
As discussed in chapters four and chapter five, the difficulties that New South Wales’
juries face when deciding homicide cases where self-defence is argued by the
defendant are the result of several factors. Those factors can be summarised as
follows. First, the mixture of objective and subjective tests in ss 418 and 421 is
confusing. Secondly, under s 418(2)(a)(i) (the first limb),15 it is also confusing that
juries are required to consider “all” of the personal characteristics of the accused
whereas under s 418(2)(a)(ii) (the second limb) they are required to consider “some”,
but not, all of these characteristics.16 Thirdly, the difficulties in the construction of s 421
because of the complexity involved in considering the three essential elements of s
421(1).17 Fourthly, it is easy for a lawyer to mix up the self-defence tests in ss 418 and
421 because they are different but must both be considered in homicide cases.18

15

R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613, [23] (Howie J) (‘Katarzynski’).

16

Ibid [25] (Howie J).

Hamzy v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 53, [183] (Simpson JA dissenting) (‘Hamzy’). There
are three “essential” elements that the jury must consider under s 421(1). They were set out
by Justice Simpson in Smith v The Queen as follows:
17

o

the accused uses force that involves the infliction of death;

o

the accused believes that the conduct (that is, the use of the force in fact used) is
necessary to defend himself or herself or another person; and

o

that conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused
perceives them.

Smith v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 193, [20] (Simpson JA, Leeming JA agreeing at [1],
Hamill J agreeing at [75]) (‘Smith’). See also Hamzy [184] (Simpson JA dissenting). In Hamzy
Simpson JA went on and observed that ‘[by] s 418, the second and third elements also arise
in relation to the offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’: at [185].
18

Under s 418 (2)(a) the jury is required to consider whether the conduct of the accused was
a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives them. In assessing
whether the accused’s response was reasonable, the jury are assessing the response of the
accused, not the response of the ordinary or reasonable person. Katarzynski (n 15) [25]
(Howie J). In Moore v The Queen, RA Hulme J said that he was ‘unaware of any case in which
anything that was said in R v Katarzynski had (sic) been called into question’. Moore v The
Queen ([2016] NSWCCA 185, [124] (RA Hulme J) (‘Moore’). On the other hand, under s
421(1)(b), the jurors are no longer assessing the “reasonableness” of the response, they are
assessing its “unreasonableness”. Moreover, when assessing whether the accused’s
response was unreasonable, the jury are assessing the response of a reasonable person, not
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Fifthly, there is judicial disagreement whether the juries should be instructed to
consider the tests under ss 418 and 421 simultaneously or sequentially.19 Sixthly, the
subjective aspects of the tests set out in ss 418 and 421 have proven impossible for
judges sitting alone in homicide cases involving self-defence to apply when the
accused invokes the right to remain silent and elects not to give direct evidence. In
cases where the accused invokes the right to silence, there is little or no evidence from
which a judge (or a jury) can infer the accused’s intent. The resulting lacuna has seen
New South Wales appellate judges affirm that the judicial decisions makers have no
option but determine the accused’s intent objectively — in clear breach of the intent
expressed in s 418(2)(a)(ii).20
The judicial disagreement as to whether the tests in ss 418 and 421 should be
considered simultaneously or sequentially noted in the fifth point in the last paragraph,
raises a broader question about jury process that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
However, the reason why the judges of appeal noted in the fifth point above have not
dictated whether juries should consider the tests in ss 418 and 421 simultaneously or
sequentially, is apparently because their process is considered inscrutable. In
particular there is no requirement under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the Criminal
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), or at common law, to require jurors to take a specific path
before reaching a verdict. A verdict is a process that begins long before the
deliberations of jurors and represents ‘the end point of jurors’ decision-making
process’.21 Jurors ‘are required to agree only on the ultimate verdict, not on the precise
path to that verdict’,22 and ‘[h]ow individual juries approach their deliberations is not

the response of the accused. Grant v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 67, [65] (Lemming JA,
Adams and Hall JJ) Grant’); Sutcliffe v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 208, [11] (Leeming JA,
Adams and Fullerton JJ) (‘Sutcliffe’).
Abdallah v The Queen (‘Abdallah First Appeal’) (n 1) [44]-[47] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Campbell
J agreeing at [84]), [84] (Campbell J), [108] (Button J); Smith (n 17) [20] (Simpson JA).
19

20

Colosimo (n 3) [19] (Hodgson JA, Handley JA agreeing at [1], Ipp JA agreeing at [27]);
Evans (n 4) [49]-[50] (Davies J).
Norman J. Finkel and Jennifer L. Groscup, ‘Crime Prototypes, Objective versus Subjective
Culpability, and a Commonsense Balance’ 21 Law and Human Behavior 209, 211.
21

22

R v Randhawa, 2019 BCCA 15, [38] (Griffin J, Tysoe and Harris JJ agreeing) A judge,
however, who tries criminal proceedings without a jury must include in the judgment the
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known’.23 In Zecevic the majority said that ‘[t]here is no rule which dictates the use
which the jury must make of the evidence and the ultimate question is for it alone.’24
The above complexities and difficulties dictate that judges try to provide juries with
instructions that accurately explain the technical terms of the law. In Brown v The
Queen25, Brennan J said while reminding us that once the ordeal was no longer
permitted and trial by jury became the only mode of trial in criminal cases:
Trial by jury is not only the historical mode of trial for criminal cases … it is the chief
guardian of liberty under the law and the community's guarantee of sound
administration of criminal justice. The verdict is the jury's alone, never the judge's.
Authority to return a verdict and responsibility for the verdict returned belong to the
impersonal representatives of the community.26

Justice Brennan’s insight into the historical foundation of jury independence and
inscrutability, introduces the following discussion of how a “simple” self-defence test
should be formulated and what consequences follow the chosen formulation.

principles of law applied by the Judge and the findings of fact on which the Judge relied.
Section 133 of Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides:
133 Verdict of single Judge
(1) A Judge who tries criminal proceedings without a jury may make any finding that could have
been made by a jury on the question of the guilt of the accused person. Any such finding has,
for all purposes, the same effect as a verdict of a jury.
(2) A judgment by a Judge in any such case must include the principles of law applied by the
Judge and the findings of fact on which the Judge relied.
(3) If any Act or law requires a warning to be given to a jury in any such case, the Judge is to
take the warning into account in dealing with the matter.
23

Virginia Bell AC, Jury Directions: the Struggle for Simplicity and Clarity (Banco Court Lecture
Supreme Court of Queensland, 20 September 2018), 28.
24

Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 662 (Wilson, Dawson
and Toohey JJ) (‘Zecevic’).
25

(1986) 160 CLR 171 (‘Brown’).

26

Ibid 197 (Brennan J).
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Part Two: What features should a simple self-defence test have?
6.1 Governing principles in the formulation of the self-defence test
The principles governing the formulation of a “simple” self-defence test are that the
test should be simple, it should be free from any technical legal terms, and it should
allow the jurors to discuss it in everyday language without the need for explanatory
directions from trial judges. That is not to say that a simple self-defence formulation
will make trial judge directions redundant in a homicide case involving self-defence
issues. The intention is rather to focus on the need to ensure that the single test
provided is so simple that a jury could not misunderstand it. The simple test should
also recognise that when trial is by jury, the jury should be recognised as the final and
independent arbiter and, like judges in judge-alone criminal trials, should be
completely autonomous when deciding the guilt or innocence of the accused. If we
leave this all to the jury, we get decisions according to community standards that are
not parroted responses following legislative or judicial direction. To achieve these
outcomes, the test chosen to determine whether a homicide was committed in selfdefence or not, should be drafted in plain English.

6.1.1 Plain English
Complexity is apt to confuse. But this recommendation is not just about plain English
expression. It is about simplifying concepts so the simple cannot misunderstand.
Simplicity is an underrated but essential virtue. That virtue is perhaps at its most
important in statutory drafting. The ideal in the drafting of criminal legislation is to use
plain English so that ordinary people can understand it. This is especially important in
the criminal law where personal liberty is at stake. The law should speak to its
subjects.27 Dissatisfaction with legislative drafting and the excessive complexity of the
law has been an issue for many centuries.28 In 1362 King Edward III realised that his
See generally Rabeea Assy, ‘Can the Law Speak Directly to its Subjects? The Limitation of
Plain Language’ (2011) 38(3) Journal of Law and Society 276.
27

28

See generally Barbara Shapiro, 'Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth Century England'
(1974) 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 42; Barbara Shapiro, 'Law Reform in Seventeenth Century England'
(1975) 19 Am. J. Legal. Hist. 280; David St. L. Kelly, ‘Legislative Drafting and Plain English’
(1986) 10(4) Adelaide Law Review 409; Rabeea Assy, ‘Can the Law Speak Directly to its
Subjects? The Limitation of Plain Language’ (2011) 38(3) Journal of Law and Society 276;
Edwin Turner, ‘The Comprehensibility of Legal Language: Is Plain English the Solution’ (2000)
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subjects ‘have no Knowledge nor Understanding of that which is said for them or
against them by their Serjeants and other Pleaders’.29 The King, therefore, enacted
the ‘English Statute of Pleading’30 which has been ‘considered to be the first of the
“plain English” laws’.31 It was also reported that young King Edward VI (born October
12, 1537, London, England — died July 6, 1553) said:
I would wish that . . . the superfluous and tedious statutes were brought into one sum
together, and made more plain and short, to the intent that men might better
understand them.32

Sir John Donaldson and Lord Scarman have reiterated what King Edward III and King
Edward VI had said. For Sir John Donaldson:
The efficacy and maintenance of the rule of law, which is the foundation of any
parliamentary democracy, has at least two prerequisites. First, people must
understand that it is in their interests, as well as in that of the community as a whole,
that they should live their lives in accordance with the rules and all the rules. Second,
they must know what those rules are. Both are equally important ...33

Lord Scarman also said ‘[j]uries are not chosen for their understanding of a logical and
phased process leading by question and answer to a conclusion, but are expected to
exercise practical common sense.’34 ‘Common sense … always triumphs over
technical rules of law’.35 In the context of homicide self-defence cases, this common

9(1) Griffith Law Review 52; Jeffrey Barnes, ‘The Continuing Debate About ‘Plain Language’
Legislation: A Law Reform Conundrum’ (2006) 72(3) Statute Law Review 83.
29

36 Edw. III Stat. 1, c. 15 (emphasis in original). Statutes of the Realm. Volume 1, 375-6.
See also Gillian Gillies, ‘The Anglicisation of English Law’ (2001) 17 Auckland University Law
Review 168, 171-2 (emphasis in original).
30

Michael S Friman, 'Plain English Statutes - Long Overdue or Underdone' (1995) 7 Loyola
Consumer Law Reporter 103, 104 (citations omitted). See also Gillies (n 29) 171-2.
31

Gillies (n 30) 171 (emphasis in original). See also Firman (n 30) 104.

Kelly (n 28) 409 citing, ‘Renton Committee, The Preparation of Legislation (1975) Cmnd
6053 at 6’: at 409 n 2.
32

33

Merkur Island Shipping v Laughton [1983] 2 All ER 189; 2 AC 570, 594 (Sir John Donaldson
MR)
34

R v Hancock [1986] AC 455; 1 All ER 641, 651 (Lord Scarman) (‘Hancock’).

35

Seymour D Thompson, 'Homicide in Self-Defence' (1880) 14 Am. L. Rev. 545, 555-6.
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sense has compelled the courts to recognise that the accused is entitled to inflict
“great” bodily harm or even “kill” the victim “without retreating” if that was necessary
for her to save her own life or protect herself from bodily harm.36 The House of Lords
in Palmer37 and the High Court in Zecevic38 favoured a simple approach that a jury
using common sense could understand.
Australian law reform bodies have also endorsed the idea of drafting legislation in
“plain English”. The Law Reform Commission of Victoria (“LRCV”) noted that plain
English is ‘not a special language, it is an ordinary [language]’.39 The LRCV further
noted that:
When Parliament passes a law applying to citizens or to a selected group of citizens,
its prime concern is not with the reaction of judges or lawyers or even administrators.
Its prime concern is with the conduct of the citizens whom it regulates or on whom it
imposes burdens or confers benefits. … the prime aim should be to ensure that those
to whom the law is addressed act in accordance with it. The law should be drafted in
such a way as to be intelligible, above all, to those directly affected by it.40

36

Ibid 556.

37

Palmer v The Queen [1971] 1 All ER 1077; AC 814 (‘Palmer’), 831-2 (Lord Morris of Borthy-Gest for Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).
38

The majority in Zecevic stated the test as follows:
The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon
reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief
and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the
matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.

Zecevic (n 24) 662 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ, Mason CJ agreeing at 654, Brennan J
agreeing at 666).
39

Victoria Law Reform Commission, Palin English and the Law (Report No. 9, 2017) ix. This
report was originally published by Victoria Law Reform Commission in 1987 (“the
Commission”) but it was then “republished by the Commission in 2017 with original contents
in a new format, and a new preface.” Plain English and the Law - the 1987 report | Victorian
Law Reform Commission
40

Ibid 35.
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The Queensland Government endorsed the same principles in The Queensland
Legislation Handbook (“QLHB”).41 The QLHB emphasises that the drafter “must” draft
the legislation in “plain English”. The Queensland Government said that:
The plain English approach to legislation is based on the idea that laws should be as
simple as possible so the ordinary person in the community can understand them.
Further, the ordinary person is regarded as the ultimate user of the law rather than
bureaucrats and lawyers.42

We have to simplify the concepts and use plain English. Legalistic ideas including
references to objective and subjective standards are not ideas that lay people chosen
for jury service use. They are not words which potential jurors use to describe how
they make judgments in their everyday lives, so they will not help lay jurors fulfil their
judicial responsibility.
Though the use of plain English is desirable in drafting all legislation, plain English in
drafting criminal legislation is more critical because juries need to understand it. But
following Sir John Donaldson and Lord Scarman above, all citizens should be able to
understand it. Plain English is also essential in the way that criminal laws are
expressed because criminal laws identify crime, and criminal trials by jury enable the
community to forgive or condemn a person for antisocial behaviour.43 This
“community” is not the “political community” or the “judicial community”. A conviction
by jury as representative members of the public is ‘an expression of the community’s
moral outrage, directed at the criminal actor, for her act’.44 Therefore, if lay jurors are
to forgive or condemn a person accused of crime on behalf of the community, they
should be able to understand the law in simple terms.

The purpose of the Queensland Legislation Handbook is to outline the ‘relevant policies,
recommendations, information, and procedures for the making of law in the form of Acts of
Parliament or subordinate legislation’. Queensland Government, The Queensland Legislation
Handbook (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2019) 3.
41

42

(Ibid)18 [3.5.1].

Sandra G. Mayson, ‘The Concept of Criminal Law’ (2020) 14 Criminal Law and Philosophy
447, 453.
43

44

Ibid 452 (citations omitted).
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Confidence in a just verdict is also enhanced when criminal laws are written in plain
English. But the “plain English” phrase I am using here is not about “plain legislation”
or “plain meaning”.45 The problem identified in this thesis about self-defence law in
New South Wales arises largely because that law is not simple for lay person jurors to
understand. It will be remembered that the majority in Viro46 endorsed Mason J’s six
propositions of the self-defence test.47 Mason J (as he then was) thought that he was
simplifying the law but in fact he was not. In Zecevic,48 Mason CJ later acknowledged
that the six propositions he had set out in Viro were unduly complex.49
The only thing a jury needs to decide when determining whether a homicide was
mitigated by self-defence, is whether the force used was necessary or not. If the force
used was necessary, then the accused is entitled to an acquittal. If the force used was
more than necessary, then the accused is still responsible for the death, but it is not
murder and so the accused should be convicted of manslaughter. If the force used
was not necessary at all, then the accused should be convicted for murder. The jury’s
decision rests on its assessment of necessity and its decision is final, subject to limited
rights of appeal.
The task of the legislature is to translate these simple concepts into an explanation
that lay people will understand.50 Once the underlying concepts are clear, the
legislative drafters should be able to write the law simply enough so that lay jurors can
understand it. But the simplification of the underlying concepts has been a challenging
journey — a journey that began in English jury pre-history but which came to a climax
in the tussle between the High Court of Australia and the Privy Council in England as

45

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or analyse the subject matters of statutory
interpretation, ‘plain legislation’ or ‘plain meaning”.
46

Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 (‘Viro’).

47

Ibid 146-7 (Mason J, Gibbs J agreeing at 128, Stephen J agreeing at 134-135, Jacobs J
agreeing at 158, Murphy J agreeing at 171, Aickin J agreeing at 180).
48

Zecevic (n 24).

49

Ibid 653 (Mason CJ).

For the question of “what exactly is a concept?” see generally Kenneth Einar Himma,
‘Conceptual Jurisprudence – An Introduction to Conceptual Analysis and Methodology in
Legal Theory’ (2015) 26 Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law 65.
50
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to whether excessive self-defence entitled a defendant to a complete acquittal or
whether the conviction should be reduced from murder to manslaughter.51 In the
context of such high level jurisprudential disagreement and the law reform
consideration which followed, it is not surprising that the statutory drafting has not yet
achieved ideal simplicity. That means we must try again. But how do we best express
these self-defence concepts in plain English?

6.2 How a “simple” self-defence test should be formulated in terms
of necessity
The conclusions arrived at about the unsatisfactory nature of the existing self-defence
formulations in chapter five provide context. Self-defence is an excuse of natural
necessity.52 For the defence to succeed, the accused must convince the jury that what
she did was necessary.53 William Blackstone said that when a man kills another in
self-defence, it is an excusable necessity or ‘necessitas culpabilis [culpable
necessity]’.54 ‘”[I]t is necessary self defence which makes a homicide justifiable” …
what is necessary in the eyes of the community will vary from age to age and according
to the circumstances’.55 Sir James Stephen has written ‘the inflection[sic] of death, or
minor personal injuries’56 in self-defence is founded upon reasonable necessity. The
House of Lords in Palmer said that ‘[i]t is both good law and good sense that he may
do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary.’57
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Self-defence at common law or in any of its statutory forms has always been based
upon necessity. Though the courts have not always agreed on how necessity should
be defined, the importance of the element of necessity in self-defence was agreed in
Howe,58 Palmer,59 Viro,60 and Zecevic.61 The foundation of necessity is also clear in
the various self-defence provisions in all Commonwealth, state and territory legislation
that has engaged with self-defence.62
The problem is how the existing self-defence provisions in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
can be simply reformulated so that they can be understood by juries without a great
deal of judicial assistance and can also be simply explained by trial judges. The
questions that flow from the problems identified in chapter five is whether the idea of
“necessity” in New South Wales’ self-defence law should be explained in subjective,
objective, or mixed terms? Does that kind of semantic analysis assist jury
understanding or would a plain English formulation avoid those concepts no matter
how well they are by legally trained lawyers and judges?
William Blackstone and Sir James Stephen appear to have pioneered the use of
merged subjective and objective elements when they used the phrase “reasonably
necessary” to explain when self-defensive conduct was justified. But the fact that the
“reasonably necessary” phrase is well understood by lawyers and judges does not
mean it is the right plain English phrase to enable competent jury understanding and
verdict delivery. Though this merger of objective and subjective elements is deeply
embedded in the law, the analysis in chapter five suggests that combinations of
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subjective and objective language complicate matters for many juries. For example, it
is doubtful that the word “reasonably” adds anything to the word “necessary” when
explaining whether self-defence is justified or not to someone who has not had legal
training. The idea of reasonableness is already included in the word “necessary”
because it is an objective word. With or without the word “reasonably”, the jury is not
obliged to accept what the accused has said is true. But judges who know that every
statutory word must be given its due wrestle to explain the “unnecessary” addition of
the word “reasonably” and are apt to confuse jurors in the process. As Lord Griffiths
said in Beckford v The Queen (‘Beckford’),63 the reality is that the jury will assess the
reasonableness of the accused’s belief when assessing the honesty of that belief as
a matter of common sense.64 It is better to leave these issues to the jury without
analysing them in detail in judicial directions as lawyers are want to do.
The adjudication of a claim of self-defence in a criminal trial is founded upon the
assessment of necessity, and this is a matter for determination by the jury. As the
embodiment of community standards, when the jury considers whether the accused’s
conduct was necessary or reasonably necessary, factors like the imminence of the
danger, the opportunity to retreat from that danger, and the personal characteristics
or attributes of the accused (e.g. age, sex, ethnicity, religious beliefs, tribal beliefs and
traditions, physical disabilities, and cognitive and volitional capacities), are all factored
in. For a lay jury, the idea of necessity by itself includes and takes account of all these
elements. This analysis suggests that breaking the elements of justification into
subjective and objective parts, unnecessarily complicates what the jury is required to
do. Indeed, when a judge breaks down necessity or justification into a number of
forensic parts, aberrant trial results suggest that juries think that they are being asked
to do something other than what comes naturally.
The expressions “was that necessary (or really necessary)?” or “was any of this
necessary (or really necessary)?” are commonly and frequently used in everyday
language by members of the community. It is then legitimate to ask whether any of
this needs more than a superficial explanation? Why explain the word “necessary” if
it has no meaning beyond its common sense meaning?
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For Seymour Thompson the ‘right’ to use force in self-defence ‘[as] it is founded in
necessity, it is limited by necessity’,65 and the use of defensive force ‘must cease as
soon as the necessity, real or apparent, ceases’.66 Joseph Beale has similarly stated
that the right of self-defence begins and ends with necessity.67 The person’s necessity
to avoid a threat of death overrides her necessity in avoiding using excessive force in
self-defence in repelling that threat. Necessity also naturally avoids or disdains the use
of excessive force. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated:
[T]he law cannot prevent [a person using excessive force in self-defence] by
punishment, because a threat of death at some future time can never be a sufficiently
powerful motive to make a [person] choose death now in order to avoid the threat.68

The resulting principle is that when self-defence is raised as an answer to any charge
other than homicide, the question for the jury is quite simple: was it necessary in selfdefence for the accused to do what she did?
The focus of this chapter so far has been to formulate a simple self-defence provision
that will explain when self-defence is justified in offences other than homicide. The
recommendation resulting is that subsection one of the self-defence provision would
be improved if it read as follows:
A person is not guilty of an offence if it was necessary in self-defence to do
what he or she did.
I now discuss whether the self-defence provision should be different when selfdefence is raised in homicide cases. Does this “simple” test need to recognise that
homicide cases raise different self-defence issues as ss 418 and 421 seem to accept?
That is, could one simple provision explain how self-defence should be applied in
every criminal case whether involving homicide or any lesser offence?
This part of the thesis considers whether the provisions explaining self-defence should
be any different when a homicide is alleged to have resulted from self-defensive
65

Seymour (n 35) 546.

66

Ibid.

67

Joseph H Jr Beale, 'Homicide in Self-Defence' (1903) 3 Colum. L. Rev. 526, 530.

68

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1881) 47.

233

action. Does the fact that there is always a dead body in a homicide case where selfdefence is alleged mean that different common sense factors apply? Does the
existence of a dead body change community notions of what constitutes common
sense adjudication of self-defence? In Howe,69 Palmer,70 Viro,71 and Zecevic,72 the
proportionality of the force used was the central issue for the judges who formulated
the self-defence tests that came out of those cases.73
The New South Wales public servants who prepared ss 418 and 421 for the legislators
also focused on the proportionality of the force used. But the reality is that the concept
of necessity includes that idea of proportionality for the jury whether a homicide
resulted or not. The core of the decision as to whether the accused should be
acquitted, found guilty of manslaughter, or guilty of murder, lies in the jury’s
assessment of the necessity of what was done in self-defence. That is, if the jury
decides the accused in self-defence did “no more” than was necessary, she is not
guilty of murder and not guilty of manslaughter. If the jury decides the accused used
more force than was necessary, she is guilty of manslaughter but not guilty of murder.
If the jury decides that the force that the accused used was not necessary at all, she
is guilty of murder.
A single simple provision explaining how self-defence should be considered and
applied in all criminal cases can suffice even if a homicide has resulted. There is thus
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no need for more technical definitions that feature the convoluted requirements of
objectivity/subjectivity found in ss 418 and 421.

6.3 The “simple” self-defence test for homicide offences, and
various offences other than homicide
It is therefore proposed that the following provision be introduced into the New South
Wales Crimes Act to replace all the existing provisions that explain how self-defence
should be adjudicated when it is raised by the defence:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if it was necessary in self-defence to do
what he or she did.
(2) In homicide murder trials, a person will be guilty of manslaughter and not
guilty of murder if it was necessary for the person in self-defence to do what
he or she did, but the force used by the person was more than necessary.
The phrase test “not guilty” is used because when a jury returns its verdict, they say
whether the accused is “guilty” or “not guilty”. They do not say whether the accused
was “criminally responsible” or “not criminally responsible”.74
It is submitted that this provision would eliminate the complexities and difficulties which
juries and judges face in self-defence cases like Abdallah, Patel, Colosimo and Evans.
This self-defence provision is the more virtuous because it is written in plain English.
It gives the judicial decision maker complete autonomy subject only to appeal on
matters of law.75 Because it is simple enough for a jury to understand without judicial
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explanation, it will also likely reduce appeals premised in arguments that the trial judge
misdirected the jury on the relevant law.76
This plain English test may have potential application in other parts of the Crimes Act
1900 (NSW) where complicated objective and subjective tests are used such as in
defining consent in sexual assault cases, but that consideration is beyond the scope
of this thesis.

6.4 Onus of proof issues
It is elementary that the prosecution retains on overriding obligation to prove an
offence including a murder or manslaughter charge beyond reasonable doubt (s
419).77 That prosecution obligation is unchanged in a case where the accused alleges
exonerating or mitigating self-defensive conduct.78 The changes to the self-defence
test recommended above require consequential amendment to s 419. My
recommendation for a change to s 419 is as follows:
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In any self-defence case, the prosecution has the onus of proving, beyond
reasonable doubt, that it was not necessary for the person in self-defence to do
what he or she did.
The final question then is what directions a trial judge would need to give the jury if the
recommended plain English provision is adopted.

6.5 Model judicial directions in self-defence cases under the
recommended provision
Model directions should be written in plain English so that lay jurors can understand.
No generic judicial direction would be appropriate because the facts of every case are
different. As Gleeson CJ in Doggett v The Queen79 said ‘[d]irections are not ritualistic
formularies. Their purpose is to assist the jury in the practical task of resolving fairly
the issues which have been presented to them by the parties.’80 In Zoneff v The
Queen81 Kirby J warned against using complex instructions. He said:
Instructions to a jury should be comprehensible. They should avoid the unrealistic
imposition on a jury of over-subtle distinctions and the imposition on judges of a duty
to give directions that may actually be counter-productive to the end sought. Where
matters are tried by jury, our legal system operates on an assumption that jurors will
obey the judge's directions concerning matters of law and other matters upon which
the judge has authority to speak. It is realised that sometimes jurors are likely to be
"dumbfounded" by judicial statements about the law.82

In 2008 the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (“NSWLRC”) found that
“difficult language in model directions” has been attributed to:
The desire to be legally accurate. To prevent possible appeals, directions use the
language found in case law and statutes. Directions therefore contain complex legal
rules and explain concepts in legal language that is foreign to jurors. Efficiency in terms
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of time-savings and legal accuracy overshadow the aim of ensuring that jurors properly
understand the relevant legal rules and concepts.83

In practice however, complex language back-fires and has led to many appeals.84
The NSWLRC also recommended plain English model judicial instructions and if this
provision were adopted, that counsel could also be applied in self-defence cases. The
NSWLRC has found that the “model directions” in the Bench Book ‘may contain
language that is very difficult to understand. They may contain legal jargon and many
words and phrases that are unfamiliar to most people’.85 The NSWLRC has stated,
‘jury directions should use language that jurors can understand. This is a key element
in enabling juries to make well-informed decisions.’86 The NSWLRC recommended
that model plain English judicial directions be adopted. 87
In 2012 the NSWLRC reiterated its recommendation that the legislature provide model
plain English directions and suggested the legislature could most effectively do that by
directing the “Bench Book Committee” to rewrite the Bench Book in ‘consultation with
experts in plain English drafting’.88 Because such model plain English directions have
never been officially drafted, I now set out recommended model judicial directions.
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6.5.1 Model judicial directions in self-defence cases that do not involve homicide
The foregoing discussion has suggested that model self-defence directions should
also be written in plain English so that lay jurors find them simple to understand. 89 I
recommend that the trial judge start the direction by stating to the jury the offence (or
offences) in respect of which the plea of self-defence has been raised. That is, the trial
judge should say: The accused has been charged with the following offence(s) [specify
the offence, for example, Assault]. The trial judge should then tell the jury that the
accused says that she is not guilty because she was defending herself. The judge
should say that “the accused says she is not guilty because she was defending
herself”. The judge should then remind the jury of what their role. The direction should
be in words to the following effect: Your role is to apply the law and determine whether
the accused is guilty or not guilty based on the evidence that has been placed before
you in this courtroom. The judge should then tell the jury the law of self-defence that
they must apply, which is as follows:
The law recognises the right of the accused to defend herself. Although selfdefence is referred to as a defence, it is for the Crown to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that it was not necessary for the accused to do what she did
in self-defence. That will be overwhelmed if the defence proves on the balance
of probabilities that the self-defensive force used was necessary. The question
as to whether the accused should be acquitted or found guilty lies in the
necessity of what she did in self-defence. The word necessary has no meaning
beyond its common sense meaning that you members of the jury use in your
everyday conversation. Therefore, the law you must apply is as follows:
1. If you decide that it was necessary for the accused in self-defence to [do
what she/he did. Specify the offence, for example, assault], then your verdict
must be not guilty.

89

For the lengthy and complex self-defence directions in relation to ss 418, 421 and 419 of
the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) see the “[s]uggested direction self defence — cases other than
murder”, Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Criminal Trials Courts Bench Book
(Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 2019) 1298-1300 (‘Criminal Trials Courts Bench
Book’). See also the “[s]uggested direction self defence — murder cases”: at 1300-1302.

239

2. If you decide that it was not necessary for the accused in self-defence to [do
what she/he did. Specify the offence, for example, assault], then your verdict
must be guilty.
6.5.2 Model judicial directions in self-defence cases that involve homicide
I recommend that the judge start the direction in homicide cases where the accused
claims self-defence by stating to the jury the offence (or offences) in respect of which
the plea of self-defence has been raised. That is, the judge should say: The accused
has been charged with the following offence(s) [specify the offence, for example,
murder]. The judge should then tell the jury that the accused says that she is not guilty
because she was defending herself. I recommend that the judge should do this by
saying: “The accused says she is not guilty because she was defending herself”. The
judge should then remind the jury of their role. The direction should be in the following
terms: “Your role is to apply the law and determine whether she is guilty or not guilty
based on the evidence that has been placed before you in this courtroom.” The judge
should then tell the jury the law of self-defence that they must apply, which is as
follows:
The law recognises the right of the accused to defend herself even to the point
of killing. Although self-defence is referred to as a defence, it is for the Crown
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was not necessary for the accused to
do what she did in self-defence. That will be overwhelmed if the defence proves
on the balance of probabilities that the self-defence used was necessary. The
question as to whether the accused should be acquitted, or found guilty of
manslaughter or murder, lies in whether it was necessary for her to do what she
did in self-defence and whether the level of force she used was excessive or
not. The word necessary has no meaning beyond its common sense meaning
that you members of the jury use in your everyday conversation. Therefore, the
law you must apply is as follows:
1. If you decide that it was necessary for the accused in self-defence to do
what she did and she used no more force than was necessary, then your
verdict must be not guilty of murder and not guilty of manslaughter.
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2. If you decide that it was necessary for the accused in self-defence to do
what she did and she used force more than was necessary, then your
verdict must be not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.
3. If you decide that the accused was not intending to defend herself and that
the force she used resulted in this homicide, then your verdict must be guilty
of murder.

The trial judge should then provide every individual juror with the directions she has
given in writing.

Part Three: Recommendations
The recommendations in relation to the test of self-defence, the onus of proof, and the
model directions in law for the jury to be told by the trial judge, are as follows:

6.6

Self-defence test: Recommendations

6.6.1 Recommendation One
Section 481 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), self-defence, should be repealed.
6.6.2 Recommendation Two
Section 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the partial defence of excessive selfdefence, should be repealed.
6.6.3 Recommendation Three
The new test of self-defence should be in the following terms:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if it was necessary in self-defence to do
what he or she did.
(2) In homicide murder trials, a person will be guilty of manslaughter and not
murder if it was necessary for the person in self-defence to do what he or she
did and the force used by the person was more than necessary.
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6.7 Onus of Proof Recommendation
The new onus of proof section should be drafted in the following terms:
In any self-defence case, the prosecution has the onus of proving, beyond
reasonable doubt, that it was not necessary for the person in self-defence to do
what he or she did.

6.8 Judicial Model Directions: Recommendations
6.8.1 Recommendation One: Model judicial directions in self-defence cases that
do not involve homicide
The model directions are as follows:
1. The accused has been charged with the following offence(s) [specify the offence].
2. The accused says she is not guilty because she was defending herself.
3. Members of the jury, your role is to apply the law and determine whether she is
guilty or not guilty based on the evidence that has been placed before you in this
courtroom.
4. The self-defence law that you must apply is as follows:
4.1 The law recognises the right of a person to defend herself.
4.2 Although self-defence is referred to as a defence, it is for the Crown to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that it was not necessary for the accused to do what
she did in self-defence. That will be overwhelmed if the defence proves on the
balance of probabilities that the self-defence used was necessary.
4.3 The question as to whether the accused should be acquitted or found guilty lies
in the necessity of what she did in self-defence. Therefore, the law you must
apply is as follows:
4.3.1 If you decide that it was necessary for the accused in self-defence to [do
what she/he did. Specify the offence, for example, assault], then your
verdict must be not guilty.
4.3.2 If you decide that it was not necessary for the accused in self-defence to
[do what she/he did. Specify the offence, for example, assault], then your
verdict must be guilty.
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6.8.2 Recommendation Two: Judicial directions in self-defence cases that
involve homicide
The model directions are as follows:
1. The accused has been charged with the following offence(s) [specify the offence,
for example, murder].
2. The accused says she is not guilty because she was defending herself.
3. The law recognises the right of a person to defend herself even to the point of
killing.
4. Although “self-defence” is referred to as a defence, it is for the Crown to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt, that it was not necessary for the accused to [specify act,
for example, stabbing, shoot the victim] in self-defence. That will be overwhelmed
if the defence proves on the balance of probabilities that the self-defence used was
necessary.
5. The question as whether the accused should be acquitted, or found guilty of
manslaughter or murder, lies in whether it was necessary for her to do what she
did in self-defence and whether the level of force she used was excessive or not.
6. The word necessary has no meaning beyond its common sense meaning that you
members of the jury use in your everyday conversation. Therefore, the law you
must apply is as follows:
6.1 If you decide that it was necessary for the accused in self-defence to do
what she did and she used force no more than was necessary, then your
verdict must be not guilty of murder and not guilty of manslaughter.
6.2 If you decide that it was necessary for the accused to defend herself but
that she used force more than was necessary, then your verdict must be
not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.
6.3 If you decide that the accused was not intending to defend herself and
that the force she used resulted in this homicide, then your verdict must
be guilty of murder.
6.8.3 Recommendation Three
The trial judge should provide every individual juror with the self-defence test in writing.
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6.8.4 Recommendation Four
The trial judge should provide every individual juror with the directions she has given
in writing.

Conclusion to chapter six
I have recommended different self-defence tests for criminal cases involving homicide
and those which do not. But the tests are consistent. The only difference between the
homicide and non-homicide tests arises because of the need to recognise that
manslaughter is an appropriate conviction in a homicide case where the accused used
more force than was necessary to defend herself. The self-defence test I have
proposed when arguments of self-defence are raised in homicide cases, eliminates
the problems that I have identified in the existing tests set out in ss 418 and 421 of the
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The recommended self-defence test for homicide cases is
more virtuous because it is conceptually simple and is written in plain English. It gives
the judicial decision maker, whether judge or jury, complete autonomy in making the
conviction or acquittal decision, subject only to appeal on matters of law. Because it is
simple enough for a jury to understand without judicial explanation, it will likely reduce
appeals premised on arguments that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the relevant
law.
Dissatisfaction with legislative drafting and the excessive complexity of the law has
been an issue for many centuries. King Edward III and King Edward IV endorsed
enacting plain and short statutes. Sir John Donaldson and Lord Scarman reiterated
what the two Kings said. The House of Lords in Palmer and the High Court in Zecevic
favoured a simple approach. Various governments’ law reforms bodies have endorsed
the idea of drafting legislation in plain English. The legislature should recognise that
conceptually they are writing the criminal law for lay people.
The governing principles in the formulation of a “simple” self-defence test are that the
test should be simple, it should be free from any technical legal terms, and it should
allow the jurors to discuss it using everyday language without the need for explanatory
directions from trial judges. That is not to say that a simple self-defence formulation
will make trial judge directions redundant in a homicide case involving self-defence
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issues. The intention is rather to focus on the need to ensure that the single test
provided is so simple that a jury could not misunderstand it. The simple test eventually
chosen should also recognise that when trial is by jury, the jury should be recognised
as the final and independent arbiter and, like judges in judge-alone criminal trials,
should be completely autonomous when deciding the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If we leave this all to the jury, we get decisions according to community
standards that are not parroted responses following legislative or judicial direction. To
achieve these outcomes the test chosen to determine whether a homicide was
committed in self-defence or not, will be drafted in plain English.
I submit that if implemented, these recommendations would simplify the law and
reduce aberrant jury verdicts in New South Wales in the future because they are
drafted in plain English and recognise the autonomy of the jury as the relevant judicial
decision-maker.
Because the ultimate question in a self-defence case is whether the accused was
defending him or herself and whether what was done was necessary, the
recommendations have avoided legal jargon and the legal predilection to explain selfdefence in either objective or subjective terms. That is because many self-defence
cases will be decided by lay jurors who do not use objective or subjective tests in their
every day lives and conversations. The recommendations therefore proceed from the
premise that there is no need for more technical definitions that feature the convoluted
requirements of objectivity/subjectivity currently found in ss 418 and 421. Nor are
judges who can understand objective and subjective tests in legislation disadvantaged
by the changes recommended. That is because they can also understand the plain
English rules that are recommended here. The expressions “was that necessary (or
really necessary)?” or “was any of this necessary (or really necessary)?” are
commonly and frequently used in everyday language by members of the community.
Because the lay jurors, and judges, who are required to adjudicate claims of selfdefence in criminal law cases understand the idea of necessity as it is used in regular
conversational English, the recommendations here are sound even though they omit
legal jargon.
Section 419 should also be amended to be compatible with the recommended selfdefence test.
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I have also recommended model judicial directions for self-defence cases in criminal
law in plain English. The plain English used follows the plain English used in the
recommended new statutory language and it is submitted that lay jurors will find these
model directions easy to understand.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FINAL CONCLUSION
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis has been to formulate and recommend a “simple” selfdefence test that lay person jurors in New South Wales can understand and apply in
self-defence cases, when self-defence is raised in answer to various offences
including homicide offences.
The law of self-defence is simple. As Deane J said in Zecevic and as I stated in the
chapter one:
The defence of self-defence is embedded deeply in ordinary standards of what is fair
and just. It sounds as readily in the voice of the school child who protests that he or
she was only defending himself or herself from the attack of another child as it does in
that of the sovereign state which claims that it was but protecting its citizens or its
territory against the aggression of another state.1

Nevertheless, it has become challenging. In part, that difficulty arises because lay
juries have to draw a line that determines whether an accused was committing an
offence, or whether she was just defending herself. In part, that difficulty arises
because in homicide cases where self-defence is claimed, juries have to draw the line
between murder, manslaughter, self-defence, or in lay terms, between limited guilt or
no guilt whatsoever. In part, the difficulty arises because what was supposed to be a
simple law became unnecessarily complex.
7.1 Chapter one
In chapter one, I discussed the research questions that this thesis answered, and the
methodology in answering those questions. Because the law related to self-defence
in homicide cases in New South Wales became very contested during the 20th century
for reasons that are explained within the thesis, the research questions that this thesis

1

Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (VIC) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 675 (Deane J).
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answered were: (1) Is it possible to define self-defence within the existing Crimes Act
1900 (NSW) so simply that no reasonable jury could misunderstand it; and (2) If so,
how should self-defence be so defined? The thesis also answered the ten supporting
questions which assisted in responding to those primary questions: (3) Did English
common law always recognise that self-defensive action by a person accused of
homicide mitigated that action?; (4) if not, how and when did self-defence come to be
recognised as a defence that mitigated the severity of a finding of homicide against a
person accused of homicide?; (5) what part did the English jury play in the
development of a law of self-defence in English common law?; (6) what part did the
High Court of Australia and the Privy Council in England play in the development of a
law of self-defence in Australia common law?; (7) how have the parliaments of the
Australian states and territories responded to the uncertainties in Australian selfdefence law?; (8) have legislative amendments in New South Wales since Zecevic
improved clarity or have they compounded complexity?; (9) does a “simple” selfdefence test matter?, and; (10) if so, what are the requirements of a simple selfdefence test simple that a jury cannot misunderstand?; (11) how can such a simple
test be formulated?; and (12) how should self-defence law in New South Wales be
reformed?
The methodology section explained the approach that I have taken in this thesis to
answer those questions. The primary methodological approach was a qualitative
approach which used ‘doctrinal’2 research and ‘black-letter’ legal methodology3 in the

2

Terry Hutchinson offered an explanation as what doctrinal research in reforming the law
might involve. She stated, ‘[t]he essential features of doctrinal scholarship involve ‘a critical
conceptual analysis of all relevant legislation and case law to reveal a statement of the law
relevant to the matter under investigation’.
Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming
the Law’ (2015) 3 Erasmus Law Review 129, 131.
3

Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan has offered one explanation of the term back letter, they
stated:
The term ‘black letter’ refers to research about the law included in legislation and case law. The
term originated from the name of the Gothic type which continued to be used for law texts. It is
defined in Bryan A Gardner (ed), Blacks Law Dictionary (Westlaw International, 9th ed, 2009)
as: ‘One or more legal principles that are old, fundamental, and well settled.’ In addition, the
definition notes: ‘The term refers to the law printed in books set in Gothic type, which is very
bold and black’.

Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal
Research’ (2012) 17 (No1) Deakin Law Review 83, 94 n 42.
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process. However, because this thesis includes law reform recommendations, it may
not be categorised as ‘pure’ doctrinal research.4 The primary materials used in that
doctrinal and black letter research were case law and the legislation/statutes.
However, the thesis began with a detailed historical section to place the common law
materials in context, and after the analysis of common law reviews law reform and
academic commentary to identify the reasons for statutory amendments that flowed
from a number of jurisprudential blockages in Australia in the 20th century. The
research questions were thus not answered using a single research methodology. This
thesis used a number of different methodologies, which sometimes overlapped.
The structure and contents section, together with the table of contents, pointed to the
signposts of this thesis.
7.3 Chapter two
In chapter two I began by tracing the idea of self-defence in criminal law history back
to medieval English life and and “the peace” that the king was trying to establish as
his contribution to the good of English society as a whole. Because this thesis is about
the law of self-defence, I traced the idea of self-defence in the criminal law back to
medieval England because the lay idea that ordinary people should not be found guilt
of crime if they acted in self-defence, conflicted with the idea of Norman kings who
wanted a conviction for every homicide. The royal focus was on enforcing the peace.
In chapter two, I explained that the story of self-defence in English law is the story of
the complicated interaction of new institutions in a very lawless time. I explained where
the criminal law came from. I noted that criminal law and the law of torts were not
separated until about the early 14th century. Before that there was no distinction
between wrongs between individuals and wrongs committed against the state, and
more specifically “the peace” that the king was trying to establish as his contribution
to the good of English society as a whole. The king’s desire to establish peace was
the foundation of the entire system of criminal procedure and led to its growth. The
Crown enacted several statutes to press the need for convictions for homicide to
maintain the king’s peace with assurances to juries that those they convicted would
be fairly treated if those juries simply noted that the homicide concerned was a killing

4

Hutchinson (n 2) 132.
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in self-defence. Those statutes are part of the story of how juries decided self-defence
cases from about late 13th century to the 18th century. That history is the story of how
English juries responded to the king’s statutes.
In chapter two I also explained how the jury came to decide the guilt or innocence of
persons accused of wrongdoing. I explained that was the result of the Pope’s
proclamation at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, that priests could no longer be
involved in the king’s ordeal trials. Though the Pope probably intended to secure
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and control over matters of sin by this proclamation, the
dexterous experimental development of the jury as a fact deciding institution by the
king and his judges not only created a popular institution, but an institution that came
to be perceived as a protector of citizen rights and liberty. I explored how early juries
dealt with homicide cases when they accepted that there was an element of selfdefence in the story.
To stop juries meddling in the fate of persons accused of homicides, successive
English kings passed a variety of statutes. Each of those statutes was designed to
convince juries to let the king decide who should escape capital punishment for
homicide by royal pardon. But because juries did not trust the king to always pardon
in self-defence cases despite his statutory assurances, they continued to manipulate
the evidence and added explanations to convince the king why this was not a
homicide. The goal of those ancient juries was to protect people accused of homicide
if the jury considered that they had acted in self-defence and not with malice
aforethought. By adding explanations, or finding that persons accused of crime had
acted in undeniable self-defence, juries ensured that accused persons would escape
punishment altogether or be granted royal pardons.
The line between murder, manslaughter, self-defence, limited guilt or no guilt has thus
always been challenging. Different degrees of homicide developed in large part
because of what the executive perceived as jury perversity. A distinction between
homicide in the execution of the law and homicide by misadventure or self-defence
was also developed, and the categories of justifiable homicide and excusable
homicide were established as the primary categories of non-felonious homicide.
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Jury perversity only became obvious after the development of the role of public
prosecutor. That exposure increased the ability of judges to insist on jury
independence and impartial fact finding. Though juries did not have to have personal
knowledge of the facts of a case from the 13th century, they were not excluded from
trial if they did have personal knowledge until perhaps, the 16th century. Juries were
popular because they were believed to protect the common man against excessive
executive action. Juries continued to find ways to protect people accused of homicide
in self-defence cases, even when statutory rules theoretically dictated very limited
scope for acquittal.

7.4 Chapter three
In chapter three I explained the criminal self-defence law that New South Wales
inherited and how it was developed during the 20th century. I discussed the four cases
which defined Australian common law on self-defence between 1958 and 1987 and
which recognised a partial defence to murder which was generally, but not always
accurately described as excessive self-defence. Three were decided by the High Court
of Australia and one by the Privy Council in England. Those cases are: R v Howe
(HC),5 Palmer v The Queen (PC),6 Viro v The Queen (HC),7 and Zecevic v Director of
Public Prosecutions (Vic) (HC).8 Gleeson J (as he then was) said that the High Court
decisions in Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic, were an “experiment” with criminal law
and justice.9
Even though the decisions in Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic did not succeed in
creating a simple and predictable modern law of self-defence in Australia, they did
identify the competing arguments as to what a good modern law of self-defence should
look like. The underlying questions were about whether modern self-defence law

5

(1958) 100 CLR 448 (‘Howe’).

6

[1971] 1 All ER 1077; AC 814 (‘Palmer’).

7

(1978) 141 CLR 88 (‘Viro’).

8

(1987) 162 CLR 645 (‘Zecevic’).

Anthony Murray Gleeson ‘Clarity or Fairness: Which Is More Important’ (1990) 12 Sydney L.
Rev. 305, 309.
9
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should focus on overall intent or the proportionality of the force that was used. A
secondary intellectual conflict concerned whether proven intent should result in an
acquittal or a manslaughter conviction in a self-defence case. Some judges focused
on whether the accused’s intent was determinative. If there was no intent to kill but
just to self-defend, then an acquittal was appropriate. Other judges believed that if the
accused used more force than was necessary, then an acquittal was inappropriate,
and the jury should be instructed to consider a manslaughter verdict.
The decisions in Howe, Palmer, Viro and Zecevic have attracted considerable
academic commentary. I discussed the reasoning of those commentators. Most of that
commentary was directed to whether, there should be a manslaughter half-way house
or middle-ground verdict in proven self-defence homicide cases. Some commentators
liked the half-way house or middle ground approach. Others rejected it for various
reasons. The High Court appears to have been discouraged in their efforts to
modernise the law of self-defence in Australia before 1987 because they were still
subject to English common law precedent. But the complexity and impracticality of
these decisions did not assist modernisation efforts and did not garner universal
support, state legislatures stepped in and made the law more complex as I explained
in chapter four.
7.5 Chapter four
In chapter four I discussed how the parliaments of the Australian states and territories
responded to the uncertainties in Australian self-defence law occasioned by the lack
of clear High Court direction in homicide cases that involved self-defence. I first
explored the statutory self-defence provisions which were passed in the various states
and territories. I identified the various tests as to what constitutes self-defence that
those legislatures devised and what judges have said about those tests. I then
discussed the New South Wales statutory self-defence provisions. I explained the
context in which these provisions were passed and the alternatives that were
considered before they were passed. I also briefly discussed the self-defence
provisions they settled on and what judges have said about them. I analysed these
provisions and what judges said about them in more detail in chapter five.
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7.6 Chapter Five
In chapter five I analysed the effectiveness of the New South Wales legislative
responses to the uncertainties in Australian self-defence law occasioned by the
absence of unanimous High Court direction when a homicide had been charged as
murder and self-defence had been claimed. I noted how juries had resisted verdict
direction in homicide cases involving homicide elements in English history and
questioned whether juries were still behaving in similar ways. I observed that the near
obsession of executive governments in Westminster democracies with the need for a
conviction for every homicide resulted in harsh legislation that did not resonate with
jury common sense and which is difficult for trial judges to explain in simple terms. I
then analysed the statutory self-defence provisions in New South Wales. I showed
why ss 418-421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) were passed to “codify” self-defence
law in homicide cases in New South Wales. I explained why these legislative
amendments in New South Wales post Zecevic have not improved clarity. And I
explained why even these new provisions need to be simplified.
I explained that the primary reason New South Wales’ self-defence law still needs
simplification is because the statutory provisions provided in 2002 are too complicated
for judges to easily explain to juries. They require juries to undertake complex legal
analysis which is incompatible with the “democratic common sense” juries are
expected to apply in reaching their verdicts. And, I noted, as has been consistently
said for hundreds of years, that is why we persist with juries in criminal trials. While
New South Wales trial judges have tried hard to explain when giving trial directions to
juries the formulas provided by the legislature, jury instructions in self-defence cases
are not easy to get right. Nor is it the job of the courts in Australia to reform the law. I
therefore proposed that the New South Wales legislature needs to revisit and simplify
the self-defence provisions in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). That is the task that I set
myself in chapter six of the thesis.
7.7 Chapter six
The thesis concludes with the formulation of a “simple” self-defence test. I
recommended different self-defence tests for criminal cases involving homicide and
those which do not. But the tests are consistent. The only difference between the
homicide and non-homicide self-defence tests I proposed arises from the need to
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recognise that manslaughter is an appropriate conviction in a homicide case where
the accused used more force than was necessary to defend herself. The self-defence
test I proposed when self-defence arguments are raised in homicide cases eliminates
the problems that I identified in the existing tests set out in ss 418 and 421 of the
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The recommended self-defence test for homicide cases is
better because it is conceptually simple and written in plain English. It gives the judicial
decision maker, whether judge or jury, complete autonomy in making the conviction or
acquittal decision subject only to appeal on matters of law. Because it is simple enough
for a jury to understand without judicial explanation, it will likely reduce appeals
premised on arguments that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the relevant law.
Dissatisfaction with legislative drafting and the excessive complexity of the law has
been around for many centuries. King Edward III and King Edward IV endorsed the
enactment of plain and short statutes. Sir John Donaldson and Lord Scarman
reiterated what those two Kings said.

The House of Lords in Palmer and the High

Court in Zecevic favoured a simple approach. Various government law reforms bodies
have endorsed the idea of drafting legislation in plain English. There is thus no doubt
that simple drafting is better. But the current self-defence provisions in the Crimes Act
1900 (NSW) are not drafted in plain English. They use a number of tests that mix
objective and subjective approaches which cannot be readily understood by lay jurors.
The governing principles in the formulation of a “simple” self-defence test are that the
test should be simple, it should be free from any technical legal terms, and it should
allow the jurors to discuss the facts and law in everyday language without the need for
complex explanatory directions from trial judges. That is not to say that a simple selfdefence formulation will make trial judge directions redundant in a homicide case
involving self-defence issues. The intention is rather to focus on the need to ensure
that a single test be provided that is so simple that a jury could not misunderstand it.
Plain English is essential if that simplicity ideal is to be realised.
I have also submitted that the implementation of these recommendations would
simplify the law and reduce aberrant jury verdicts in New South Wales in the future.
Because the ultimate question in a self-defence case is whether the accused was
defending him or herself or not and whether what was done was necessary, the
recommendations have avoided legal jargon and the legal predilection for the
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explanation of self-defence in either objective or subjective terms. That is because
many self-defence cases will be decided by lay jurors who do not use objective or
subjective tests in their every day lives and conversations. The recommendations are
therefore premised on the notion that there is no need for more technical definitions
that feature the convoluted requirements of objectivity/subjectivity currently found in
ss 418 and 421. Nor are judges who can understand objective and subjective tests in
legislation disadvantaged by the changes recommended. That is because they can
also understand the plain English rules that have been recommended. The
expressions “was that necessary (or really necessary)?” or “was any of this necessary
(or really necessary)?” are commonly and frequently used in everyday language by
members of the community. Because the lay jurors and judges who are required to
adjudicate self-defence claims in criminal law understand the idea of necessity as it is
used in regular conversational English, the recommendations here are sound even
though they omit legal jargon.
I have also recommended consequential change to s 419 about the onus of proof in
homicide trials so that it is compatible with the recommended self-defence test.
I concluded the thesis by recommending plain English model judicial directions for use
in criminal law self-defence cases. The plain English used follows the plain English
used in the recommended statutory amendments. It is submitted that lay jurors will
find these model directions easy to understand.
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Appendix

Note: This Appendix has three parts.

The first provides a summary and source material under the heading ‘The
Psychology of Self-Defence’ as mentioned in footnote 2 in chapter one and
footnote 190 in chapter five.

The second provides a summary and source material under the heading ‘SelfDefence in Domestic Violence Cases’ as mentioned in footnote 51 in chapter 4
and footnote 189 in chapter five.

The third provides a schedule of Australian legislation by jurisdiction indicating
how self-defence is currently treated in cases of domestic violence/intimate
partner violence in Australia.

1. The Psychology of Self-Defence
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss or analyse the psychological aspect of
self-defence. It suffices to provide a brief note.

In chapter one in Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (VIC)1 Deane J said:
The defence of self-defence is embedded deeply in ordinary standards of what is fair
and just. It sounds as readily in the voice of the school child who protests that he or
she was only defending himself or herself from the attack of another child as it does in
that of the sovereign state which claims that it was but protecting its citizens or its
territory against the aggression of another state.2

1

Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (VIC) (1987) 162 CLR 645 (‘Zecevic’).

2

Ibid 675 (Deane J).
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Justice Deane’s insight into the emotions that arise in circumstances of self-defence
echo what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said in Brown v United States of America:3
’Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife’.4 In
Palmer,5 the House of Lords said:
[A] person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary
defensive action … If a jury is of the opinion that in a moment of unexpected anguish
the person attacked did only what he honestly and reasonably thought was necessary,
that should be regarded as most potent evidence that only reasonably defensive action
was taken.6

The phrase ‘unexpected anguish’ in this test from Palmer recognises the psychological
element of self-defence which is premised in the emotion of fear. Fear7 does not
discriminate. Anyone can feel fear regardless of their race, age, height, weight, colour,
ethnicity, national origin, culture, religious beliefs, tribal beliefs, sex, gender, sexual
preference, physical or mental ability, or marital status.8
The fear of death or other bodily harm is a contributor to that ‘compulsion or necessity,
… which [can] take away… the guilt of many crimes and misdemeanours.’9 The fear
of an attack, or the perception that an attack is imminent may trigger the need for the
accused’s necessity to defend herself. ‘Fear perceives the impending harm as

3

Brown v. United States of America (1920) 256 US 335; [1921] USSC 117.

4

Ibid 343 (Holmes J).

5

Palmer v R [1971] AC 814 (Lord Morris, Lord Donovan and Lord Avonside).

6

Ibid 832 (Lord Morris for Lord Donovan, and Lord Avonside).

Fear is one of the major emotions. “The major emotions include joy, grief, fear, anger, hatred,
pity or compassion, envy, jealousy, hope, guilt, gratitude, disgust, and love”. Dan M. Kahan
and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Two conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’ (1996) 96 Colum. L.
Rev. 269, 276 (citations omitted).
7

Kahan etl. stated that: “Numerous studies show that risk perceptions are skewed across
gender and race: women worry more than men, and minorities more than whites, about myriad
dangers-from environmental pollution to handguns, from blood transfusions to red meat.” Dan
M. Kahan; Donald Braman; John Gastil, ‘Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining
the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception’ (2007) 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 465, 465-466.
8

9

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-1769) (Lonang Institute)
Bk 4, ch 2.
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significant’.10 In R v Phillips11 Barwick CJ said: ‘the apprehension of injury or the
instillation of fear or fright … does not necessarily involve physical contact.’12 A person
who fears an attack or perceives that an attack is imminent may ’overestimate…the
probability of harm associated with the threat that causes his fear.’13
A fearful person does not make a distinction between inevitable and reasonable
necessity. In Zecevic, Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ said that judges should direct
the jury to give ‘proper weight to the predicament of the accused.’ 14 The reason for
this approach was that at the time of the occasion or situation in question the accused
‘may have…little, if any, opportunity for calm deliberation or detached reflection.’15
People are not responsible and should not be held responsible for their fear, but they
are responsible for their anger.16 In People v Trevino17 the Court said:
The party killing is not precluded from feeling anger or other emotions save and except
fear; however, those other emotions cannot be causal factors in his decision to use
deadly force.... But if the only causation of the killing was the reasonable fear that there
was imminent danger ... then the use of deadly force in self-defense is proper
regardless of what other emotions the party who kills may have been feeling but not
acting upon.18

10

Kahan and Nussbaum, Two conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law (n 7) 285.

11

(1971) 45 ALJR 467.

12

Ibid 472 (Barwick CJ).

13

Eric A Posner, 'Law and the Emotions' (2001) 89 Geo. L. J. 1977, 1982 (citations omitted).

14

Zecevic (n 1) 662-663 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

15

Ibid 663 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

16

See, eg, Kahan Nussbaum Two conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law (n 7); Kahan et al,
‘Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition (n 8); Jeremy A Blumenthal, 'Law and the Emotions:
The Problems of Affective Forecasting' (2005) 80 Ind. L. J. 15; Eric Posner, Law and the
Emotions (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 103, 2000); Eric
A. Posner, ‘Law and the Emotions’ (n 13).
17

200 Cal App 3d 874, 246 Cal Rptr 357 (1988).

V.F. Nourse, ‘Self-Defense and Subjectivity’ (2001) 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1258 n 114
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
18
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The emotions of an accused person who necessarily acted in self-defence are not
immaterial.19 A pattern of abuse or violence ‘heightens the awareness of persons who
have suffered violence, shaping their perception of harm.’20 Sir James Stephen has
written:
An emotion (anger, love, fear, &c.) may be roused by associations connected with the
perceptions and acts of intelligence in which it originated, by links at once uncertain
and obscure, and may prompt to volition and action after the lapse of years.21

In 1881 the Court in Batten v State22 said:
An ideal man is thus made the standard … by which the guilt or innocence of the
accused is to be determined. Is this correct? Should not the standard be the man
himself? Ought regard to be had to real things, the man, the situation, the
surroundings, or should some imaginary person be taken as the guide? Our conclusion
is that the question must be decided upon the appearances present to the eyes and
mind of the accused himself and upon the belief actually and in good faith entertained
by him .... [T]he court is not to set up ... as the belief tested, an ideal man. In cases
involving life, actual, real things rather than ideal should be taken as standards and

19

Kahan and Nussbaum, Two conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law (n 7) 328. Dan Kahan
and Martha Nussbaum stated the following questions and said the law has not provided
answers to these questions. They said:
Emotions are ubiquitous in criminal law, as they are in life. But how do they, and how should
they, affect legal assessment? Should the law be more sympathetic to defendants who are
taken over by passions such as anger and fear, or should it view such defendants as especially
dangerous? Or should the response of the law depend on an appraisal of the emotion itselfwhether it is appropriate or inappropriate, "reasonable" or "unreasonable"? What does it mean
for an emotion to be reasonable? Aren't emotions, after all, just disturbances of the personality
that can be more or less strong but that are always hostile to reason? Or do they embody
judgments, ways of seeing the world? If they do, should we hold people morally accountable
for those judgments?: at 270.

In the context of self-defence: at 327-333.
20

Geraldine Mackenzie and Eric Colvin, Homicide in Abusive Relationships: A Report on
Defences’ (Prepared for the Attorney-General and Minister for Industrial Relations [of
Queensland], 2009) 20. See also Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284 (Leeming JA
dissenting, McCallum J and R S Hulme AJ). See generally Deborah W. Denno, ‘Gender,
Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses’ (1994) 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 80.
21

Fitzjames Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1883) vol 2, ch 19, 129.
22

80 Ind. 394 (1881).
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tests. It is much safer and better to take the real man, the actual situation, and the real
surroundings.23

In Grainger v State24 the issue of reasonableness as a limitation upon self-defence
was raised and the Court “definitely” rejected that objective limitation.25 The Court held
that:
if Grainger himself thought that he was in danger, even if that was an unreasonable
belief, the killing was in self-defense. The court made clear that it was the defendant's
mental state, and not that of a reasonable man ̶ certainly not a reasonable timid
coward - that was to be assessed. Mistake, and fear, were to be judged by a subjective
test. 26

The emotions that arise when people feel the need to defend themselves have been
the subject of considerable academic research. The following sources will enable the
interested reader to research the way human emotions work inside a person who feels
the need to defend herself:
Kahan and Nussbaum, Two conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law (n 7); Kahan et
al, ‘Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition (n 8); Dan M Kahan and Donald Braman,
'The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense' (2008) 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1;
Blumenthal, (n 16); Eric Posner, Law and the Emotions (n 16); Posner, ‘Law and the
Emotions’ (n 13); Stefan Bracha, ‘Freeze, Flight, Fight, Fright, Faint: Adaptationist
Perspectives on the Acute Stress Response Spectrum’ (2004) 9 (9) CNS Spectrums
679; Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011);
Camille A Nelson, 'Consistently Revealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of
Fear in the Criminal Law' (2004) 48 St. Louis U. L. J. 1261; Arthur J. Westermayr, ‘The
Psychology of Fear: Considered in its Relation to Human Conduct’ (1915) 4 The Open
Court Magazine 250, Arne Ohman and Susan Mineka, ‘Fears, Phobias, and

Richard Singer, ‘The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II-Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact
in Self Defense’ (1987) 28 B.C. L. Rev. 459, 485 n 150 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
23

24

25

26

13 Tenn. 459 (1830).
Singer (n 23) 479.
Ibid 480.
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Preparedness: Toward an Evolved Module of Fear and Fear Learning’ (2001) 108(3)
Psychological Review 483; Joseph E. Ledoux, ‘The Emotional Brain, Fear, and the
Amygdala’ (2003) 23 (4-5) Cellular & Molecular Neurobiology 727; Victor Tadros, ‘The
Homicide Ladder’(2006) 69 Mod. L. Rev. 601; Lydia D. Johnson, ‘Guilty or Innocent?
… Just Take a Look at My Brain – Analyzing the Nexus Between Traumatic Brain
Injury and Criminal Responsibility’ (2009-2010) 37 S.U. L. Rev. 25; Kent Greenawalt,
‘The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse’ (1984) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897;
Cathryn Jo Rosen, ‘The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on
Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill’ (1986) 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11; Daniel J. Siegel,
The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who We
Are (New York: Guilford Publications, 2nd ed., 2012); Singer (n 23).

2. Self-defence in Domestic Violence Cases
Questions concerning self-defence often arise in cases concerning “domesticcaptives” or “dominated defendants” and “battered women”. This note acknowledges
the issues that arise in these cases and identifies literature which readers can explore
for themselves to study the subject further.
Domestic and family violence have attracted the attention of many historians, authors,
and scholars. Mackenzie and Colvin have explained that:
[p]ersons who have suffered [such] violence are not confined to a particular gender,
age, sexual preference or culture, nor to a particular type of domestic relationship …
persons who have suffered violence may be in a heterosexual, homosexual or familial
relationship or a relationship of care with the abuser.27

Brooks Holland has argued:
The question of how broadly or narrowly to define “domestic violence” itself invites
debate and can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. “Domestic violence is not merely
generic violence exhibited in a particular locale or by a perpetrator with a particular

27

Mackenzie and Colvin (n 20) 13-14 (citations omitted).
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relationship to his victim. It is this pattern of domination, and not a particular level of
violent force, that is central to the concept of domestic violence.”28

A context of such violence is particularly relevant when legal culpability for criminal
conduct is assessed with subjective tests. Subjective tests recognise the specific
emotions experienced by individual accused persons and those emotions are material
to the question of whether that person perceived the necessity to act in self-defence.29
The scholarly literature generally recognises that patterns of abuse and violence
‘heighten...the awareness of persons who have suffered violence, shaping their
perception of harm.’30 Sir James Stephen has written:
An emotion (anger, love, fear, &c.) may be roused by associations connected with the
perceptions and acts of intelligence in which it originated, by links at once uncertain
and obscure, and may prompt to volition and action after the lapse of years.31

The idea of excessive self-defence was said to be ‘fashioned by men’,32 for men who
kill men, and it failed to take into account the circumstances of women who kill men in

28

Holland (n 27) 90 n 8 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

29

Kahan and Nussbaum, Kahan and Nussbaum, Two conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law
(n 7) 328. Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum stated the following questions and said the law
has not provided answers to these questions. They said:
Emotions are ubiquitous in criminal law, as they are in life. But how do they, and how should
they, affect legal assessment? Should the law be more sympathetic to defendants who are
taken over by passions such as anger and fear, or should it view such defendants as especially
dangerous? Or should the response of the law depend on an appraisal of the emotion itselfwhether it is appropriate or inappropriate, "reasonable" or "unreasonable"? What does it mean
for an emotion to be reasonable? Aren't emotions, after all, just disturbances of the personality
that can be more or less strong but that are always hostile to reason? Or do they embody
judgments, ways of seeing the world? If they do, should we hold people morally accountable
for those judgments?: at 270

In the context of self-defence see Kahan and Nussbaum (n 7) 327-333.
30

Mackenzie and Colvin (n 20) 20.

31

Fitzjames Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1883) vol 2, ch 19, 129.
Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘Norval Morris and the ‘New Manslaughter’ in the Adelaide Law Review’
(2019) 40 Adelaide Law Review 75, 80.
32
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self-defence as a response to domestic violence within a family. 33 Ian Leader-Elliot
has argued:
None of those who developed the new partial defence considered the question whether
a doctrine formulated for men who kill men in response to threatened harm might fail
to reflect the exculpatory circumstances when women kill men in self-defence.34

Self-defence laws have become more accommodating to women who kill their violent
abusers since 2005.35 In some jurisdictions, self-defence has been made available
even where a person was responding to a threat of force or violence that was not
imminent,36 and, in those cases, pre-emptive self-defence is thus permitted. In Wright
v Tasmania37 Blow J said:
A person who believes he or she is about to be attacked does not necessarily have to
wait for the assailant to strike the first blow or fire the first shot. Circumstances may
justify the use of pre-emptive force in self-defence.38

In R v Conlon39 Hunt CJ said:
However, it is well established that a person defending himself from a threatened
attack and who has to react instantly to imminent danger cannot be expected to weigh
precisely the exact measure of self-defensive action which is required. The accused
was not obliged to wait until the attack upon him was repeated. If he honestly believed
that the attack would be repeated, he was entitled to take steps to forestall that

33

Ibid 76.

34

Ibid 76.

Angelica Guz and Marilyn McMahon, ‘Is Imminence Still Necessary? Current Approaches
to Imminence in the Laws of Governing Self-Defence in Australia” (2011) 13 Flinders L.J. 79,
93-96.
35

Thomas Crofts and Danielle Tyson, ‘Homicide Law Reform in Australia: Improving Access
to Defences for Women Who Kill Their Abusers’ (2013) 39 Monash U. L. Rev. 864, 883.
36

37

[2005] TASSC 113.

38

Ibid [17] (Blow J, Tennent J agreeing at [33]) (citations omitted).

39

(1993) 69 A Crim R 92.
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threatened attack before it was begun. This was a situation in which a pre-emptive
strike was justified.40

The historical rule that a threat was only imminent if it was likely to occur immediately
had two temporal aspects: force was neither to be used too soon nor too late.41 But
there was no precise meaning of these ideas of time in criminal law.42 Imminence also
had many definitions and those differences caused many injustices, particularly in
cases which involved various forms of intimate partner violence.43 In some of these
intimate partner violence cases where the victim acted in self-defence, the clock was
said to tick at exactly the same speed as it did in other cases. But again, it has now
been generally accepted that time measurement in such cases needs to be considered
more carefully.44 Victoria Nourse has explained: ‘We know that the imminence rule is

40

Ibid 98 (Hunt CJ) (citations omitted).

Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, ‘Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq’ (2004) 46
Arizona Law Review 213, 223.
41

See generally Mark Kelman ‘Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law’
(1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 591; Nourse, ‘Self-Defense and Subjectivity’ (n 18).
42

43

Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity (n 18) 1236-1237.

44

Victoria Nourse has explained that point by discussing the case of In re Christian S. 20 Cal
App 4th 1210, 13 Cal Rptr 2d 232 (1992). A self-defence case involving a skinhead named
Elliott who repeatedly harassed a juvenile named Christian. She said:
There was no dispute that the defendant, Christian, had killed Elliott after an extended
set of confrontations on a beach, each time pointing the gun but then running away.
The question was whether the presence of malice aforethought had been sufficiently
established in the trial court. To the trial judge, time implied malice. It was the
"substantial interval during which Christian aimed at Elliott before firing" that convinced
the court of Christian's malice: the defendant "had sufficient time to carefully consider
what he was doing. Reversing, the appellate court interpreted the meaning of time
rather differently, finding lack of malice. "Elliott's repeated threats and his continued
pursuit of Christian in the face of his request to be left alone confirmed the immediacy
of that risk."
Notice what has happened here: the clock did not change, but its meaning did. There
was no dispute between the trial and appellate courts about the actual temporal lapse
between the threat and the shooting. To the trial court, time signified Christian's malice,
his motive or emotion. To the appellate court, it signified a different set of emotions
and a lack of motive-Christian's fear of Elliott's taunts." For both courts, imminence
served as a proxy for emotion and motive, fear or malice.
Nourse, ‘Self-Defense and Subjectivity’ 1257-1258 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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not invariable.’45 ‘The rule of imminence became a rule not of time, but of the human
relationships we know as family and gender’.46
Self-defence by those who are the victims of intimate partner violence is thus a subject
of separate expertise. The following sources will enable the interested reader to
research the way human emotions work inside a person who feels the need to defend
herself:
Lenore E. A. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (New York: Springer Publishing
Company, 3rd ed, 2009); Lenore E A Walker, 'Battered Women Syndrome and SelfDefense' (1992) 6 Notre Dame JL Ethics & Pub Pol'y 321; Ian Leader-Elliott (n 33);
Mackenzie and Colvin (n 20); Stella Tarrant, ‘Self-defence in the Western Australian
Criminal Code: Two Proposals for Reform’ (Research Paper, University of Western
Australia-Faculty of Law, 2015-2016); Kenneth Arenson, ‘The Demise of Equality
Before the Law: The Pernicious Effects of Political Correctness in the Criminal Law of
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3. Examples of Australian Legislation which responds to Domestic
Violence - The Legislation Schedule

Section 10.4 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) provides:
10.4 Self-defence
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if he or she carries out
the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.
(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if he or she believes
the conduct is necessary:
(a) to defend himself or herself or another person; or
(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself or
herself or another person; or
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(c) to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage
or interference; or
(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises; or
(e) to remove from any land or premises a person who is committing
criminal trespass;
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them.
(3) This section does not apply if the person uses force that involves the
intentional infliction of death or really serious injury:
(a) to protect property; or
(b) to prevent criminal trespass; or
(c) to remove a person who is committing criminal trespass.
(4) This section does not apply if:
(a) the person is responding to lawful conduct; and
(b) he or she knew that the conduct was lawful.
However, conduct is not lawful merely because the person carrying it out is not
criminally responsible for it.

Section 418 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides:
418 Self-defence —when available
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out
the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.
(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person believes
the conduct is necessary:

(a) to defend himself or herself or another person, or
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(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the
liberty of another person, or
(c) to protect property from unlawful taking, destruction, damage or
interference, or
(d) to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person
committing any such criminal trespass,
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives
them.

Section 419 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides:
419 Self-defence—onus of proof
In any criminal proceedings in which the application of this Division is raised, the
prosecution has the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the person did not
carry out the conduct in self-defence.

Section 421 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides:
421 Self-defence —excessive force that inflicts death
(1) This section applies if:

(a) the person uses force that involves the infliction of death, and

(b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she
perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary:

(c) to defend himself or herself or another person, or
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(d) to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the
liberty of another person.

The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder, the
person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise criminally
responsible for manslaughter.

Section 93FB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides:
93FB Possession of dangerous articles other than firearms
(1) A person who, in a public place, possesses-(a) anything (not being a firearm within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1996 )
capable of discharging by any means-(i) any irritant matter in liquid, powder, gas or chemical form or any dense
smoke, or
(ii) any substance capable of causing bodily harm, or
(b) a fuse capable of use with an explosive or a detonator, or
(c) a detonator, or
(d) a distress signal, or distress flare, that operates by emitting a bright light,
is liable, on conviction before the Local Court, to imprisonment for 2 years, or a
fine of 50 penalty units, or both.
(2) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section for possessing anything
referred to in subsection (1) if the person satisfies the court that he or she had a
reasonable excuse for possessing it or possessed it for a lawful purpose.
(3) A person is not guilty of an offence under this section for possessing anything
referred to in subsection (1) (a) if the person satisfies the court that he or she
possessed it for the purpose of self-defence and that it was reasonable in the
circumstances to possess it for that purpose.
(4) In considering a defence under subsection (3), the court must have regard to its
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the case, including--
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(a) the immediacy of the perceived threat to the person charged, and
(b) the circumstances, such as the time and location, in which the thing was
possessed, and
(c) the type of thing possessed, and
(d) the age, characteristics and experiences of the person charged.

Section 43BD of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) provides:
43BD
(1)

Self-defence
A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out

the conduct constituting the offence in self-defence.
(2)

A person carries out conduct in self-defence only if:
(a)

the person believes the conduct is necessary:
(i)
(ii)

to defend himself or herself or another person; or
to prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself or

herself or another person; or
(iii)

to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction,

damage or interference; or
(iv)

to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises; or

(v)

to remove from any land or premises a person who is committing

criminal trespass; and
(b)

the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she

perceives them.
(3)

However, the person does not carry out conduct in self-defence if:
(a) the person uses force that involves the intentional infliction of death or
serious harm:
(i)

to protect property; or
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(ii)

to prevent criminal trespass; or

(iii)

to remove a person who is committing criminal trespass; or

(b) the person is responding to lawful conduct that the person knew was lawful.
(4)

Conduct is not lawful for subsection (3)(b) merely because the person

carrying it out is not criminally responsible for it.

Section 29 of the Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) is also relevant. It provides:
29
(1)

Defensive conduct justified
Defensive conduct is justified and a person who does, makes or causes an act,

omission or event by engaging in defensive conduct is not criminally responsible for
the act, omission or event.
(2)

A person engages in defensive conduct only if:
(a)

the person believes that the conduct is necessary:

(i)

to defend himself or herself or another person;

(ii)

to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her or another

person's personal liberty;
(iii)

to protect property in the person's possession or control from unlawful

appropriation, destruction, damage or interference;
(iv)

to prevent trespass to land or premises occupied by or in the control of

the person;
(v)

to remove a trespasser from land or premises occupied by or in the

control of the person; or
(vi)

to assist a person in possession or control of property to protect that

property or to assist a person occupying or in control of land or premises to
prevent trespass to or remove a trespasser from that land or premises; and
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(b)

the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person

reasonably perceives them.
(3)

A person does not engage in defensive conduct if the conduct involves the

use of force intended to cause death or serious harm:
(a)

to protect property; or

(b)

to prevent trespass or remove a trespasser.

(4)

For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), a person trespasses if he or she

enters or remains on land or premises:
(a)
(b)

with intent to commit an offence; or
in circumstances where the entry on to or remaining on the land or premises

constitutes an offence.
(5)

A person does not engage in defensive conduct if:

(a)

he or she is responding to the lawful conduct of another person; and

(b)

he or she knows that the other person's conduct is lawful.

(6)

Nothing in subsection (5) is to be taken to prevent a person from engaging in

defensive conduct in circumstances where the other person's conduct is lawful merely
because he or she would be excused from criminal responsibility for that conduct.
(7)

Sections 31 and 32 do not apply in relation to defensive conduct.

Section 271 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) provides:
271 Self-defence against unprovoked assault
(1) When a person is unlawfully assaulted, and has not provoked the assault, it is
lawful for the person to use such force to the assailant as is reasonably necessary to
make effectual defence against the assault, if the force used is not intended, and is
not such as is likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm.
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(2) If the nature of the assault is such as to cause reasonable apprehension of death
or grievous bodily harm, and the person using force by way of defence believes, on
reasonable grounds, that the person can not otherwise preserve the person defended
from death or grievous bodily harm, it is lawful for the person to use any such force to
the assailant as is necessary for defence, even though such force may cause death
or grievous bodily harm.

Section 272 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) provides:
272 Self-defence against provoked assault
(1) When a person has unlawfully assaulted another or has provoked an assault from
another, and that other assaults the person with such violence as to cause reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm, and to induce the person to believe,
on reasonable grounds, that it is necessary for the person’s preservation from death
or grievous bodily harm to use force in self-defence, the person is not criminally
responsible for using any such force as is reasonably necessary for such preservation,
although such force may cause death or grievous bodily harm.
(2) This protection does not extend to a case in which the person using force which
causes death or grievous bodily harm first begun the assault with intent to kill or to do
grievous bodily harm to some person; nor to a case in which the person using force
which causes death or grievous bodily harm endeavoured to kill or to do grievous
bodily harm to some person before the necessity of so preserving himself or herself
arose; nor, in either case, unless, before such necessity arose, the person using such
force declined further conflict, and quitted it or retreated from it as far as was
practicable.

Section 15 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) provides:
15 Self defence
(1) It is a defence to a charge of an offence if—
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(a) the defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to
be necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose; and
(b) the conduct was, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed
them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely
believed to exist. 1
(2) It is a partial defence to a charge of murder (reducing the offence to manslaughter)
if—
(a) the defendant genuinely believed the conduct to which the charge relates to
be necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose; but
(b) the conduct was not, in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely
believed them to be, reasonably proportionate to the threat that the defendant
genuinely believed to exist. 2
(3)

For

the

purposes

of

this

section,

a

person

acts

for

a

"defensive purpose" if the person acts—
(a) in self-defence or in defence of another; or
(b) to prevent or terminate the unlawful imprisonment of himself, herself or
another.
(4) However, if a person—
(a)

resists another who is purporting to exercise a power of arrest or some

other power of law enforcement; or
(b)

resists another who is acting in response to an unlawful act against

person or property committed by the person or to which the person is a party,
the person will not be taken to be acting for a defensive purpose unless the
person genuinely believes, on reasonable grounds, that the other person is
acting unlawfully.
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(5) If a defendant raises a defence under this section, the defence is taken to have
been established unless the prosecution disproves the defence beyond reasonable
doubt.
Notes—
1

See, however, section 15C. If the defendant establishes that he or she is

entitled to the benefit of that section, this paragraph will be inapplicable.
2

See, however, section 15C. If the defendant establishes that he or she is

entitled

to

the benefit of

that

section,

the defendant will

be

entitled

to

a

complete defence.

Section 322K of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides:
Self-defence
(1)

A person is not guilty of an offence if the person carries out the conduct

constituting the offence in self-defence.
(2)

A person carries out conduct in self-defence if—
(a) the person believes that the conduct is necessary in self-defence; and
(b) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the
person perceives them.

(3)

This section only applies in the case of murder if the person believes that the

conduct is necessary to defend the person or another person from the infliction of
death or really serious injury.
Notes
1

See section 322M as to belief in circumstances where family violence is alleged.

2

The circumstances in which a person may carry out conduct in self-defence

include—
•

the defence of the person or another person;
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•

the prevention or termination of the unlawful deprivation of the liberty of
the person or another person;

•

the protection of property.

Section 322M of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides:
Family violence and self-defence
(1)

Without limiting section 322K, for the purposes of an offence in circumstances

where self-defence in the context of family violence is in issue, a person may believe
that the person's conduct is necessary in self-defence, and the conduct may be a
reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them, even if—
(a)

the person is responding to a harm that is not immediate; or

(b)

the response involves the use of force in excess of the force involved in

the harm or threatened harm.
(2)

Without limiting the evidence that may be adduced, in circumstances where self-

defence in the context of family violence is in issue, evidence of family violence may
be relevant in determining whether—
(a)

a person has carried out conduct while believing it to be necessary in self-

defence; or
(b)

the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as a person

perceives them.

Section 322 J of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides:
(1) Evidence of family violence, in relation to a person, includes evidence of any of
the following—
(a)

the history of the relationship between the person and a family member,

including violence by the family member towards the person or by the person
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towards the family member or by the family member or the person in relation
to any other family member;
(b)

the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the person or a

family member of that violence;
(c)

social, cultural or economic factors that impact on the person or a family

member who has been affected by family violence;
(d)

the general nature and dynamics of relationships affected by family

violence, including the possible consequences of separation from the abuser;
(e)

the psychological effect of violence on people who are or have been in a

relationship affected by family violence;
(f)

social or economic factors that impact on people who are or have been

in a relationship affected by family violence.
(2)

In this section—
"child "means a person who is under the age of 18 years;
"family member", in relation to a person, includes—
(a)

a person who is or has been married to the person; or

(b)

a person who has or has had an intimate personal relationship

with the person; or
(c)

a person who is or has been the father, mother, step-father or

step-mother of the person; or
(d)

a child who normally or regularly resides with the person; or

(e)

a guardian of the person; or

(f)

another person who is or has been ordinarily a member of the

household of the person;
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"family violence", in relation to a person, means violence against that person
by a family member;
"violence" means—
(a)

physical abuse; or

(b)

sexual abuse; or

(c)

psychological abuse (which need not involve actual or threatened

physical or sexual abuse), including but not limited to the following—
(i)

intimidation;

(ii)

harassment;

(iii)

damage to property;

(iv)

threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or

psychological abuse;
(v)
(A)

in relation to a child—

causing or allowing the child to see or hear the physical, sexual or

psychological abuse of a person by a family member; or
(B)

putting the child, or allowing the child to be put, at real risk of seeing

or hearing that abuse occurring.
(3)

Without limiting the definition of violence in subsection (2)—
(a)

a single act may amount to abuse for the purposes of that

definition; and
(b)

a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour may

amount to abuse for that purpose, even though some or all of those
acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial.
Section 59 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) provides:
59 Content of direction on family violence
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In giving a direction under section 58, the trial judge must inform the jury that—

(a) self-defence or duress (as the case requires) is, or is likely to be, in issue
in the trial; and

(b) as a matter of law, evidence of family violence may be relevant to
determining whether the accused acted in self-defence or under duress (as the
case requires); and

(c) in the case of self-defence, evidence in the trial is likely to include evidence
of family violence committed by the victim against the accused or another
person whom the accused was defending; and
(d) in the case of duress, evidence in the trial is likely to include evidence
of family violence committed by another person against the accused
or a third person.

Section 60 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) provides:
60 Additional matters for direction on family violence
In giving a direction requested under section 58, the trial judge may include any of
the following matters in the direction—
(a) that family violence—
(i) is not limited to physical abuse and may include sexual abuse
and psychological abuse;
(ii) may involve intimidation, harassment and threats of abuse;
(iii) may consist of a single act;
(iv) may consist of separate acts that form part of a pattern of
behaviour which can amount to abuse even though some or all
of those acts may, when viewed in isolation, appear to be minor
or trivial;
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(b) if relevant, that experience shows that—
(i) people may react differently to family violence and there is no
typical, proper or normal response to family violence;
(ii)it is not uncommon for a person who has been subjected to
family violence—

(A) to stay with an abusive partner after the onset of family violence,
or to leave and then return to the partner;

(B) not to report family violence to police or seek assistance to stop
family violence;

(iii) decisions made by a person subjected to family violence about how
to address, respond to or avoid family violence may be influenced by—
(A) family violence itself;

(B) cultural, social, economic and personal factors;
(c) that, as a matter of law, evidence that the accused assaulted the victim
on a previous occasion does not mean that the accused could not have
been acting in self-defence or under duress (as the case requires) in
relation to the offence charged.

Section 322I of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provides:

Onus of proof
(1)

The accused has the evidential onus of raising self-defence, duress or sudden

or extraordinary emergency by presenting or pointing to evidence that suggests a
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reasonable possibility of the existence of facts that, if they existed, would establish
self-defence, duress or sudden or extraordinary emergency (as the case may be).
(2)

If the accused satisfies the evidential onus referred to in subsection (1), the

prosecution has the legal onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
did not carry out the conduct in self-defence, under duress or in circumstances of
sudden or extraordinary emergency (as the case may be).

Section 248 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) provides:

248. Self-defence
(1) In this section —
harmful act means an act that is an element of an offence under this Part other
than Chapter XXXV.
(2) A harmful act done by a person is lawful if the act is done in self-defence under
subsection (4).
(3) If —
(a) a person unlawfully kills another person in circumstances which, but for this
section, would constitute murder; and
(b) the person’s act that causes the other person’s death would be an act done
in self-defence under subsection (4) but for the fact that the act is not a
reasonable response by the person in the circumstances as the person believes
them to be,
the person is guilty of manslaughter and not murder.
(4) A person’s harmful act is done in self-defence if —
(a) the person believes the act is necessary to defend the person or another
person from a harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent; and
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(b) the person’s harmful act is a reasonable response by the person in the
circumstances as the person believes them to be; and
(c) there are reasonable grounds for those beliefs.
(5) A person’s harmful act is not done in self-defence if it is done to defend the
person or another person from a harmful act that is lawful.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), a harmful act is not lawful merely because the
person doing it is not criminally responsible for it.

Section 24 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) provides:
24. Mistake of fact
A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but
mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible for
the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such
as he believed to exist.
The operation of this rule may be excluded by the express or implied provisions of the
law relating to the subject.

